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Introduction
The desire to become a part of the European club has been undoubtedly a crucial motor of the
political changes in Croatia. As in any other former communist country, the EC (today’s EU)
was regarded as a model of economic prosperity, political stability and cultural diversity that
the country should become part of. It was generally represented as exactly the opposite of the
model that the country had experienced during more than half a century of communist rule.
Furthermore, unlike in the ex-communist countries that were never a part of a
multinational socialist federation, this goal was always deeply interlinked with the major
desire of the Croatian nation to exercise its right for self-determination and to form an
independent national state. Thus, symbolically, to become a member of the European club
implied becoming independent, and therefore, the idea of Europeanism gained an even larger
amount of support than it was rational to expect in the turbulent last decade in Croatia.
Having said that, one should not forget to mention at least two reasons why the
European concept might not have been so popular in Croatia as it was in other post-
communist countries:
? The clear lack of capability on the European side to deal with the armed conflict  on
the Croatian territory, which included the mass deportations of Croatian citizens and
the destruction of housing and the economic infrastructure, and which had a direct
reflection on the EC’s (or the EU’s) popularity in the country,
? The negative impact of the aforementioned state-building environment on the nature
of the political system and the political culture in Croatia during the 1990s, which
appeared to be in contradiction with the basic principles of European integration.
Even after the achievement of independence and international recognition, which were
recently marked as directly linked with the essence of the ‘pro-European’ public opinion in
the early 1990s,  one may say that  the popularity of the European concept was quite high in
the  late  1990s  as  well,  despite  the  above-mentioned  reasons  that  may  make  suggest
otherwise. However, the logic behind this fact was mainly linked to the negative attitude
towards the regional concept of the Western Balkans, which was introduced by the
international community, and in that sense ‘being European’ meant to be a proof of not being
a part of an undesirable framework that has rather negative political connotations.
A significant number of Croatian authors, especially during the 1990s, were actively
trying to prove that Croatia was never part of the region called Western Balkans, in which it
had  been  cemented  owing  to  some  world  powers’  political  will,  whose  main  goal  was  to
endanger the young Croatian democracy and sovereignty and to revitalize some form of a
new/old Balkan federation. Generally, these interpretations tend to rely on some historical
facts,  insisting  that  Croatia  was  always  part  of  Central  Europe,  as  it  had  been  a  part  of  the
Habsburg Empire and a sort of bastion of Christianity, who had long defended Western
Europe from the Ottoman invasions and the spread of Islam.
On the other hand, there are many (generally from outside the region, but also some
from inside it) who do not see beyond the regional concept. Their oversimplifications make
them try to directly apply some mechanisms for regional co-operation that were functional in
other parts of Europe. While there are obvious differences between the regions concerned, in
particular the inter-relations within them, and especially the incomparable starting points of
the so-called Western Balkan countries in the very beginning of their transition and European
integration processes.
In general, it is obvious that the perception of ‘being European’ was not very clear in
the  country  during  the  1990s,  either  for  the  public,  or  for  the  political  elites.  All  this  was
accompanied by misuses of this concept for political purposes, which represents one of the
major reasons for such a delayed start of the ‘real transition’ in the country.
Namely, the real transition in Croatia, like that in a number of other countries from the
region started in 1999, followed by paramount democratic changes and the introduction of the
first consistent policy of the EU towards the region – The Stabilisation and Association
Process  (SAP).  The  SAP  represents  a  milestone  in  the  relations  between  the  EU  and  the
region, and with Croatia specifically, mainly owing to the fact that it happened for the first
time in modern history that  the possibility of a full  EU membership for the countries of the
region was clearly confirmed. This was a major precondition for the EU conditionality to
work for the EU side, and even more, it was essential for transitional enthusiasm and a pro-
European attitude in the countries of the region and in Croatia in particular. Also, one should
not forget another aspect of the new EU policy towards the region that was of utmost
importance, especially for Croatia as the most developed country, the so-called own merits
policy, which guaranteed the individual assessment of each country in its reform progress and
path towards a full-fledged EU membership.
The previous vague framework that had caused so many suspicions was finally
enriched with some new elements,  which gave new energy to the country’s reform process.
This was another confirmation of the fact that the EU membership perspective boosts the
‘transitional enthusiasm’ of a country and a nice example how it opens a manoeuvring space
for the EU to use the conditionality mechanism as a reliable corrective in the process.
Although the SAP concentrated on stabilisation and other post-conflict problems rather than
on the accession process to the EU, it proved useful as a stimulating framework for changes,
owing to the fact that it showed ‘some light at the end of a tunnel’ and managed to contain a
satisfactory level of bilateralism within its regional concept, and hence, it allowed the country
to remove its  own obstacles on the way to the EU membership,  without being burdened by
‘somebody else’s problems’. On the other hand, it helped the EU much in its attempts to
regain credibility after years of a lack of a clear position, not to mention a coherent policy. It
also shook up the Croatian state administration,  which had been immobile for years,  by the
creation of the new Ministry of European Integration. Although this institution encountered
some difficulties,  it  performed really well  in mobilising the rest  of the apparatus,  as well  as
society in general.
From that time on, the country has been experiencing a totally different dynamics in
the reforms process and its relations with the EU, which has been followed by the change of
the perception of the EU in both the public and the political elites. The discourse of the
debate on the pros and cons for joining the EU have become dominated by pragmatic issues
and clear arguments.
Therefore, it is obvious that one can differentiate between two periods of recent
Croatian history, which have almost opposite attitudes towards the meaning of ‘the European
concept’. The changes that happened during the turn of the century clearly show the
importance of the new framework of relations between the EU and the countries from the
region, which has positively affected the political  development in Croatia in particular.  The
perspective of the EU membership was a crucial motor that helped the country pass through
its ‘democratic catharsis’ and reach standards of democratic development that had been
almost unthinkable less than ten years ago. In the present final  phase of the EU integration
process, it made it possible to achieve some very painful compromises that were required for
the successful continuation of the process. In that sense, it is important to mention that even
the greatest Euro-sceptics, who are mainly marginalised in Croatia’s political life, cannot
afford to question the general necessity for the country to join the EU.
1.1 The creation of democratic institutions and their functioning
1.1.1 Difficult path towards independence and democratic state-building
In order to understand the current developments as well as the ones that this paper will try to
predict, it is worthwhile to turn to the past and glance at the way former Yugoslavia dissolved
and Croatia gained its independence and sovereignty. Having in mind the size limitations of
this research, this part will briefly analyze the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, despite
the fact that the roots of the whole process can be found in earlier periods.
After Tito’s1 death, whose political figure and personality generally represented the
integrative factor for the preservation of the ‘Fraternity and Unity myth’, the differences
between the republics with regard to the constitutional arrangement and the future of the
federation  started  to  show  up.  The  internal  tensions  that  broke  up  the  Communist  Party  of
Yugoslavia, and which reflected the general shape of the country that had started falling apart
a long time before that,  prompted the authorities of the federal  republics to call  for the first
free multiparty election in more than fifty years,  which marked the beginning of the end of
the federation. On the other hand, the geostrategic importance of Yugoslavia dramatically
declined with the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations2,  which  gave  the
nationalist power the opportunity to take part in the process of dissolution.
As a result,  the war broke out,  determining the end of the political  stability that  had
been preserved by the two big global poles from the outside and by the military and police
repression from within. The fighting continued to spread rapidly, mainly owing to the
procedural vacuum in the relations between the leading European countries that emerged
after the end of the Cold War. Taking everything into consideration, it was clear that there
was no adequate political structure in Europe after the Cold War which would be able to cope
with the situation3.
1 Josip Broz Tito – President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, died in 1980.
2 During the Cold War, the wider region was characterised by the strategic balance formula 2+2+2 (two NATO
members – Greece and Turkey; two Warsaw Pact members – Bulgaria and Romania, and two countries outside
the bloc frameworks – non-aligned Yugoslavia and isolated Albania).
3 The EU, which acted without clear political will, was prepared to offer only humanitarian aid, which
prolonged the status quo. – See details in Sandro Knezovic, “The Western Balkans Security Dysfunctions and
the EU Response: From Pacification To Integration”, Croatian International Relations Review (CIRR) Vol. 10,
No. 36/37 (2004).
The so-called Antibureaucratic revolution4 that  had  started  from  Belgrade  with  the
political upsurge of Slobodan Milosevic resulted in the abolition of the autonomy of two
provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) and the assurance of Milosevic’s absolute political
domination among the Montenegrin political elites. Having achieved this, he managed to
completely block the decision-making process in the highest executive body of the dissolving
federation (the Federal Executive Council) and to put additional pressure on the other
republics (especially Slovenia and Croatia) that were opposing his unitary concept of
Yugoslavia and opting in favour of the more loose confederative model. Apart from this, he
succeeded in recruiting the Serbian population in Croatia as well as in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to support his political agenda of redrawing Serbia’s boundaries to include the
territories  of  other  republics  where  Serbs  were  living,  in  case  of  the  dissolution  of
Yugoslavia5. By means of a strong nationalist propaganda and the transfer of troops,
weapons, as well as significant financial support, he managed to light the fire of a rebellion,
which resulted in the occupation of more than 30% of the Croatian territory.
Hence, it is obvious that unlike most ex-socialist states that have found the
opportunity to change their societal, political and economic system and start on their path
towards the European club in the historical year of 1989, Croatia unfortunately had to take a
different, much more difficult road to get to where it is now. It was forced to fight a war for
its independence, a significant part of its territory was occupied for almost four years,
communication between its continental and coastal part was almost made impossible, and any
kind of development was blocked.
During the war in Croatia, more than 13,000 people were killed, 2,300 are still
missing, 40,000 were wounded, and the first  estimations of the nominal damage of the war
were approximately USD 20 billion (EUR 15 billion). Of course, the real damage is much
more  serious  and  still  difficult  to  capture,  since  a  significant  part  of  the  country’s  housing,
economic and transport infrastructure was destroyed. Also, there is still a large number of
4 The term ‘Antibureaucratic revolution’ is used for the political praxis of the Serbian political elites in the late
1980s. In that period of crisis in former Yugoslavia, instead of the ‘working class’, the ethnically defined nation
was inaugurated as the ‘motor of changes’ and the leadership of one republic ‘showed the ambition to solve the
problems’ of a non-functioning state. The changes that were about to take place were to affect ‘the bureaucracy’,
i.e. anybody who opposed the new leadership and the changes that it offered (the abolition of Vojvodina and
Kosovo’s autonomy, the unification of the federation, etc.).
5 It is quite illustrative to recall his famous idea of all Serbs living in the same state, whatever it takes to achieve
it - "We believe that Serbs have the legitimate right to live in one country. If we must fight, then by God, we
will fight." Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/Europe/2000/milosevic_
yugoslavia/croatia.stm.
land-mines6 that take the lives of Croatian citizens, which directly affects free movement
within some remote and rural parts of the country and has a negative effect on the
development of the agriculture and livestock farming, which represented a significant part of
the Croatian GDP in the pre-war times, especially in the regions that were severely damaged
during  the  war  (Slavonia  and  Lika),  which  are  still  facing  serious  difficulties  in  recovering
from it.
Therefore, although Croatia was economically and structurally the most developed
one among the ex-socialist countries, apart from Slovenia, instead of having the possibility to
use this position to advance further and to start its process of accession to the EU (the EC at
that time) and NATO, Croatia was forced to cope with the above-mentioned situation of
being a war-torn country, and fight for the recognition of its sovereignty in the international
arena. Both efforts were more than demanding, since Croatia was under the weapon imports
embargo and faced a force that was surpassingly stronger, better equipped and supported by
the local population (i.e. the ex-JNA and various Serb paramilitary forces), as well as the
international  community,  which  seemed,  at  least  from  the  Croatian  point  of  view,  ‘to  have
difficulties comprehending’ what was actually going on in ex-Yugoslavia,  and it  was trying
to preserve it even though it had obviously not been functioning for a significant period of
time.7
On the other hand, the development of the internal political life was not helpful either
in the country’s progress in terms of the development of democracy and the rule of law, not
to mention meeting some of the crucial criteria required for the accession to the Euro-Atlantic
community, which a number of ex-socialist countries had started to tackle. The first multi-
party election brought the HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – Croatian Democratic
Union) to power under the leadership of the ex-communist dissident and nationalist historian
Franjo Tudjman, who was elected president.8
It  is  important  to  notice  the  fact  that  the  HDZ was  a  movement  rather  than  a  party,
which was organised with one very clear goal – Croatian independence -  and which had
under its umbrella assorted groups of liberals, modernisers, as well as ex-communists and
6 Still today, 12 out of the 21 Croatian counties are not totally mine-cleansed. Between the years 1998 and 2007,
273 persons were victims of mines (101 dead), and the estimations of the Croatian Demining Centre show that
there are still 240,000 mines hidden in 1044 km2 of mine-suspicious area within the country. Website of
Croatian Demining Centre, http://www.hcr.hr/index.php?link=faq&lang=hr.
7 An excellent example for this is a statement of former French President Mitterrand on the eve of the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, according to which there is no reason to support the dissolution of some
European countries, while the rest of Europe is in the middle of the process of unification.
8 See details on this in the next section.
right-wingers, who shared the same idea of a Croatian statehood. Of course, during their
struggle for independence or just for changing the old communist regime, other countries
have had the same experience – for example, Slovenia with DEMOS, and Poland with
Solidarnosc.
However, the crucial difference between these countries and Croatia, apart from the
important fact that only Croatia was forced to fight a long and devastating war for its
independence9, is that the Croatian movement of HDZ, unlike the ones in other countries, did
not disappear from the political scene or split up into several parties after fulfilling its main
cause, but it remained in power by means of mechanisms characteristic of semi-authoritarian
regimes, showing very modest efforts to become ‘one of the subjects of Western-like political
life’ in the country.
Therefore, unlike during the first period of the transition, in the mid-1990s Croatia
became more frequently regarded as a part of the backward South Eastern region rather than
a part of the Central-European group of advanced transition countries. The initial attitude
towards the country was directly related to the assessment of its transformational capacities,
such as the type of the former communist regime (which was rather open compared to other
ex-socialist countries), its political, religious and cultural tradition (mainly in reference to its
history within the Habsburg Empire), and the level of its economic development (which was
far better than the average in the other ex-communist states at that time).
As it was identified by Kasapovic10, this sort of change in the perception of the
potentials of the Croatian transition happened owing mainly to two important factors: the war
and the low quality of the transformations process. The war made the transitional processes
(i.e. the transformation of the society, and the economic and political system in the country)
of secondary importance, owing to the fact that the defence of a new-born state against the
aggression and secession of its parts was given top priority. It is not difficult to find
theoretical confirmation to the argument that it is highly unreasonable to expect from a
country to start dealing with problems of political transformation unless it has resolved its
main issues of existence. Even more, that can be regarded as an issue of general consent
among experts dealing with democratic consolidation world-wide, not to mention the
absolute incompatibility of war with the processes of democratic consolidation.
9 Having said that, the author does not want to underestimate the importance of the Slovenian war for
independence but only underlines the fact that fortunately it was not devastating and long, and it did not have as
strong a negative impact on the country’s economic and political life.
10 Mirjana Kasapovic, Hrvatska politika 1990-2000, (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao, Hrvatska politologija,
Fakultet politickih znanosti, 2001).
In Croatia, the war and the occupation dramatically endangered the territorial integrity
of the country, and hence, any kind of democratic consolidation. After the international
recognition of Croatia’s independence and sovereignty, the state borders were formally
confirmed, but they were not entirely controlled by the country’s authorities until the peaceful
reintegration of Eastern Slavonia was finalised in 1998. The Croatian democratic
consolidation was affected by the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina11 as well, owing to the fact
that the development on the ground led to the creation of parallel Croatian authorities, which
were loyal to the government in Zagreb, which, in turn, owing to the fact that the territorial
integrity of BiH at that time was rather questionable, kept the issue of Croatia’s Eastern
borders open due to secessionist aspirations on its side.
In general, the democratic transition in Croatia in the 1990s was conducted in a very
turbulent environment, both in terms of the development in the country and in the region, and
it was marked mainly by war, destruction and the violation of various kinds of rights that are
in the developed democratic world. Starting with a short war in Slovenia, the Homeland war
in Croatia, the long and devastating war in BiH, and ending with the ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo and the NATO military intervention against Milosevic’s regime in the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the 1990s in this region will surely not be remembered as the typical
initial period of the post-socialist democratic transformation like the ones in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, which have successfully finalised their transition process and are
already  members  of  the  Euro-Atlantic  community.  Therefore,  as  it  was  emphasized  in  the
introduction, one may conclude, that the real process of democratic transition in the region
and in Croatia started with ‘a decade of delay’, and especially for the purpose of this research,
this fact has to be taken into consideration with special attention.
1.1.2 The Croatian democratic tradition and the post-communist political transition
One of the most frequently used arguments in the Croatian political life during the last two
decades when speaking about the right for self-determination and statehood in the early
1990s or about ‘Croatia’s deserved place in the estern democratic world’ is without any doubt
that of the tradition. It is enough to take a look at the preamble of the Croatian constitution in
order to understand the importance of this argument in the political discourse:
11Hereinafter referred to as ‘BiH’.
“The millenary identity of the Croatia nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its
entire historical experience within different forms of states and by the preservation and growth of the idea of a
national state, founded on the historical right of the Croatian nation to full sovereignty, manifested in:
? the formation of Croatian principalities in the seventh century;
? the independent mediaeval state of Croatia founded in the ninth century;
? the Kingdom of Croats established in the tenth century;
? the preservation of the identity of the Croatian state in the Croatian-Hungarian personal union;
? the independent and sovereign decision of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) of 1527 to elect a king from
the Habsburg dynasty;
? the independent and sovereign decision of the Croatian Parliament of the Pragmatic Sanction of 1712;
? the conclusions of the Croatian Parliament of 1848 regarding the restoration of the Triune Kingdom of
Croatia under the authority of the Banus grounded on the historical, national and natural right of the
Croatian nation;
? the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868 on the relations between the Kingdom of Dalmatia,
Croatia and Slavonia and the Kingdom of Hungary, grounded on the legal traditions of both states and
the Pragmatic Sanction of 1712;
? the decision of the Croatian Parliament of 29 October 1918 to dissolve state relations between Croatia
and Austria-Hungary and the simultaneous affiliation of independent Croatia, invoking its historical
and natural right as a nation, with the state of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, proclaimed on the former
territory of the Habsburg Monarchy;
? the fact that the Croatian Parliament had never sanctioned the decision of the National Council of the
State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs to unite with Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes (1 December 1918), subsequently (3 October 1929) proclaimed the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia;
? the establishment of the Home Rule (Banovina) of Croatia in 1939, by which Croatian state identity
was restored within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
? establishing the foundations of state sovereignty during the course of the Second World War, by the
decisions of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia (1943), as opposed to the
proclamation of the Independent State of Croatia (1941), and subsequently in the Constitution of the
People's Republic of Croatia (1947) and all later constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia
(1963-90), on the threshold of the historical changes, marked by the collapse of the communist system
and changes in the European international order, the Croatian nation by its freely expressed will at the
first democratic elections (1990) reaffirmed its millenary statehood. By the new Constitution of the
Republic of Croatia (1990) and the victory in the Homeland War (1991-95), the Croatian nation
demonstrated its will and determination to establish and defend the Republic of Croatia as a free,
independent, sovereign and democratic state.
Considering the presented historical facts and universally accepted principles of the modern world, as well as
the inalienable and indivisible, non-transferable and non-exhaustible right of the Croatian nation to self-
determination and state sovereignty, including its fully maintained right to secession and association, as basic
provisions for peace and stability of the international order, the Republic of Croatia is established as the national
state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of autochthonous national minorities...”12
Despite the fact that similar formulations may be seen in the preambles of other constitutions
as well, the way these arguments have been used recently underlines their specific importance
for the legitimation of the main goals of the national policy, both in the country and abroad.
While it is obvious that the specific importance of the tradition argument shall not be
underestimated in the analysis of the Croatian political  transformation process,  we may still
find different interpretations of its motivation of use, especially in the 1990s. One of them
relies on a legitimate right of the nation to recall its historical tradition in the process of
national state-building, which is a typical example how nations faced with a deficit of the
‘modern legitimacy elements’ tend to rely on those from past centuries, marking their
transition with traditionalist and backward-oriented characteristics, which directly affect the
success of the whole process, which is conducted in a world dominated by globalisation.
Regardless of the interpretation one may choose, it is undeniable that there is a
tradition of Croatian sovereignty through the centuries in different forms and environments.
However, one still has to see if this means that there is a democratic tradition in the country
that may affect the contemporary post-communist political life, and if it can have any
influence on the pace of the transition process.
The analysis of the Croatian political life in the last two centuries brings us to the
conclusion that there is only a modest democratic tradition, with very limited impact on the
contemporary political life, especially bearing in mind the fact that the experience of a liberal
civic political practice in the late 19th and early 20th centuries has been overshadowed by the
negative consequences of the various types of dictatorships in the 20th century. As Zakosek13
clearly states, in the period of the initiation of the Croatian civic political practice within the
Habsburg Empire (1848 – 1918), owing to the limited and uneven voting rights, there were
no conditions present for the development of a broader political participation, and the
parliament had only limited influence on the government’s policies.
However, one may argue that in the period after 1861, i.e. after the reestablishment of
the constitutional order in the empire, the conditions were set for the articulation of different
12 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Preamble – Official Web-Site of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Croatia, http://www.usud.hr/default.aspx?Show=ustav_republike_hrvatske&m1=27&m2=50&La
ng=en.
13 Nenad Zakosek, Politicki sustav Hrvatske (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao, Hrvatska politologija, Fakultet
politickih znanosti, 2002).
political options and preferences, as well as for the formation of the first modern parties.
While only the educated elites participated in the process in the very beginning, the middle
and low class citizens, as well as the workers and peasants started taking part in it in the late
19th century.
Between the years 1918 and 1929, in the newly formed Yugoslav state (the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) there was a short period of very limited democratic
parliamentarianism, which had a rather negative impact on the Croatian political life. First of
all,  the former members of the Habsburg Empire gathered in the State of Serbs,  Croats and
Slovenes were unlawfully drawn into a common state with Serbia and Montenegro, which
was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, by an unilateral decision of the
Serbian Regent Alexander (December 1918). In contrast with the political position of the
State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which demanded negotiations on an equal footing, the
aforementioned state was attached to the Serbian state, and accordingly, completely
centralised.
Having lost its own parliament, the Croatian political participation was limited to the
right to select the representatives for the Yugoslav parliament in Belgrade. Political life in
general was marked by the constant struggle between the Serbian centralists and the
autonomists from Croatia and Slovenia, the intensity of which frequently challenged the
sustainability of the political institutions. The tension reached its peak in 1928, with the
assassination of a group of leading Croatian politicians in the parliament in Belgrade by a
Serbian deputy, which resulted in the boycott of the common political institutions by the
Croatian parties. This was used as a pretext for the introduction of the king’s dictatorship in
1929, i.e. absolute centralisation marked by the suppression of any aspect of democratic life
in the country. Even after the reintroduction of some ‘constitutional institutions’ in the early
1930s, it was obvious that even the minimal preconditions for the development of a
democratic  environment  were  missing,  and  given  the  fact  that  the  situation  did  not  change
substantially until the beginning of the Second World War, it is clear that there  was no form
of democratic tradition whatsoever before the Second World War.
The antifascist partisan movement in the Second World War, which was based on the
communist doctrine and was led by Josip Broz Tito, developed to a recognisable political
force only in the early post-war period, and it played a decisive role in the formation of the
socialist Yugoslav federation. Despite the fact that Croatia as a constitutive republic in the
former Yugoslavia had its own political institutions, open communist dictatorship was
immediately introduced in late 1945, so there was practically no chance for the development
of  any  kind  of  basis  for  a  democratic  political  life  in  the  post-war  period.  A  whole  set  of
problematic relations in this most complicated and conflict oriented country in this part of
world  was  planned  to  be  solved  by  implementing  the  Soviet  model  of  communism without
any critical assessment of the system, which was believed to be universally applicable. With
that concept, after taking the absolute power in 1945, the Yugoslav Communist party started
the  elimination  of  basic  values  of  the  civic  society  such  as  the  multi-party  system,  private
property, free market, civil rights, religious rights, national traditions. Despite the fact that the
Stalin-Tito conflict in the late 1940s provoked the rejection of the Soviet model and brought
some visible changes into the Yugoslav political system, substantial democratic changes did
not occur, and the hegemony of only one party remained intact.
Therefore, in the period between 1918 and 1990, Croatia found itself in the
framework  of  the  Yugoslav  state,  which  represented  the  outcome  of  the  dissolution  of  the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the dictates of the First World War winners, i.e. the creation
of the so-called Versailles world order. It was expected from the creators of this world order
that Yugoslavia, as a unified country, will ensure peace or at least a power balance in a
traditionally troublesome region, where the First World War had been initiated. During the
more than seventy years of the existence of the Yugoslav political project, various types of
state organisation, governments and political systems were put in place and different forms of
constitutions have appeared during that time as well.
However, the essence of all these regimes was basically the same – autocracy and
dictatorship. Despite the fact that they were marked by various ideological and political fore-
signs, all of them were based on principles directly opposing democracy and the rule of law,
with evident lack of respect for human rights,  the rights of minorities and individuals.  This
state, which was formed based on different political traditions, cultures and religions, tried to
legitimize itself within its borders and abroad by, for example, investing into efforts to invent
a unique Yugoslav nation or an atypical form of socialism called socialist self-management.
However, since the existence of the country was ensured mainly by force – of the two global
blocks during the Cold War from the outside and the repressive apparatus, i.e. the army,
police and secret services, from within – it was inevitable that the collapse of communism
would have an enormous impact on the political map of this part of Europe as well.
Taking into consideration the basic determinants of the Croatian political life in the
presented period, one can conclude that it is very difficult to find a recognisable democratic
tradition that may have affected the contemporary political life in the process of the post-
communist  transition,  and perhaps it  would not be incorrect  to conclude that  the era of free
and democratic elections started only after the fall of the communist regime.14
1.1.2.1 The first free multi-party elections (1990)
Formally, the first Croatian elections that can be regarded as free were conducted in 1990,
while Croatia was still a part of the Yugoslav federation. According to a number of authors,
these elections cannot be seen as constitutive elections, but rather as pre-constitutive ones.
However, one may view this opinion with reservations, given the fact that according to the
legislation in power at that time, the level of the republics as constitutive elements of the
federation was the highest level for the elections to be conducted. Namely, according to the
1974 constitution, the institutions of the federation were constituted only as the representative
bodies  of  the  republics,  while  they  preserved  the  exclusive  right  to  delegate  their
representatives. Hence, in the existing Yugoslav constitutional framework there could not
have been any form of elections conducted at the federal level.
As a consequence of the inability to reach any kind of compromise at the federal level
regarding  the  course  of  political  and  economic  reforms,  and  the  awareness  that  the
transformation towards democracy and a market economy in the existing federal framework
was highly unlikely to happen, the ideas favouring the conduct of free multi-party elections
started to be more frequently advocated in the two North Western republics (Slovenia and
Croatia). During 1989, the first political organisations emerged in Croatia as the core of the
future formation of different parties and started arguing for the defence of the Croatian
sovereignty, for conducting the first free elections, and the introduction of a multi-party
democratic system. The reform-oriented forces started to grow stronger in the society, which
directly affected the Communist Party as well, and thus, it was of crucial importance for the
further developments in the Croatian political transformation.
The decision on the conduct of free multi-party elections was made in December
1989, in a very complex interaction of the party in power and the new opposition movements
and parties, marked by mass public demonstrations, different petitions in support of the
demands of the representatives of the opposition that were forwarded to the parliament and
other state bodies. In this context, one should not underestimate the importance of the
14 As it was stated in the introduction, reservation shall be kept regarding the exercise of 'real democracy' in
practice as we understand it today in the period before 2000. However, regardless of that, the fall of the
communist regime had significant importance in the political life of Croatia, and therefore, we are here referring
to that period.
international developments – the fall of the communist regime in Europe, and the violent
break-up of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. While these developments undoubtedly
influenced the decision to conduct free multi-party elections, the crucial motivation that
helped overcoming political differences within Croatia and coming up with this sort of step in
the  process  of  the  initiation  of  the  transition  was  a  need  to  form  an  apparatus  capable  of
ensuring the defence of the country from brutal aggression and that could ensure the basic
elements for the creation of a new sovereign state. In line with that, in a very short period of
time, the changes of the constitution were adopted, along with the first  draft  of the election
legislation, as well as a number of other legislations necessary for the conduct of the first free
multi-party elections. Of course, the electoral law was of utmost importance, bearing in mind
the  fact  that  it  determined  the  rules  of  candidacy,  the  protection  of  electoral  rights,  and  the
procedures of the determination of the election results.
The institutional framework of the parliamentary elections at that time may be
regarded  as  a  result  of  the  transformational  pattern  of  the  transition  in  Croatia,  where  the
reformed communists had a decisive influence on the crucial conceptual choices, while the
specific conditions of the transitional process in the neighbourhood also affected its form and
outcome. Owing to a very late emergence of the political opposition in the form of political
organisations or parties, and the significant weaknesses of the democratic movement in
general, combined with severe pressures from the Serbian national movement, the communist
party took on the responsibility to define the conditions for the legalisation of political
pluralism, to conduct the constitutional reforms, and to decide on the date of the elections.
A majority electoral system was established in Croatia, which contained the use of the
principle of an absolute majority and two-round elections. The basis for the establishment of
such  a  system  was  the  French  electoral  system  from  the  year  1986,  which,  apart  from  the
above-mentioned, included the following: uninominal election counties and a threshold of 7%
for participation in the second round of the elections, as well as the methodology of the
division of the state into electoral counties, which drastically affects the outcome of the
elections.
It  was obvious that  the elections were seen as a precondition of the general  political
reconstruction, and therefore, one can conclude that they were treated mainly as an
instrument in that process. This shows that the so-called functional interpretation of
democracy prevailed. In that sense, the majority elections were regarded almost as a
necessary precondition for the creation of a democratic system, and, taking into consideration
the fact that the number of different minor parties was growing, and they were producing
large polarisation, a guarantee for the concentration of the political spectrum required the
creation of a sustainable government. According to that interpretation, proportional
representation could have had a negative impact on the atomisation of the political life, and
hence, on the stability of the political system, especially in the turbulent environment in
which it was created.
The political interests of the particular parties, related to their expectations in terms of
the electoral process, which significantly influenced the choice of the model of the electoral
system.  The  Communist  Party  in  power  (SKH  –  SDP)  advocated  for  the  majority  system,
owing to the fact that at that time it had a developed organisational structure with solid
financial support and connections with the population. Given the fact that this type of
electoral system favours big parties while discriminating against the small ones, from their
position it was reasonable to expect that the outcome of the elections organised in such a way
would be favourable for them.
The second big party (HDZ – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, Croatian Democratic
Union) managed to gain a significant support of the population and significant financial
support  from  the  Croatian  diaspora,  and  hence,  to  take  advantage  of  the  majority  elections
and take the power. The remaining small parties, which had limited influence, objected to the
electoral system, mainly because of the fact that it left very limited manoeuvring space for
them in the political arena, which was clearly visible from the elections results.
The D’Hont method of vote counting also contributed to the final outcome of the
elections, distorting the results and creating a so-called artificial majority in the parliament.
The next table shows the disparities between ‘the values’ of the votes of the different parties:
Table 1.1 The average number of votes for one mandate in the first round of the
parliamentary elections in 1990
PARTY / COALITION
AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTES FOR
ONE MANDATE IN THE FIRST
ROUND
HDZ 22,090
SDP 50,637
KNS 143,189
SDS 46,418
Independent 118,167
Source: Mirjana Kasapovic, Izborni i stranacki sustav Republike Hrvatske (Zagreb: Alinea, 1993):
45.
This shows that the electoral system had a crucial role in determining the elections results and
thanks to the majority system, the absolute majority of one party was created on the basis of a
relative majority of the votes, as it is visible from Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 The relationship between the votes and mandates in the parliamentary
elections in 1990
PARTY / COALITION VOTES IN THE FIRSTROUND
MANDATES IN THE
PARLIAMENT
HDZ 42.30 % 60.00 %
SDP 35.30 % 28.40 %
KNS 15.00 % 5.90 %
SDS 1.60 % 1.40 %
Independent 4.10 % 3.70 %
Rest 1.70 % 0.60 %
Total 100 % 100 %
Source: Mirjana Kasapovic, Izborni i stranacki sustav Republike Hrvatske (Zagreb: Alinea, 1993):
45.
1.1.2.2 The period of HDZ domination (1990 - 2000)
Elections undoubtedly represent the most important political process in transitional countries,
given the fact that they mark the real beginning of the transformation from a totalitarian to a
democratic political system. In the former Yugoslav federation, the elections represented not
only  a  form  of  the  delegitimation  of  the  old  political  system,  but  also  that  of  the  former
federation, and hence, they acted as a milestone on the path towards the Croatian
independence and sovereignty. Despite the fact that, as we have stated before, the 1990
elections  cannot  be  regarded  as  constitutional,  they  represent  a  turning  point  in  the  modern
Croatian history, and therefore, they are of utmost importance. In general, one could have
expected from the elections that followed to contribute to the consolidation of a young
democracy, by ensuring the peaceful change of the party in power, as it was the case in other
countries. However, that was not the case in Croatia. The following ten years represented an
era of the absolute dominance of HDZ, where elections became a tool for the legitimation of
the political situation in the country, and various types of electoral systems were changed
according to the preferences of the political elites in the different electoral periods.
Despite their instrumentalisation, the numerous functions of the elections and the
expectations from them in the initial stage of the post-communist period made their
legitimacy almost unquestionable, so they were relatively frequently conducted. After the
first elections in 1990, there have been three elections held for the House of Representatives
of the Parliament (1992, 1995, 2000), which reveals the fact that the regular term of a
mandate  has  been  shortened  from  four  to  approximately  less  than  two  and  a  half  years  till
1995.  Apart  from  that,  there  have  been  two  elections  for  the  House  of  the  Counties  of  the
Parliament (1993, 1997) and three presidential elections (1993, 1997, 2000).15
As it was mentioned before, in accordance with the political preferences of the
political elites, a very high level of institutional reformism marked this period in Croatia.
Within only ten years, basically all major models of the electoral system were applied – the
system of  absolute  majority  (1990),  two types  of  combined  electoral  systems  (1992,  1995),
and the system of proportional representation (2000). Given the fact that it is very difficult to
find a similar trend in any other transitional country during the 1990s,  it  is  obvious that  the
decision makers, by changing different systems, tried to follow the change of the preferences
of the electorate and adjust the general institutional framework to the needs of the party in
power.
The political system itself says much about the character of governance, since its
semi-presidential form, with the strong position of the president, coupled with various
mechanisms  that  ensured  the  domination  of  the  party  in  power,  made  the  constitutional
declaration about the multi-party system rather questionable and the level of democratisation
dependent on the ruling party’s political will.
Croatia has followed the French model of semi-presidentialism as a role-model for the
definition of the relations between the main subjects in its political life. The very strong
position of the president in this model of political arrangement was additionally cemented by
a significant lack of political culture in the country, where clientelism and populism were the
main characteristics that allowed the president to govern undisputedly. Furthermore, his
absolute power was ensured by the continuous dominance of his party (HDZ) in the
parliament, so co-habitation, or any other form of political relations that might have
endangered the dominance of the president actually never happened. Elected directly by the
people and the undisputed leader of the ruling HDZ, the president has governed Croatia
almost entirely unchallenged. Therefore, in fact, while pledging pure democracy, a form of a
one-man rule was imposed – the president’s word was usually final in the parliament and his
ruling party’s domination in nearly all institutions made certain that his will was
implemented.
15 Apart from that, a constitutional referendum was held in 1991, up to now the only one conducted in modern
Croatian history.
Accordingly, the ruling party under his governance became the main actor in the
process of the creation of the Croatian state, and hence, except during the relatively short
period of the coalition Government of National Unity (in late 1991 and early 1992), it became
crucial in its decision-making process in almost every sphere – e.g. political, military,
economic ones.
Also,  one  of  the  frequently  repeated  criticisms  of  Tudjman’s  time  in  power  was  the
suppression  of  the  independent  media  and  the  usage  of  the  state  television  for  the  political
purposes of the governing elites. Libel and criminal laws were combined to control the
media, confrontations with nongovernmental organisations and democratic opposition parties
helped to ensure government control.
At the same time, the consequences of this policy were felt in the economic field,
especially during the last part of Tudjman’s time in power, when severe economic problems
started to show, which could not be swept under the carpet as consequences of war. The
regime had surrounded itself with ‘a new political-economic elite’ that had gained its estate in
a very questionable manner.  The economy was recovering slowly from the war period, and
FDI was relatively modest,  mainly because of the political  burdens of the Croatian political
system. From 1996, Croatia even experienced numerous long-lasting labour disputes and
social unrest, since unemployment remained high at almost 20%, and part of the population
was living close to subsistence level.
The transition in all the ex-communist states obviously dealt a blow to the popular
expectations of a rapid upturn in people’s standard of living, but the results in the Croatian
case, especially in comparison with the macroeconomic data before 1990s, were among the
least successful. The number of employed was cut by half, the production and export declined
dramatically, the tourist sector was recovering slowly, the current account deficit was rapidly
increasing and, due to the negative image abroad of being semi-autocratic and unfavourable
towards FDI, the country found itself in an undesirable position, without a solid base for the
development of its economy. Of course, one should not forget the fact that the country went
through a devastating war for its independence and the occupation of its territory for almost
four years, which had dramatically influenced the overall development of the country in a
very negative way.
In general, one can see that this decade of political transformation was not successful,
and one can find various reasons explaining the stalemate of Croatia’s development, as well
as the fact that it found itself lagging behind the countries that had shown a significantly
lower transitional potential in the early 1990s. However, in this turbulent decade of state-
building and war for independence, there were some paramount developments that are of
crucial importance for the very existence of sovereign Croatia. First of all, the new
constitution was adopted in December 1990, which was essential for the future independence
of the country as its legal base, since it clearly defined the issue of national sovereignty and
the new political profile of the country as well as introduced the new national symbols.
Second, a referendum on independence and sovereignty was conducted in May 1991, when
the people were given the chance to decide upon Croatia’s future (the turn-out was approx.
85%, and approx. 94% supported Croatia’s independence). This was the basis of the
legitimacy of that idea and the motivation for the Declaration of Independence, which was
adopted in the parliament on 25 June 1991, which represented a break-up of all bonds with
the ex-Yugoslav federation and opened a new chapter in Croatia’s history. Following that
decision, Croatia’s  independence and sovereignty received international recognition on 15
January 1992.
Having achieved the formal international recognition of its statehood, the country
needed to achieve another goal in order to finalise the first phase of its state-building process,
and that was the liberation of the occupied territories. With two victorious military missions
in 1995 (Flash in May and Storm in August), and the peaceful reintegration of Eastern
Slavonia in 1998, Croatia took control over its entire territory and by achieving that, it
satisfied  the  basic  precondition  for  the  real  start  of  the  transition  process.  However,  it  also
takes political will to initiate such a process, and that is the main reason why one can
conclude that the real transition started with the political changes in late 1999 and early 2000.
1.1.2.3 Croatia on a new political track (2000 – present)
On 3 January 2000, a coalition of six opposition parties, led by the centre-left Social
Democratic Party (SDP) and the centre-right Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), swept the
parliamentary elections, taking 71 of 151 seats (including six seats reserved for Croatians
living abroad). Following that, the presidential elections took place following the death of
Franjo Tudjman, where the HDZ candidate failed to reach the second round. This represented
the end of the era of HDZ’s absolute dominance in the Croatian political life.
Long  prepared  for,  the  2000  parliamentary  elections  were  called  at  the  end  of  the
previous parliament’s four-year term. However, Tudjman’s death on 10 December moved the
presidential election forward by two years, so that it almost coincided with the parliamentary
elections. In fact, the presidential ballot was announced before the parliamentary elections
took place, and in effect, the two merged into a single lengthy electoral event. One good
example of this argument is the fact that the parties running for parliament made campaign
promises for reforming the presidency.
Table 1.3 The results of the 2000 parliamentary elections
Coalition
(PARTIES)
Mandates
(NUMBER)
Mandates
(TOTAL)
Votes
(PERCENTAGE)
SDP
HSLS
S-BHS
PGS
43
25
1
2
71 47.02%
HDZ 46 46 30.46%
HSS
IDS
HNS
LS
16
4
2
2
24 15.89%
HSP
HKDU
4
1
5 3.31%
NATIONAL MINORITIES 5 5 3.31%
Source: Results of the 2000 Elections for the Croatian Parliament, http://www.hidra.hr/
stranke/501rz2000.htm
The victory of the coalition of the opposition’s parties undoubtedly opened new opportunities
for Croatia’s transitional reforms and the integration into the Euro-Atlantic community,
processes that had been frozen for long, owing to the previous regime’s lack of political will
and Croatia’s negative image abroad.
One crucial precondition for a new start was a structural change in the political
system, i.e. reducing the unnecessarily strong position of the president and improving the
parliament’s position in it. It was announced by the government at the very beginning of its
mandate that it wanted to depoliticize the organs of the state, which had been bastions of the
nationalist party during the previous decade. In order to create institutions that citizens can
start to have faith in, it planned to bring under parliamentary scrutiny especially the army, the
police and the security services. The constitutional changes that took place in 2000 showed a
strong  determination  of  the  new political  elites  to  change  the  political  praxis  in  Croatia,  to
avoid the unreasonable dominance of the executive branch and to make the state apparatus
more efficient and compatible with the difficult tasks of the reform process and the EU and
NATO accession. Therefore, the French model of the semi-presidential political system,
which proved not to be functional in combination with the under-developed political culture
in the country, was replaced with a parliamentary one, where presidential powers were
significantly lowered, the role of the parliament increased, and its structure changed from
bicameral to unicameral, which contributed to its efficiency and reduced costs.
The new government inherited a semi-isolated country with a weak democratic and
economic system, burdened by the negative results of the shady privatisation that took place
during the 1990s. The political and economic problems were likely to force a successor to
remain focused on internal issues and to improve the relation with the countries in the region.
Therefore, the ambitions shown by the Tudjman regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina were
about to become less important not only because of the severe pressure from abroad and the
fact that this was a conditio sine qua non for the normalisation of the country’s relations with
the international community, but mainly owing to the fact that any reasonable government in
such  a  position  would  have  been  forced  to  increase  the  priority  of  the  economic  and  social
issues.
Besides this, unlike its predecessor, the new government showed clear political will to
fulfil its obligation to fully co-operate with the ICTY. Also, very soon after taking power, it
made  it  clear  that  issues  that  are  of  most  serious  concern  for  the  international  community,
such as the return of refugees and regional co-operation, will be placed very high on the
government’s list of priorities16, and that some unpopular measures like rationalisation in the
sectors of economy and state administration, especially downsizing the large and costly
security sector, will be conducted.
After a very short period of time, it was evident that democracy had made
considerable progress, as far as media rights and the freedom of expression was concerned,
and that the hard-line one-party rhetoric was replaced by a much more moderate one, giving
grounds to democratic dialogue. However, many serious problems were waiting to be
resolved. Apart from the economic and institutional reforms, the issues related to the legacy
of the war were certainly the most demanding ones, especially the co-operation with the
ICTY17 and the regional co-operation, which had been made compulsory in the framework of
the SAP18.
The recognisable success of the coalition government brought the country closer to
the Euro-Atlantic community and changed the overall picture of Croatia abroad. It had started
the painful process of the transitional reforms, changed the political discourse and brought the
country ‘back on the right track’. Nevertheless, the situation was everything but rosy, owing
16 Full co-operation with the ICTY, the return of refugees and regional co-operation were the three main
conditions for the normalisation of relations with the international community, and with the EU in particular.
Since these issues were of utmost importance, marking the political life in Croatia in the last decade, they will
be thoroughly examined in the next chapter.
17 ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.
18 See details on the process later in the text.
to the difficult political and economic reality, burdened by complicated relations with the
region, the EU, NATO, and a number of other problems.
Still, the major problem for the government which was negatively affecting the
coalition’s effectiveness was in fact due to the way it had been formed. It was based on ‘the
old Croatian syndrome’ of voting and acting ‘against’ rather than ‘in favour’ of some political
option. Namely, the modest experience of the Croatian statehood has shown that if we put
aside the declarative statements of the highest party officials, their pre-election behaviour was
mostly  a  display  of  the  intention  to  discredit  their  political  opponents  rather  than  to  offer
‘something concrete’ as an alternative.
Accordingly, the Croatian electorate was following their example, and by voting for a
change, they opted to punish the incumbent government rather than in favour of some
coherent alternative political programme. A vote for HDZ in the early 1990s was a vote
against the failed state of Yugoslavia, Serbian domination and aggression, as well as against
the un-fair federal financial system, which was perceived as transferring an enormous amount
of funds (on an annual basis) from the more developed republics (Slovenia and Croatia) to
the others in the name of the ‘balanced development of a common federation’. The
alternative was very clear – loosening the federal model, or independence. On the other hand,
the way HDZ governed the country during the 1990s revealed the fact that the political elites
were  ‘not  quite  sure’  what  they  had  in  mind  while  declaratively  opting  for  an  independent
and European Croatia, simply because their ‘anti-program’ replaced their actual program.
Exactly the same situation happened in 2000 – a vote for the opposition was in fact a
vote against the semi-autocratic regime of HDZ, as well as against international isolation,
economic backwardness, shady privatisation, corruption, and the limitation of the freedom of
expression. It took a broad compromise to overthrow HDZ, so a wide coalition was formed,
which consisted of various parties that had different political priorities and apparently only
one thing in common – the determination for political change. The wide structural diapason
of the government ‘stretched’ from, for example, the Istrian Democratic Union as a moderate
regional party of the most developed Croatian county, which was oriented towards SME
development, tourism and cross-border regional co-operation, to the Croatian Peasants Party,
which advocated the importance of traditional Christian values and state subsidies in the
agriculture. Additionally, the economic pressures drove the main party in the government, the
Social Democratic Party, to taking immediate actions to cut the unsustainable welfare system
and by doing so to acting in direct contradiction with its political profile. This type of mish-
mash heterogeneity with unclear and conflicting political preferences, accompanied by a
burdensome political and economic situation, had a negative impact on the government’s
functionality and popularity.
Table 1.4 The results of the 2003 parliamentary elections
PARTY / COALITION VOTES (PERCENT) MANDATES (NUMBER)
HDZ 43.42% 66
SDP 19.08% 29
HSS 6.58% 10
HNS 6.58% 10
HSP 4.61% 7
IDS 2.63% 4
LIBRA 1.97% 3
HSU 1.97% 3
SDSS 1.97% 3
HSLS 1.32% 2
LS 1.32% 2
DC 0.66% 1
PGS 0.66% 1
SDA 0.66% 1
Source: Results of the 2003 Elections for the Croatian Parliament, www.hidra.hr/stranke/ sabor.htm
The election victory of the HDZ in 2003 raised a huge question mark over Croatia’s future
and its relations with the international community and the countries within the region, as well
as serious doubts about the perspectives for the country’s economy and its citizens’ living
standards. Although the coalition government showed some severe weaknesses, especially
during the last two years of its mandate, it left the country in a much better shape both in the
domestic and the international fields than in 2000, when it took office. Therefore, the
outcome of these elections provoked some serious questions in the country and abroad. Was
Croatia going backwards to the 1990s in terms of rhetoric and politics? Could the severe
malfunctions of the political system of that time be expected again? What about the future
role of Croatia as a proof that successful reforms in this turbulent part of Europe are possible
and that the SAP really works? These are just some of the questions that were raised at that
time.
After their severe defeat in the 2000 elections, the HDZ was at a crossroads – to
transform into a regular European centre-right party or literally cease to exist as a
recognisable player in the Croatian political life. A new leadership was elected and its new
President,  Ivo  Sanader,  former  Deputy  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Chief  of  the
President’s Office during the Tudjman time, started the initiative of reshaping the party in
accordance with its new pro-European programme and cleansing it from backward oriented
right-wing extremist persons, who simply could not find their place in the new political
framework. Also, not only the HDZ, but also the whole political pre-elections discourse
started changing, and concrete programs and ‘votes in favour’ started replacing the political
mud-slinging and the ‘votes against’. The way the government was formed was another good
sign of change – since it did not have a clear majority to form the government alone, it was
forced to find some support in the other parties that made it to the parliament, and instead of
taking the easy way out by forming a coalition with the right-wing Croatian Party of Rights
(HSP)19, HDZ managed to find a partner elsewhere – in the Pensioners Party and the
representatives of the minorities (including the representatives of the Serbian minority). This
gave it a lot of credit abroad.
The last elections, held in November 2007, have shown a trend of electoral
bipolarisation in Croatia, where the two biggest parties (HDZ and SDP) won approximately
80% of the votes. However, taking into consideration the fact that neither of them managed to
win enough mandates to be able to form a government individually, the importance of small
coalitions and parties has increased dramatically, becoming a typical example of ‘pivot
parties’20.
For the first time in country’s history, the coalition agreement was thoroughly
negotiated, and the details of the coalition’s future work were agreed upon and specified in a
document of more than 100 pages. The experience of the relatively inefficient coalition from
the term 2000-0321 led the partners to the conclusion that it is important to precisely define
the details of their future co-operation in order to avoid political turmoil and technical
complications in the time to come. After lengthy negotiations, which proved to be too long
with  regards  to  the  pace  of  reforms  in  the  process  of  the  EU  accession,  HDZ  formed  a
government with HSS-HSLS (the Croatian Peasants Party and the Croatian Social-Liberal
Party), HSU (the Croatian Party of Pensioners) and the representatives of the minorities. Two
significant signs of democratic maturity were visible. Firstly, the representative of the Serbian
19 This was the only party, apart from those from the opposite end of the spectrum, which won enough seats that
can guarantee the stability of the government without a need for another partner.
20 'Pivot party' is a party without which no one else can form a government. In the situation where it was
difficult to expect that 'a big coalition' (HDZ and SDP) would be formed, not so much because of the
unbridgeable differences but more due to the lack of political will and culture on both sides, it was not only that
coalitions like HSS-HSLS were important (8 mandates) but negotiations were conducted with each MP from
minor parties or the representatives of minorities.
21 This coalition found it difficult to work on the basis of a three-page document. A broad compromise, which
was needed to overthrow the HDZ, proved to be insufficient for the sustainability of the six-party coalition
government. This was one of the major reasons why they moved to opposition in 2003.
minority was appointed Vice-president of the government, which is a very important step,
bearing in mind Croatia’s recent history. Secondly, for the first time in Croatia, the Roma
community has its own representative in the parliament, which will help articulate the
specific position of their population in the society and help their integration in it.22
Table 1.5 The results of the 2007 parliamentary elections
PARTY / COALITION VOTES (PERCENT, APPROX.) MANDATES (NUMBER)
HDZ 42 % 66
SDP 37 % 56
HSS-HSLS 5 % 8
HNS 5 % 7
HDSSB 2 % 3
IDS 2 % 3
HSP 1 % 1
HSU 1 % 1
NATIONAL MINORITIES 5 % 8
Source: State Electoral Committee of the Republic of Croatia, Report on the Elections for Croatian
Parliament (November 2007), http://www.izbori.hr/izbori/izbori07.nsf/FI?OpenForm
The present coalition successfully went through some difficult decisions (the cancellation of
the Protected Ecological Fishery Zone, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, etc.). The
invitation  to  join  NATO,  which  was  received  at  the  Bucharest  Summit,  as  well  as  the  first
official  visit  of the US President that  followed, seem to be a confirmation of the quality of
Croatia’s  work  and  a  solid  motivation  for  the  endeavours  to  come.  However,  the  very
demanding schedule of reforms for the next year on the country’s path towards a full-fledged
EU membership, which will have to include some tough decisions influencing some strategic
branches of the economy (e.g. the termination of state subsidies in the ship-building industry
and the agriculture), not to mention the problems with judiciary efficiency and the fight
against corruption, will be the best test for its stability and the level of political maturity in
Croatia.
22 Because of the importance of the minority rights issue, this topic will be discussed in detail in the following
chapter.
1.2 The implementation of the EU’s democratic requirements: Transparency, decision-
making processes, the role of civil society actors, minority rights, the rights of the
political opposition
As it was stressed before, the importance of the EU democratic requirements is relatively
difficult to estimate for the period before the year 2000, bearing in mind that it represented
the first constructive approach of the EU towards the region that included the possibility for
the countries of the region to become a part of it once they meet the required criteria. Prior to
that,  in the absence of political  consent within the EU, it  was difficult  for it  to provide any
kind of political framework that could have stimulated the reform process in the region, and
hence, to rely on its well-known conditionality mechanism, which had been frequently used
in its relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Therefore, a milestone of Croatia’s change of course after 1999 was the EU’s
Stabilisation and Association Process, with its own merits policy of distinction, and the
perspective of the EU membership, which brought an entirely different dynamics to the
country’s political life. The previous vague framework that had caused so many suspicions
was finally enriched with some new elements, which gave new energy to the country’s
reform process. Owing to the turbulent past of the region, and its consequences, which were
still visible, apart from the standard political requirements formulated in the Copenhagen
Criteria, the EU defined three important obligations for the countries of the region, or better
to say, conditio sine qua non’s, for the improvement of their relations with the EU and their
progress in the process of the EU accession. These are as follows: full co-operation with the
ICTY,  regional  co-operation  and  the  return  of  refugees  (directly  related  to  minority  rights).
Since  these  conditions  were  crucial  in  the  assessment  of  the  country’s  ability  to  meet  the
EU’s democratic requirements and successfully conduct the very difficult process of reforms
on its way towards membership in the Euro-Atlantic community, we will thoroughly examine
these issues here.23
23 Owing to the fact that the minority issue is rather complicated in Croatia and directly related to several issues
that are of significant importance, such as the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the Homeland War, the return
of refugees, as well as to the fact that it has different implications for the political life in the country and its
Euro-Atlantic perspective, it will be analysed with special attention in the pages to come.
1.2.1 Co-operation with the ICTY
The first condition was troublesome because it raised painfully sensitive political topics,
which go deep into the very core of the Croatian independence. It required the critical re-
examination of the role Croatia played during the war and the responsibility of its  generals,
who had been celebrated as national heroes. Furthermore, the extradition of the accused
persons to the ICTY also triggered the  issue of the legitimacy of the government to do it, as
the government was run by the party that succeeded the communist one from the ex-
Yugoslavia times and was still regarded in that manner by a significant part of the right wing
oriented population.
The problem was further complicated by the fact that the country had obviously been
the victim of an aggression, and the government found it very difficult to move the political
discourse on this particular issue from the variety of senseless attempts to prove the
impossibility of committing a crime in a defensive war. Inevitably, the conditions imposed on
Croatia by the ICTY were often compared with those imposed on Serbia and were criticised
as comparatively too harsh, given the responsibility that Serbia ought to bear. Therefore, it
required a lot of courage and determination on the part of the country’s officials to continue
implementing the defined goals, and maybe the best example for this, is President Stjepan
Mesic’s decision to retire seven generals in the autumn of 2000 for publicly criticising the
government’s  crackdown  on  persons  suspected  for  war  crimes.  This  was  of  special
significance due to the importance and image that the army had in the country during these
days – that of the national liberator and a crucial pillar of Croatia’s independence and
statehood.  Therefore,  the  president’s  decision  can  be  regarded  as  a  solid  sign  that  the  civil
oversight of the military would be taking place after the gloomy 1990s.
After the 2003 elections, the HDZ government decided to use its first couple of
months in the office, relying on the ‘post-election honeymoon’ period, to start the most
unpleasant moves it was obliged to make. Therefore, it was very efficient in the extradition of
a number of Croatian citizens to the ICTY, and it  achieved a level of co-operation with the
tribunal without serious turmoil that had been unthinkable in the period of the SDP-led
coalition government because of the party’s communist past. Only one person remained at
large, managing to get out of the reach of the Croatian authorities and hide until December
2005,  significantly  burdening  the  country’s  relations  with  the  ICTY,  and  accordingly,  with
the rest of the international community, and the EU in particular.
Moreover, because of that problem, Croatia would probably be remembered as the
only country whose membership negotiations with the EU were postponed after a clear date
for their start had been set. This was, of course, warmly welcomed by a number of Euro-
sceptics, who rushed to prove that this was just another clear sign that ‘Europe does not want
Croatia anyway’. They managed to significantly decrease the public support for the process,
mainly owing to the lack of solid counter-argumentation from the government’s side at that
time, not to mention any sustainable PR campaign. It was a sobering experience, and
although it was difficult to defend the position of the ICTY Chief Prosecutor that “Croatia is
not showing the political will to co-operate fully”, especially after the government’s
performance during its first months in office, it was obvious that the country failed to deliver
on its promise, and if there was no problem with the determination to co-operate, there was
surely one with the democratic oversight of the security sector.
Therefore, capturing the last fugitive represented not only a display of the
determination to fully co-operate with the ICTY, which was never  questioned after the 2000
democratic changes, but a consolidation of the security sector as well, i.e. the achievement of
the ability to conduct it in practice. Having solved this issue, the country has managed to
remove the last major obstacle from its accession track, and finally it came into a position
where it can perform in the EU accession negotiations, which started in November 2005,
without heavy and rather limiting political  pressure from abroad as well  as from within the
country.
However, one should not forget to take into consideration the broader political context
in which the European Council’s decision to start the negotiations with Croatia has been
made. It was the time when ‘more important decisions’ were about to be made. The issue of
the initiation of the membership talks with Turkey proved to be very difficult for the EU in
terms  of  achieving  a  compromise,  i.e.  a  common  position.  It  was  interesting  to  see  how  a
small country like Austria, which was highly sceptical about the Turkish EU bid and
supportive of the Croatian one, managed to use the decision making procedure of the
European Council (the unanimity requirement for enlargement issues), and inter-relate the
solutions for the two, and hence, pave the way for Croatia. Apart from that, the statement of
ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte coincided with the aforementioned political decision
and gave a sort of legitimation to it, opening the floor for various interpretations about the
links between the two.
1.2.2 Regional co-operation
Another issue, not much easier than the previous one, was regional co-operation, which was
provoking a lot of tensions and doubts in the country, owing to the lack of the clarity of the
concept on the one side and some unreasonable fears on the other. Although it was logical
from the EU’s point of view, the condition was often perceived as a step back towards some
form of old/new Yugoslavia. Since the country had just managed to consolidate itself after
getting back its occupied territories Croatia was reluctant to rush into anything that looked
like the undesirable framework it wanted to leave behind, despite the fact that it opened the
perspective of EU integration. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the fact that
some parts of the Croatian society were doing their best to feed these fears, owing to the fact
that  moving  closer  to  transparency,  as  required  by  the  EU,  meant  facing  some  unpleasant
questions about their political activities during the previous decade and the origins of their
wealth. This problem was additionally burdened with the unresolved questions of the
refugees, managing the former Yugoslavia’s debts and assets, as well as certain unsettled
territorial disputes between the region’s countries.
But at  that  moment,  during the first  part  of this decade, it  was of utmost importance
for the coalition government to prove its readiness for serious changes and to adopt policies
compatible with the European democratic standards. The government’s declarations were
constantly tested against the new requirements and the different pressures from the
international community and the EU in particular. It was obvious that, apart from the general
Copenhagen  criteria  required  from all  countries  on  their  path  towards  EU membership,  the
focus would remain on those additional ones originating from the Dayton Peace Process that
were mentioned before. These basic elements would determine what the image of the new
European Croatia would look like and reveal the country’s potential  to be able to become a
member of the European Union.
An issue of serious concern after the HDZ political comeback was its policy towards
the region, but after Croatia solved its major political and security problems, regional co-
operation became the rational choice for the sake of the national interest for various reasons,
especially ones of economic nature. It is also useful to mention that the HDZ government
found itself in a much better position regarding this than its predecessor, owing to the fact
that  in  2003  the  country’s  future  was  much  clearer  than  in  2000,  so  it  was  much  easier  to
invest in regional co-operation while having ‘a solid back-up’ in a visible EU membership
perspective, which was confirmed by the candidate country status that was granted to Croatia
in 2004.
Indeed, there are several examples proving the fact that Croatia went beyond the
‘basic regional co-operation’ required by the EU and started building more constructive
relations with its Eastern neighbours, as well as helping them in their reform process and their
EU and NATO bid. Having achieved a respectable pace of accession to the Euro-Atlantic
structures, and hence, feeling less punished for being cemented in an undesirable framework,
the country was finally able to channel more energy into regional co-operation not only
because of its own economic, security and other interests, but also because it was an excellent
opportunity to show that it is significantly contributing to the efforts of the international
community and the EU in particular, for the stabilisation and sustainable development of the
region.
With  regard  to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia has shown the political will to
support its state-building and democratisation, and hence, it plays an active, although limited,
role  in  the  EU mission  in  BiH,  acting  as  a  host-support  nation.  Croatia  has  been  providing
extensive and vital logistical support to all operations that involve air-sea-land transit or
support  bases.  Even though Croatia has not been asked to contribute troops to ALTHEA, it
has been providing free air control services, and it has done the same for the KFOR
Operation in Kosovo24. Since the officials from Zagreb, regardless of their political
orientation, are doing their best to remain transparent and not ‘step on thin ice’ in their
relations with the Croatian parties from BiH, the only issue that appears to be a disputable
one is the right of the Croatian citizens residing in BiH to vote in Croatia. The debate is
ongoing over the question whether ‘a constitutive nation’ in a neighbouring country could be
regarded as a diaspora, and hence, it should be given the right to vote, just like the Croatians
in other countries all over the world, or should the system follow the ‘no representation
without taxation’ logic. However, the fact that the debate intensifies mostly during the
election year signals that it is more an issue of pre-election mathematics rather than being of
high political significance.
A good example for this is the consequences of the change of the HDZ policy on
supporting the voters in BiH and the reaction of their  political  opponents.  Namely,  the fact
that HDZ started losing its traditional support in BiH forced the ‘loudest opponent’ of the
existing settlement, the SDP, to reconsider its position on the particular issue and to try
24 Additionally, Croatia has been providing EUFOR with medical support as well.
gaining some votes there by nominating candidates that are ‘suitable for the targeted group’.
Therefore, despite of the rather ‘benign’ nature of the issue, the confusion and mis-
interpretations that it sometimes brings into the relations between the two countries,
especially from the point of view of the international community, should be good motivation
to have it clarified sooner rather than later.
The co-operation with Montenegro, after it gained its independence, is positively
developing, especially owing to the fact that there are some positive signs from Podgorica
about the political will to take responsibility, at least on a declarative level, for the role of the
Montenegrin troops in the aggression on Croatia during the early 1990s. Symbolic gestures
worth mentioning are the initiation of the discussion on the highest political level about this
problem, as well as about the possibilities of a compensation for war damage, and the
decision to grant the Croatian president the status of honourable citizen of Podgorica. On the
other hand, Croatia shows the political will to help Montenegro, and it seems that it has
started to take some concrete measures in that regard. However, despite the fact that this is a
recognisable improvement of the relations between the two countries, there is a wide range of
opportunities that are still open, and there are several examples, especially from the business
sector, that give us good reason to believe that it will happen in the future.
Relations with Serbia are also stable and slowly improving, although there is no clear
sign from Belgrade about the preparedness to follow the Montenegrin example in facing the
recent past, and hence, opening a new chapter in their relations with Croatia. The very modest
attempts, such as the one by Serbian President Tadic (June 2007), have been welcomed by
the Croatian officials, although they had been taken with reservations, especially with regards
to the occasion in which the statement was issued and its formulation. It is also true that it is
difficult to expect further significant improvement to happen these days, given the fact that
Serbia is facing a difficult period in its democratic development, and it is especially burdened
with the resolution of Kosovo’s status and its troublesome relations with the ICTY, as well as
coping with the frightening extent of public support for the radical option.
However, Croatia is showing support for its democratisation in different ways –
perhaps the best practical example, apart from the positive spill-over effect of its success in
the reform process, is the assistance to the Serbian government on the aforementioned issue
of  co-operation  with  the  ICTY.  A good  example  for  this  is  the  fact  that  the  Croatian  State
Prosecutor’s Office assisted in preparing the strategy and implementing the plan for the
extradition of the fugitives that are still at large on the basis of Croatian experience. On the
other hand, the Serbian minority in Croatia, which is politically represented in the
government, tends to react rather pro-actively to its inclusion in the decision making process
and  takes  the  role  of  a  link  between  the  two  countries,  in  contrast  with  the  practice  of  the
recent past.
Croatia’s relations with Albania and Macedonia were never burdened with burning
political  issues,  so  they  are  developing  constantly,  both  bilaterally  and  in  the  form  of  the
Adriatic Charter. The mutual support for the EU and NATO bid was always clear, and
especially Macedonia benefited from this co-operation, using different Croatian translations
of the acquis documents.
With regards to Kosovo, Croatia is contributing to its stability in accordance with its
capabilities and under the umbrella of the international peacekeeping and democracy-building
missions. The participation of the Croatian staff in the UNMIK and OSCE missions to
Kosovo  proved  to  be  very  successful,  and  thanks  to  this,  it  is  expected  that  the  Croatian
personnel will take part in an ESDP mission (EULEX), which is planned to be initiated after
the resolution of Kosovo’s status. Furthermore, in accordance with its general harmonisation
with the EU policies, it can be expected that Croatia will keep on supporting the EU policies
in Kosovo.
Despite the fact that Slovenia is rarely considered as a part of the region, some
unsettled disputes are providing relations between the two countries with plenty of dynamics,
and therefore, they deserve to be mentioned here. Fifteen years of independence has
obviously not been enough for the two friendly states to resolve the issues of their common
border, the debt of ‘Ljubljanska Banka’ (Ljubljanska Bank) to Croatian citizens, and the
common  management  of  the  Krsko  nuclear  power-station.  However,  one  should  not
overestimate the importance of the occasional tensions between the two sides, especially
since they tend to occur only during the pre-election period in both countries, as well as the
fact that these disputes are completely overshadowed by the successful co-operation in a
number of other fields.
Of course, all these relations are far from perfect, and there is much to be done, but it
is an undeniable fact that Croatia has enhanced its relations with the countries from the region
by taking a pro-active attitude,  especially after it  managed to pave its  own way towards the
EU membership.
Indeed, it has always been much easier, and ‘less dangerous’, to deal with the region
in a bilateral rather than a regional form, especially from the point of view of a country that
has always been very careful and reluctant to rush into something unfavourable. However,
the success of Croatia’s EU and NATO bid had loosened the tension in this regard as well,
and it enabled the country to take a more constructive role in the regional co-operation
frameworks, especially in those whose membership is not limited to the SAP countries.
Croatia is a member of a number of regional organisations and initiatives, but a detailed
explanation of its participation in each of these goes way beyond the limits of this paper, so
the focus will be kept on those that seem to be the most important and interesting ones.
The establishment of a free-trade area in the region was one of the few high
priorities of the EU, owing to the fact  that  it  was supposed to simplify the economic flows
within the region by combining thirty-one bilateral agreements into one multilateral free trade
agreement, and hence, hopefully attract FDI, help the countries to prepare for a tougher
competition  on  the  EU  market  once  they  join  it,  and  contribute  to  their  economic
development in general. Croatia reacted constructively to the initiative from Brussels,
proposing the extension of the already existing CEFTA to the region and beyond. Apart from
Croatia and Macedonia, and of course Bulgaria and Romania, who were just about to leave it
because they were joining the EU, no country from the region was part of it simply because
they were not meeting the criteria to become one.  Therefore, it seems that this initiative
proved to play a significant role in granting a CEFTA membership to the countries of the
region and Moldova without meeting the criteria, even if one regards it as a smooth
manoeuvre to avoid the proposal of the WBFTA, without being exposed to an accusation for
a lack of regional co-operation. Obviously, this framework was not recognised as a politically
recommendable one, so, having landed successfully after a manoeuvre with a pretty high
altitude of political risk, Croatia managed to avoid rushing into a politically possibly
undesirable package, while positively responding to the economic part of the EU’s proposal,
i.e. the one presented as the crucial reason for the whole initiative.
Continuing the assessment from an economic point of view, it is important to
underline that the country will also have the opportunity to profit considerably from
improved regional cooperation, bearing in mind that its economy is much stronger and more
competitive than that of the others from the region. The endless debates that took place before
the  agreement  was  signed,  as  well  as  the  unsuccessful  attempts  of  some countries  to  retain
some protective  measures,  show that  many of  them will  have  serious  problems  in  terms  of
economic competition with Croatia. On the other hand, having in mind the trade deficit with
the EU, the whole framework can be used as a good opportunity for the country to balance it
out at least to a certain extent.
In accordance with the obvious trends and the needs for regional ownership in South
East Europe, Croatia tends to show an understanding of the importance of the regionally
initiated co-operation frameworks, and its chairmanship of Southeast Europe Co-operation
Process (SEECP) in 2006-07 seems to be a promising example. One special characteristic of
the  SEECP  is  exactly  that  it  is  a  unique  form  of  co-operation  among  the  countries  in  the
region, launched on their  own initiative.  In that  regard,  SEECP seeks to define itself  as the
authentic voice of South East Europe, being complementary to the EU accession process of
the countries in the region, and going hand in hand with the transformation and the gradual
phasing out of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. According to the Report on the
activities of the Croatian Chairmanship-in-Office of the Southeast European Co-operation
Process (SEECP) May 2006/May 200725, the activities of this year were focused on
strengthening regional ownership, promoting the European dimension of the region and
enhancing the operational capabilities of the regional co-operation, as well as intensifying the
co-operation among the parliaments and in the fields of energy, home and justice affairs.
In view of the European integration of the countries of the region, the Chairmanship
gave special attention to intensive co-operation with the EU, and the participation of the EU
representatives in all SEECP meetings and activities.
Apart  from  the  list  of  other  activities,  the  report  lists  the  following  overall
achievements:
? Strengthening the political dialogue, and thus, contributing to stability and security in
South Eastern Europe, as well as the rapprochement of the countries of the region to
the EU and the Euro-Atlantic structures;
? The enhancement of the SEECP through amending the Charter on Good Neighbourly
Relations, Stability, Security and Co-operation in South Eastern Europe;
? The designation of the Seat of the Regional Co-operation Council Secretariat, and the
appointment of the Secretary General of the RCC, thus contributing to setting up the
regional co-operation structure;
? Successful co-operation with the European Commission, the Stability Pact and the
donors in the establishment of the new regional co-operation architecture, especially
its operational capabilities;
? Intensifying regional co-operation in the fields of energy, home and justice affairs,
and parliamentary co-operation.
25For the whole document, see the Official Website of Croatian Government,
www.vlada.hr/hr/content/download/16888/198789/file/07.05.11.Report%20on%20the%20activities%20of%20t
he%20.
Croatia also supports the transformation of the Stability Pact to a regionally owned co-
operation framework, the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC).  By  the  end  of  2008,  a
new framework for regional co-operation called the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC)
will bring together the representatives of South Eastern Europe, including UNMIK/Kosovo,
with the representatives of the international community. This should ensure that the unique
composition of the Stability Pact’s Regional Table, where all countries participate on an
equal footing,  is  maintained. While the SP currently works in 25 different areas via its  task
forces and some secretariats located in the region, the RCC will focus on five priority areas:
economic and social development; infrastructure; justice and home affairs; security co-
operation; building human capital and parliamentary co-operation - an overarching
supporting theme. A decisive step of the transformation of the internationally led Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe into the regionally owned Regional Co-operation Council
(RCC) was made on 10 May 2007, when the Regional Table of the Stability Pact endorsed
the nominations of the RCC’s first Secretary General and the seat of the RCC Secretariat, and
it adopted the RCC Statute. Decisions to endorse the nomination of the State Secretary at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Croatia to be the RCC’s first
Secretary General can be regarded as the recognition of the country’s proactive attitude
towards the region and a good opportunity to show its determination to continue improving in
this area.
1.2.3 Minority rights
The  violation  of  human  rights  and  the  rights  of  national  minorities  was  one  of  the  main
criticisms of the nature of the political system in Croatia during the 1990s. While analysing
these issues, one has to take into consideration the fact that the country inherited a legislative
base for the protection of the rights of national minorities from the former Yugoslav
federation which dealt with the minorities that were recognized at that time (the ‘old
minorities’),  but  the  issue  of  the  'new  minorities'  was  not  resolved.  Although  some  efforts
were directed towards solving the minority issues during the 1990s, true efforts were shown
only in 2000, with the adoption of the Law on the Education of National Minorities and the
Law on the Use of the Language and Letter of National Minorities,  and especially with the
introduction of the Constitutional Law on Minority Rights (CLNM) in 2002.
It is useful to mention that the rights of national minorities were seriously violated in
the former Yugoslavia in the period before the 1974 Constitution. In the framework of the
constitutional changes, three laws dealing with minority rights were adopted:
? Law on the rights of individuals as members of national minorities;
? Law on the collective rights of national minorities;
? Law on the control mechanisms of the implementation of the rights of national
minorities.
On this legal basis, every citizen of the former Yugoslav federation had the right to express
his or her identification with any nation or national minority. Furthermore, the legislation
forbade the spreading of any national, racial and religion based hatred. Besides the basic
human rights related to the remarks above, the members of the national minorities had the
freedom to use and practice their culture, language and letter before the judicial institutions
and the institutions of public administration.
Each  federal  republic  adopted  a  constitutional  law  and  developed  specific  laws  that
define the basic rights of the national minorities in the society and develop a framework of
specific political relations between the majority and national minorities. For instance, the
Socialist Republic of Croatia adopted laws protecting the rights of minorities that guarantee
their representation at the state and local level and participation in the bodies of the state
administration. Also, special commissions were appointed at the local and state level, to
supervise the implementation of these legislative guaranties. 26
The education in the language of the national minorities was guaranteed by five laws
in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, creating a bilingual model of education and a well
developed and organized cultural life for the members of the Hungarian, Czech, Italian,
Slovakian, Russian and Ukrainian national minority.27
All the above-mentioned laws were implemented in the legislation of the Republic of
Croatia in the 1990s. However, the laws were related to only one part of the society, leaving
the rights of the ‘new minorities’, the people of the republics of the former Yugoslav
Federation, unprotected. The international community demanded a reform and strong
legislative for the protection of the ‘new minorities’ in Croatia regarding the post-war climate
in the society, especially towards the Serbian minority. By adopting the Constitutional law on
26 Budakar Vukas. Etnicke manjine i medjunarodni odnosi, (Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1978)
27 Mirjana Domini, Manjine u Alpsko-Jadranskom prostoru (Hrvatska) (Zagreb: Institut za migracije i
narodnosti Sveucilista u Zagrebu, 1990)
the protection of the national minority rights and by ratifying the international conventions
regarding minority issues, the Republic of Croatia only adopted a platform for national
minority rights protection. Owing to the lack of political will at the time, until 2000 none of
the actual laws were practiced in reality. The issue of the protection of the national minority
rights was one of the major preconditions of the international recognition of Croatia’s
sovereignty, and one of the major long-term international obligations put before the country
as a subject of monitoring.
The demographic changes during the 1990s had a major impact on the structure of the
population, and therefore, on the size of the national minorities’ community in Croatia as
well. There was no national minority living in a geographically rounded area, and therefore,
none was entitled to ask for territorial autonomy. Generally, the national minorities required
only the protection of the main national minority rights, as it was stated in the Constitutional
law: the representation of minorities at the local and state level, the freedom of cultural
identity, and religious freedom and education using the language of the national minorities.
Therefore, one may conclude that the issue of the preservation and protection of the national
minority rights at that time was a question of identity, not power.28
By comparing the 1991 and 2001 demographic censuses, we can see major
demographic changes, especially the decrease of the minority population and the increase of
the size of the majority population in Croatia.
The results of the demographic census in 2001 showed a major change in the ethnic
structure of the population compared to the year 1991. In the year 2001, the major national
minorities  were  the  Serbs  with  201,631  members  or  4.54%,  followed by  the  Bosnians  with
20,755  members  or  0.5%,  the  Italians  with  19,636  members  or  0.4%,  the  Hungarians  with
16,595 members or 0.4%, the Albanians with 0.3%, the Slovenians with 13,173 members or
0.3%, the Czechs with 10,510 members or 0.2 %, the Roma with 9,463 members or 0.2%, the
Montenegrins  with  4,926  or  0.1%,  the  Slovakians  with  4,712  members  or  0.1%,  the
Macedonians with 4,270 members or 0.1%, the Germans with 2,902 or 0.1% and the
Russians with 2,337 members or 0.1%, the Ukrainians with 1,977 members, the Jews with
576  members,  the  Poles  with  567,  the  Romanians  with  475,  the  Bulgarians  with  331,  the
Turks with 300, the Austrians with 247 and the Vlahos with 12 members in the total number
of the population.
28 Sinisa Tatalovic, Nacionalne manjine u Hrvatskoj (Split: Stina, 2005).
Table 1.6 Demographic census – Data on national minorities in Croatia in 1991 and
2001
Total 2001 % Male Female Total 1991
Republic Croatia - total 4,437,460 100.0% 2,135,900 2,301,560 4,784,265
Croats 3,977,171 89.6% 1,912,953 2,064,218 3,736,356
National minorities - total 331,383 7.5% 158,990 172,393
Albanians 15,082 0.3% 8,653 6,429 12,032
Austrians 247 0.0% 100 147 214
Bosnians 20,755 0.5% 10,896 9,859 43,469
Bulgarians 331 0.0% 157 174 458
Montenegrins 4,926 0.1% 2,738 2,188 9,724
Czechs 10,510 0.2% 4,930 5,580 13,086
Hungarians 16,595 0.4% 7,482 9,113 22,355
Macedonians 4,270 0.1% 2,018 2,252 6,280
Germans 2,902 0.1% 1,254 1,648 2,635
Poles 567 0.0% 116 451 679
Roma 9,463 0.2% 4,777 4,686 6,695
Romanians 475 0.0% 203 272 810
Russians 906 0.0% 174 732 706
Russins 2,337 0.1% 1,125 1,212 3,253
Slovakians 4,712 0.1% 2,180 2,532 5,606
Slovenians 13,173 0.3% 4,215 8,958 22,376
Serbs 201,631 4.5% 97,481 104,150 581,663
Italians 19,636 0.4% 9,210 10,426 21,303
Turks 300 0.0% 183 117 320
Ukrainians 1,977 0.0% 832 1,145 2,494
Vlahos 12 0.0% 7 5 22
Jews 576 0.0% 259 317 600
Other 21,801 0.5% 11,267 10,534 3,012
No answer
Total 89,130 2.0% 43,537 45,593 73,376
Regional 9,302 0.2% 4,757 4,545 45,493
Unknown 17,975 0.4% 9,153 8,822 62,926
Remark: In the demographic census in 2001, 19,677 citizens identified themselves as Muslims.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistic of the Republic of Croatia, Information on population of national
minorities in Croatia, http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm
The reduction of the national minorities was evident: Serbs - 65%, Montenegrins - 49%,
Slovenians - 41%, Macedonians - 32%, Russians - 28%, Hungarians - 25%, Ukrainians -
20%, Slovakians - 15%, Italians - 7%, while the increase of the national minorities was
evident for the Roma - 41%, the Albanians 25% and the Germans - 10%. The main reasons
for the decrease of the size of the national minorities are:
? The consequences of the Homeland War that took place from 1991 to 1995;
? Geographical reasons - the dispersal of the members of national minorities;
? Urbanization  and  the  migration  of  the  rural  population  to  cities,  which  leads  to  the
weakening of village communities;
? The migration of the population abroad, especially during and after the Homeland
War;
? The higher education of the members of the national minorities, which leads to social
moving;
? Mixed marriages;
? The weakening of cohesive elements, replaced by identification with professional,
social or regional groups.29
It is important to emphasize the fact that the demographic census in 1991 should be assessed
with a certain amount of reservation because many Croats, Serbs and Bosnians identified
themselves as Yugoslavians in 1991 and by 2000 changed their declaration. This should be
interpreted as a reflection of the positive change of the political climate for the national
minorities.
The 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia constituted Croatia as a “... national
state of Croatian people and the members of other people and minorities that are citizens of
Croatia: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenians, Czechs, Slovakians, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and
others to whom the state guarantees equality with citizens of Croatian nationality.”30
The regulation of minority issues in the Constitution was not thorough and adequate
according to the reports of the international community, and therefore, it needed changes.
Hence, Croatia had to improve the legislative framework for minority rights by adopting a
Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities (1992) and by trying
to  follow  the  examples  of  countries  such  as  Hungary,  Estonia  and  Latvia,  as  they  were
considered to be ones that had achieved significant progress in this area. The main issues
related to the context of the constitutional law were:31
? The general protection of national minorities;
? The institutionalization of cultural autonomy;
? Development  and equality;
? Co-operation with the 'home countries';
? The right for non-discrimination, identity, religion and culture;
? The right for the public and private use of language and letter;
? The use of national symbols;
? The bilingual use of city and community names in some cases;
29 Ibid, str. 26
30 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Preamble.
31 The Constitutional law on human rights and freedoms and rights and freedoms of national minorities, 1990,
http://hrvatska.poslovniforum.hr/nn-arhiva/0003e/03e89.asp
? The education of the members of the national minorities at  all  levels (this issue was
thoroughly explained in the special law afterwards)
? The  representation  of  the  members  of  the  national  minorities  at  the  local  and  state
level.32
The Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Rights of National Minorities was, without any
doubt, in accordance with the highest standards recommended by the international
community. However, mainly due to the consequences of war, the total size of the national
minority  decreased  below  8%  of  the  total  population,  which  negatively  affected  the
representation of minorities in state institutions, not to mention at the local level.
The adoption of the new Constitution Law on Minority Rights in 2000 made certain
changes regarding the protection of minority rights:
? The full protection of the principle of non-discrimination;
? Full protection against any action aimed to endanger national minorities;
? The  right  for  identity,  culture,  religion,  the  public  and  private  use  of  language  and
letter as well as education;
? Equal participation in public affairs;
? The right of each person to decide to which national minority s/he belongs.33
The implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
was extremely important for the protection of the rights of national minorities in Croatia.
Croatia’s first report on the implementation of the aforementioned Framework Convention in
1999 showed, besides the general efforts to improve the position of the minorities, the
obstruction of their rights by the state administration. Major efforts were invested into the
organisation and work of the Government’s Office for National Minorities,  which managed
to function despite the generally inadequate political climate through programs and different
types of co-operation with NGOs dealing with national minority issues. Another essential
document for the protection of national minority rights is the Convention for the Protection of
Regional and National Minority Languages, upon which Croatia adopted the Law on
National Minority Languages and Letter. As a member of the Council of Europe, Croatia has
adopted many legal obligations and taken many concrete obligations in this regard, such as
32 The national minorities that are represented in the total demographic census by more than 8% had the right to
be represented in the parliament, the government and the judicial instititions.
33 The Constitutional  law on human rights and freedoms and rights and freedoms of national minorities 2000.
the  ratification  of  the  Framework  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  National  Minorities,  co-
operation with ICTY, following the Dayton agreement, the respect of human rights, the rights
of refugees, the freedom of the media and the conduct of free and fair elections. 34
Croatia has adopted a model of protecting national minority rights that, first of all,
recognizes the existence of national minorities, and secondly, assures not only the cultural
autonomy but the representation of national minorities at all levels of the state apparatus.
The  first  model  of  the  protection  of  national  minorities  was  introduced  in  1997.  It
assured the preservation and development of (ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious)
identity for national minorities individually and in associations with all citizens, with an
emphasis on joint efforts directed at stopping assimilation and ensuring the preservation of
the diversity of the society.35 In the period between the report in 1999 and the one in 2003, a
lot of recommendations were adopted, and in that time a whole legal framework was created.
There was a major improvement of the legal basis for the protection of minority rights and
the right for own language and representation at all levels of the state apparatus. Besides the
representation at all state levels, a special mechanism was introduced through the institutions
of councils and representatives. The number of the representatives of the national minorities
in the parliament also increased. However, many issues remained unresolved, such as the
economic position and perspective of all citizens living in parts of Croatia where war had
devastated the economic infrastructure, including members of national minorities. This is
specifically related to the return of refugees, the return of their property, and employment.36
The Opinion on the Report of the Republic Croatia on the Implementation of the
Framework Convention on Minority Rights in 2004 showed that many steps were undertaken
to implement the Framework Convention on Minority Rights and to strengthen the dialogue
between the majority and the minority in the society. However, certain problems remained
unresolved,  such  as  the  representation  of  the  members  of  national  minorities  in  the  judicial
system, the use of other languages at the local level, and ‘the Roma question’.37
By implementing the recommendations of the Framework Convention, Croatia has
shown the determination to build an adequate model of protection according to the historical,
cultural and national specifications of the country. The Constitutional Law on Human Rights
34 Sinisa Tatalovic, Nacionalne manjine u Hrvatskoj (Split: Stina, 2005).
35 Sinisa Tatalovic, “Model of Realization of Ethnic Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia,”
Politicka misao, vol. 34 (1997).
36 Report of Republic Croatia on Implementation of Framework Convention of Minority Rights, Zagreb, 2004.
37 Ibid.
and the Rights of National Minorities was a part of a set of political obligations taken in the
framework of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, and therefore, an important
stepping stone on Croatia’s path towards a full-fledged membership in the EU38. Extremely
important for the European Commission was the general increase of minority representation
in  the  local  bodies,  and  especially  the  increase  of  the  number  of  minority  MPs  at  the  state
level  from 5  in  the  year  2000  to  8  in  the  year  2003.  Besides  that,  the  fact  that  Croatia  has
ratified all conventions of the Council of Europe and has concluded bilateral agreements
about the protection of minority rights with Italy, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro was very
well received, while the practice of the use of the language and the education of minorities
was graded satisfactory. The special model of representation through councils and
representatives at the local level was seen as very effective, with special focus on the
importance of a better representation of the members of national minorities in public services.
On the  other  hand,  the  European  Commission  was  critical  about  the  media  and  the  lack  of
adequate programs on minority languages.
The Roma question was identified as one of utmost importance, and the European
Commission welcomed the adoption of the National Program for the Roma in accordance
with the “Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015”. Apart from that, the Serbs in Croatia, as the
largest minority, have a special status. Therefore, the European Commission has pointed out
the increase of the number of Serbs since the war, the return of refugees, as well as the return
of their property. It is also important to notice that the government made a broad political
agreement with the representatives of the Serbian minority in 2003 and put their
representatives in high positions in the executive branch, which gave them the opportunity to
positively influence the general position of their minority.39
The important role in the protection of national minority rights is also thoroughly
monitored by the OSCE. Apart  from its  generally positive evaluation,  the remarks from the
OSCE are mainly related to the representation of the members of national minorities in the
judiciary system and the electoral lists that were not updated.40 However, as it will be clear at
the end of this section, a major proof of democratic maturity in the country, at least from the
38 Sinisa Tatalovi, „Europski mehanizmi zastite nacionalnih manjina,“ in Godisnjak Sipan 2004 (Zagreb:
Politicka kultura, 2005).
39 European Commission, The European Commission opinion on the application of Croatia for membership of
the EU (Brussels, 2004), http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/Download/2004/04/27/Misljenje_EK-hrv.pdf.
40 Status Report No. 15 on Croatia’s Progress in Meeting International Commitments, 2004, http://www.
osce.org/documents/mc/2004/11/3828_en.pdf.
perspective of this international organisation, is the fact that the OSCE has ended its mission
in Croatia.
In conclusion, it is useful to remember that the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the
European Commission have issued reports on Croatia’s progress in the field of the protection
of national minorities in the year 2007. These observations about changes related to the
implementation of the Constitutional Law on National Minorities seem to be generally
positive, with some remarks related to the slow changes in practice, the return of refugees and
their property, the protection of the Roma and the integration of the Serbian national minority
into the society. Perhaps the best way to assess the situation on these issues in Croatia these
days is to quote a part of the Report of the Head of the OSCE Office in Zagreb, Ambassador
Jorge Fuentes to the OSCE Permanent Council in 2008:
"The efforts and progress by Croatia in fulfilling OSCE commitments have permitted
the culmination of a process that began almost 12 years ago when the Mission to Croatia was
established in the aftermath of the armed conflict. The Mission has been a success for both
the OSCE and Croatia and the final balance is quite positive. Croatia has proved to be a stable
and maturing democracy, subject to irreversible and self-sustaining reform processes through
its institutional and organizational framework. The processes for EU and NATO membership
represent additional guarantees. Croatia’s completion of most aspects of the Mission’s
mandate convinced the Permanent Council to close the Mission. Since further progress was
warranted in relation to several mandate issues, notably the prosecution of war crimes, the PC
established the Office in Zagreb.
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) has indicated his
continued engagement with the protection and promotion of rights of persons belonging to
national minorities in Croatia, consistent with his engagement in all Participating States.” 41
According to the Progress Report of the European Commission in 2007, “...major
progress in the field of protection of national minority rights is evident with remarks related
to the implementation of Constitution Law on Minority Rights (CLNM) in practice,
especially related to the action plan covering all state institutions concerned with CLNM.
Problems persist, particularly in terms of under-representation of minorities in state
administration, judiciary and police. Elections for the local councils of national minorities
have showed progress in comparison to the 2003 elections but with a still low voter turn-out.
41 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Report of the Head of the OSCE Office in Zagreb
Ambassador Jorge Fuentes to the OSCE Permanent Council, 2008, http://www.osce.org /documents
/mc/2008/03/30456_en.pdf .
Protection of cultural rights of national minorities has been satisfactory with remarks
to the representation of minorities in the media and bi-lingual rights guaranteed in
municipalities and towns that haven’t been adequately protected.”42
One can conclude that Croatia, if we put aside the few aforementioned remarks, has
developed a solid model of the legal basis and practical experience in the field of the
protection of national minority rights, serving as a model for other countries in the region that
are still facing severe difficulties in this field. By working hard on the recommendations of
the international community and the elimination of the remaining ethnic tensions, mainly by
the inclusion of the minorities into the Croatian society, it has managed to consolidate the
mechanisms of minority protection, as well as its democracy in general, and continued
successfully with the negotiations towards membership in the EU and NATO.
1.2.4 Religious freedoms
When considering religious freedoms in Croatia since the independence, it is important to
mention that religion and ethnicity are closely intertwined, which makes it difficult to
distinguish between ethnic and religious discrimination in those years. Religion as a term that
connected to ethnicity led to violence, including the destruction of religious institutions
during the war. Also, when mentioning the violent behaviour of the members of different
nationalities, it is important to underline the fact that this behaviour was not based on
religion, but it has been ethnically motivated during the past few years.
A comparison of the reports regarding religious freedom shows major progress
regarding the process of the democratization of the society in this specific field. Therefore, it
is useful to present some key observations from the U.S. State Department reports, as well
from those of the European Commission.
According to the Religious Freedom Report of the US State Department, in 1999, the
approximate religious breakdown of the country was: Roman Catholic 85 %, Orthodox
Christian,  5%,  Muslim  1%,  Jewish  1%,  atheist  3%  and  other  5%.  The  high  percentage  of
Roman Catholics makes the Roman Catholic Church predominant in the society, especially
taking  into  account  its  historic  relationship  with  the  Holy  Seat  and  the  great  support  to  the
Croatian independence it offered during the early 1990s. According to the report, the freedom
42 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document 'Croatia 2007 Progress Report' Accompanying
The Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament and The Council Enlargement
Strategy And Main Challenges 2007-08,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf.
of conscience and religion and the free public profession of religious conviction is provided
by the Constitution, and they are also respected in practice. In addition, these are some of its
other findings: “There were no restrictions regarding conducting public services or opening
charitable and social institutions. Religion training was provided in schools and it was
optional for all religions if they fill the necessary quota. Unfortunately, due to the lack of
resources and adequate teachers, the training is mainly offered in Catholic catechism. As a
contribution of religious institutions regarding mainly ethnic issues in post-war society,
churches have organized meetings with the intent of reconciliation, especially between the
Catholic and the Orthodox Church”.43
According  to  the  Religious  Freedom  Report  of  the  US  State  Department,  in  2002,
“There was no change in the status of religious freedom during the period covered by this
report, and the democratic coalition government continued to contribute to the generally free
practice of religion.”44
It is indicative that the representatives of several minority religion groups have stated
that the overall climate for religious freedom has improved since the 2000 election of the
coalition government, meaning more media space for different religious communities. The
issues of the restitution of the nationalized property has remained a problem for the major
religious groups, mainly the Catholic, Orthodox, and Jewish ones. The period after 2000 is
significant for the legislation adopted regarding the freedom of religion. In 2002, the Law on
the Legal Status of the Religious Communities defined the legal position of the communities
with regard to government funding, tax benefits and education.
According to the Religious Freedom Report of the US State Department, in 2006, the
main changes were related to the legislation. “In 2003 Regulation on Forms and Maintaining
Records of Religious Communities in Croatia was approved and it  led to the registration of
forty  religious  communities.  Understanding  of  differences  is  very  important  for  the  social
cohesion  of  the  society,  therefore  media  can  make  a  great  contribution.  In  Croatia  in  2005,
Croatian Radio Television (HRT) recognized that importance and signed an agreement with
eight minority religious communities guaranteeing equal representation in its programs on
weekly and monthly coverage and obligated to report on all the major celebrations. Other
than that it is important to mention that Catholic Church operates one of the private radio
43US State Department, Croatia - International Religious Freedom Report 1999, http://atheism.about.com
/library/irf /irf99/blirf_croatia99.htm.
44 US State Department, Croatia - International Religious Freedom Report 2002, http://www.state.gov/gov/
g/dr/rls/irf/2002/13926.htm.
stations.  Regarding religious holy days, Muslims have the right to celebrate their holy days
and they are granted a paid holiday for one Bairam day”45. The report mentions schools
organized for members of the minorities, including a Jewish private school, an Islamic
secondary school, an Orthodox secondary school, with plans for university levels, as well as
the restitution of property as a remaining problem in this period, too.
The Catholic Church has had a great influence in the society, advocating traditional
values.  For instance, in 2005 the Church publicly criticized the international Global Fund’s
MEMOAIDS, which was designed to raise awareness about the importance of the use of
contraception, especially among the youth. On the other hand, the church works hard on
ethnic and religious reconciliation. It is also worth adding that according to surveys, the
institution that people have most trust in is still the Church. Also, in the light of contemporary
trends in the relations between Islam and Christianity, it is important to underline that Croatia
is one of the four countries in Europe that fully recognize Islam, and where the Muslim
society has been successfully integrated into the society.46 This represents a promising
potential for the further enhancement of Croatia’s relations with the Islamic world, which has
shown some results in the last years. In its conclusion, the US State Department  report states
the following: “During the period covered by this report, human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and religious leaders noted that overall ethnic and religious relations
remained stable.”47
Owing to the importance of the EU’s evaluation of Croatia’s overall democratic
progress, it is important to take into consideration the European Commission’s Commission
Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report,  which also generally confirms that
the freedom of religion is guaranteed in Croatia. Therefore, only a small part of the report
deals  with  this  issue,  saying  that  “There  have  been  no  particular  difficulties  as  regards  the
freedom of religion.“48
45 US State Department, Croatia - International Religious Freedom Report 2006,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/ irf/2006/71374.htm
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Croatia 2007 Progress Report Accompanying
The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council Enlargement Strategy
and Main Challenges 2007-2008, {COM(2007) 663 final}, 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/strategy_paper_en.pdf .
1.2.5 Media freedoms
The mass media in Croatia during the 1990s experienced dramatic challenges. Although the
fall  of the communist  regime led to increased freedom of the press,  the development of the
press  at  that  time  experienced  many  difficulties.  According  to  the  Nations  in  transit  1999-
2000 Report on Croatia, which illustrates the media freedom in Croatia during the 1990s,
“...freedom of expression and press is guaranteed by the Constitution. Journalists can be
prosecuted for insult and defamation. The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists
reported in 1998 that there were 300 criminal proceedings against journalists and more than
600 civil suits against newspapers, mainly Globus, Nacional, Feral Tribune and Novi list.
The Law on Telecommunications and Post assured a monopoly for the Croatian Radio-
Television (HRT), which, on the other hand, served as a tool for President Tudjman’s
campaign and authoritarian regime. In the nineties a number of independent radio and
television stations were closed. Monopoly in newspaper distribution was mainly given to
Tisak,  a  company close to the HDZ establishment.  The Freedom House’s annual Survey of
Press Freedom rated Croatia “Partly free” from 1994 through 1996 and “Not free” from 1997
through 1999.”49
In the meantime, after the 2000 democratic changes, significant efforts were invested
into changing the position of the media in the Croatian society. Major efforts were directed
towards the reform of Croatian Television, which has managed to become an ordinary public
television, after being a PR agency of the political elites during the 1990s. This progress was
recognized in the EU, and according to the European Commission’s Working Document, the
Croatia 2007 Progress Report, the freedom of the press in Croatia is seen as follows:
“Freedom of expression including freedom and pluralism of the media continue to be
provided for in Croatia. Some progress has been made in following up the recommendations
of the 2004 joint expert mission for changes to the laws on electronic media and on Croatian
radio and television. Following a renewed public tender, parliament appointed the remaining
four members of the State news agency HINA management board. However, the public
broadcaster HRT continues to be subject to occasional political pressure, raising concerns
49 United Nations, Nations in Transit 1999-2000: Country Report of Croatia,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/ groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan008362.pdf.
about freedom of expression. There are possibilities for undue political influence on the
media at the local level, with much of the media at this level in public hands.”50
Taking into consideration the developments since 2000 and the messages from these
reports, it is obvious that recognisable progress has been made in the last decade, but also that
there is room for further improvement.
1.3 The functioning of the Parliament and parliamentary control
1.3.1 The evolution of the parliamentary practice in Croatia
As it was already mentioned, the legal basis of representative governance is drawn from the
concept of inseparable national sovereignty. Therefore, if the sovereignty belongs to the
nation as an abstract constitutional subject, and it is regarded as something that consists of not
only contemporary but also past and future generations as well, it is obvious that governance
cannot be conducted by its every single member or by the nation as a whole. Therefore,
modern democracies recognise the institution of the representative body (the parliament) as a
legal expression of the will of the nation, which is given legitimation at the parliamentary
elections that are conducted every four years.
As  it  is  the  case  in  all  other  modern  democratic  systems,  the  Croatian  constitution
recognises the principle of national sovereignty, understanding ‘nation’ as a comprehensive
term that includes all Croatian citizens, regardless of their ethnic, religious or any other
differences.51 Owing to the fact that, according to Article 1 of the Croatian Constitution, the
nation exercises its power by electing its representatives, it is obvious that the concept of
representative governance is accepted, and in line with that, the Constitution (Article 70)
clearly states that the Croatian Parliament is a representative body of the Croatian citizens as
well  as  the  main  body  of  the  legislative  branch  in  the  country.  According  to  the  1990
Constitution, the Croatian parliament had a bicameral structure, and it consisted of the House
of Representatives and the House of Counties, where the first one used to hold all the
authorities of a parliament, while the other represented a form of regional representation.
Regarding  the  discussion  about  the  role  of  the  parliament  and  its  relations  with  the
other branches of power at that time, it is useful to mention that the Croatian president had
the right for a life-long seat in the House of Counties after the expiration of his presidential
50 European Commission, European Commission’s Working Document - Croatia 2007 Progress Report,
http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement /pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf.
51 The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Article 1.
mandate. Apart from that, he had the so-called ‘virile right’, which was characteristic of pre-
modern electoral history and represented the right to individually appoint several persons to
the representative body and thus influence its structure and the political relations within it.
According to the 1990 Constitution, the president was entitled to name five representatives to
the House of Counties, through whom he used his position to strengthen the absolute majority
of his party in it.
This is only one of a number of examples that the functioning of the Croatian
parliament in the first decade of the post-communist transformation was conducted in a
paradoxical way. While the enormous symbolic importance of the Croatian parliament was
almost unquestioned, its real political importance was somewhat different, and it was marked
by the marginalisation of its position in the political system, especially in relation to the
dominant executive branch, which manifested in the position of the country’s president, as
well as to some non-institutional political subjects, such as political parties, security services,
and informal interest groups.
The significant symbolical importance of the Croatian parliament is derived from its
historical role of the ‘guardian of the Croatian sovereignty’, owing to the fact that during the
centuries, regardless of the wider political frameworks that Croatia was part of (the Habsburg
Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Kingdom SHS, the communist Yugoslavia), it
represented the main institutional guarantee of the independent political life. In general, that
was frequently used as a proof of the continuity of the Croatian municipal right, as well as the
basic argument for the right to form a modern Croatian nation state.52
However, the development in the 1990s shows the evolution from a complicated
representative body during communist times, followed by a marginalised representative body
with limited functionality in the era of the dominant executive branch, to a better structured
and functional unicameral representative body after 2001, which represents a recognisable
political counter-balance to the executive branch in the new parliamentary system. In fact, the
bicameral structure of the parliament introduced with the 1990 Constitution was questioned
from the very beginning of its existence, mainly because of the fact that its essential part of
defending regional representation and decentralisation was rather questionable in the unitary
state of Croatia in the 1990s. Apart from that, during its two mandates, the House of Counties
in its praxis mainly followed the interests of the party in power (HDZ), and instead of
representing the regional interests regardless of the political characteristics, it acted as a
52 As it was mentioned in the first chapter (p. 11-12), this symbolic importance is incorporated in the Preamble
of the Croatian Constitution, representing a basis for the proclamation of independence.
second-class representative body, i.e. the copy of the first house, with less authority and
fewer responsibilities. In short, it was not only that the bicameral structure was not in line
with the Croatian parliamentary tradition53, but the House of Counties simply did not function
as an effective representative body, either. Furthermore, its existence significantly
complicated and slowed down the procedure of decision-making in the parliament, which
negatively affected the already weak position of the legislative body vis-à-vis the strong
executive branch personalised in the institution of the President of the Republic.
As  it  was  already  mentioned,  the  legal  and  political  position  of  the  President  of  the
Republic  was  among  the  most  controversial  issues  of  the  Croatian  political  system  in  the
1990s. During the period of drafting the 1990 Constitution, the need for a powerful institution
of the president in the semi-presidential political system was based on the argument about the
specific environment in which the country started its state-building process, which was
marked by turbulence, armed conflicts, and which required functional and stable authorities,
which cannot be achieved with a purely parliamentary system characterised by a
fragmentation of the party system, instable parliamentary majorities and very weak
governments.
The constitutional conception of governance was formulated mainly according to the
understanding  and  preferences  of  the  first  Croatian  president,  who  was,  owing  to  the  clear
majority with which his party won in the 1990 elections, in a position to significantly
influence the main determinants of the constitution. In accordance with his ‘degaulleistic
perception’ of politics, marked by beliefs related to the historic roles of national leaders in the
process of state-building, the first Croatian constitution was characterised by a dominating
presidential position, with competences for individual decision-making on the important
political  issues.  Furthermore,  the populist  nature of HDZ, which used to function more as a
movement than as a party, required a leader in a traditional sense, whose undisputed authority
would have an integrative effect on the different factions within the movement and prevent its
dissolution.
Despite the fact that the constitution itself provided the president with a significant
amount  of  power,  such  as  the  right  to  appoint  and  dismiss  the  president  of  the  government
and its members, the right to issue legislations with the power of law in extraordinary
circumstances and many others, the prevailing interpretations of the accumulation of power
in  the  hands  of  the  president  during  the  1990s  tend  to  find  the  main  reasons  for  that  in  a
53 Throughout history, the Croatian parliament had always been unicameral.
combination of the above-mentioned constitutional provisions and the environment as well as
the manner in which the governance was conducted. During the entire time he was in office
(1990-99), President Tudjman could rely on the undisputable parliamentary majority of the
party, where he preserved his position of unchallenged leader.
Apart from that, he established a parallel mechanism of presidential bodies and
advisers, which were functioning de facto as the highest decision-making bodies, responsible
only to the president.54 Apart from that, as it was partially mentioned before, the complexity
of the bicameral parliamentary procedure, combined with the extreme conditions in the
period of aggression and the occupation of a significant part of the country, created a
situation where the executive branch (especially the president) had a clear political initiative.
Furthermore, their dominance in that period was clearly visible from the fact that during the
first few years, a large number of laws and regulations were adopted using the so-called
‘emergency procedure’, which dramatically narrowed down the time and the possibilities for
the discussion of the respective issues in the parliament, and hence, marginalised the role of
the representative body, not to mention any form of parliamentary oversight, which would be
typical for developed democracies.
1.3.2 The New Constitutional Arrangement
These were the main reasons for the constitutional changes at  the beginning of this decade,
which followed the political changes in 2000 and marked a new beginning in Croatia’s
political life, and a new dynamics in its relations with the Euro-Atlantic community. One of
the main characteristics of the new constitutional setting is the transformation of the political
system from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary one, with a dramatically lower authority
of the president vis-à-vis the prime minister within the executive branch, as well as the
improved position of the legislative branch, i.e. the new unicameral parliament.
1.3.2.1 Parliamentary committees
The working bodies of the parliament are undoubtedly among the most important
mechanisms of the functionality of the parliament and its oversight of the executive branch.
Their structure, number, and competences are determined in the Rules of procedure of the
Croatian parliament. The so-called parliamentary committees were formed in order to ensure
54 See details on this issue in the next section, which deals with the political power relations.
a debate on specific topics before the final parliamentary procedure, as well as the
preparation of materials for the plenary sessions. However, the fact that they are field-
oriented gives them a kind of legitimacy to influence or at least to shape the final decision in
the  parliament,  which  also  makes  the  parliament  itself  more  legitimate  and  efficient  in  the
decision-making process vis-à-vis the  executive  branch  on  the  given  issue,  and  hence,  to  a
certain extent, this contributes to its oversight of the political system in general.
The Croatian parliament has twenty-four working committees and a Board for
Mandates and Immunity. When analysing their competences, one can conclude that a
significant number of these corresponds to the government’s different fields of activities (the
Committee for Agriculture and Forestry, the Committee for Finance and State Budget, etc.),
while some follow the logic of parliamentary work (the Committee for the Constitution, the
Rules of Procedure and the Political System, the Committee for Applications and Complaints,
etc.), or they concentrate on important and specific fields (the Committee for Gender
Equality, the Committee for Human Rights and the Rights of Minorities, etc.).55
Owing to the changing international environment marked by integration processes and
the new dynamics of both the domestic and the foreign policy,  as well  as to the significant
increase of the importance of the parliament in Croatia’s political system after the
constitutional changes, this representative body assumes more competences and
responsibilities, which requires a division and specialisation of labour and responsible
decision-making, where the role of the parliamentary committees becomes more visible. One
may conclude that the parliamentary committees have an extraordinary significance in this
constellation, especially with regards to the specific relations between the legislative and
executive branches. In order to provide the reader of this study with a general picture of the
parliamentarian committees’ competences, their full list can be found below.
? Committee for Constitution, Rules of Procedure and Political System;
? Committee for Legislature;
? Committee for Foreign Policy;
? Committee for Interior Policy and National Security;
? Committee for Finance and State Budget;
? Committee for Economy, Development and Reconstruction;
? Committee for Tourism;
55 Generally, the committees consist of MPs, and their structure depends on the political consensus of the
position and opposition. However, in some cases, the members are not MPs, but. experts or members of some
interest groups (syndicates).
? Committee for Human Rights and Rights of Minorities;
? Committee for Judiciary;
? Committee for Labour, Social Policy and Public Health;
? Committee for Family, Youth and Sports;
? Committee for Immigration;
? Committee for War Veterans;
? Committee for Physical Planning and Environmental Protection;
? Committee for Education, Science and Culture;
? Committee for Agriculture and Forestry;
? Committee for Maritime Affairs, Transport and Communications;
? Committee for Selection, Appointments and  Administrative Services;
? Committee for Applications and Complaints;
? Committee for Inter-parliamentary Co-operation;
? Committee for European Integration;
? Committee for Informing, Informatisation and Media;
? Committee for Gender Equality;
? Committee for Local and Regional Self-management;
? Board for Mandates and Immunity.56
1.3.2.2 Other forms of parliamentary control over the activities of the government
Besides the typical legislative competence (i.e. the adoption of laws), the Croatian parliament
has authority over the confirmation of international treaties (ratification) concluded by the
representatives of the country’s executive branch with international partners. Taking into
consideration the fact that international treaties are not considered to be enacted until they are
ratified in the parliament, it is obvious that this form of confirmation gives a power of
oversight over the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy to the representative body.57
Apart from the fact that, like in any other parliamentary system, the representative
body appoints and dismisses the government, there are some other mechanisms that ensure its
oversight over the executive branch. One of these is MPs’ right to question the members of
the government during the so-called ‘actual morning session’, which is regularly conducted at
56 Rules of Procedure of Croatian Parliament, Article 56 (Croatian), www.poslovniforum.hr/ zakoni/poslovnik_
hrvatskog_sabora.asp.
57 An excellent example for this is the so-called Border Agreement with Slovenia, which was signed by the
prime minister but never ratified in the parliament, and hence, it was never considered relevant.
the beginning of every parliamentary session. There are two forms of question that an MP
may direct to the members of the government – oral or written ones. The first form is mainly
used during the above-mentioned ‘actual morning session’, while the second one can be
directed  to  the  members  of  the  government  any  time.  The  members  of  the  government  are
obliged to respond to the MPs’ questions in an appropriate form, according to the Rules of
Procedure of the Croatian Parliament.
Another mechanism is the right for interpellation, which is in essence similar to the
right to question the members of the government because the question is raised from the side
of the parliament and requires a response from the government’s side. However, it differs
from the previous mechanism at least in two details. First, the right for interpellation is
regularly given to a group of MPs, while the right to question the government belongs to each
MP individually. Second, in the case of interpellation, a discussion in the representative body
follows the government’s response, which may be a subject of voting in the parliament as a
form of evaluating its quality or MPs’ satisfaction with it.58
Also, according to Article 91 of the Croatian Constitution, the parliament may
exercise the oversight of the government, i.e. the entire public administration, with its special
boards for investigation, which have the right to question and investigate certain activities of
the government and the public administration. In the parliamentary practice in different
countries, these boards very often act as hearing boards or some form of special courts for
state officials and employees.59
One can conclude that significant political changes have taken place in the Croatian
political system during the last decade. These changes have had a positive impact on the
transitional reform process on the country’s path towards its place in the Euro-Atlantic
structures. Croatia has drastically changed its reputation and general image in the
international community, which has been confirmed on several occasions. The specific
consequences of these will be assessed in the pages to come.
Bearing in mind the information about ‘the sovereignty holder’ in any modern
republic, we can say that all these changes would have no significance if they were not ‘for
the people’. Therefore, it would be interesting to see the attitude of the Croatian citizens
58 The right for interpellation was introduced in the 2000 Constitution as one of the innovations in the
framework of changing the political system from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary one.
59 While the praxis in Croatia on this matter is still in the developing phase, these kind of boards are very well
known in countries like the US and France.
towards the national political institutions, as well as towards the international ones, in
comparison with the attitude of European citizens.
Table 1.7 Trust in institutions
TENDS TO BELIEVE TENDS NOT TO
BELIEVE
DOES NOT KNOW
EU 27 CROATIA EU 27 CROATIA EU 27 CROATIA
GOVERNMENT 34% 20% 59% 75% 7% 5%
PARLIAMENT 35% 20% 56% 75% 9% 5%
DOMESTIC JUDICIARY 47% 14% 46% 79% 7% 7%
EUROPEAN UNION 48% 32% 36% 57% 16% 11%
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
55% 40% 27% 41% 18% 19%
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
50% 39% 26% 41% 24% 20%
COUNCIL of the EU 44% 41% 25% 40% 31% 19%
EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK
47% 34% 24% 38% 29% 25%
UNITED NATIONS 53% 39% 30% 49% 17% 12%
POLICE 64% 45% 31% 50% 5% 5%
ARMY 71% 59% 19% 33% 10% 8%
RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS
46% 55% 42% 39% 12% 6%
SYNDICATES 39% 35% 45% 53% 16% 12%
POLITICAL PARTIES 18% 8% 75% 86% 7% 6%
CONSUMERS’ UNIONS 65% 54% 22% 31% 13% 15%
Source: Country Report - Croatia, EUROBAROMETER 68, Autumn 2007 – http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_hr_nat.pdf
It can be seen from Table 1.7 that the general trust of the Croatian citizens in national
institutions is still rather low in comparison with that of the European citizens. However,
despite their traditional scepticism, there is an obvious increasing trend if we take into
account the surveys from past years, which have shown minimal percentages in these
categories.  On the other hand, the sign of traditionalism can be traced in the relatively high
confidence in the army and religious institutions, which seems to be the only category that is
above the 50% margin. It is expected that the confidence in domestic institutions will rise in
parallel  with  the  country’s  progress  on  the  track  to  a  membership  in  the  Euro-Atlantic
community, mainly because it assumes the increase of these institutions’ transparency and
functionality. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the fact that this progress assumes
taking more difficult steps in the final stage of the transition process, which includes
unpopular measures that have to be taken by the national government at home. This complex
of relations may significantly decrease the popularity of both the national and the European
institutions,  as  it  was  the  case  in  the  majority  of  the  former  transitional  countries,  so  these
effects should not be excluded in the analysis of the Croatian data, either.
1.4 The restructuring of the political power relations (confrontations and consensus-
building)
1.4.1 Political power relations in the former Yugoslavia
In order to understand the political power relations in Croatia during the 1990s and today, it
is  very  important  to  take  a  look  at  the  structure  and  praxis  of  these  relations  in  the  former
federation. This one may find helpful when trying to assess whether there was any tradition
of power sharing that may be useful for a consensus-oriented political behaviour or culture in
the contemporary society of the country.
The  general  societal  system  of  the  former  Yugoslavia,  together  with  its  subsystems
(political, economic, etc.), may be regarded as an example of an inseparable monolithic
mechanism, organised on the principle of a revolutionary-quasi-democratic hierarchy, where
the lower instances absolutely and uncritically obey the order of the higher ones. At the top of
the pyramid there was the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia, which consisted of approximately a dozen persons, who were responsible for
running the country and every segment of the society. Their members were in charge of the
particular parts of the system, which was divided into sectors and based on a general state
monopoly over the production assets.
This general description of the system reveals that its structure was built as a replica
of the internal organisation of the communist party. Despite the fact that the political system
was based on the principle of the so-called representative democracy, the power de facto
belonged only to the party elites. Therefore, the representative bodies had a marginal role in
the political  system and were no threat  at  all  for the party elites’ monopoly in the decision-
making process, and in fact, they served only for the acclamation of the policy proposals,
giving them formal legitimacy. Apart from that, below the level of the party leadership, there
was a huge and mighty apparatus whose role was to ensure that the leaders’ decisions would
be implemented in practice. Following this path of state-building, within a very short period
of time the general societal structure transformed dramatically into an etatistic one and after
only few years there was no field of societal life that had not been ‘covered’ by some form of
supervision by the state.
However, no matter how rigid the system was, it could not be immune to its internal
and external challenges. Up to the early 1970s, the situation in Yugoslavia and in its
international surroundings changed, and they started challenging relations within the
federation and its political structure. The unresolved national question, which had been swept
under the carpet of the ‘fraternity and unity’ myth for some time, linked with the issue of the
power relations between the republics and the institutions of the federal state, raised some
existential questions about the future of the federation.
A return to the Soviet-style centralism was not feasible, owing to the fact that it would
represent  a  form  of  the  rejection  of  the  already  developed  ‘Yugoslav  type  of  socialism’  -
marked by the resistance to Stalin in 1948, socialist self-management, and the non-alignment
movement - and a step back to the Eastern bloc. On the other hand, the fact that the republics
were already in a Cold War – a state of permanent confrontations, where their leaders
gathered at federal level meetings without any fruitful discussion or confidence in each other
– any form of unity or common vision of the Yugoslav federation was difficult to envisage.
In a constellation like this and since dissolution was not an option in the international
environment of the 1970s, the national communist elites decided to continue with their
national policies, preserving the common state by relying on the only two remaining
integrative elements of the federation – President Tito and the Federal Army.60
Taking into account the fact that even these two elements were not as powerful as
they used to be before, the constitutional changes that introduced very ‘elastic bonds’
between the republics seemed to be the only option for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Loose
confederalist institutional solutions, combined with the mentioned system of a ‘socialist self-
government’, which was incorporated into the 1974 Constitution, dramatically changed the
power  relations  within  the  state.  Furthermore,  the  introduction  of,  for  example,  the  right  of
self-determination for each nation represented de facto the  beginning  of  an  end  for  the
Yugoslav federation, owing to the fact that it was used as the constitutional basis for the
proclamation of the independence of the ex-Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s.
Therefore, we may say that several different models of power relations were seen
during the approximately fifty years of communist Yugoslavia. However, none of them
proved to be good enough to neutralize the unbridgeable differences within the federation and
prevent dissolution in the early 1990s. Apart from the many differences, there is at least one
thing  that  was  in  common for  former  Yugoslavia,  and  that  is  its  communist  system,  which
60 For details, see Dusan Bilandzic, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999).
was, regardless of its models, monolithically organised and hostile towards any form of
power sharing in its modern understanding. Therefore, despite the fact that Yugoslavia was
frequently used as an example of a ‘not that rigid’ system, especially in comparison with the
other  former  communist  European  states,  it  has  to  be  stressed  that  it  was  a  one-party  state
with the undisputable monopoly of the communist party over the political system and the
society in general, and therefore, it definitively does not represent a desirable tradition for a
consensus oriented power sharing behaviour in the contemporary Croatian political system,
which was especially visible during the 1990s.
1.4.2 Political power relations during the 1990s
Unlike in the period of the absolute dominance of the Communist Party, political parties are
essential subjects of a modern democratic political process, since their activities and the
relations among them largely determine the institutional structure of the political system and
the formal procedures of the decision-making process. Furthermore, it has to be underlined
that the institutions in democratic countries derive their legitimacy from the legitimacy that
the political parties earn in the election process. Therefore, for a very long period of time, the
multi-party system has represented the main ‘institution of mediation’ between the society
and the state, i.e. between the citizens and the government.
The formation of parties in new transitional countries undoubtedly represents a special
phenomenon, especially with regard to their significance for the process of democratic
consolidation. Namely, unlike in the political processes in the South European countries a
few decades ago (Greece, Spain, Portugal), where the transition began with the reanimation
of the old political parties, in the case of the ex-communist states, the parties emerged only in
the late 1980s. This happened due to three main reasons:
? In most countries there was no pre-communist pluralist political tradition, or it was
very weak and unstable;
? In  the  case  of  the  appearance  of  a  pluralist  transition,  if  any,  communism  was
dominant for long enough to neutralise them;
? Communism did not tolerate the existence of new political parties.61
61 For details see Mirjana Kasapovic, Hrvatska politika 1990.-2000. (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao,
Hrvatska politologija, Fakultet politickih znanosti, 2001), 122-123.
The first political parties in Croatia were formed in 1989 and 1990, mainly as clubs of
intellectuals, public persons and former political dissidents, who gathered in order to offer ‘an
alternative option’ to the existing political reality. Among all of them, only HDZ managed to
develop a broader organisational structure with solid material support within the country and
especially abroad, ensuring the significant increase of its membership and other preconditions
for being able to take the decisive role in the country’s political life during the 1990s. First of
all, using the pressures from the Serbian political elites and the historical momentum of the
collapse of communism, the HDZ managed to go beyond the form of a simple political party
and became a much wider movement, advocating the end of the communist regime, and
Croatian independence and sovereignty. As it was mentioned before, owing to its political
character,  which  inclined  more  to  populism  than  to  liberal-democracy,  it  did  not  dissolve
after the formation of the multi-party system, like it was the case in Poland, and Slovenia. On
the contrary, it remained in power using different semi-authoritarian means to govern the
country undisputed, marking the difference between the transitional processes in Croatia and
other post-communist countries.
In general, when speaking about power sharing, the model of the absolute domination
of one party known from the political praxis of the former federation de facto did not change
dramatically.  Broadly speaking, the model of one predominant party marked the whole ten-
year period between 1990 and 2000. First of all, there was the great advantage of the party in
power compared to the second strongest  one,  in terms of the outcome of the elections.  This
difference increased significantly in the parliament, owing to the disproportional effect of the
majority  electoral  system,  so  the  HDZ  had  six  times  more  MPs  than  the  second  strongest
party.
Other mechanisms of the institutionalisation of the HDZ as a movement were visible
in the political vocabulary that was predominant at that time. The terminology of the
nationalistic movement, together with its interpretation of the political reality and the
promotion  of  its  political  goals  under  the  influence  of  a  media  dominated  by  the  political
elites, appeared in almost every aspect of the public debate. As it was emphasized before, the
position of the president, along with his constitutional position and his personality, which had
been carefully built by the party support mechanisms, significantly contributed to the
institutionalisation of the HDZ, and the general atmosphere of populism and clientelism,
which  replaced nationalist enthusiasm, only added to it.
On the other hand, while it is a fact that a single party dominated the political life in
Croatia during the 1990s, the rift between a more organised opposition and the party in power
became very visible in the period between 1995 and 2000. The main reason for that was the
end of the aggression and the occupation of a significant part of the country (1995), which
practically ended the period of extreme circumstances and opened the floor for a debate on
the  democratic  future  of  the  country.  While  the  war,  apart  from  its  well-known  horrifying
consequences, provoked broad national solidarity for the defence, and sometimes it served as
a good excuse for the irregularities in the political and economic system, its termination
opened opportunities for the reformulation of the political discourse in Croatia.
As a reaction to the above described environment marked with populism and
clientelism, the opposition parties started to gather and oppose the regime instead of opposing
each  other,  which  had  been  the  praxis  for  some time.  This  contributed  to  a  perception  of  a
‘united opposition’ and a clear rift between the opposition and the government. This provided
the 2000 election process with a new dimension of real competition and contributed to some
new trends of power sharing.
1.4.3 The era of coalitions (2000 – present)
The 2000 elections marked a crucial turning point in the contemporary political life in
Croatia. It not only represented the end of the era of a semi-autocratic regime in an isolated
country, which had lasted for ten years, but also the beginning of an era of coalitions, which
characterises the country. The significance of this trend for the democratic maturity of the
political  system  seems  to  be  self-explanatory,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  contributes  to  the
development of a consensus-based decision-making practice, and hence, to the development
of a consensus-oriented power sharing tradition. It is important to mention that this sort of
change becomes even more important if we take into consideration the way power sharing, if
any, had been conducted in the 20th century.
As  a  result  of  the  progressive  legitimacy  crisis  of  the  HDZ at  the  end  of  the  1990s,
which was marked by inter-party rifts and the formation of factions, the rise of a broad public
dissatisfaction with the relatively low standard of living, shady privatisation, a high
unemployment rate, corruption, and the consolidation of the parliamentary opposition into
two  main  coalitions  (SDP  and  HSLS;  and  HSS,  LS,  HNS  and  IDS),62 which  formed  a
government after the elections, Croatia began a new period in its democratic transformation.
62 SDP – Social Democratic Party; HSLS – Croatian Social Liberal Party; HSS – Croatian Peasants Party; LS –
Liberal Party; HNS – Croatian People's Party; IDS – Istrian Democratic Union.
Therefore, after the fourth parliamentary elections in January 2000, for the first time
in its modern history, Croatia faced a need for the creation of a coalition government.63 The
general conditions for such an endeavour were rather favourable due to the fact that the
number of parties that were potential coalition partners was not too big.64 Although the
general conditions were favourable for the creation of a coalition government, the political-
cultural framework was not, due to the fact that Croatia did not have any experience with this
sort of government formation. Even the government of the Democratic Unity (1991 – 1992)
cannot be regarded as a coalition government but rather as a war-time all-party government,
which was highly dependant on the HDZ parliamentary majority and the president of the
republic in a semi-presidential political system, based on the consensus of all political parties
about a need for political unity for the sake of the defence of the country. It was not only that
the political actors were not prepared for this endeavour, but even the public political
discourse misinterpreted the political negotiation and the efforts to reach a compromise as
examples of ‘political trade’, or ‘bargaining among parties’.
The experiences of developed democracies led to the conclusion that coalition
agreements are becoming more detailed and lengthy, which indicates the need of the parties
to thoroughly determine the elements of their co-operation, as well as the main figures of the
future power sharing. This also shows that coalition agreements no longer represent only
general political declarations, but they are rather detailed policy documents. The first
Croatian coalition, made up of the six parties from the above-mentioned two coalitions, was
formed  on  the  basis  of  a  few-page  document,  which  lists  very  general  goals  of  the
government, such as the transformation of the semi-presidential political system,
decentralisation, the development of an independent judiciary, and the depolitisation of the
police and the army. Kasapovic presents a few examples that prove how general and under-
developed the framework of the coalition policy was:
“It was not mentioned that in the framework of reform of the political system from a
semi-presidential to a parliamentary one, the parliament itself will be reformed. Only in the
second phase of the constitutional reform in 2001, was the House of Counties abolished and
the Croatian Parliament did become unicameral. This was a change of utmost importance for
63 Mirjana Kasapovic, “Koalicijske vlade u Hrvatsko – prva iskustva u komparativnoj perspektivi“ in ed. Goran
Cular, Izbori i konsolidacija demokracije u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao, Fakultet politickih
znanosti, 2005).
64 The rifts between the parties and new factions that appeared in the parliament had a signifficant impact on the
parliament's work, while the split within the HSLS and its withdrawal from the government directly influenced
its stability.
any democratic system that has to be mentioned in a list  of priorities of the government.  In
the field of economic policy, two projects of the government that proved to be the financially
most demanding and politically most successful ones (Highway Zagreb and the Split and
government-supported housing program) were not mentioned at all.”65
Furthermore, from the standpoint of a minimal winning coalition theory, whose ratio
is  derived  from  the  maximisation  of  the  profit  of  its  members,  this  coalition  was  irrational
owing to the fact that it consisted of more parties than needed, which decreased the political
profit  of  the  main  winners  of  the  elections  (SDP and  HSLS),  increased  the  expenses  of  the
negotiations and the decision-making process, as well as the potentials for conflict within it.
This proved to be almost disastrous for the coalition, owing to the fact that due to the political
differences, IDS left the government in the very beginning, followed by the faction of the
HSLS during the middle of the mandate.66
After the elections, a Coalition agreement on the formation of the government and the
management of the House of Representatives was concluded. According to that agreement, a
main conflict-resolution body was established, the so-called Co-ordination of the Coalition,
consisting of the presidents of the parties that were part of the government. This body was de
facto a consequence of the political agreement, in which only two party presidents took a post
in  the  government,  which  resulted  in  complaints  about  the  lack  of  information  on  the
government’s activities by those who were not part of it. The co-ordination of the Coalition
represented a compromise that should have resolved the situation, but it appeared not to be
the best solution for the governing coalition because it was very unpopular among the public,
and it was treated as a parallel structure or an informal body that has taken over the decision-
making competences from the legally elected government.
The basic power sharing in the coalition was conducted according to the share of each
party in the parliamentary mandates, so SDP was given 50%, HSLS 25%, and the other four
parties shared the remaining 25%. The most important positions in the government (the Prime
Minister, two Vice-presidents of the government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Interior and the Minister of Finance) were given to the SDP, while the place of
one Vice-president of the government and the Minister of Defence belonged to the HSLS.
With  that,  the  rule  according  to  which  the  most  important  positions  shall  be  given  to  the
strongest parliamentary parties seemed to be obeyed. Apart from that, the rule of mutual
65 Ibid, p. 198–99.
66 The insufficience of the coalition happened to be crucial for the survival of the government, owing to the fact
that despite the loss of support from ten MPs, it managed to retain the parliamentary majority.
control within some ministries was agreed upon, which was reflected in the fact that the
ministers were generally not from the same party as their assistants and state secretaries.
Furthermore, another criterion was applied in the power sharing process in that parties
assumed responsibilities  in  accordance  with  their  nature.  Thus,  HSS,  the  Croatian  Peasants
Party, as almost all agrarian parties in European coalitions, was given the post of Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry, the SDP was given the post of Minister of Labour and Social
Welfare, and HSLS, as any other liberal party, took the place of Minister of Economy.
The first coalition managed to retain its relative stability and, despite a very
troublesome political and economic environment, avoided early elections and remained in
office for its full mandate. This experience was crucial as a starting point for future consensus
oriented power sharing endeavours, and this is the reason why so much space has been
dedicated to it in this study.
The 2003 elections showed the consequences of the malfunctions of the previous
coalition and brought HDZ back to power. However, the need for a coalition was more than
obvious,  due  to  the  fact  that  HDZ,  despite  its  clear  victory,  was  not  able  to  form  a
government alone.  Unlike in the case of the former coalition,  the process of the creation of
the government was not determined by the formal pre-elections agreements, although it was
more or less clear who could be a partner in a HDZ-run government. It may be useful to warn
about the political significance of the term ‘a HDZ-run government’, which reveals the
dominance of the HDZ and a difference between the two coalitions. Namely, while the
number of MPs in the parliament and the fact that in the government that was formed in 2003
only one post  was not held by the HDZ, legitimises the term ‘a HDZ run government’,  the
same power sharing parameters of the previous government that were mentioned before (50%
-  SDP;  25%  -  HSLS;  25%  -  HSS,  LS,  HNS,  IDS)  show  something  entirely  different.  This
difference had a significant impact on the efficiency of the government – it decreased the
expenses of the negotiations and the decision-making process, as well as the potentials for
conflict within it, while the position of the ‘strong prime minister’, who was the HDZ
president at the same time, only contributed to this even more.
Immediately after the elections, five parties (HDZ, HSS, HSLS, HSP67 and DC68)
participated in the negotiations; however, only one formally became a part of the coalition
with HDZ. HSS withdrew from the negotiations, calling upon unbridgeable political and
67 HSP – Croatian Party of Rights, the only remaining typical right-wing party.
68 DC – Democratic Centre, the moderate faction of the HDZ, led by a former Foreign Minister and adviser to
the former President.
economic differences, although according to numerous interpretations, it had done so because
of the fear that the party might end up being swallowed up by a bigger one with a very
similar ideology and overlapping target groups within the electorate. HSP was de facto
excluded as an option, owing to the very negative reactions from the international community
and the EU in particular regarding the possibility to include an extreme right party into the
new government in a period when the country expected the Avis and a candidate country
status.  After  HSLS  decided  to  withdraw  from  the  negotiations,  only  one  partner,  the  DC,
signed  an  agreement  with  HDZ,  taking  responsibility  for  a  very  unpopular  post  -  the
judiciary, which was in charge of the co-operation with the ICTY.
Formally, a minority coalition government was formed, with only 44.1% of the seats
in the parliament. In fact, it was supported by an absolute parliamentary majority, ensured by
a number of political agreements that were concluded between the HDZ and three HSU69
MPs, two HSLS MPs, one HDSS70 MP, and eight representatives of national minorities,
including three members of the Serbian minority, which had a positive impact for the
legitimacy of the government abroad. In this context, it is important to underline the
difference between the coalition agreement and the bilateral political agreement that followed
and ensured the parliamentary support for the government. The political agreements did not
have the political significance of the coalition ones, so the government was frequently
exposed to the danger of losing parliamentary support if it failed to meet the requirements of
a very divergent majority, which had a direct impact on its stability and efficiency.
The outcome of the 2007 parliamentary elections has revealed a new trend in the
Croatian political and parliamentary life – bipolarisation. The number of parties that made it
to the parliament significantly went down, and two major parties (HDZ and SDP) won
approximately 80% of votes.  As it  was mentioned before,  for the first  time in the country’s
history, the coalition agreement was thoroughly negotiated and the details of its future work
were agreed upon and specified in a document of more than 100 pages. This was mainly due
to two reasons. The complexity of the political framework that shall incorporate the main
determinants of each partner’s programs and the lessons learned from the problems of the
2000–2003 coalition, which was formed on the basis of a so-called policy-blind political
agreement. Power sharing was conducted in the same manner as in the previous coalitions,
69 HSU – Croatian Pensioners Party.
70 HDSS – Croatian Democratic Peasant Party.
mainly respecting the profile of the parties71, while ‘the most important innovation’ that had a
direct impact on the credibility of the government abroad is the fact that a representative of
the Serbian minority was appointed Vice-president of the government for the first time in
modern Croatian history.
The relatively short  term in office – the elections were held in November 2007, and
the government was formed in January 2008 – prevents us from conducting a deeper analysis
of the political consequences of the applied power sharing model or of its general efficiency.
It ‘managed to survive’ two major tests of stability – the temporary termination of the
application of the Protected Ecological-Fisheries Zone towards the EU members (which was
part of the HSS pre-election program’s headlines) and the recognition of Kosovo’s
independence (taking into consideration that a representative of the Serbian minority is the
Vice-president of the government). However, due to a very demanding EU accession
schedule, which includes many challenges and unpopular moves that will have to be done at
home.
1.5 The changes of the political pParty-preferences, the struggle for power, and
political populism
1.5.1 The background of political preferences during the 1990s
The last two decades surely represent the most dynamic period of the Croatian political
history, and therefore, it is interesting to see the background of the processes that took place
during  that  period.  The  dissolution  of  the  former  federation,  the  independence  and
sovereignty of the new states, the change of the political and economic system, burdened with
war and aggression, definitively represent processes of recognisable complexity and
importance. The new possibility to choose among different political programs in the
framework of free and multi-party elections raises several questions about voters’ political
preferences and the different reasons for them.
What are the social, political, historical, personal or other reasons for the political
preferences manifested by the voters? Is there a consolidated system of electoral preferences?
The answers to these or similar questions provide us with very important information on the
behaviour of the electorate, which has a direct impact on party preferences and the party
system as such. In accordance with a need to ‘articulate’ the preferences of the electorate and
71 The exception is the post of the Minister of Tourism, which was given to HSS.
comprehend their impact on the development of the party system, Siber simplifies the
problem by dividing the political spectrum only to left and right wing, differentiating groups
of parties according to the following orientations:
? Ethnocentrism/aggressive nationalism vs. national tolerance;
? Traditional rural values vs. modern urban values;
? Euro-scepticism and xenophobia vs. a pro-European attitude.72
First of all, Siber claims that the position of an individual in a society and his or her place in
the societal division of labour directly affects the structure of his/her needs, and hence,
his/her mindset and political preferences. However, he finds it difficult to apply these
principles in the analysis of the Croatian political reality. The lack of democratic tradition and
the traditional social structure, formed on the basis of private property and a market economy,
the long period of a single-party system and the communist ideology, have made it almost
impossible to identify a simple link between social status and political preference, which can
be seen from the following table.
Table 1.8 Social position and party preference
PROFESSION 1990 1992 1995 2000
L         C         R L          C          R L          C          R L          C          R
WORKER 36.1    10.8    53.1 6.3     37.8     55.9 4.5       40.4      55.1 28.0     42.3      29.7
PEASANT 30.0    23.0    47.0 4.0     36.0     60.0 4.2      46.2     49.6 37.6    50.0     12.4
ENTERPRENEUR 23.6     20.9    55.5 6.3     41.7      52.1 8.0      43.0     49.0 25.0     46.5     28.5
PUBLIC SERVANT 59.3    12.9     22.8 9.1     45.7      45.1 10.0     48.5      41.5 34.0     44.0      23.0
EXPERT 50.8    25.2     24.0 14.1    51.6      34.4 9.0      52.0     39.0 46.0     32.0      22.0
MILITARY, POLICE 92.4      2.5        5.1 4.4     35.6      60.0 4.3      14.0     81.7 18.1    27.3     54.6
HOUSWIFE 29.5     22.3     48.2 5.4       28.7      65.9 8.0      25.0     67.0 23.4    41.6     35.0
STUDENT 35.6    22.4     42.0 10.7    54.6     34.7 4.5      51.5     44.0 59.7    32.7      7.6
PENSIONER 52.5    18.5     29.0 17.0    34.0     49.0 11.0    25.0     64.0 40.0     29.0     31.0
UNEMPLOYED 25.0    23.4     51.6 7.1      39.0     53.9 -           -             - 48.8     37.2      14.0
Remark: L, C, and R stand for left, centre, and right, respectively. The category ‘unemployed’ was not
part of the 1995 opinion polls.
Source: Ivan Siber, “Politicko ponasanje biraca u izborima 1990-2000,” in ed. Mirjana Kasapovic,
Hrvatska politika 1990-2000 (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao, Hrvatska politologija, Fakultet
politickih znanosti, 2001): 73.
72 Ivan Siber, “Politicko ponasanje biraca u izborima 1990-2000,“ in ed. Mirjana Kasapovic, Hrvatska politika
1990-2000 (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao, Hrvatska politologija, Fakultet politickih znanosti, 2001). This
part of the section will be mainly based on this piece of research.
The  data  shows  two  trends:  first,  the  differences  among  the  given  categories  were
significantly lower than in stable and traditional democracies; and second, the big changes of
the political preferences from 1990 to 2000 reflect the general changes towards some parties
or groups of parties in that period. In short, these are some of the general conclusions of the
opinion polls:
? The preferences of some groups of the public tend to follow the general changes in
the society;
? Students  proved  to  be  the  most  flexible  group,  which  shows  the  main  trends  of  the
general changes;
? The party preferences of the police and army personnel were greatly dependent on the
ruling regime (prior to 1990 and from 1990 to 2000);
? Public servants and experts represent the social basis of the parties on the left and in
the centre of the political spectrum;
? Pensioners and housewives mainly represent the most inert group of voters, which
mainly conforms with the dominating political trends;
? Workers and entrepreneurs supported right-wing parties in the 1990 elections, but
they rejected them in the 2000 elections;
? Peasants, who are mainly undecided, mostly support HSS as a party from the centre,
but by also supporting it in the 2000 elections in the left-centre coalition, they have
supported left-wing parties as well.73
There is another important element that is characteristic of the societies of new-born
countries in the 1990s, and hence, of Croatia as well. Namely, owing to the fact that the
process of political and economic transition was directly connected with the creation of the
independent nation state, ideas like a nation and a state became very important and somehow
managed to overshadow the impact of the social structure on the definition of voters’ main
values and political preferences. In other words, the process of the establishment of new
social relations within the society had been formed after the dominating national state-
building process. Unfortunately, the creation of the nation state in Croatia had been
conducted in a disastrous war environment, which caused transnational homogenisation for
the purpose of a common defence, as well as the marginalisation of the importance of social
orientations.  One  may  conclude  that,  owing  to  the  difficulties  of  the  transitional  process,
73 Ibid, p. 75.
Croatia still did not have a stabilised social structure that may have served as a basis of an
interest-oriented differentiation between societal groups.
The ideological ‘left-right self-identification’ represents one of the elementary
showcases of individuals’ political preferences. Regardless of the complexity of the political
and economic context, people tend to want to simplify them and affiliate with one of the few
main categories, which helps a lot in the efforts for a general evaluation of the political
preferences of the target group.
It is important to stress that the meaning of the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ have
significantly changed during the last two decades. While ‘left’ had previously meant an
orientation towards the concept of state-monopoly in the economy and the clash of classes,
today it means advocating better standards, social environment, gender equality, etc. On the
other hand, the meaning of ‘right’ from the early 1990s (extreme nationalism, isolationalist
xenophobia, etc) has changed into the contemporary modest conservative approach towards
issues  in  the  society  and  international  relations,  mainly  owing  to  the  positive  impact  of  the
‘Euro-Atlantic processes’.
Figure 1.1 Changes in the left-right self-identifications, 1986-2000
Source: Ivan Siber, “ Politicko ponasanje biraca u izborima 1990-2000,” in ed. Mirjana  Kasapovic,
Hrvatska politika 1990-2000 (Zagreb: Biblioteka Politicka misao, Hrvatska politologija, Fakultet
politickih znanosti, 2001):  86.
As in the case of political preferences, the public opinion polls from the 1990s reveal that
ideological self-identification mainly followed the general trends in the society at that time.
While the leftist political orientation dominated in 1990, owing to the negative validation of
the rightist orientation at that time, the same trend (with opposite data) is noticeable from the
opinion polls during the war. The beginning of the political consolidation in 2000 is marked
by  the  fall  of  both  left  and  right  self-identification  and  the  rise  of  identification  with  the
political centre.
1.5.2 Conformity with the EU 27 public opinion on the main trends in contemporary
societies
The political changes that happened in 2000, followed by the introduction of the SAP from
the EU side, have opened new perspectives for the accession. This marked the start of ‘a real
transition process’ in Croatia,  which significantly influenced the political  preferences in the
country, making general trends more comparable with the European ones.
1.5.2.1 Attitude towards the EU*
According to the Eurobarometer 68 survey, during the last six months, the positive attitude
towards the EU has risen by four percent, while the scepticism towards the EU went down by
three percent. However, there are still a significant number of citizens with a neutral attitude,
although that is modestly declining as well.
Table 1.9 Attitude towards the EU in Croatia*
EU 27 CROATIA
POSITIVE 49% (52%) 34% (30%)
NEGATIVE 14% (15%) 27% (30%)
NEUTRAL 34% (31%) 37% (38%)
DOES NOT KNOW 3% (2%) 2% (2%)
*Data in brackets are from the spring 2007 opinion polls.
Source: Country Report - Croatia, EUROBAROMETER 68, Autumn 2007 – http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_hr_nat.pdf
In contrast with the slight improvement in the Croatian case, the EU 27 public opinion is
showing a decline in the positive attitude towards the EU, although its average is still fifteen
percent higher than that in Croatia, which is mainly due to the aforementioned consequences
of the demanding reforms in the final stage of the accession.
1.5.2.2 Attitude towards membership in the EU*
During the last  six months,  the number of Croatian citizens with a positive attitude towards
Croatia’s potential membership in the EU went up by six percent, while the same data for the
EU 27 rose by one percent. This trend in Croatia shows a slight rise in the awareness of the
positive consequences of the eventual membership in the EU, while the proportion of neutral
people is still worrisome, especially for the political elite, taking into consideration the fact
that  the integration into the EU can be done only on the basis of a positive outcome of the
referendum.
Table 1.10 Attitude towards membership in the EU*
EU 27 CROATIA
POSITIVE 58% (57%) 35% (29%)
NEGATIVE 13% (15%) 25% (28%)
NEUTRAL 25% (25%) 37% (40%)
DOES NOT KNOW 4% (3%) 3% (3%)
*Data in brackets are from the spring 2007 opinion polls.
Source: Country Report - Croatia, EUROBAROMETER 68, Autumn 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_hr_nat.pdf
1.5.2.3 The perception of the potential benefits from the EU membership
While the rise in the positive answers and the decline of the negative ones can be seen from
the next table, it is interesting to compare data from the previous two tables. This reveals a
difference between the symbolically and pragmatically formulated questions on the same
matter  and  uncovers  two trends  in  Croatia.  While  the  symbolical  popularity  of  the  EU was
rising, although it remains pretty low (35%), the awareness of the benefits of Croatia’s
potential membership in the EU is rather high (47%), which shows voters’ pragmatism.
While to a certain extent the ‘grey image’ of the EU in Croatia from the early 1990s,
combined with the pressures of the conditionality in the final stage of the accession still have
a rather negative impact on the EU’s popularity at a symbolical level, the general awareness
of the benefits of the potential membership is on the rise and represents a significant potential
for the forthcoming demanding period of the European integration.
Table 1.11 Do you think that your country (will) benefit(s) from the membership in the
EU?*
EU 27 CROATIA
YES 58% (59%) 47% (43%)
NO 29% (30%) 44% (48%)
DOES NOT KNOW 13% (9%) 9% (9%)
*Data in brackets are from the spring 2007 opinion polls.
Source: Country Report - Croatia, EUROBAROMETER 68, Autumn 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_hr_nat.pdf
1.5.2.4 Attitude towards the future of the EU
The following table shows the rise of optimism in Croatia regarding the future of the EU, as
well as a decline in pessimism. Despite the fact that it is still lower than the average EU 27,
especially in comparison with surveys from a couple of years ago, it has been gradually
growing in the last years in the country.
Table 1.12 Attitude towards the future of the EU*
EU 27 CROATIA
OPTIMISTIC 66% (69%) 57% (53%)
PESIMISTIC 26% (24%) 37% (41%)
DOES NOT KNOW 8% (7%) 6% (6%)
*Data in brackets are from the spring 2007 opinion polls.
Source: Country Report - Croatia, EUROBAROMETER 68, Autumn 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb68_hr_nat.pdf
It is important to underline that none of these trends are accidental. They are the
results of a long-term commitment from both Croatia and the EU for the European integration
process of Croatia. This is of utmost importance for the democratic development and the
marginalisation of the populist forces in Croatia. It is enough to compare their representation
in the Croatian parliament in the 1990s, which was paramount (both within the extreme right
parties and HDZ during the ‘Tudjman time’),  and today (only one seat  for the HSP) to see
another irreversible positive effect of their elimination from parliamentary life.
1.6 Conclusions
The  transformation  of  the  political  system  in  Croatia  to  a  certain  extent  may  be  compared
with similar processes in the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. However, this process
in Croatia has some special characteristics, which distinguish it from the other countries: the
state building process had been conducted in parallel with the Homeland war, which
significantly affected the dynamics of the political transformation during the 1990s. Apart
from the burden of the war, there was another element that had negatively affected the
transformation process in the 1990s, and that is the semi-autocratic nature of the political
elites, which were, while declaratively opting for a ‘European Croatia’, showing a very
modest political will for their claims. A combination of these two elements left the country
far behind the average pace of the transition shown by the countries of the fifth enlargement.
The political and economic systems burdened with the consequences of the war and the
rudimentary democratic culture praxis simply could not offer answers to the transitional
challenges that followed the fall of the communist system.
Therefore, the ‘real transition’ in Croatia started with ‘a decade of delay’ in
comparison with the other Central and Eastern European countries. The turn of the century
brought a semi-autocratic regime to an end, opening new perspectives for the Croatian
democratic future. One of the most important consequences was that the necessary
transitional reforms, the integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, processes that had
been frozen for a long period of time, started taking place and began moving the country
forward. In that sense, the inauguration of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
from the EU side at the Zagreb Summit (2000), which for the first time offered a possibility
for full-fledged EU membership for countries from the region, represented the main turning
point  in  the  relations  between  the  EU  and  Croatia  and  a  main  motor  of  the  transitional
reforms. Its conditionality and mechanism has had an extraordinary importance for the pace
and direction of the Croatian transitional efforts, while the principle of ‘own merits’
guaranteed the individual evaluation of each country from the region and removed the
political concerns from the regional SAP package that were dominating the political
discourse in the country.
The complex of changes had a significant impact on the whole political system and
political preferences in general. Apart from that, the changed political environment brought
the practice of consensual power sharing to Croatia for the first time, due to the fact that the
political performances of the parties made the individual formation of a government
impossible, so the ‘era of coalition’ started in 2000, which has continued until the present.
The importance of the fact that no single party can form a government in the period of crucial
transition  changes  speaks  for  itself.  While  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  symbolic  proof  of  the
positive impact of the process of the European integration on the political praxis in Croatia,
and the parliamentary one in particular. The reflection of the broad political consensus on the
importance of the EU accession process is  formalised in the parliament by the formation of
the so-called Pact for Europe, which gathers all parliamentary parties in a joint effort to
improve parliamentary work as an important element of the accession process.
Therefore, it is obvious that the process of European integration remains to be of
utmost importance for the ongoing process of political  transformation in Croatia.  As it  was
presented in this study, it helped changing the political discourse in the country, by
introducing new elements that  make the trends of the Croatian society comparable with the
ones of the European Union and eliminate the former populist rhetoric and values, which
have had a negative impact on the transitional process and political preferences in Croatia.
The continuation of this process and the finalisation of the accession to the EU are vital
guarantees for the continuation of these positive trends in the Croatian political
transformation, and they represent a major priority for both the political elites and the society
in general. Only this will ensure a sustainable democratic development in the country and
offer  it  a  possibility  to  support  similar  processes  in  the  region,  where  Croatia  with  its
experience can play a significant role as a partner of the EU in its long-term efforts for
regional stabilisation.
In  general,  one  may  expect  Croatia  to  continue  speeding  up  its  reforms  in  order  to
finalise the accession process with the EU within a reasonable period. Despite the fact that
nobody really wants to forecast the accession dates, especially owing to the fact that the
quality of the negotiation and the preparation for membership is far more important than the
timetable  of  the  accession  itself,  there  are  some estimations  that,  if  the  country  manages  to
finalise the negotiation process during the next year, it may be expected that it will probably
be  able  to  join  the  EU  in  2011,  the  earliest.  However,  one  should  not  forget  the  fact  that
Croatia  will  have  to  show the  capability  of  conducting  very  demanding  reforms  in  a  rather
short period of time in order to achieve these goals. On the other hand, despite the assurances
given  by  the  highest  EU officials  about  the  Croatian  European  perspective,  the  outcome of
the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty has raised a number of questions regarding the
future institutional arrangement of the EU, and we still  have to see how this will  affect  the
continuation of the enlargement.
Regardless  of  the  potential  obstacles  to  the  Croatian  membership  in  the  EU that  we
just  have  mentioned,  it  is  very  difficult  to  imagine  that  the  country’s  accession  would  be
blocked and that the EU enlargement process would be stopped in the period to come.
Therefore, it may not be too early to start thinking about the political reality in Croatia once it
joins the EU. Thanks to the experience of the Central European countries, one may already be
aware of the fact that once the transitional country fulfils its two main foreign policy goals –
full  fledged  membership  in  the  EU and  NATO –  the  dynamics  of  the  internal  political  life
will significantly change, affecting the relations between the main political parties. Namely,
as it was mentioned before, all the major parties in the parliament decided to join forces in the
Pact for Europe, in order to facilitate parliamentary procedures as well as other aspects of the
Croatian EU bid. Once the common goal is achieved, the grounds for consensus will probably
be narrowing down, so one may expect parties ‘to take a harder stand towards each other’,
and thus, bring a new dynamics into the political life.
The  future  membership  in  the  EU  and  NATO  will  definitively  influence  Croatia’s
foreign policy by offering it a possibility to use its comparative advantage to contributing to
the efforts of these two organisations in their endeavour to ensure the stability of South East
Europe. Aware of the fact that it has too limited capabilities to contribute significantly to the
efforts  of  the  international  community  in  some other  distant  parts  of  the  globe,  the  country
may be expected to concentrate on the region, where it can prove to be a recognisable
stabilising partner of the transatlantic community. Apart from that, as it is visible from the
recent trends of increase, Croatia’s participation in peace-keeping missions around the globe
will continue ensuring its contribution to the international mechanisms of collective security
in accordance with its limited capabilities. Apart from that, its current position of non-
permanent  member  in  the  UN  Security  Council  and  the  active  role  it  is  playing  there,
additionally confirms its willingness to contribute to international stability in general and
proves the fact that Croatia has successfully managed to transform from a security consumer
into a security provider.
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2.1 The economic history of the transition between 1990-2006
2.1.1 Macroeconomic aspects: The development of the main indicators
Croatia's economy suffered badly during the 1991-95 war, as the output collapsed. The direct
war damage has been estimated at USD 27 billion74, and the country missed the early waves
of investment in Central and Eastern Europe.
Table 2.1 Summary table of main economic indicators in Croatia
GDP at
PPPs
(EUR
million)
GDP
growth,
(%, yoy)
Inflation
(CPI)
Export of
goods
(EUR
million)
Import of
goods
(EUR
million)
Trade
balance,
% GDP
Current
account
balance
(% GDP)
FDI inflow
EUR
million
1990 32 775 -7.1 609.5 -
1991 37 208 -21.1 123.0 -
1992 24 743 -11.7 665.0 -
1993 22 869 -8.0 1 517.5 3 384.2 3 998.0 -6.5 5.5 100.9
1994 24 696 5.9 97.6 3 724.4 4 805.9 -8.8 4.8 94.9
1995 26 780 6.8 2.0 3 496.0 5 993.9 -17.2 -7.6 84.0
1996 29 273 5.9 3.5 3 735.1 6 520.4 -17.6 -5.0 394.0
1997 32 102 6.8 3.6 3 557.2 8 319.6 -26.8 -12.6 476.6
1998 33 515 2.5 5.7 4 083.6 7 713.3 -18.8 -6.8 842.8
1999 33 882 -0.9 4.2 4 134.1 7 240.0 -16.6 -7.0 1 369.2
2000 35 992 2.9 6.2 4 969.3 8 468.7 -17.5 -2.4 1 138.5
2001 38 307 3.8 4.9 5 318.8 9 922.6 -20.8 -3.6 1 502.5
2002 41 407 4.4 1.7 5 293.1 11 253.4 -24.4 -8.5 1 196.9
2003 43 658 5.6 1.8 5 571.7 12 545.9 -26.6 -7.1 1 784.5
2004 46 906 5.3 2.1 6 603.1 13 330.9 -23.5 -5.1 990.3
2005 49 536 4.3 3.3 7 216.6 14 738.3 -24.1 -6.4 1 424.9
2006 52 082 4.8 3.2 8 433.6 16 797.5 -24.4 -7.8 2 837.6
Source: WIIW
Negative trends in GDP growth, employment, investment, consumption, exports, imports, the
level of the utilization of economic potentials and a high monthly rate of inflation started in
1990 and continued until 1994. The economic stabilisation effort that started in late 1993
delivered price stability (in the period 1994-97, inflation was 3.7%,) and an average annual
GDP growth of over 6% during 1994-97, but the external current account deficit reached
13% of the GDP. Still, despite the economic growth, in the same period the net change in
employment was persistently negative, mostly as a consequence of the slow restructuring and
modernisation of the economy.
74 Commission services report, Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with
the conditions set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia,  (Brussels, 1997),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/9710_report_a_en.pdf.
The economic situation started to deteriorate in the course of 1997, when the country
experienced a  loss of international competitiveness, resulting in a reduction of exports (-5%)
the continued growth of imports (28%), a widening current account deficit (from 5% to
12.6%  of  the  GDP)  and  a  sharp  increase  of  the  external  debt.  The  adoption  of  the
amendments to the Company Law abolishing the condition of reciprocity coincided with a
more significant FDI inflow, which started in 1999. The already high unemployment
continued to increase in the period 1998-2000 and reached an average rate of 16.1% in 2000
(labour force survey based on ILO standards; 1999:13.6%). The official rates were even
higher. The unemployment was the result of wage increases above the productivity gains,
which was aggravated by the period of slow economic growth. Especially alarming was the
rate of youth unemployment (up to 25 years of age) of about 30%.
Tightening the monetary policy, flagging the domestic demand and political
interference in the economy resulted in a rapid build-up in the domestic arrears of public and
private enterprises and resulted in serious solvency problems in the banking sector. The
combination of the mounting structural problems, increases in taxes and administered prices,
as well as the impact of the Kosovo crisis contributed to the recession that started in the last
quarter of 1998 and continued through the first three quarters of 1999. The imports were
decreasing  (7%  in  1998  and  6%  in  1999,  yoy)  and  the  exports  were  increasing.  The  GDP
started to grow again in the last quarter of 1999, albeit at modest levels. For the whole year of
1999, the GDP contracted by 0.9%75,  but  in  2000,  real  GDP grew at  some 2.95%,  coming
from a strong rebound in household consumption. However, unemployment continued to
grow until 2000, when this trend reversed.76
Since 2000, GDP growth has been moderate but steady, led by a rebound in tourism
and credit-driven consumer spending. Inflation over the same period has remained the same
and the currency, the Kuna, has remained stable.
In the period 2000-03, the government's failure to press the economic reforms needed
to spur growth was largely the result of coalition politics and public resistance, particularly
from the trade unions.77 The current account deficit was widening. However, in this period
75 In this chapter we use WIIW data. The documents of the European Commission present different numbers.
E.g. according to the Western Balkans in Transition, 2001, available from
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2001/c2001_03_en.pdf   p. 10 , the GDP
in 1999 contracted by 0.4%,  and the current account deficit in 1997 reached 11% of the GDP.
76 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 1 (January, 2003), 11.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2003/ocp1en.pdf.
77 CIA – The world factbook 2002, “Economy overview : Croatia,”
http://www.faqs.org/docs/factbook/fields/2116.html.
(2001-03),  the  exports  grew  faster  than  the  imports,  and  there  were  some  more  significant
FDI inflows. A key objective of the government in the period 2004-07 was achieving
macroeconomic growth and stability by eliminating external imbalances and creating a
transparent fiscal system.  Nevertheless, macroeconomic challenges have remained, including
high unemployment, a growing trade and current account deficit, and uneven regional
development. The state has retained a significant role in the economy, and privatization has
not been completed, but the EU accession process should accelerate the fiscal and structural
reform.
2.1.2 Transformation and privatisation
The basis for the transformation of the social  ownership of enterprises was provided by the
Transformation Act that was adopted in 1991. According to the Transformation Act and
Company Law, socially owned companies had to have a market-oriented management board
and  a  shareholders'  assembly.  The  equity  of  a  company  belonged  to  the  personal
shareholders, to the social security institutions and to the state. Thus, enterprises began
working as market entities. The state’s shares have been conducted by the Croatian
Privatization Fund, which has been responsible for monitoring the privatization process. In
other words, the Transformation Act did not implement the privatization of enterprises in full,
but rather created the legal conditions for its implementation in the next stage of privatisation,
when the Croatian Privatisation Fund was expected to sell out its shares on the stock
market.78
The transformation of social ownership was largely completed (under the
Transformation Act) by 1995, one exception being the territories of the Republic of Croatia
that  had  been  occupied  during  the  war.  Therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  legally  regulate  the
procedures for the privatization of those assets transferred to the Croatian Privatization Fund
in the social ownership transformation process, i.e. the assets which, pursuant to special
regulations and in a legally permissible fashion, became the property of the state, counties,
cities, or municipalities.79
78 Stjepan Zduni?, “Central Europe and Croatian foreign Trade Policy,” in Croatian Economic Survey, no. 2
(1994),  http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=toc&id_broj=651.
79 Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, no. 21(1996), 71 (1997) and 73 (2000).
The Privatization Act, which regulates the criteria and procedures for the privatization
of those assets not privatized during the transformation process, was adopted in 199680.  The
process of privatisation started thus following the transformation although it has not been
completed yet. It was expected that the privatisation of the state portfolio would be finalised
by the end of 2005. However, the pace of privatisation was slower than planned and further
complicated by corruption scandals.
A Law on Compensation for Expropriated Assets was also adopted.  The law foresaw
the restitution of assets either in kind, through shares reserved in the Croatian Privatization
Fund, or by payment from the Croatian Compensation Fund.
2.1.3 Liberalisation and economic integration
In spite of the war and the risky environment in the early 1990s, the main characteristic of the
foreign trade policy was liberalisation. Croatia became a member of the IMF in December
1992 and did not maintain any restrictions on payment and transfers for current international
transactions.
Since 1993, free entry into foreign trade was guaranteed, domestic and foreign
companies have the same legal treatment, and foreign and domestic investors have the same
legal status. The gradual abolishment of price controls followed. Since the second half of the
1990s, the prices of goods and services in most sectors have been determined freely by
market  forces.  In  the  late  1990s,  the  direct  price  controls  in  force  were  obligatory  prior  to
reporting price changes for a limited number of products. 81 The requirement of a prior
reporting of price changes for certain goods and services was not applied to imports or
exports. The government could also prescribe price controls, but only in exceptional
circumstances, for a limited period of time. Price controls were gradually abolished in most
sectors. In 2002, the Commission’s Report on Croatia’s level of price liberalisation was
considered advanced, as the use of administered prices in Croatia was limited to agricultural
products, energy and transport.
80 “Privatisation Act,” Official Gazette, no. 21 (March 14,1996.)
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1996/0392.htm.
81 These were: milk for daily consumption;  fertilizers;  wheat flour;  bread type 850;  petroleum products;
natural gas;  electric energy;  radio and television subscriptions; the transportation of passengers and freight by
local rail or maritime line traffic;  standard letters and postcards;  telephone impulse and telephone subscription;
road, bridge and tunnel tolls;  official forms;  round-wood logs; cubic wood;  and the services of loading and
transportation of wood sorting.
However, despite the liberal trade policy, Croatia was slow in economic integration.
In 1991, Croatia was not willing to join CEFTA, and later it  had difficulties in meeting the
criteria (WTO membership, agreement with the EC, and bilateral trade agreements). Croatia
joined the WTO in 2000, and by then it had concluded free trade agreements only with
Slovenia and Macedonia (in 1997). By 2002, Croatia's trade was under the free trade regime
with four countries: Macedonia, Slovenia, Hungary and Bosnia Herzegovina. The process of
trade liberalisation was then speeded up, and by 2004, 80% of Croatia's trade was under the
free trade regime. In addition to a number of bilateral free trade agreements, Croatia also
concluded free trade agreements with regional integrations: in 2001 with EFTA and the EU,
and in 2003 it  joined CEFTA. The CEFTA 2006 agreement,  providing for the creation of a
free trade zone in South East Europe by 2010, came into effect for Croatia in 2007.
2.1.4 Developments of the monetary and fiscal policy
Following the secession from Yugoslavia, Croatia ceased to be a part of the monetary system
of the former SFRY in June 1991. All business relations between the Croatian commercial
banks  and  the  former  Central  Bank  were  broken  off.  Croatia  issued  its  own  currency.  The
Croatian Dinar replaced the Yugoslav Dinar in December 1991. It was a transitional currency
until June 1994, when it was replaced by the Croatian Kuna. The Dinar was replaced by the
Kuna at a rate of 1 Kuna = 1000 Dinars. The introduction of the Kuna enabled the
implementation of the government’s stabilisation programme, which was launched in 1993.
One of its main instruments was a restrictive monetary policy, the reduction of the budget
deficit, and the elimination of the current account deficit.82 The  monetary  policy  has  been
very successful in reducing the inflation by using the exchange rate as the nominal anchor.
The policy can be described as strict exchange rate targeting. It is characterized by a very low
tolerance  to  exchange  rate  movements  and  the  significant  role  of  the  Central  Bank  in  the
foreign currency market. The Kuna was implicitly pegged to the Deutsche Mark.
The strict exchange rate targeting has been successful in achieving a high level of
price stability in the mid-1990s.  The price stability was defined as the primary objective of
82 Government, “Osnove stablizacijske politike,“ (1992)
http://northwesternerbybirth.googlepages.com/RezimeOsnovestabilizacijskogprograma.doc.
the monetary policy by the 1992 Law on the Croatian National Bank.83 By defining price
stability as the primary objective, the emphasis on the exchange rate was reduced.84
In 2000, the Central Bank relaxed the restrictive monetary policy: it lowered the
interest rates and softened the mandatory reserve requirements. New instruments were
introduced:  repo operations and the auctions of foreign currency denominated Croatian
National Bank bills. The legislative changes introduced enabling the development of the
financial market provided opportunities for a more active use of the market mechanisms.
Since 2005, there are regular open market operations.
As regards fiscal policy, the period of 1993-98 was marked by significant changes of
the tax system with the objective of its modernisation and the establishment of a system
compatible with the market economy. In 1994, profit tax, income tax and excises were
introduced. The reform of custom duties followed in 1996, and in 1998, value added tax was
introduced, replacing turnover tax.
During 1999, the state was not servicing its obligations regularly, which contributed
to serious liquidity problems. The issue was tackled by the fiscal policy, i.e. by timely
payments. During 2000, the tax burden was diminished, which was reflected in the decreased
share of the budget revenue in GDP. The expenditures decreased accordingly. The basic
personal deduction increased, and a 15% tax rate was introduced. The profit tax rate
decreased from 35% to 25%, and incentives for investments were introduced.  The fiscal
deficit continued widening, which required the tight control of the public spending and the
managing of the public debt. In 2001, the treasury was created, and in 2004, transparency was
further enhanced by the inclusion of all expenditures of the Croatian Railways and the
Croatian Motorways in the budget. 85
2.1.5 Main economic challenges
The starting point of the economic policy documents, the Strategic Development Framework
(SDF), is that government-driven growth is not sustainable in the long run. Required is the
strengthening of the private sector, its competitiveness and its overall ability to become the
83 “Regulation on National Bank of Croatia,” Official Gazette, no. 71 (1991),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1991/1846.htm and “Law on National Bank of Croatia,” Official Gazette, no.
74 (1992), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1992/1966.htm
84 Andreas Billmeie and Leo Bonato, Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Monetary Policy in Croatia. IMF
working paper 02/109 (IMF, 2002).
85 Manuel Benazi?, “Fiskalna politika i gospodarska aktivnost u Republici Hrvatskoj: model kointegracije,”
Ekonomski pregled, 57 (2006).
main driver of future economic growth. The key areas that can challenge growth and
competitiveness relate to the completion of the transition process (mainly related to the
reform of the judiciary and public service), development of human resources (education,
efficient labour market) and developmental links (macroeconomic environment, efficient and
integrated financial services, natural resources and regional development).
The elimination of the administrative barriers for business development, a labour
market reform, the reform of the education system, the reform of social welfare and related
social  benefits  are  identified  by  the  Pre-Accession  Economic  Programme  2008-10  as
challenges that have to be tackled soon. The key fiscal policy objectives in the period
between 2007 and 2009 include the reduction of the budget deficit below 3% of the GDP,
stabilisation, and the further reduction of the public debt to less than 60% of the GDP, the
decrease of foreign debt to values around 80% of the GDP and support to the decisive
implementation of the structural reforms.
Other challenges that have to be tackled include undeveloped capital markets, the high
unemployment rate combined with a high share of long-term unemployment (particularly
among  women)  and  a  high  level  of  youth  unemployment;  and  the  social  exclusion  of  the
long-term unemployed. The mismatch between the labour market requirements and the
education system should also be tackled by a further reform of the education system.86
The EU sees the problems somewhat differently, and as the main challenges that have
to be tackled in order to meet the economic membership criteria, it identifies state aid, the
restructuring of the loss making enterprises and the improvement of the efficiency of public
spending.
2.1.6 Development in a broader sense
The main development indicators (HDI, literacy ratio, life expectancy) are presented in Table
2.2. According to the Human Development Report 2006/2007, the HDI for Croatia is 0.850,
which gives the country a rank of 47th out of the 177 countries with data.
The education attainment levels of the population are generally below the EU
standards. According to the 2001 census, 18.6% of the population aged over 15 have not
completed primary school education, and 21.8% have completed only primary school. Only
86 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU funds, Strategic Coherence Framework
2007-2013: Instrument for pre-accession assistance (Zagreb: Central Office for Development Strategy and
Coordination of EU funds, 2006), 36.
11.9% of the population have received education beyond the secondary-school level.
Conversely, the percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least
secondary  education  was  almost  98.3% in  2005.  Such  a  high  attainment  is  not  achieved  in
tertiary education, in spite of the high enrolment rate (over 70% of those who completed
secondary education) due to the long duration of studies and a high drop out rate. The gross
enrolment ratio at tertiary level in Croatia increased significantly in the period 2002-03
compared to the 1998-98 level: the enrolment of women increased from 34.2 to 42.8% and
that of men from 29.6 to 36.1%. This is significantly lower than in most new member states
(e.g. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, one exception being Slovakia) and even
Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.87
Table 2.2 Main development indicators
Human
development
index (HDI)
value
Life
expectancy
at birth
(years)
Adult literacy
rate (% aged
15 and
above)
Combined
gross
enrolment
ratio for
primary,
secondary
and tertiary
education (%)
Life
expectancy
index
Education
index
GDP
index
GDP per
capita
(PPP USD)
rank minus
2005 0.85 75.3 98.1 73.5 0.839 0.899 0.843 4
2004 0.846 75.2 98.1 73.0 0.84 0.90 0.80 7
2003 0.841 75.0 98.1 75.0 0.83 0.90 0.79 5
2002 0.841 75.0 98.1 75.0 0.83 0.90 0.79 5
2001 0.83 74.1 98.1 73.0 0.82 0.90 0.77 4
2000 0.811 74.0 98.4 68.0 0.82 0.88 0.75 7
1999 0.803 73.6 98.2 68.0 0.81 0.88 0.82 10
1998 0.795 72.8 98.0 69.0 0.80 0.88 0.70 7
1997 0.773 72.6 97.7 67.0 0.79 0.88 0.65 18
Source. OECD, Human Development Report, World Bank88
Life expectancy in Croatia increased from 73 to 75 years in the period 1997-2005. Health
indices, such as the infant mortality rate (which halved in the period 1991-2006),89 or life
expectancy, are also improving.
87 UNESCO statistics. http://status.uis.unesco.of/ReportFolers/reportfolders.aspx.
88 World Bank, “Human Development Report,” http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?REPORT_ID=7136&REQUEST_TYPE=EXCEL&HF=N
&WSP=N
89 The infant mortality rate per 1000 livebirths was 575 in 1991 and 215 in 2005. The data for each year show a
continual decline of the infant mortality rate. Croatian Health Service Yearbook 2006, (Zagreb: Croatian
national institute of public health, 2007),  http://www.hzjz.hr/publikacije/hzs_ljetopis/.
As regards the raw physical infrastructure, progress has been most significant in the
transport sector, which is still unevenly developed.  The transport infrastructure consists of
the following: 28,750 km road; 2,726 km rail track; six seaports of special economic
importance, two of which are predominantly for freight transport and three predominantly for
passengers; seven airports and two airfields; and 781.1 km waterways, with four river ports.
In five years (2001-05),  the length of motorways in Croatia was more than doubled,
which is the result of the implementation of the government’s decision to connect all the vital
areas and towns in Croatia by motorways.
The railway infrastructure still needs serious modernisation and restructuring. There
are 62 kilometres of rail track per 100,000 inhabitants, while the EU-25 average is 45
kilometres. The length of railway lines in Croatia also exceeds the European average, but
only 9% are double-track lines, and 36% of the lines have electricity. Activity in the transport
sector is below the pre-war level, and the number of passengers in 2004 made up only 57% of
the number of passengers transported in 1990.90
In the period between 1990 and 2000, only 282 kilometres of railway lines were built
(a 35.3 km average on an annual basis), which amounts for 8.8 per cent of all lines in Croatia,
while around 75 per cent of the lines date from the Austro-Hungarian period.91
The modernisation of some of the airports and sea ports is also needed, and the
transport and trade integration at the Port of Plo?e and the construction of an international
passenger terminal at the Port of Dubrovnik are identified as necessary for the development
of the Core Network in South East Europe.
The information and telecommunication infrastructure is well developed, while the
energy sector experienced serious war damage and needs investments.
2.2 Macroeconomic aspects
2.2.1 Economic growth
At the beginning of the transition, Croatia was a prosperous industrialised area, compared
with the new EU member states and the South East European countries. However, Croatia's
economy suffered badly during the 1991-95 war. The output collapsed, and the country
missed the early waves of investment in Central and Eastern Europe.
90 Strategic Coherent Development.
91 Croatian Economic Development.
Figure 2.1 The development of the GDP, 1990-2006
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Table 2.3 GDP per capita, 1990-2006
Year
GDP per capita, at
exchange rate
(EUR)
GDP per capita,
PPP (EUR)
GDP per capita at
exchange rate/GDP in
PPP
1990 4 080 6 860 1.68
1991 4 013 6 030 1.50
1992 1 780 5 540 3.11
1993 2 033 4 930 2.42
1994 2 654 5 310 2.00
1995 3 118 5 740 1.84
1996 3 531 6 510 1.84
1997 3 891 7 020 1.80
1998 4 284 7 450 1.74
1999 4 102 7 440 1.81
2000 4 502 8 110 1.80
2001 4 995 8 630 1.73
2002 5 507 9 320 1.69
2003 5 906 9 830 1.66
2004 6 462 10 570 1.64
2005 7 038 11 150 1.58
2006 7 704 11 730 1.52
Source: WIIW
The significant drop of the GDP per capita in the period 1992-93 was less dramatic in PPP
terms, when the gap between the GDP per capita at exchange rate and in PPP was the highest
(GDP per capita in PPP was three times higher than at exchange rate). The ratio between the
GDP per capita at exchange rate and in PPPs has been steadily decreasing, from 3.1 in 1992
to 1.5 in 2006.
Croatia established a strong track record of policy implementation in the period 1994-
97, when GDP growth was estimated at 5.5%. After a short recession, positive economic
growth resumed at the end of 1999, driven by a rebound in household consumption, a
booming tourist industry and a favourable external environment.
Despite the worldwide slowdown, the macroeconomic performance of Croatia was
positive in 2001. The Croatian economy grew in 2001 by 3.8%, driven by domestic demand,
notably private consumption, and a favourable tourism activity. Industrial production posted
a solid growth of 6%, but the construction and agriculture sectors remained subdued. In 2002,
the  GDP  grew  by  4.4%  (year-on-year),  resulting  from  the  continued  growth  of  domestic
demand, especially investment and personal consumption. The construction and the
(wholesale and retail) trade sector displayed high growth rates. The tourism season was
satisfactory but with lower growth rates than in the two years before.92  In  line  with  the
investment and consumption growth, value added in construction (+13.9%) and retail and
wholesale trade (+12.7%) recorded the strongest gains.
In 2003, the Croatian GDP grew by 5.6% in real terms, which was the highest growth
rate since the recession in 1999. The gross fixed capital formation remained strong; the
private consumption growth somewhat cooled down, reflecting the high indebtedness of the
households as well as slower credit expansion. Debt-financed public investment, especially in
highway construction, measured up to the activity level of the previous year. The tourist
season was good, as the overall earnings increase was estimated at 15% in 2003.93
The GDP growth slowed down in 2004 to 5.3% (from 5.6%, yoy), and to 4.3% in
2005.94 Industrial production grew by 5.1% in 2005 and by around 4.5% in 2006. 95In 2006,
real GDP growth accelerated to 4.8%. The economic output remained largely driven by
92 “The Western Balkans in Transition,” European Economy occasional papers, no. 1 (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2003/ocp1en.pdf.
93  “The Western Balkans in Transition,” European Economy occasional papers, no. 5 (2004),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2004/ocp5en.pdf
94 WIIW data.
95 “Western Balkans in Transition,” European Economy enlargement papers, no. 30 (2006),
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication1481_en.pdf
domestic demand. In particular, investment spending increased by 12.6%, strongly supported
by a private sector initiative. The stronger private investment contributed to an acceleration of
the total real investment growth to 10.9%, up from 4.8% in 2005. Private consumption grew
by  around  3.5%  in  real  terms.  The  real  growth  of  the  imports  of  goods  and  services  was
slightly stronger (9.5%) than that of exports, and net exports posted a negative contribution to
growth (2.2 percentage points). The economic growth remained robust in 2007. Real GDP
growth accelerated further to 6.8% in the first half, and industrial production went up by 7%
year on year in the first eight months of 2007. Overall, the economic performance remained
strong, with real growth rates above the potential growth.
The investment ratio has experienced significant growth since 1990, from 13.7% of
the GDP to a level of roughly 30%. The trade balance in goods deteriorated and the deficit
increased from 6.5% in 1993 to 24.4% in 2006. In the same period, the balance in services
significantly increased (from 10 to 17%), mostly caused by a boosting tourism. Government
expenditures fluctuated around 50% of the GDP.
Figure 2.2 GDP and its components
Source: WIIW
Changes in the contribution of the main sectors to the GDP have been limited, indicating
slow structural reforms. Despite the importance of tourism, the share of services reached 63%
(up from 58 in 1990), which is still below the EU average (67% for the EU-15 in 2001). The
share of agriculture, although decreasing (from 9% to 7%), is still significantly above the EU
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average  (2.3%)  and  that  of  the  new  EU  member  states  (5%).  The  share  of  the  industry
decreased  from  26  to  23%,  (which  is  comparable  with  the  EU  levels),  while  the  share  of
construction remained at the level of 6% (which is higher than that in the EU).
Figure 2.3 The contribution of the main sectors to the GDP, %
Table 2.4 Composition of GDP
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture, hunting, forestry
and fishing (% of the GDP) 9.3 9.4 9.6 8.8 9.0 8.7 7.0 7.5 7.3 7.1
Industry (% of the GDP) 25.9 25.0 24.6 24.3 23.0 22.8 22.8 23.4 23.8 23.5
Construction (% of the GDP) 7.1 6.6 5.3 4.6 4.9 5.3 6.3 6.6 6.5 6.8
Services 57.8 59.0 60.4 61.9 61.8 63.1 63.9 62.5 62.4 62.6
Source: Eurostat, 2007
2.2.2 Prices and monetary conditions
2.2.2.1 Inflation and interest rates
A low inflation environment has been maintained since 1994. The average annual inflation
rate, measured by the consumer price index, was around 3.4% since the mid-1990s.
Following the introduction of the VAT on 1 January 1998, when there was a one-shot
increase  of  prices  by  2.4% in  January,  price  trends  stabilised  in  the  following  months.  The
one-shot price increase was primarily the result of the increased burden in food taxation, of
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about 2%. On the contrary, the manufacturers’ prices in January and February 1998
decreased by 0.4% and 0.1%, respectively.
Croatia  has  maintained  price  stability  using  the  exchange  rate  as  a  nominal  anchor.
The average retail price inflation fell from 4.9% in 2001 to 2.2% in 2002, ensuing from
falling agricultural  prices and the subdued growth of non-agricultural  prices and despite the
prominent inflation in services. Producer prices fell by 0.4% in 2002, but they showed an
accelerating trend towards the end of the year. Retail price inflation in November 2003 (yoy)
was 1.9%. Producer prices rose by a modest 0.9% (yoy). 96
The average annual consumer price inflation increased significantly, from 2.1% in
2004 to 3.3% in 2005, resulting from higher prices for energy (oil), transport and food. On a
twelve-month moving average, the inflation further increased to 3.4% in October 2006, also
fuelled by the adjustments of the administrative prices. The average producer price inflation
stood at 2.9% in November 2006, slightly lower than a year before. 97
In December 2006, the CPI was 2% higher than in December 2005, while the average
inflation rate in 2006 amounted to 3.2 percent. The increase of the inflation rate was mainly
driven by the growth in the prices of services, i.e. the increase in the prices of water supply
and utility services. In December 2006, the prices of services were 4.2 percent higher than in
December 2005, while the prices of goods rose only by 1.4 percent. The producer prices
measured by PPI rose by 1.9 percent in December 2006. Inflation was kept stable and
relatively low due to the appreciation of the HRK/EUR exchange rate, the slow nominal
wage increase, the mild labour productivity growth, and the intense competition in the retail
trade.
It should be also noted that the trends in the development of the producer price index
diverged from those of the consumer price index.
96 “The Western Balkans in Transition.” European Economy occasional papers, no. 5, (January, 2004),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2004/ocp5en.pdf.
97 WB in transition, 2006.
Figure 2.4 Consumer price index, producer price index, core inflation, %, 1995-2006
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Table 2.5 Interest rates (official, market rates)
The policy rate of the
Central Bank,
 %
Short term interest
rate, %
Long term interest
rate, %
1990 - - -
1991 - - -
1992 - 951.2 -
1993 34.5 1370.5 -
1994 8.5 26.9 -
1995 8.5 21.1 -
1996 6.5 17.6 -
1997 5.9 9.7 -
1998 5.9 11.2 -
1999 7.9 10.7 -
2000 5.9 6.8 -
2001 5.9 3.4 -
2002 4.5 1.7 -
2003 4.5 3.3 -
2004 4.5 5.1 -
2005 4.5 3.1 -
2006 4.5 2.1 -
Source: WIIW, IMF
The 1993 data show extremely high interest rates and a large interest spread because the
expectations of the market participants did not adjust immediately after the exchange rate and
price stabilization occurred in November 1993. The nominal interest rates decreased in 1994
due to the rising credibility of the ongoing programme and due to price deflation (real lending
interest rates in 1994 were strongly positive, amounting to more than 18%), and then they
increased again in 1995, mainly due to a rise in the inflation (real interest rates rose only
marginally compared to 1994). However, it is the interest rates spread that rose significantly
in 1995. According to Šonje, Kraft and Dorsey (1996), this was due to the very high and
growing overhead administrative expenses in banks, and the costs of the exchange rate
volatility that were passed on to clients.
Figure 2.5 Trends in the policy rate of the central bank, short term interest rate, and
inflation, 1993-2005
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
Policy rate of central bank
,  %
Short term interest rate,
%
Inf lation
Source: WIIW
Following the stabilisation programme in 1993, the interest rates were decreasing.
However, the policy rate of the Central Bank, inflation and the short-term interest rate did not
follow the same trend during the whole period.
2.2.2.2 Exchange rate
At the  end  of  1991,  the  Republic  of  Croatia  introduced  the  Croatian  Dinar  at  the  exchange
rate  1  convertible  Dinar  =  1  HRD.   In  May  1994,  a  new  monetary  unit  called  Kuna  was
introduced at the exchange rate 1 000 HRD = 1 Kuna.
The legal basis for Croatia's foreign exchange regime was the Law on the Foundations
of the Foreign Exchange System, effective since 19 October 1993.  The Law regulated the
foreign exchange market, in which all purchase and sale of foreign exchange took place.  The
exchange rate of the Kuna is determined by the supply and demand in the interbank market,
with the significant participation of the Croatian National Bank.
Croatia opted for a floating exchange rate for its national currency, the Kuna, pegged
to the Deutsche Mark, and from 1 January 1999 to the Euro, to enable the economy to adjust
to external shocks.  Measured at the average monthly HRK/EUR exchange rate, fluctuations
have been within a narrow ±4% band during the period 2001-06.
The tolerance of the CNB for exchange rate movements has been relatively low and
intervention quite systematic. In this regard, it is interesting to compare Croatia with other
transition economies with similar exchange rate arrangements, like the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania — all, like Croatia, "managed floats" in the IMF classification
scheme — and a soft "peg" one like Hungary. While the latter three have a history of
continuous depreciation since 1994 (largely managed in the case of Slovenia and Hungary),
the Croatian currency, like that of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, has been fairly stable
over time and even within this group its movements have been remarkably smooth. Croatia
displays by far the most inflexible exchange rate.98
The authorities’ exchange rate policy regarding the Kuna is managed floating with no
pre-announced path for the exchange rate, and the float has been tightly managed. The
National Bank of Croatia is authorized to intervene in the foreign currency market to
maintain a competitive exchange rate. The Central Bank alleviates the appreciation pressures
coming from the strong capital inflow and tourism revenues through interventions on the
foreign exchange market. The Croatian National Bank transacts only in Euros, US dollars and
SDRS. Exchange rates are published daily by the authorized banks and the National Bank of
Croatia.99
98 Andreas Billmeie and Leo Bonato, Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Monetary Policy in Croatia. IMF
working paper 02/109, (IMF, 2002).
99 Report of the working party on the accession of Croatia to the world trade organization, (2007), 3
http://www.wto.org/.
Figure 2.6 The development of exchange rates
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Data source: WIIW, Croatian National Bank
IRRER1 is deflated by the consumer price index, 2001=100. Until December 1997, instead of
the consumer price index, the retail price index was used.
Figure 2.7 The index of the real effective Kuna exchange rate, CPI (IREER1) & PPI
(IREER2), 2001=100
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2.2.2.3 Ratings
At the end of 1996, three global agencies for the evaluation of credit rating initiated the
process of the Republic of Croatia’s credit rating evaluation.100 Croatia requested a credit
rating from the agencies Standard & Poor and IBCA, while Moody’s Investor Service
initiated the process without an explicit request from Croatia. All three agencies were
uniform in their  evaluation of the Croatian credit  rating,  and at  the beginning of 1997, they
attributed an investment credit grade rating to Croatia.
Verification in 1999 resulted in the confirmation of the investment credit rating by
Moody's Investor Service, Standard & Poor's Corporation and the Japanese rating agency
R&I, whereas the British rating agency Fitch IBCA placed Croatia into the group of countries
with lower credit ratings, among the speculative credit ratings. In 2000, Moody's Investors
Service, Standard & Poor's Corporation, and R&I confirmed the investment credit rating.
Fitch IBCA left the Republic of Croatia in the group of countries with the highest speculative
credit rating, but it changed the ‘stable’ outlook into a ‘positive’ one.  Indeed, the verification
of the awarded credit rating in 2001 resulted in an improved credit rating by the Fitch Rating
Agency, which transferred Croatia from the group of countries with a speculative credit
rating into the group of countries with an investment credit rating with a ‘stable’ outlook.
Standard & Poor’s rating confirmed the investment credit rating, but improved the outlook
from ‘negative’ to ‘stable’, while other agencies (Moody’s Investor Service and R&I)
confirmed the previous investment grading rating.
In the period 2002-03, the improvement of the overall state of the economy, as well as
the advancement of the balance-of-payments indicators resulted, besides the confirmation of
the investment credit rating, in the change in the outlook from a ‘negative’ to a ‘stable’ one
by the Standard & Poor's Corporation.
In 2004, Standard & Poor’s increased the credit rating of Croatia from BBB- to BBB,
which was the most important upgrade.  The credit  rating upgrade reflected the reforms and
structural  changes,  as  well  as  the  stabilisation  of  the  external  debt  level  of  the  public  and
private sector.  Moody’s Investor Service, Fitch Ratings as well as Rating and Investment
Information (R&I) confirmed the investment grade credit rating.
In 2006, Rating and Investment Information increased the credit rating from BBB to
BBB+, while other agencies confirmed the previous rating.
100 This subsection is based on Ministry of Finances, “Annual Reports of the Ministry of Finances, 1994-2006,”
http://www.mfin.hr/str/73/.
Table 2.6 Credit ratings attributed to Croatia, 1997- 2007
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Fitch IBCA R&I
Long term,
Foreign
Currency
Long term,
Domestic
currency
Short tem,
Foreign
currency
Long term,
Foreign
Currency
Long term,
Domestic
currency
Short tem,
Foreign
currency
Long term,
Foreign
Currency
Long term,
Domestic
currency
Short tem,
Foreign
currency
Long term,
Foreign
Currency
1997 Baa3 - P-3 BBB- A- A3 n/a n/a n/a BBB*
1998 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1999 Baa3 Baa1 P-3 BBB- BBB+ A-3 BB+ BBB B BBB
2000 Baa1 Baa1 P-3 BBB- BBB+ A-3 BB+ BBB B BBB
2001 Baa3 Baa1 P-3 BBB- BBB+ A-3 BBB- BBB+ F3 BBB
2002 Baa3** Baa1 P-3 BBB-* BBB+ A-3 BBB-*** BBB+ F3 BBB
2003 Baa3** Baa1 P-3 BBB-* BBB+ A-3 BBB-*** BBB+ F3 BBB
2004 Baa3** Baa1 P-3 BBB** BBB+ A-3 BBB-*** BBB+ F3 BBB
2005 Baa3** Baa1 P-3 BBB** BBB+ A-3 BBB-** BBB+ F-3 BBB
2006 Baa3** Baa1 P-1 BBB** BBB+ A-3 BBB-* BBB+ F3 BBB+
2007 Baa3 BBB BBB-
*JBRI (Japan Bond Research Institute) at the time, predecessor of Japan Rating & Investment (R&I), which was established in 1998.
** Stable outlook
*** Positive outlook
Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Reports 1994-2007, available from http://www.mfin.hr/str/73/, Croatian National Bank (data for 2007)
2.2.3 Fiscal conditions
After a period of budgetary surplus (in 1994) and the relatively balanced fiscal policy during
1995 and 1996, the fiscal  policy in 1997 can be defined as expansive.  The agreements with
the London and the Paris Club and the establishment of the Croatian investment credit rating
enabled access to the international capital market. As a result, foreign borrowing increased 18
times from 1994 to 1997 (from HRK 43 million to HRK 3 726 million). Still, the fiscal
deficits  were  kept  relatively  low,  at  or  below three  percent  of  the  GDP until  the  end  of  the
1990s. Nevertheless, during this period, the country witnessed, in parallel, a dramatic
expansion of the public sector spending from the independence (1991) to the end of the war
(1995),  partly  due  to  the  need  to  introduce  a  new layer  of  government  and  to  the  resources
allocated to the war effort. The total consolidated general government spending grew from 39
percent of the GDP (1991) to 49 percent by the end of the war. This expansion was carried out
despite  a  steep  reduction  of  the  pensions  and  the  public  sector  wages  immediately  after  the
independence. This expenditure expansion continued throughout the post-war period, due to
reconstruction activities, social spending linked to the war, and the government’s inability to
resist social demands aimed at rapidly recovering pre-war levels of consumption.
As a result, the size of the government, as measured by the ratio of consolidated
general government expenditure to the GDP, expanded by more than 16 percentage points
between 1991 and 1999. In 2000, the government started reducing expenditures in line with
the  IMF  framework  under  the  past  Stand-by  Arrangement  (SBA),  and  the  deficit  of  the
consolidated central government (on  an  accrual  basis)  was  reduced  from  5.7%  of  GDP  in
2000 to 5.4% in 2001. On the expenditure side, overall expenditure increased by 4.1% in 2001
compared to 2000, essentially due to transfers to the pension and health funds. The wage bill
was even reduced by 3.8%, reflecting the wage freeze and the streamlining of the public wage
coefficient grid.
On the revenue side, tax revenues increased by 4.2%. The VAT revenue remained the
single most important revenue source and increased by more than 8%. For 2002, the central
budget foresaw  a  rise  in  revenues  by  4.2%  over  2001,  half  of  it  coming  from  the  VAT
(+5.6%). Expenditure remained almost unchanged in nominal terms, thus dropping in real
terms.  The  wage  bill  was  set  to  fall  by  2.7%.  According  to  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the
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authorities aimed to achieve a deficit of the consolidated central government budget of 4.3%
of the GDP, in line with the IMF programme101.
Fiscal consolidation continued through 2005 and 2006. According to the spring 2006
fiscal notification submitted by Croatia, the general government deficit declined from 5% in
2004 to 3.9% in 2005. According to the officially released budget data based on GFS, the
general government deficit shrank from 4.9% to 4.2% of the GDP (GFS), which was in line
with the adopted budget framework and with the policy targets set under the Pre-Accession
Economic Programme and the precautionary IMF stand-by programme, which expired in
November 2006.
Within the structure of total revenue, the most important ones are tax revenues, which
in 2005 accounted for 59.2% of the total revenue. Social contributions follow with their share
of  36.5%  in  total  revenues,  while  the  remainder  refers  to  grants,  property  income,
administrative fees, revenues under the special regulations and other revenues.
If the shares in the GDP of certain revenue categories are observed, it can be seen that
the share of the total revenue in the GDP was almost constant in the period 2002-05. Namely,
in 2002, the budgetary central government revenue accounted for 38.4%, 37.6% in 2003,
while in 2004 it accounted for 37.8%. In 2005, the share of the total budgetary central
government revenue in the GDP accounted for 37.4%, in line with the government’s policy
aimed at reducing the share of both revenue and expense in the GDP.
Compared to previous years, the 2005 share of the tax revenue in the GDP was
moderately reduced. Namely, in 2002, the share of the tax revenue in the GDP accounted for
23.6%, in 2003, this share amounted to 22.8%, 22.2% in 2004, while in 2005 it accounted for
22.1% of the GDP. It can be concluded that a moderate trend of the reduction of the tax
revenue share in the GDP is present. Social contributions recorded broadly the same share in
the GDP over the years,  although in 2005 this share was lower then the average of the past
few years, but only by 0.1 percentage points. Other revenues, especially property income,
depend on the specific circumstances in the different periods, so that the comparison of their
share in the GDP is not representative.
The fiscal consolidation years led to a stabilisation of the general government debt
ratio at around 44% (ESA 95) at the end of 2005. However, if the issued guarantees as well as
101 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 1 (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2003/ocp1en.pdf.
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the outstanding debt of the state development bank, HBOR, is included, the total public debt
amounted to around 53% of the GDP. 102
The 2006 budget framework provided for the further reduction of the general
government  deficit  to  3%  of  the  GDP  (GFS).  Revenues  grew  faster  than  spending,  but  the
high external debt and the need for consolidation require an acceleration of the structural
reforms, in particular in the area of health care, social welfare spending and state aid to
enterprises.
Figure 2.8 The development of revenues and
expenditures
Data source: WIIW
102 Western Balkans in transition, 2006.
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Figure 2.9 The development of the general government balance
Data source: WIIW, according to national definition
2.2.3.1 The development of public debt
According to the 2003 Budget law103, government debt is defined as the debt of the
consolidated government budget without government guarantees. With government
guarantees added, government debt is defined as public debt. Table 2.7 illustrates the trend of
the public debt of Croatia in the period 1999-2006.104
In the early 1990s, a significant part of the public debt of Croatia emerged by taking
over a part of the former SFRY debts (towards the London and the Paris Club, namely to the
official creditors), or as a consequence of the disintegration of the former SRFY (frozen
foreign currency deposits, JDA, JDB bonds). Until 1998, only a minor part of the total public
debt was an original debt of Croatia.105  The structure of the internal debt and the stock of dept
are presented in Table 2.8.
103 “Budget Law,“ Official Gazette, no. 96 (2003), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2003/1216.htm.
104 The reports of the Ministry of Finance until 1999 did not present government guarantees.
105Ministry of Finances, “Annual Reports of the Ministry of Finances, 1994-2006,” http://www.mfin.hr/str/73/.
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Table 2.7 The development of public debt, 1999-2006, % of the GDP
Year Public debt, % of the GDP
1999 42.3
2000 48.9
2001 50.3
2002 50.7
2003 51.1
2004 52.1
2005 52.8
2006 49.7
Source: Ministry of finance, Annual Reports, 1994-2006
Table 2.8 Stock of internal debt, 1991-96, end of the year, DM million
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1. Frozen foreign
exchange deposits 5033.90 4653.61 3989.68 3245.91 2796.28 2382.75
2. Big Bonds 1055.09 1597.28 1420.03 1360.72 1301.42 1087.37
3. Bonds 93 107.37 89.48 53.69 17.90
4. Bonds 94-1 41.76
5. Bonds 94-2 9.66
6. Bonds JDA 153.70 128.08
7. Bonds JDB 147.10
8. Reconstruction
Bonds 16.25 10.87 7.96 7.32
9. CNB I Loan 31.31 4.08 4.27 3.78 3.48
10 CNB III Land 100.33 54.44
11. Banks
Rehabilitation
Agency’s Bonds
736.59
I Total
Long term internal
debt
6583.99 6282.2 5537.41 4758.86 4426.82 4565.03
II Treasury Bills 76.39
III Long term and
short term debt 6583.99 6282.20 5537.41 4758.86 4426.82 4641.42
Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Report 1994-1996, 62.
Frozen foreign exchange deposits were a major component of the internal debt in the period
until 1997.  Croatia ceased to be a part of the monetary system of the former SFRY in June
1991 by a decision of the former National bank of Yugoslavia. All business relations between
the Croatian commercial banks and the former Central Bank were broken off. The
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commercial banks could not realize their claims towards the National Bank of Yugoslavia
related to the foreign exchange deposits of the citizens. Namely, the commercial banks in
SFRY were liable to deposit foreign exchange funds in the National Bank of Yugoslavia and
obtained in return the equivalent value in the former domestic currency (Dinar).
At the end of 1991, the government of Croatia issued a Decree on the Conversion of
the Citizens’ Foreign Exchange Deposits with Banks into the Public Debt of the Republic of
Croatia.106 Croatia issued its bonds to commercial banks, denominated in Deutsche Marks.
With respect to the repayment of the first out of the 20 annuities of the principle of the frozen
foreign exchange deposits, Croatia issued so-called JDA bonds. In the same manner, the
payment of the second annuity for the principle of frozen foreign exchange deposits in 1995
was replaced by the issuance of JDB Bonds. The so-called “Big Bonds” issued in 1991
represent another major component of the internal debt. The bonds were issued to enterprises
dealing with the economic infrastructure, exporting capital goods, performing investment
works abroad, as well as to the manufacturers of basic agricultural products. Reconstruction
bonds were issued during 1992 and 1993. The loans from the Croatian National Bank granted
in 1991 and 1995 were repaid in total at the end of 1997, regardless of their longer maturities.
Treasury bills  are short-term securities by which the Ministry of Finance collected funds on
the domestic money market.
As regards external public debt, in 1995 and 1996 Croatia finalised the negotiations
with the member governments of the Paris Club and the commercial banks of the London
Club. In accordance with the Agreement on the Consolidation of the Debt of the Republic of
Croatia, the government took over the allocated debts107 and 28.49% of the non-allocated
debts of the former SFRY. By reaching an agreement with the members of the Paris and
London Clubs, the basis for emerging on the international capital market was accomplished.
After negotiations held with a number of international banks, the Dresdner Bank
Luxembourg was appointed as the Leading Bank of the International Syndicate Banks.
Another 28 banks from 12 countries joined the syndicate, which provided DEM 200 million
in 1996. In 1997, Croatia issued bonds denominated in Kunas in the amount of HRK 300
million, out of which HRK 150 million was issued on the domestic, and HRK 150 million on
106 Decree on the Conversion of the Citizens’ Foreign Exchange Deposits into the Public Debt of the Republic of
Croatia, Official Gazette no. 71 (1991), no. 3 (1992), no. 12 (1992), no. 71 (1992), no. 58 (1993). In November
1993 Law on the Conversion of the Citizens Foreign Exchange Deposits into the Public Debt entered into force
Official Gazette, no. 103 (1993).
107 The allocated debts were contracted or guaranteed by legal entities resident in Croatia.
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the international market. The Inaugural Eurobond denominated in USD in the amount of USD
300 million was also issued in 1997.
Croatia joined the IMF in 1992, and the IBRD and its affiliations (IFC, IDA; MIGA)
in  1993.  It  took  over  29.38%  of  the  former  SFRY  share  in  the  capital  of  the  World  Bank
group and 7.6% of the debts towards the IBRD, according to the territorial principle. The total
inherited debt of Croatia incurred by inherited loans amounted to USD 160 million and in the
period 1993-97, the IBRD approved USD 312 million for 10 projects.
In  1993,  Croatia  became  a  full  member  of  the  EBRD,  and  by  1997,  the  EBRD
approved 17 loans in total for Croatia in the amount of DEM 498 million and USD 40 million.
The  EIB,  by  the  end  of  1997,  approved  ECU 148.922  million  for  six  projects.  Croatia  also
inherited 23 million of the debt to the Council of Europe Social Development Fund, while the
formal application to CEF was submitted in 1996.
2.2.4 Trade developments
The volume of trade, i.e. the changes in market share, the structural changes of an export
sample, and the redirection of exports towards more demanding markets are some of the
indicators  that  are  used  to  measure  level  of  competitiveness.  Openness,  in  line  with  the
traditional theory, is related to the allocation of resources. Thus, it is not surprising that in the
period 1993-95, when openness was decreasing the export of goods was stagnating108
108 Ana-Maria Boromisa and Mia Miki?, “The European Union as determinant of Croatian trade policy,” in
Croatian accession to the European Union: Economic and Legal Challenges, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute
for Public Finances : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003), 139-157, http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU/boromisa-mikic.pdf.
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Figure 2.10 Openness of the country
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The increasing openness in the period that followed had limited economic effect as regards
Croatia's export performance. The stagnation of the exports of goods continued until 1999,
which can be attributed to a number of factors. First of all, Croatia’s export structure remained
largely unchanged, i.e. the domination of the former and the current public enterprises (in
particular, shipbuilding with large import components), as well as the lack of significant FDI
in the manufacturing sector continued. Furthermore, Croatian companies were often not able
to  apply  the  EC  standards.  The  structure  of  exports  has  not  changed  significantly,  and  the
main export products have remained mostly the same since the 1990s: ships and boats, textile
products, wood and wooden products.109 Croatia was slow in establishing contractual relations
with the EU and in the creation of free trade agreements, and thus, it has not been included in
the Pan-European System of Diagonal Accumulation of Rules of Origin.
109 International Trade Centre. “Comtrade data for 1997-2005.”(2007), http://www.intracen.org/tradstat.
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Figure 2.11 Development of exports: goods and services, EUR million
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As a result of the increased imports, openness and the trade deficit increased. The steady
export of services (mostly driven by tourism) has helped limiting the growth of the current
account deficit.
Table 2.9 Development of the trade balance, million USD
Trade deficit, total Trade deficit, EU
1992 0.1 0.2
1993 -0.8 -0.4
1994 -0.9 -0.6
1995 -2.9 -2
1996 -3.3 -2
1997 -4.9 -3.3
1998 -3.9 -2.7
1999 -3.5 -2.3
2000 -3.2 -2.2
2001 -3.8 -2.2
2002 -5.8 -4.4
2003 -8.1 -6
2004 -8.6 -6.3
2005 -9.8 -6.8
2006 -11.2 -7.4
Source: Central Statistic Bureau
114
Figure 2.12 Development of the trade balance, % of the GDP
Data source: WIIW
Figure 2.13 Development of imports, EUR million
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In spite of the decrease of the market share and the stagnation of the volume of the total
exports  to  the  EU until  2001,  the  EU has  remained  the  most  important  market  for  Croatian
products.110 In 2006, the share of the EU in Croatia’s total trade was 66%, followed by Russia
(6.6%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (6.2%), China (3.3%), and the USA (2.0%). The same is the
ranking of Croatia’s major import partners. Croatia exports the most to the EU member states
(62.2% of the total exports), Bosnia and Herzegovina (14%), and the USA (3.2%). 111
Figure 2.14 The evolution of the current account balance
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110 For more about the Croatia-EU trade, see: Overview of Croatia –EU relation.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/croatia/index_en.htm.
111 European Commission, DG Trade, “Croatia 2007,”
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113370.pdf.
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Figure 2.15 The evolution of the main elements of the account balance
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2.2.5 Factors affecting trade and current account developments
During the war, the output collapsed and restructuring was delayed. Tourism also suffered
badly  from  the  political  instability.  There  were  several  reasons  for  the  stagnation  of  the
exports of goods until 1999: the unchanged export structure, the lack of FDI and the inability
to apply the EC standards (e.g. slow transition). The lack of institutional links with the main
partner countries and the exclusion from the Pan-European System of Diagonal Cumulation
of Rules of Origin also did not help.112
Accession to the WTO in 2000 and the gradual establishment of the free trade zone
represent the institutional conditions that facilitated access to most important markets. The
agreements with the London and the Paris club and the establishment of the Croatian
investment credit rating enabled access to the international capital market. The total deficit
realised in 1997 can be observed as a turning-point in the fiscal policy position and a result of
the government’s capability to finance part of its needs on the international capital market
under relatively favourable conditions.113 As  a  result,  foreign  borrowing  increased  18  times
from 1994 to 1997 (from 43 million Kuna to 3,726 million Kuna).
2.2.6 External assistance
2.2.6.1 Remittances
Croatia is considered to be a labour exporting-county, and the official working remittances (in
million USD, real terms (see Table 2.10), are significant. Compared to Croatia's total export
in the period 1994-2003, remittances range from 8 to 22%.
In the same period, Croatia experienced a stable inflow that increased every year.
From  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  period,  remittances  more  than  tripled.  The  only
exception is in the year 1999, when Croatia experienced a decrease in remittances from the
previous period. This is probably due to the banking crisis and the recession in 1998, which
lasted until the end of 1999. For the period 1999-2002, Croatia experienced its fastest rise in
remittances. In 2004, remittances were estimated at 3% of the GDP. Compared to the capital
flows, remittances have been the most stable source of capital to the domestic economy and
far more significant than the official development finance.
112 Western Balkans in transition.
113 Ministry of Finances, “Annual Reports of the Ministry of Finances, 1994-2006,” http://www.mfin.hr/str/73/.
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Table 2.10 Remittances received in Croatia, USD million, 1994-2007
Year Remittances,
USD million
Remittances
EUR million
1994 349
1995 544
1996 668
1997 617 512
1998 625 526
1999 557 480
2000 641 649
2001 747 783
2002 885 883
2003 1085 900
2004 1222 928
2005 933
Sources: Data in USD; Sources: Ali Mansoor and Bryce Quillin (eds) Migration and Remittances (
World Bank, 2006), 125,  available from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/257896-
1167856389505/Migration_Appendices.pdf, accessed on 20 December 2007; Data in Euro:
Prpezinovic Adela, Remittances and Income Inequality in Croatia, Master's Thesis (Scholl of
Economics and Management Lund University, February 2007), available from
http://biblioteket.ehl.lu.se/olle/papers/0002354.pdf
2.2.6.2 Foreign aids and loans
The Law on Credit  Relations with Foreign Countries regulates borrowing from international
financial institutions and lending or borrowing arrangements with foreign partners by
authorized banks, companies and legal entities, as well as guarantees issued for the account of
domestic and foreign entities.
According to the CIA fact book, Official Development Finance (ODF) in 2005
reached USD 125.4 million, including assistance from the World Bank, the IMF, other
international organizations, and from individual nation donors.114
114  Formal commitments of aid are included in the data. Omitted from the data are grants by private
organizations. The CIA fact book data is calculated on an exchange rate basis, and it calculates the inflows of
grants and loans and their repayment.
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2.2.6.3 Relations with the main international financial institutions
Since gaining independence, Croatia has become a member of a number of prominent
financial institutions. Here we present its cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank Group,
the EIB and the Council of Europe Social Development Fund.
Croatia became a member of the IMF in December 1992, and it has benefited from
IMF's technical assistance in key monetary, fiscal and public administration areas. An
agreement was made with the new government in March 2001, culminating in a 14-month
stand-by arrangement (SBA) for SDR 200 million (USD 255 million).115
Although all the performance criteria had been fulfilled, Croatia decided not to draw
any funds in 1998. On 29 March 2002, the IMF completed the second review under the 14-
month precautionary stand-by arrangement, which expired in May 2002. The authorities
wanted to conclude a successor arrangement (also of a precautionary character). Such an
arrangement,  necessary  for  a  credible  policy  of  fiscal  consolidation,  was  approved  in  2003
and expired in 2004. The SBA amounted to SDR 105.88 million (about USD 147 million),
and its aim was to stabilise the public debt ratio through fiscal prudence, whereas the review
broadened the focus and underlined the need to contain the external current account deficit
and the external debt. The subsequent IMF programme, agreed on in 2004, was also cautious,
and it has proved useful in supporting the government’s policies of macroeconomic
stabilisation. 116
From the last three stand-by arrangements (signed in 2001, 2003 and 2004), Croatia
did not draw any funds, and the programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was
successfully completed in November 2006.  The authorities did not request a successor
arrangement.  The transactions with the Fund in special drawing rights (SDRs)117 are
presented in Table 2.11.
115 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 3 (2001),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2001/c2001_03_en.pdf.
116 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 5 (2004),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2004/ocp5en.pdf.
117 SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement the existing official reserves
of member countries. SDRs are allocated to member countries in proportion to their IMF quotas The SDR also
serves as the unit of account of the IMF and some other international organizations. Its value is based on a basket
of key international currencies. On 14 December 2007, SDR was 1.084 EUR. (www.imf.org)
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Table 2.11 Transactions of Croatia with the IMF, from 1990-2007, SDRs
Year General Resources Account (GRA)GRA
Total
Disbursements Repurchases Charges Paid Disbursements Repayments Charges/Interest Paid
2003 0 0 285,376 0 0 285,376
2002 0 97,231,667 2,565,822 0 97,231,667 2,565,822
2001 0 24,198,333 5,354,697 0 24,198,333 5,354,697
2000 0 21,800,000 6,947,321 0 21,800,000 6,947,321
1999 0 22,890,000 6,329,729 0 22,890,000 6,329,729
1998 0 6,540,000 7,955,667 0 6,540,000 7,955,667
1997 28,780,000 1,559,828 7,477,760 28,780,000 1,559,828 7,477,760
1996 0 3,119,656 6,555,543 0 3,119,656 6,555,543
1995 65,400,000 3,899,570 6,407,516 65,400,000 3,899,570 6,407,516
1994 78,480,000 6,239,312 830,283 78,480,000 6,239,312 830,283
1993 0 17,200,839 2,568,323 0 17,200,839 2,568,323
1992 44,328,984 12,309,779 0 44,328,984 12,309,779 0
Source: IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extrans1.aspx?memberKey1=227&endDate=2007%2D12%2D
17&finposition_flag=YES, accessed on 17 December 2007
Based on the arrangements to take over the rights and liabilities inherited from the former
SFRY, Croatia re-joined the World Bank Group in 1993 and took over 29.38% of the
former  SFRY  share  in  the  capital  of  the  World  Bank's  group  and  took  over  7.6%  of  the
outstanding debts of the SFRY. In 1998, the World Bank opened its South Central Europe
Regional Office in Zagreb, which covers Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.118
In the period 1994-2006, the IBRD approved public loans for 21 projects (EUR 706
million, USD 576 million), and loans for nine projects with government guarantees (USD 81
million , EUR 234 million). The total loans reached USD 608.680 million and EUR 383.431
million.119
In the same period, 49 grant agreements were concluded, in the total amount of USD
35 million, JPY 270 million, GBP 352,800, EUR 11 million and SEK 23 million.120
In November 2000, the general European Investment Bank (EIB) mandate 2000-07
was extended to lending to Croatia. The target amount for Croatia was EUR 250 million, but
the final amount of lending to Croatia has been smaller. In the period 2000-06, a total of EUR
426 million was withdrawn.
118 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 1 (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2003/ocp1en.pdf.
119 Ministry of Finance, Annual Report 2006 (2006), 148.
120 Ibid., 151.
121
Croatia joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in
March 1993. The EBRD had made a cumulative commitment of about EUR 1,600 million in
Croatia, contributing to a total project value of some EUR 3 billion. About two thirds of the
EBRD's portfolio was in private and one third in state projects. 121
The Council of Europe Development Bank approved 11 public loans and 2 with
government guarantees until the end of 2006, worth EUR 181 million and USD 4.5 million .
2.2.7 Foreign direct investment
Foreign investment has been regulated under the Company Law, which entered into force on
1 January 1995.  The Law defined a foreign investor as any foreign national or legal person
with a registered seat outside the Republic of Croatia.  The law from 1995 had nullified a
number of restrictions on the foreign investment maintained under the previous legislation
(the Law on Foreign Investments).  No particular sector was closed to foreign investment.
However, investments in the military industry and telecommunications were subject to a
special procedure.  According to the Law on Telecommunications, foreign investment in radio
and television concessions was limited to 25 per cent of the capital of the concessionaire.
Inward portfolio investment was not restricted, except for the Central Bank short-term
securities in the primary market.
Foreign direct investment by non-residents could take the form of joint venture or full
ownership.  Registration with the commercial courts was required.  National treatment applied
to foreign investment in principle, on the condition of reciprocity.  Amendments to the
Company Law, abolishing the condition of reciprocity and thus providing full national
treatment in respect of the establishment of commercial presence, was adopted by the
parliament in March 1999, and entered in force following Croatia's accession to the WTO.
Concerning outward investments, Croatian residents were required to report their
investments abroad to the Ministry of Economy ex-post for statistical purposes.  The
acquisition of real estate in Croatia by non-residents has been granted on the basis of
reciprocity.  However, before the accession to the WTO, foreign exchange restrictions in
practice prevented Croatian residents from purchasing real estate abroad.
121 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 1 (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2003/ocp1en.pdf.
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Figure 2.16 Inward and outward FDI, stock
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Figure 2.17 FDI inflow and outflow, 1993-2006
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Inflows have been concentrated in few sectors. Just five industries have received more than
65% of the overall amount of FDI inflows: financial intermediation 31.1%,
telecommunications 13.5%, chemical industry 14.0%, manufacture of coke and refined
petroleum products 4.7% and gas and wholesale trade 4.1% of the total FDI inflows.
The first important FDI individual projects occurred in telecommunications and
electronic industries (Ericsson, Siemens in 1995). The privatisation of banks followed: while
in 1996 foreign banks held 1% of the total assets, in 1999, this share increased to 39.9%,
and in 2000 to 84.1%. Seven state-owned banks were privatised in 1999-2000. In 2002,
three regional banks were privatised (Rije?ka, Dubrova?ka and Splitska banks).
Next was the privatisation of Croatian Telecom. In October 1999, the government
accepted the offer of Deutsche Telekom for the sale of 35% of Croatian Telecom for
USD 850 million. In mid-2001, an additional 16% stake in the Croatian Telecom Company
(HT) was sold for EUR 500 million to Deutsche Telekom. The privatisation of another 19%
was been postponed until 2007, when this share was sold following an initial public offering
(IPO). In 2004, four privatisation projects in the telecommunication sector were completed,
worth USD 42 million.122 The  first  stage  of  the  privatisation  of  the  oil  company  INA  was
finalised in 2003, and MOL, as a strategic investor, bought a 25%+1 share in the company.
In the period 2002-06, the total FDI into Croatia was close to the regional average
(averaging just below 5 percent of the GDP annually during 2002-06), but greenfield FDI was
well below the potential.123
The uneven flow of FDI and the dominance of brownfield investments underline the
need for improvements in the business and investment climate, or generally the need for
structural reforms, which will increase the competitiveness of the overall economy and its
attractiveness for investors, in particular, foreign investors.124
122 World Bank, “Privatisation database,“
http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/Results.aspx?countryid=52&startyear=2000&endyear=2006&sectors=1,2,
3,4,5,6
123 David Moore and Athanasios Vamvakidis, “Economic Growth in Croatia: potential and Constraints,” IMF
Working Paper (International Monetary Fund, 2007),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07198.pdf.
124 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU funds, Strategic Coherence Framework
2007-2013: Instrument for pre-accession assistance, (Zagreb: Central Office for Development Strategy and
Coordination of EU funds, 2006), 16.
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2.2.8 Labour market developments
2.2.8.1 Labour market regulation
The  Labour  Law,  replacing  the  Law  on  working  relations  (1992)  and  the  Law  on  primary
rights of employment (1991), was adopted in 1995 and entered into force in 1996. In 2001, it
was amended twice, and once again in 2003.125 Unlike the former changes, the change in
2003  directly  referred  to  the  level  of  the  legislative  protection  of  employment.  The
consolidated text of the Labour Law was published in 2004126, and its latest change derives
from the Decision of the Croatian Constitutional Court of May 2005.127
The reform of the employment protection legislation in 2003 resulted in the significant
reductions of the restrictions imposed by the legislation. The reform enjoyed strong support
from various international institutions, so it was a structural benchmark in both the agreement
with the World Bank on the Structural Adjustment Loan and the Stand-by arrangement with
the International Monetary Fund. However, both the awareness of the necessity of the reform
and the  final  results  of  the  negotiations  were  outcomes  of  the  dialogue  within  the  domestic
tripartite  institutions.  The  case  for  the  changing  of  the  Labour  Law  was  reinforced  by  the
impression that it was considerably more restrictive than similar legislation in developed
countries as well as in the neighbouring transition countries, thus making the creation of new
jobs more expensive to the entrepreneurs, driving them into the sphere of the informal
economy and discouraging foreign investors.128
The changes introduced in 2004 define more precise criteria for concluding fixed-term
contracts and dismissal. Some protection for whistleblowers was introduced. This provision
can be regarded as support for fighting corruption. On the other hand, the minimum period for
a regular notice was shortened and the minimum severance pay lowered (from one half to one
third of the average monthly salary).
The 2004 Law also introduced a bargaining fee, i.e. the obligation for non-union
workers to pay a fee throughout the period of the validity of the collective agreement, for the
125 “Act on Amendments to the Labour Act,“ Official Gazette, no. 114  (July 19, 2003),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2003/1574.htm
126 Teo Matkovi? and Iva Biondic, “Reforma zakona o radu i promjena EPL indeksa,” Financial theory and
practice 27 (2003), 515-528.
127 “Odluka Ustavnog suda Republike Hrvatske, broj:U-I-2766/2003 i dr. od 24. svibnja 2005,” Official Gazette,
no. 68 (2005).
128 Vedran Šoši?, “Poverty and Labor Market Policies in Croatia,” Financial theory and practice 29 (2005), 55-
73.
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benefits negotiated by the collective agreement. However, this provision was abolished by the
Constitutional Court in 2005.
In order to help fighting the high unemployment, the establishment of temporary
employment agencies was enabled. A temporary employment agency is an employer who,
under  a  worker  assignment  agreement,  assigns  workers  to  another  employer  for  the
performance of temporary work. Temporary employment agencies have the role of mediators
during the process of employment. They take care of the selection, administration, and
registration of workers.
The adoption and implementation of the policies and the establishment of the relevant
institutions are seen as essential steps for promoting employment.129 Still,  employment  is  a
very challenging area for Croatia.  Among all  the EU member states,  only Malta and Poland
have lower total employment rates than Croatia, while the long–term unemployment rate is
higher only in Slovakia and Poland. A high unemployment rate, in particular for the long-term
unemployed and the young, and a low labour force participation rate, indicate that the labour
market is not very flexible in Croatia.130
2.2.8.2 Demographic composition and activity rate
According to the 2001 census, the Republic of Croatia had 4,437,460 inhabitants. Although
the data are not strictly comparable, this represents a 6.1% fall in the total population
compared to 1991 (based on the 1991 census definition). This is partly explained by a
negative rate of natural increase, which is the effect of a long and steady decline in the birth-
rate, which has fallen as low as 8.9 live births per 1000 inhabitants, while death rates have
been stable in recent years. The share of people of working age in the total population is
around 65%, and it will only start to decline after 2010131: according to the 1991 census, 70%
of the men and 65% of the women were of working age (15-64). The share of this age group
remained the same 10 years later, but the share of children decreased from 20% (boys) and
18% (girls) to 18% and 16 %, respectively. 132
129 Ibid., 16.
130 International Monetary Fund, “Republic of Croatia: Selected Issues, February 2007,” IMF Country Report no.
07/82, http://www.informest.it/docs/documenti/HR_20070319105356_IMF_Selected07.pdf.
131 Sandrine Cazes, Alena Nesporova, Deniz Sertcan and Françoise Kempf, Employment Policy Review Croatia,
(ILO, 2006).
132 Own calculations based on the DZS data.
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The main determinant of demographic trends in Croatia, however, is migration. After
a wave of emigration from Croatia to Western Europe at the beginning of the war, there was a
large inflow of Bosnian refugees into Croatia when the war broke out there. In recent years,
however, a positive migration balance has systematically set off the negative natural decrease.
Increasingly, migrants arrive in order to work in Croatia: the number of work permits issued
to foreigners has risen from about a fifth of the total  immigrants in 1999 to almost a half  in
2003. Migrant workers are predominantly male blue collar workers originating from the
former Yugoslavia, although the share of college graduates is increasing.
The share of the active population decreased from 45.3% in 1991 to 43 % in 2001. The
activity rate was decreasing in the period 1996-2000, from 56.2% to 50% and was about 50%
until 2004, when it started growing and reached 62.6% in 2006. There is a significant gender
gap: the activity rate of males in the period 1996-2003 ranges between 57% (in 2001) and
65% (1996), while the activity rate of females was below 50% during the whole period,
ranging between 42% (2001) and 49% (1996). Young people between 14 and 24 have the
highest unemployment rate, i.e. 28%, which is significantly higher than the total
unemployment rate of 11.2% in 2006.
2.2.8.3 The development of employment
According to the labour force survey, Croatia had 1,536,500 employed inhabitants in 2003,
which represents 83.6% of the 1989 figure. Today, employment rates are at a very low level
compared with most East and South-East European countries, and they displayed a declining
tendency throughout the 1990s. From 50.6% in 1996, employment fell to a low of 41.5% of
the working age population in early 2001, before stabilising and reaching 43% at the end of
2003.
As with the activity rates, employment rates are very unequal with respect to gender.
While  the  male  employment  rate  reaches  50.3%,  only  36.5%  of  working  age  women  are
employed, with particularly low rates for older women. The downward trend in employment
has  been  quite  evenly  spread  across  the  age  groups,  with  the  exception  of  workers  between
50-64 years of age, whose employment rate has remained constant.
The pattern of employment in different sectors of economic activity in the period
1991-2006 roughly followed the general development trends in these sectors, i.e. a shift from
employment in the industry and agriculture to services can be observed. The share of renting
and business sector in the total employment doubled (from 4.8% in 1999 to 9.6 in 2006),
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while the share of employment in the transport, storage and communication sectors decreased
from 5.3 to 3.5%.  There was also a significant decrease in the share of public administration
and defence and compulsory social security in the total employment, from 3.8 to 2.1%.
Figure 2.18 Shares of individual sectors in the total employment
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 While the main loss of industrial employment occurred as early as the beginning of the
1990s, agriculture continues to lose workers, while services keep gaining them. The single
sector of strong growth was construction, which increased its workforce by about 30%
between 1996 and 2003, partly thanks to public infrastructure projects.
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Figure 2.19 The development of employment by sectors
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Employment in small and medium enterprises increased by 29% between 1995 and 2003, in
contrast to the slight overall decrease in employment over the same period. This indicates a
sizeable shift from large enterprises to SMEs. The proportion of workers employed in SMEs
out of the total employment is now 38%.
2.2.8.4 Unemployment
From low levels, unemployment started increasing in 1991. It then remained constant at
around  8% for  some years,  and  in  1996,  it  started  to  rise  steadily  until  it  reached  a  peak  of
17% in the second half of 2000. Sound economic growth and some systematic changes
including stricter eligibility rules for the unemployed resulted in a gradual decrease of the
official unemployment rate, which reached 14.4% in 2003.
Registered unemployment diverges systematically from the labour force survey
results, showing significantly higher unemployment rates. The official unemployment rate
was increasing in the period 1994-2001, from 14.1 to 23.1%; at the same time, the 2003
labour force survey places the number of unemployed in Croatia at 256,000, which represents
an unemployment rate of 14.3%, while registered unemployment stood at 19.2%.
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Figure 2.20 The development of unemployment between 1992-2006, total (series 1),
females (series 2)
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The officially registered unemployment rate in 2005 was 16.8%, while the labour force survey
estimate is 13.1%. In 2006, according to the labour force survey, unemployment was
11.8%.133 A decline in the unemployment rate has also been observed by the Employment
Office and the Pension Insurance Fund. Still, the data on employment growth diverge: while
the Employment Office estimates employment increase to be 0.6 year-on-year, the data of the
Pension Insurance Fund suggests a stronger employment growth of above 3% on average in
2006.
Female  unemployment  is  about  20%  higher  than  the  rate  for  men,  and  the  gender
difference holds across the age groups. The unemployment trends for different age groups are
similar  to  the  trends  of  the  total  unemployment,  although  the  levels  of  unemployment  rates
differ enormously. While the prime age workers (25-49) have a slightly lower than average
unemployment rate of 12.6%, and older workers have a comparably low unemployment rate
of 8.9%, young people have an alarmingly high unemployment rate of 35.9% according to the
LFS. However, older workers’ share of the total registered unemployment has also grown
quite dramatically, from 5.7% in 1990 to 20.7% in 2004.
The duration of unemployment is a matter of particular concern in Croatia. In 2003,
32% of the unemployed had been looking for a job for less than half a year, and another
13.1% had been unemployed for up to a year. This group of short and medium-term
unemployed tends to have a higher level of qualification than the long-term unemployed.
13.9% of the labour force had been unemployed for between one and two years, while an
133 “Western Balkans in Transition,” European Economy enlargement papers, no. 30 (2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication1481_en.pdf.
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alarming 39.4% had been unemployed for more than two years. The latter figure appears even
more menacing if its development over time is taken into account. While the share of long-
term  unemployment  up  to  two  years  in  the  total  unemployment  has  been  fairly  constant,
unemployment lasting for over two years has increased from 26.5% in 1996 to 39.3% in the
second half of 2003. This means that once people become unemployed, they increasingly tend
to remain so.
A breakdown of the unemployed population by occupation reveals that the single
largest  occupational  group  among  the  unemployed  is  service  workers  and  shop  and  market
sales workers’ group, which represents 17.9% of the unemployed. This occupational group
also has shown the strongest increase in unemployment over the last decade. Yet there are
even more unemployed workers who have never worked before (33.2% of the total
unemployment).  The  two  sectors  of  activity  generating  the  most  unemployment  are
manufacturing and trade (with a 15 % average for the period 1999-2007).
A comparison of the employment and unemployment structure by educational
attainment shows that tertiary education considerably improves the labour market position of
workers, while persons with a secondary education and in particular those with blue-collar
professions are disproportionately hit by unemployment. Also, the demand for new labour
reflected in the recruitment rates confirms this trend. The discrepancy between the low hiring
rates of unskilled and semi-skilled workers and their seemingly better labour market position
only reflects their low labour market participation, as many of them withdraw from the labour
market after unsuccessfully looking for a job. The unskilled and low-skilled workers are also
those who stand to gain most from a recovery of the labour demand.
The number of workers employed abroad (according to the Croatian Employment
Agency) varied significantly in the period 1999-2006. After a significant drop in the period
1991-94, the average number of workers employed abroad in the period 1995-2006 was
6,026, peaking at 7,862 in 2001. Most of the workers employed abroad are seasonal workers,
but since 2002, students have also appeared in the official statistics.134
134 E.g. According to the UNESCO statistics, in the period 1998-99 4600 students from Croatia were studying in
Germany. Quoted according to the World Bank, “Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and Former Soviet
Union”,182.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/2578961167856389505/Migration_Chapter2.pdf
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Figure 2.21 Employment abroad
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The number of workers returning from abroad in 2006 was 3000, mostly returning from
Germany, where they had spent up to four months.135  The share of women in this group is
54%. According to Swiss data, the highly qualified migrants from Croatia are much affected
by brain waste: more than 20% of migrants with tertiary education from Croatia are active in
jobs requiring low skills (i.e. they are overqualified).
2.3 Structural developments
2.3.1 Monetary policy
2.3.1.1 Inflation factors and disinflation
An analysis of the driving forces of the inflation process in Croatia suggests that mark-up and
excess money relationships, imposed as error correction terms, are the most significant
variables for explaining the short-run behaviour of inflation. The GDP gap and the nominal
effective exchange rate are also significant in explaining the short-run inflation dynamics.  It
seems that the Croatian inflation is much more responsive to deviations from the equilibrium
135 Croatian Employment Office, “Return of workers from temporary work in foreign countries,”
http://www.hzz.hr/default.aspx?id=3995&proiz=1962.
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on the supply side and to changes in the nominal effective exchange rate than to deviations
from the equilibrium in the monetary sector. The Croatian consumer price inflation is affected
by changes in the interest rates and import prices.136
In the 1992-99 period, wage growth and currency depreciation had a positive and
significant impact upon the inflation.137 The evidence suggests that there were feedback
effects from wage growth and currency depreciation to money growth. Likewise, past values
of wage growth and currency depreciation had a positive impact on the current wage growth.
Currency depreciation was affected by money growth and past values of currency
depreciation. The relationship between money growth and currency depreciation is not
surprising, given that since January 1994 the Croatian National Bank has followed (though
unannounced) an exchange rate band wide enough to pursue a discretionary monetary policy
to offset any adverse movements in the exchange rate triggered by capital flows. Moreover,
the significance and importance of the nominal exchange rate as a factor in the inflationary
process parallels the findings in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Albania and Slovenia.
2.3.1.2 Exchange rate regime
At the end of 1991, the Republic of Croatia introduced the Croatian Dinar at the exchange rate
1 convertible Dinar = 1 HRD.  The Croatian Dinar was pegged to the Deutsche Mark and the
nominal exchange rate ceiling was initially set to 4.444 HRD/DEM, although the exchange
rate soon appreciated to 3.7 HK/DEM and later to 3.5 HRK/DEM, due to increased
confidence in the domestic currency and the large capital inflow that followed. The exchange
rate stabilised after the appreciation and was then backed by a ‘dirty floating’ regime, as the
Central Bank decided to introduce more flexibility and pass on to a managed float. The legal
basis for Croatia's  foreign exchange regime was the Law on the Foundations on the Foreign
Exchange System, effective since 19 October 1993.  The Law regulated the foreign exchange
market, in which all purchase and sale of foreign exchange took place.
By  1994,  the  foreign  exchange  reserves  were  already  over  USD  1  billion  and  were
growing. The success of the stabilisation programme and the stability of the exchange rate
136 Maruška Vizek and Tanja Broz, “Modelling Inflation in Croatia,” EIZ Working Papers (2007), 1-22,
http://www.eizg.hr/AdminLite/FCKeditor/UserFiles/File/radni%20materijali%20EIZ-a-working%20papers-
0703.pdf.
137 James E. Payne, “Inflationary dynamics of a transition economy: the Croatian experience,” Journal of Policy
Modeling no. 24 (3), (2002), 219-230.
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encouraged the government to replace the Croatian Dinar in May 1994 with a new currency.
The Kuna was introduced at the exchange rate 1 000 HRD = 1 Kuna.
A year later, current account convertibility was introduced, while the capital accounts
restrictions were eased only much later, in June 2001. Croatia achieved a high level of price
stability using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. Since the mid-1990s, the defence of the
exchange rate has been the central aim of the macroeconomic policy, and the Central Bank
law defines price stability as the primary objective of the monetary policy. The exchange rate
of the Kuna is determined by the supply and demand in the interbank market, with the
significant participation of the Croatian National Bank. Measured at the average monthly
HRK/EUR exchange rate, fluctuations have been within a narrow ±4% band during the period
2001-06.
The tolerance of the CNB for exchange rate movements has been relatively low and
the intervention is quite systematic. In this regard, it is interesting to compare Croatia with
other transition economies with similar exchange rate arrangements, like the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania — all, like Croatia, "managed floats" in the IMF classification
scheme — and a soft "peg" one like Hungary. While the latter three have a history of
continuous depreciation since 1994 (largely managed in the case of Slovenia and Hungary),
the Croatian currency, like those of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, has been fairly stable
over  time  and  even  within  this  group  its  movements  have  been  remarkably  smooth.  Croatia
displays by far the most inflexible exchange rate.138
The authorities’ exchange rate policy regarding the Kuna is managed floating with no
pre-announced path for the exchange rate, and the float has been tightly managed. The
National Bank of Croatia is authorized to intervene in the foreign currency market to maintain
a competitive exchange rate. The Central Bank alleviates the appreciation pressures coming
from a strong capital inflow and tourism revenues through interventions on the foreign
exchange market. The Croatian National Bank transacts only in Euros, US dollars and SDRs.
The Croatian National Bank is authorized to pass subordinate legislation and other enactments
to regulate the foreign exchange operations of legal entities and natural persons and to
perform foreign exchange control in Croatia. The Croatian National Bank is also authorized to
138 Andreas Billmeie and Leo Bonato, “Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Monetary Policy in Croatia,” IMF
working paper 02/109, (IMF, 2002).
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adopt methods for setting the value of the Kuna against other currencies. The exchange rates
are published daily by the authorized banks and the National Bank of Croatia.139
2.3.1.3 Monetary regime
One of the tasks of the Croatian National Bank is to formulate and execute the monetary
policy. The Croatian National Bank may adopt the measures and instruments needed to
regulate credit activity and the liquidity of banks and money supply, and to institute measures
for  the  interest  rates.  For  the  purpose  of  implementing  the  established  monetary  policy,  the
Croatian National Bank may issue its own securities denominated in domestic or foreign
currencies and may enter into agreements on purchasing, selling and exchanging securities
and other readily marketable financial instruments, as well as the rights and obligations
related to and arising from them.
The Croatian National Bank manages the international reserves in a manner which is
best suited to the implementation of the monetary and foreign exchange policies and which
ensures a smooth settlement of Croatia's international obligations. The Croatian National
Bank may grant credits to solvent banks with a head office in the Republic of Croatia for
periods not exceeding six months. The instruments of collateral that may be used for those
loans include financial instruments as defined by the Law on the Croatian National Bank, debt
instruments issued by the Croatian National Bank or the Republic of Croatia, payable in
Croatia and constituting a part of the public issue, and debt instruments stipulated by the Law
on the Croatian National Bank.
The interest rates for the discounts and loans of the Croatian National Bank are
determined in a separate decision of the Croatian National Bank. The Croatian National Bank
also obliges the banks to set aside and maintain reserve requirements in the settlement account
and in the vault or in a separate account with the Croatian National Bank. Reserve
requirements are defined as a percentage determined with regard to the type, maturity, and
size of deposits, as well as the increase in the deposits and other liabilities of a bank. The
decision on reserve requirements also provides a definition of the calculation base and the
manner of calculating reserve requirements. The Croatian National Bank may choose to
139 Report of the working party on the accession of Croatia to the world trade organization, (2007) 3
http://www.wto.org/.
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remunerate banks for their reserve requirements set aside, where the amount of remuneration
paid is prescribed by the Croatian National Bank.140
The use of monetary policy instruments is determined by the exchange rate targeting
framework of the monetary policy. There is no specified path or band for the exchange rate –
the Croatian National Bank reacts to sudden changes in the exchange rate. This behaviour has
resulted in a stable exchange rate.  The exchange rate management is conducted mainly
through foreign exchange interventions, which are the main instruments of the monetary
policy.
The Croatian National Bank has been very active in managing domestic liquidity.
Short-term interest rates are set on CNB’s liability side by selling deposits. The reserve
requirement has been the main instrument for managing domestic liquidity and monetary
tightening. The  short-tem CNB bills are also used, which were the most important
instruments in the period 2000-03. In 2005, the Croatian National Bank launched its regular
open market operations: reverse repo operations are used to increase the system's liquidity.
These are conducted every week (on Wednesdays), with a maturity of up to one week. Fine-
tuning operations used to increase or decrease the system’s liquidity are repo/reverse repo
operations, and direct purchase/sale of securities. Structural operations, the direct
purchase/sale of securities and repo/reverse repo operations are also conducted.
The three standing facilities in use are the deposit facility, which may be used on a
daily basis and suspended by a discretionary decision of the CNB, lombard loan, and intraday
loan. Other instruments used by the CNB include:
? Foreign currency auctions, held to protect the stability of the domestic currency and to
maintain the liquidity of payments in the country and abroad, based on a discretionary
decision of the CNB
? CNB bills
? Minimum required amount of foreign currency claims and
? Short term liquidity loans.
140Croatian National Bank, http://www.hnb.hr.
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2.3.1.4 Central bank regulations
The Croatian National Bank Act, adopted in 2001141 and amended in December 2006, governs
the status, operations, ownership status, powers and organization of the Croatian National
Bank, as well as the relationship of the Croatian National Bank with the Republic of Croatia,
banks and international institutions and organizations.  The Croatian National Bank has the
authority to adopt subordinate legislation and other enactments regulating the foreign
exchange operations of legal and natural persons. It also exercises control over foreign
exchange  operations  in  Croatia  and  has  the  authority  to  establish  a  method  for  setting  the
value of the Kuna against other currencies.
The Croatian National Bank is by definition autonomous and independent. The 2006
amendments increased the autonomy of the CNB and explicitly state that “The Croatian
National Bank shall be independent in adopting and enforcing its decisions pursuant to this
Act,  and  shall  neither  seek  nor  take  instructions  from  the  authorities  of  the  Republic  of
Croatia, European Union bodies or other bodies. The authorities of the Republic of Croatia,
European Union bodies or other bodies may not influence the independence of the Croatian
National  Bank  or  the  decisions  of  the  members  of  the  Croatian  National  Bank  Council,  nor
may they approve, revoke, postpone or cancel any decision taken by the members of the
Croatian National Bank Council within its fields of competence.”
The amendments also provide for a secondary objective, which allows the general
economic objectives of the European Community to take precedence over Croatia's domestic
objectives. In addition, the rules and structures relevant to integrating the CNB into the
European System of Central Banks by the time of the EU accession have been incorporated.
The amended CNB Law more comprehensively prohibits the monetary financing of the public
sector. The definition of "public sector" has been changed and now also includes extra-
budgetary funds, local self-government units and other public bodies. The provisions that
permitted the Croatian government to cover any shortfalls between the income and
expenditure of the CNB that are larger than the CNB's general reserves, either from the state
budget or by issuing bonds, have been revoked.
141 Previously the Bank Croatian National Bank Act (Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia, no. 74 (1992),
no. 36 (1993), no. 79 (1993), no. 29 (1994), no. 7 (1995) and no. 35 (1995) amended text.
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2.3.2 Fiscal policy
2.3.2.1 The tax system
Immediately after its independence Croatia started a number of changes in the fiscal system:
for example, the system of personal income tax was introduced in July 1990, war tax in
September 1990 and excises in 1993. However,  the changes made before 1994 resulted in a
non-transparent system with extremely high effective tax rates.142 The period from 1994-97
was dominated by fundamental and technical changes in the tax system. The objectives of the
reforms were the establishment of a system compatible with the market economy, the
reduction of the tax burden, the increase of the efficiency of the tax administration, the
enhancement of fiscal discipline, and increasing the efficiency of tax collection.
The Tax Administration was established in 1994, as an independent administrative
organisation within the Ministry of Finance. The key elements of the Croatian tax system in
the period 1994-2000 were the Law on Profit  Tax, the Law on Income Tax and the Law on
the turnover tax of products and services.  The latter one was replaced by the Law on Value
Added Tax on 1 January 2008.
Turnover tax was the most abundant revenue of the government budget till 1998. Its
share in the total budget revenues amounted to 58.6% in 1994 and 45.6% in 1997, in the last
year of is application. The reduction of the share of the turnover tax in the total revenues was
enabled by the reforms of direct taxation and the introduction of excise taxes. In 1991,
turnover tax was divided between eight tariff  classes,  with rates between 1% and 90%. The
number of tariff classes was gradually reduced. In 1993, it was reduced to 7 and the general
rate was decreased from 50% to 40%. Since July 1994, the number of tariff classes was
further reduced to 5, and the tax rates were between 2.5 and 20% (the latter being the standard
rate),  for all  products except one type of gas,  which was taxed 60%. Since 1995, there have
been 4 tariff classes and the last change in the sales tax rate was introduced in 1995, when the
standard tax rate was reduced to 15%.
Since 1998, value added tax is  the most important revenue of the state budget.  The
tax rates are 22 %, 10%, and 0%.
Other taxes in Croatia’s fiscal system are: income tax, profit tax, tax on insurance
premiums for cars, games of chance tax, real property transaction tax, inheritance and gift tax,
142 E.g. war tax was introduced on wages and other personal incomes, and all these impositions together with a
special municipality tax resulted in a marginal tax higher than 90% of the highest incomes. The consequence of
such a system was high tax evasion.
138
tax on motor vehicles, tax on boats, tax on slot machines for games of chance, consumption
tax, tax on country cottages, tax on uncultivated agricultural land, tax on unused business
immovable property, tax on inbuilt building sites, firm tax, tax on the use of public area, and
local surcharges. 143
The system of personal income tax was introduced in July 1990, when a system of
direct taxation on personal income was introduced, together with a tax on the total income of
citizens. The tax was paid at the end of the year if the annual net income exceeded three times
the amount of the average annual salary.
In 1994, a new personal income tax was introduced, based on consumption. The basic
characteristics of this system were economic neutrality, fairness and administrative simplicity.
As  opposed  to  the  previous  system,  where  each  type  of  income  was  taxed  differently,  the
newly introduced system of personal income tax was equally imposed on all types of personal
income. The income tax is assessed on the total income generated by each taxpayer within a
year. At the beginning, it included two tax rates: the first tax bracket was subject to a rate of
25%, while the second bracket was paid at a rate of 35%. The limits of each tax bracket
depended on the level of basic personal deduction. In 1997, the lower taxation rate was
decreased from 25% to 20%, while the non-taxable portion of income went up,  with further
increases in 1999.
The tax base for the income tax is the total income realised in Croatia and abroad (for
foreign taxpayers, income realised in Croatia). The tax is progressive, and the rates are 15%,
25%, 35% and 45%. The distribution of the revenues from the income tax are divided
between the state, municipalities, townships and counties at fixed percentages, according to
the Law on Financing Local and Regional Entities.
The corporate income tax (or profit tax) reform was carried out simultaneously with
the introduction of the personal income tax reform. In the period 1990-94, resident
entrepreneurs were paying corporate income tax at the rate of 35%, and non-residents at the
rate of 17.5%. In 1994, this system was replaced by a single-rate profit tax system. Corporate
income or profit  tax rate was 25%.  At the beginning of 1997, the discrepancy between the
personal income tax and corporate income tax was settled when the corporate income tax rate
was increased to 35%. The current profit tax rate is 20%.
143 As of August 2007. Institute for Public Finances, http://www.ijf.hr/eng/taxguide/8-07/tax-table.pdf.
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Croatia implemented excises in 1993, when excise tax on coffee was introduced.
Excises are paid in the absolute amount according to the measure unit (for automobiles,
according to the engine power). In 1994, excises were introduced on products which were
taxed at  high sales tax rates:  oil  derivatives,  personal cars,  tobacco and its  products,  alcohol
and alcohol drinks, beer and beverages. In 1997, excises on planes and vessels were
introduced.  The  share  of  excises  in  the  total  revenues  (1994-98)  ranged  between  8.10%  in
1994 and 17.25% in 1997.
In 2002, new taxes were introduced, and the specific excise taxes were changed. A tax
on  obligatory  insurance  premiums  for  cars  was  introduced,  while  excise  taxes  on  alcoholic
beverages were reduced by 40%.  The personal income tax in 2002 was somewhat lower than
in  2001.  At  the  end  of  2002  and  in  2003,  the  Croatian  tax  system also  saw amendments  of
some  tax  laws.   For  instance,  in  2003,  amendments  were  passed  on  the  Law  on  Personal
Income  Tax,  the  Law  on  Profit  Tax  and  the  Law  on  Financing  of  Local  and  Regional  Self
Government Units, whereby new changes were introduced to the reallocation of the personal
income tax, and the Law on Contributions for Obligatory Insurance.
2.3.2.2 The welfare system and funding
Compulsory  social  security  contributions  are  a  kind  of  direct  tax  that  is  used  to  finance  the
social security system, and accordingly, in a broader sense they form a part of the tax system.
The contributions are the primary revenue used to finance expenditure for retirement, and
health and employment insurance. The contributions are collected from the employee and
from the employer, and they are the revenues of three extra-budgetary funds:
? The Croatian Pension Fund - contributions for Pillar I pension insurance
? The Croatian Health Fund - contributions for health insurance
? The Croatian Employment Fund – contributions for accident insurance.
For employees insured in Pillar I, the contribution is paid to The Croatian Pension Fund, and
for those insured in Pillars I and II, the contribution is paid to The Croatian Pension Fund and
to the private insurance fund. Contributions for the Pillar II pension insurance are paid to the
private insurance funds selected by the employee.
In 2007, social contributions  paid by the employees and the employers altogether are
at a total rate of 37.2%. The contributions paid by the employee include the insurance for
retirement under the first and second pillar (20% for the first pillar, or 15 % under the first and
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5%  under  the  second  pillar),  while  the  employer  pays  15%  for  health  insurance,  0.5%  for
accident insurance and 1.7% for employment. The total contribution of the employee is 20%,
and that of employer 17.2%. The basis for compulsory social security contributions is the
salary.
Croatia spends about 8% of its GDP annually on health care. About 84% of the health
care spending comes from public sources and the rest from private sources. Within the public
sector, the Croatian Health Insurance Institute (HZZO) accounts for 96% of the general
government spending on health care. The HZZO also plays a key role on the supply side by
setting health care delivery standards and negotiating the volumes and prices of health
services with the providers.144
2.3.3 Privatisation
The overall privatization process began in 1991. Based on the Law on Transformation of
Socially-Owned Enterprises, the first phase of privatization involved the transformation of
former "socially-owned" enterprises into joint-stock or limited liability companies with
defined ownership structures. Following independence, ten large infrastructure and utilities
companies came under direct state ownership as "public enterprises", while the remaining
socially-owned enterprises were to be privatized in a two-stage process.  These enterprises
submitted requests for commercialization to the Croatian Privatization Fund and could request
"autonomous transformation", i.e. propose their own privatization plans, until 30 June 1992.
The first-stage privatization was organized by the Croatian Privatization Fund, seeking wide
participation by the employees and the population at large by offering preferential rights for
share  subscription  at  a  substantial  discount,  and  payment  by  instalments.   A  total  of  about
3,000 enterprises began the process of "autonomous transformation".
In 1996, the parliament adopted the Privatisation Act, which has been amended twice
since (in 1997 and in 2000). It defines that the Portfolio of the Republic of Croatia consists of
shares and interests held by:
? The Croatian Privatization Fund
? The National Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation Agency
? The Croatian Pension Insurance Institute
144 Dubravko Mihaljek, “Health care policy and refrom in Croatia: how to see the forest for the trees,” in
Croatian Accession to the European Union: the Challenges of Participation, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute
of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006), 277-319., http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU4/mihaljek.pdf.
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? The Croatian Health Insurance Institute
? Public companies and institutions and companies owned or founded by the Republic
of Croatia.
From April 1991 to October 1995, some 2,200 socially-owned enterprises, i.e. 75 per cent of
the initial number of enterprises subject to privatization, accounting for more than 30 per cent
of employment, were fully or almost entirely privatized.  A further 750 companies were
privatized in this manner between October 1995 and May 1999.  The shares in the enterprises
not privatized during the first stage were subsequently transferred to the Croatian Pension
Fund (one third) and the Croatian Privatization Fund (two thirds).  Under the responsibility of
the latter, shareholdings were reduced by various methods, including auctions at the Zagreb
Stock Exchange, direct trade deals, tenders open to foreign investors, as well as the free
distribution of shares to war veterans, widows and their families.  Shares in some specific
enterprises were earmarked to be sold against frozen foreign exchange deposits (FFED).
Croatian citizens participated actively in the privatization: some 600,000 small
investors acquired shares in more than 2,500 enterprises.  The government also encouraged
the establishment of Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs).  These were specialized funds
collecting vouchers and coupons in exchange for shares in companies put up for mass
privatization.  Contrary to other investment funds, the PIFs were not allowed to exchange
shares against frozen foreign exchange deposits.
The second phase of the privatization process was implemented through a mass
voucher privatization, starting in 1998.  This privatization was, in effect, a distribution of the
shares not sold in the first phase of the privatization. Vouchers were distributed to individuals
affected by hostilities, such as injured servicemen, war widows and their families, and other
displaced persons and refugees.  The shares to be represented by vouchers were held in the
portfolio  of  the  CPF;  the  shares  held  by  the  state  pension  funds  were  not  included  in  the
process.  In total, more than 500 companies sold their shares through voucher privatization.
The first round of vouchers was distributed in June 1998, and the process was concluded by
September 1998.  Voucher privatization had ensured the privatization of 50 to 60 per cent of
the residual portfolio of the CPF, including shares in 30 to 50 top-quality companies reserved
for strategic investors or public offerings, constituting the final step in the complete
privatization of the residual portfolio.  With the voucher privatization completed, the
privatization process had virtually reached its end, except for the small residual CPF portfolio
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and the large state-owned enterprises. Further information on the progress of the privatization
in Croatia is provided in Table 2.12.
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Table 2.12 Net proceeds from privatization, DM million, 1991-98
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998* Total
Cash 4.2 86.6 123.4 208.3 177 269.4 154.7 170.7 1194.3
Bonds for Reconstruction** - 48.3 28.1 41.9 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.1 121.1
Swaps with FFCDs - 157.4 455.6 741.9 257.7 253.7 152.1 37.7 2056.1
Total 4.2 292.3 607.1 992.1 436.1 523.6 307.6 208.5 3371.5
*1 January -31 July 1998, Cash proceeds include also earnings from the sale of PLIVA's shares on the
international market, which were transferred through the CPF account.
**High-yield bonds in hard currency issued by the Ministry of Finance, which can be swapped for
shares  at  a 30 per cent discount.
The Law on the Transformation and Privatization of Socially Owned Enterprises was also
applied to the agriculture.  The former socially-owned farms which had not filed requests for
"autonomous transformation" were transferred to the Croatian Privatization Fund.  These
farms were organized as joint-stock or limited liability companies and were managed by their
respective management boards.  Some 180 cooperative enterprises were foreseen for
privatisation under the Law on Farm Cooperatives.  In some cases, agricultural enterprises
were divided into smaller independent units.  All agricultural trading and processing
enterprises were privatized.  Croatia also intended to privatize the entire food procurement
and processing system.
The sectors not covered under the Law on Privatization were privatized under other
provisions.  Shares in banks were sold by their founding institutions or, in the case of
financially troubled banks, with the assistance of the Agency for Bank Rehabilitation.  The
Law on Sea Ports provided for the privatization of port services and the award of concessions;
the actual port was regulated by the port administration.  Medical services and other activities
within hospitals and clinics, but not the property or infrastructure, could be privatized in
accordance with the Statute of Conditions for the Lease of Medical Facilities for Primary
Medical Care and Hospitals.
The Law on Privatization included a provision for the privatization of public
enterprises, i.e. provided for a separate law for the following state-owned enterprises:
? Croatian Petroleum Company (INA ) - law adopted in 2002
? Croatian Electricity Company (HEP) - law adopted in 2002
? Croatian Radio and Television Broadcasting (HRT)
? Croatian Railways  (HŽ)
? Croatian Post and Telecommunications (HPT) - law adopted in 1999
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? Croatian Highways  and
? Croatian Forests.
For every enterprise, the individual law defines the share of the company to be privatized, i.e.
offered to foreign and domestic investors. Investors are chosen on the basis of a public tender
in a transparent and legally-based manner.  Prior to the adoption of each law and the initiation
of the process of privatization, the government selects a privatization consultant in an
international tendering procedure.  It  was envisaged that  CPF ownership over the companies
would evaporate by 2001 and that the privatization of the large state-owned enterprises would
be achieved by 2004145.  In  1999,  a  bill  on  the  privatization  and  division  of  the  Post  and
Telecommunication Company HPT was passed.
A considerable inflow of foreign capital started in 1998:  the sale of the remaining
14% stake in Pliva (May 1998), an agreement on the acquisition of a 35% stake in Slavonska
Banka by the EBRD and an Austrian bank, the DEM 50 million subscription by the EBRD of
convertible preference shares of Podravka, and in September 1998 the award of a second
mobile telephone license to VIP-net, to a consortium of Austrian, American and Croatian
firms.146 The privatisation of the Croatian Telecom Company (HT) followed.
Since June 2000, all state-owned companies are held by the State Privatisation Fund
(HFP), which planned to sell the shares using different methods. Non-profitable enterprises
were supposed to be sent into bankruptcy. In November 2002, the government approved an
operational plan for the privatization of the state portfolio. According to the plan, the
privatisation of the state portfolio was to be finalised by December 2005.
Companies with a majority share ownership or of strategic importance were supposed
to be publicly tendered (the plan required five such tenders a month to complete the
privatisation process by 2005). Companies with a minority share ownership were to be
offered through the "over-the-counter market", either in Varaždin or in Zagreb (100 a month).
At the beginning of 2003, the Croatian Privatisation Fund board resigned, and the
government adopted a proposal to dissolve the Privatisation Fund and to establish a new
entity completing the privatisation. This slowed down the preparation of new projects, and the
145 WTO accession documents.
146 European Commission, Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with the
conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, SEC (1998) 1727. (Brussels, 1998).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/s
ap/981019_sec_1727_en.pdf.
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portfolio of the Privatisation Fund HFP in November 2003 comprised some 1,080 companies,
of which state ownership was above 50% in 156 companies.
During  2004  and  the  first  half  of  2005,  a  total  of  386  companies  were  privatised,  of
which  366  involved  minority  stakes  in  companies  (less  than  25% of  equity  capital),  sold  at
public auctions at the Zagreb and Varaždin capital markets. The Croatian Privatisation Fund
also executed a sale of 21 companies in which the combined government portfolio exceeded
50% plus one share of the company’s equity capital. These sales were executed by means of
public invitation for bids. The first public-private partnership was established with an
estimated duration of five years.
 The government has also considered changes in the institutional structures, such as
amendments to the Privatisation Act, as well as other laws directly associated with that Act
and  with  a  view  to  introducing  new  models  of  privatisation  (such  as  MBO,  ESOP,  PPP,
settlement, etc.). This was supposed to help in cleaning up the remaining government
portfolio until the end of 2007 (the shipbuilding industry excluded).  However, these changes
were not adopted, and corruption scandals have further slowed down the process.
The  criticism of  the  privatization  process  is  based  on  the  grounds  that  the  control  of
the major enterprises has ended up in the hands of those with HDZ connections, and because
shares were issued free of charge to certain persons on the basis of their war background.147
2.3.4 Business climate
2.3.4.1 Competitiveness indicators
Since 2001, Croatia is included in the World Economic Forum surveys of global
competitiveness. In the "Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008", which encompasses 131
countries, Croatia is at the 57th place,  and  it  has  drawn closer  to  some of  the  new members
states of the European Union (EU) – Poland at  the 51st place and Hungary at the 47th place.
Romania  and  Bulgaria,  the  newest  members  of  the  EU,  are  both  ranked  lower  than  the  70th
place. According to the Business Competitiveness Index, which measures the competitive
ability of a company, Croatia is at the 60th place, while the new members of the EU are ranked
147 European Commission, Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with the
conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, SEC (1998) 586. (Brussels, 1998).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/s
ap/980330_sec_586_en.pdf.
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between the 30th and the 50th place (the Czech Republic is 32nd, Slovenia is 35th, Slovakia is
44th and Hungary is 47th).
Taking into consideration the methodological changes and the inclusion of new
countries  in  the  rankings  (Puerto  Rico,  Libya,  Oman,  Saudi  Arabia,  Syria,  Uzbekistan,  and
Montenegro), an analysis of this year's rankings shows that Croatia has achieved a real
improvement of two places in global competitiveness, while it has improved by one position
in business competitiveness compared to last year. Of the 12 pillars of competitiveness,
Croatia is ranked best in "Health and Primary Education" (44th place), "Higher Education and
Training" (46th place), "Technological Readiness" (49th place), and "Innovation" (50th
place). Croatia is ranked below average in macroeconomic stability, goods and financial
market efficiency, market size, and business sophistication.
The Fraser’s Institute economic freedom indicator measures the degree to which the
policies and institutions of countries support economic freedom. The cornerstones of
economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and the
security of privately owned property. Forty-two data points are used to construct a summary
index and to measure the degree of economic freedom in five broad areas: (1) the size of the
government; (2) the legal structure and the security of property rights; (3) access to sound
money; (4) freedom to trade internationally; and (5) the regulation of credit, labour and
business. The 2007 index includes a number of new components based on the World Bank’s
Doing Business ratings based on 130 countries (including 11 new ones).
Croatia has been included in the Doing Business survey since 1995, and its rating is
improving (see Table 2.13).   The most significant progress has been achieved in the area of
access to sound money (from 2.5 in 1990, 3.4 in 2005, to 8.2 in 2005). According to the size
of  the  government,  Croatia’s  ranking  improved  from  2.6  in  1995  to  6.4  in  2005,  while  the
regulation of credit, labour and business improved from 4.0 to 7.0. The most troublesome
areas are the legal structure and the security of property rights and freedom to trade
internationally. The rating in the legal structure and the security of property rights has
deteriorated, which is the result of the lower rating of impartial courts, while progress in the
freedom to trade internationally has been limited by the international capital market controls.
Table 2.13 Index of economic freedom, Croatia 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Summary Ratings (Rank) 4.4 (109) 5.8 (84) 6.0 (80) 5.9 (84) 6.0 (84) 6.2 (75) 6.4 (82)
1. Size of Government 2.6 2.8 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.4
A. General government consumption spending 1.9 (33.4) 2.5 (31.7) 3.2 (29.3) 4.0
(26.5)
4.1 (26.0) 4.0 (26.3) 4.2 (25.6)
B. Transfers and subsidies 5.9 (15.5) 4.7 (20.1) 4.4 (20.9) 4.4
(20.9)
4.6 (20.4) 4.0 (22.6) 4.4 (21.2)
C. Government enterprises and investment 0.0 2.0 7.0 (21.6) 7.0
(21.6)
7.0 (21.6) 7.0 (21.6) 8.0 (21.6)
D. Top marginal tax rate 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
(i) Top marginal income tax rate 4.0
(35-53)
4.0
(35-53)
2.0
(45-63)
2.0
(45-63)
2.0
(45-63)
2.0
(45-63)
(ii) Top marginal income and payroll tax rates 0.0
(56-68)
0.0
(56-68)
0.0
(62-75)
0.0
(53-71)
0.0
(53-71)
0.0
(62-75)
2. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 5.9 6.6 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.6
A. Judicial independence 3.1 2.8 2.3 3.1 3.7
B. Impartial courts 5.8 6.1 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.4 4.0
C. Protection of property rights 3.3 3.0 3.2 3.7 5.0
D. Military interference 7.4 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
E. Integrity of the legal system 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
F. Legal enforcement of contracts 6.7
G. Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property 3.4
3. Access to Sound Money 2.5 3.4 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.2
A. Money growth 0.0
(62.4)
8.3 (8.6) 8.2 (8.8) 7.3 (13.7) 6.9
(15.7)
7.9 (10.3) 8.6 (6.9)
B. Standard deviation of inflation 0.0 (573.3) 9.2 (2.1) 9.2 (2.0) 9.2 (2.1) 9.7
(0.7)
9.7 (0.7) 9.8 (0.4)
C. Inflation: most recent year 0.0
(500.0)
8.4
(8.0)
8.9 (5.3) 9.0 (4.8) 9.7
(1.7)
10.0 (0.1) 9.6 (2.1) 9.3 (3.3)
D. Freedom to own foreign currency 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
4. Freedom to Trade Internationally 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.5
A. Taxes on international trade 7.0 8.5 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.6 8.8
(i) Taxes as percentage of exports and imports 7.0 (4.6) 8.3 (2.6) 8.3 (2.5) 9.2 (1.1) 9.4 (0.9) 9.5 (0.7) 9.5 (0.7)
(ii) Mean tariff rate 8.7 (6.7) 7.6 (12.0) 7.6 (12.0) 7.6 (12.0) 9.2 (4.1) 9.5 (2.4)
(iii) Standard deviation of tariff rates 7.0 (7.4) 7.0 (7.4) 7.0 (7.4) 7.0 (7.4) 7.4 (6.6)
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B. Regulatory trade barriers 7.2 6.6 7.0 6.4 5.5
C. Size of the trade sector 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 5.0 4.6
D. Black-market exchange rates 0.0 8.4 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
E. International capital market controls 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.8 2.9 3.4 3.8 3.9
5. Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business 4.0 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.6 7.0
A. Credit market regulations 0.0 3.4 7.7 9.1 8.9 9.0 9.3 9.2
(i) Ownership of banks 0.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
(ii) Foreign bank competition 10.0 10.0
(iii) Private sector credit 6.1 7.2 7.4 7.7 8.0 8.1 7.9
(iv) Interest rate controls/negative real int. rates 4.0 6.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
B. Labor market regulations 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.5 6.4
(i) Minimum wage 5.6 5.6
(ii) Hiring and firing regulations 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.1
(iii) Centralized collective bargaining 6.5 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.1
(iv) Mandated cost of hiring 4.8
(v) Mandated cost of worker dismissal 6.5
(vi) Conscription 3.0 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
C. Business regulations 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.3
(i) Price controls 0.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0
(ii) Administrative requirements 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.4 3.2
(iii) Bureaucracy costs 7.0 7.3 9.4 5.7
(iv) Starting a business 5.5 4.7 4.5 4.9 8.2
(v) Extra payments/bribes 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7
(vi) Licensing restrictions 4.1
(vii) Cost of tax compliance 7.4
Source: James Gwartney Robert Lawson, Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson , 2007Economic Freedom of the World: 2007 Annual Report, p. 74.Economic
Freedom Network, available from http://www.fraserinstitute.org/Commerce.Web/product_files/EFW2007BOOK2.pdf
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2.3.4.2 World Bank Doing Business indicators
The table below addresses the taxes and mandatory contributions that a medium-size
company must pay or withhold in a given year in Croatia, as well as the measures of
administrative burden in paying taxes, according to the World Bank Doing Business
Indicator.
Table 2.14 Paying taxes in Croatia
Tax or mandatory
contribution
Payments
(number) Time (hours)
Statutory tax
rate Tax base
Total tax rate
(% profit)
Value added tax (VAT) 12 40 22.0% Value added
Tax on company name 1 fixed fee (HRK500) 0.02
Fuel tax 1 1 Kuna per litre 0.46
Forrest contribution
0.1% 1 0.1%
Turnover
(purchase
cost)
1.24
Corporate income tax
60 20.0% 1 60 20%
Taxable
profits 11.39
Social security 12 96 17.2% Grosssalaries 19.41
Totals 28 196 32.5
*The names of taxes have been standardized. For instance, income tax, profit tax, tax on the
company's income are all named corporate income tax in this table. When there is more than one
statutory tax rate, the one applicable to the taxpayer is reported. The hours for VAT include all the
VAT and sales taxes applicable. The hours for Social Security include all the hours for labour taxes
and mandatory contributions in general. Source: Doing Business148
2.3.5 Trade liberalisation and trade policy
2.3.5.1 Trade policy development
The main characteristic of Croatia's  trade policy since the early 1990s was liberalization,  in
spite of the war and the related risky environment. The liberalisation of trade in Croatia to
date is a reflection of its membership in the WTO and the conclusion of free trade agreements
(bilateral ones and with EFTA), and the intention to join the EU.
The institutional links between Croatia and the European Community were regulated
up to 1992 by the same instruments that were regulated the links between the SFRY and the
Community.  Pursuant  to  the  Cooperation  Agreement,  Croatia  had  preferential  access  to  the
148 Doing Business 2008 Croatia: A Project Benchmarking the Regulatory Cost of Doing Business in 178
Economies, (World Bank Group, 2007), 72,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/CountryProfiles/HRV.pdf.
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market of the European Community, and also a preferential position vis-à-vis other states in
the region.
An internationally compatible market framework was established in 1995, with the
enactment  of  the  Company  Law  and  the  Law  on  Trade,  for  the  most  part  adjusted  in
accordance with the principles of the GATT and resulting in the substantial liberalization of
foreign trade.  This law granted free entry into the foreign trade activity, introduced the same
treatment of foreign companies and traders as for domestic ones, and the same legal status for
foreign investors as domestic ones. The transfer and repatriation of capital was also granted.
Accession  to  the  World  Trade  Organization  was  among  the  main  priorities  of  the
government in the second half of the 1990s. Croatia introduced a revised Customs Tariff in
1994, aligned with the relevant international conventions.149 Some financial incentives and
subsidies  were  provided  to  the  agriculture  in  accordance  with  the  Law  on  Financial
Incentives and Subsidies in Agriculture and Fisheries (and its amendments).  The government
intended to maintain guaranteed prices for a small group of agricultural products, while the
system of variable levies was abolished.150  By the implementation of the new tariff regime in
1996 and the signature of agreements with neighbouring countries, the liberalisation of the
trade policy continued. While foreigners were able to freely repatriate deposits, certain
restrictions remained for Croatian citizens on foreign exchange deposits.151
Since  joining  the  WTO in  2000,  the  Croatian  efforts  have  been  focused  on  the  EU,
and the Croatian trade policy is given shape within the context of the restrictions that are laid
down  by  the  membership  in  the  WTO  and  in  regional  trade  agreements,  and  by  Croatia’s
expressed intention to join the EU.152 By joining the WTO, Croatia bound itself to gradually
reduce its customs duties on industrial and agricultural products to the level that is applied in
the OECD countries, by the year 2005. The export and quantitative restrictions and the
measures that have a similar effect have been abolished.
149 Croatia implemented the amendments to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity
Description and the Recommendation of the World Customs Organization Regarding Ozone Layer Depleters
and the Draft Recommendation on Drugs.
150 Report of the Working Party on the accession of Croatia to the World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/.
151 European Commission, Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe:Compliance with the
conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, SEC (1998) 586. (Brussels, 1998).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/
sap/980330_sec_586_en.pdf.
152 Ana-Maria Boromisa and Mia Miki?, “The European Union as determinant of Croatian trade policy,“ in
Croatian accession to the European Union: Economic and Legal Challenges, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute
for Public Finances : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003), 139-157., http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU/boromisa-mikic.pdf.
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By 2002, the use of administered prices in Croatia was limited to agricultural
products, energy and transport. This level of price liberalisation, according to the criteria of
the European Commission, was considered advanced, and it was comparable with most
advanced applicant countries at the time. 153 Since then, the European Commission has not
changed its estimate regarding price liberalisation. However, the rating of price controls that
indicates the index of economic freedom deteriorated in 2004 (from 4.0 to 3.0).
Trade with the EU in the period 2002-05 was regulated by the Interim Agreement that
enabled the application of the commercial provisions of the SAA until the process of
ratification was completed. The Interim Agreement contractually regulated trade preferences
somewhat more favourably than those that  were applied to Croatia after the collapse of the
SFRY, including also an agreement on trade in textile products between the Commission and
Croatia,  which has been in place since 1 January 2001, providing for the elimination of the
quantitative restrictions on Croatian textile and clothing exports.
According to the Interim Agreement, Croatian industrial products, all processed
agricultural products, apart from wine, baby-beef and beef products, have duty-free access to
the EU market without any quantitative restrictions. Croatia bound itself to liberalise access
to its  market gradually,  over a period of six years.  Since 1 January 2002, about 77% of the
trade in industrial products has been liberalised; trade in textile and steel products has been
gradually liberalised by 1 January 2006, as was trade in all other industrial products by 1
January 2007.
With respect to agricultural  products,  75% of the trade was liberalised by 1 January
2006, 41% by the abolition of customs duties and 34% by preferential treatment covering
traditional  trade.  Following  the  expiry  of  the  transitional  period,  trade  in  processed
agricultural and fish products are totally liberalised154.
The  establishment  of  regional  cooperation  became  a  standard  provision  of  the
agreements between the EU and third countries. This form of cooperation was achieved by
the applicants by the creation of CEFTA. Croatia's membership in CEFTA became effective
in 2003. Following the EU enlargement in 2004, CEFTA became a free trade zone between
Croatia,  Bulgaria  and  Romania.  In  2007,  when  Bulgaria  and  Romania  joined  EU,  CEFTA
lost its members.
153 European Commission. The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe - First Annual
Report [SEC(2002) 339] [SEC(2002) 340] [SEC(2002) 341] [SEC(2002) 342] [SEC(2002) 343]. (Brussels,
2002), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0163:FIN:EN:PDF.
154 Ibid.
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In the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, trade liberalisation
and facilitation among South East European countries was initiated in 2001. Croatia has
committed to joining the regional free trade zones in the Western Balkans based on the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The liberalisation of trade in SEE has been seen as
a tool to increase the volume of regional and international trade,  to improve the capacity of
the region to attract foreign direct investment, and to enhance the integration of the region
into the European structures and the global economy.
The principles of the trade liberalisation in SEE were the conclusion of a network of
bilateral free trade agreements by 2002 and liberalising at least 90% of the trade among the
parties, within a transitional period of six years. Aligning the existing bilateral free trade
agreements  with  these  principles  was  the  basis  for  their  multilaterisation,  as  well  as  for  the
future liberalisation of services and the harmonisation of legislation, inter alia, in the fields of
customs, phytosanitary, standards and conformity assessment, competition and intellectual
property.
The explanation for the disappointing export performance does not seem to lie in a
loss of price or cost competitiveness, but rather in the lack of reform in the labour and
enterprise sector and the remaining administrative barriers to foreign investors. The export
structure has been largely unchanged and thus reflects the continued domination of the
former and the current public enterprises (in particular shipbuilding with large import
components). Croatian trade is also restricted, since it is not yet integrated in the pan-
European system of diagonal cumulation. Furthermore, regarding the exports to the EU, the
Croatian companies are often not able to apply the EC standards.155
2.3.5.2 Financial liberalisation
The first step of financial liberalisation was the introduction of the new currency, when the
Croatian Dinar was replaced by the new currency, the Croatian Kuna in May 1994. 156 The
introduction of the new currency marked the beginning of a new phase of the financial
liberalisation and reform.
155 The Western Balkans in Transition, European Economy occasional papers, no. 1 (2003),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2003/ocp1en.pdf
156 The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, “The Croatian Banking System,“ Discussion Paper, no. 23
(2003),
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/DiscussionPapers/DP23_FinancialLiberalisationAndGlobalisati
on.pdf.
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The aim of the stabilisation programme was not only to lower the inflation rate,  but
also to ensure economic growth. The integration of the financial  market was planned as the
second phase of the development strategy, discussed following the stabilisation programme,
as it requires the coordination of monetary and exchange rate policies with partner countries.
Financial liberalisation also implies an important role for the government and international
regulatory institutions in setting the standards in the financial industry, and in carrying out the
process of supervision.
Full  current account convertibility was introduced in May 1995, followed by a bank
rehabilitation programme in November and the introduction of capital adequacy standards in
the December of the same year. The Bankruptcy Law was adopted in January 1997, which
was replaced by a new one two years later. The Banking Law adopted in December 1998 was
also changed by the adoption of a new Banking Law in July 2002.
The process of financial liberalisation in Croatia has had as a consequence a
proliferation in new banks. There were 43 banks in 1993, 54 banks in 1995, and 61 banks in
1997. The number of banks has been falling since 1997, to 43 at the end of 2001 and to 35 in
2007. The share of state-owned banks in the total banking sector assets has declined
substantially, from 78.5% in 1996 to 45.5% in 1999, to only 5.7% in 2000, and still declining
to 4.2 % in 2006.
The process of the privatisation and the internationalisation of the Croatian banking
system was almost completed during 2002. According to the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, during 2002, the Croatian government sold its stake in
Dubrovacka Banka, Unicredit/Allianz Group completed the takeover bid for Zagrebacka
Banka, as the largest bank in Croatia in terms of assets, and the government sold its 25%
stake in Splitska Banka. As a consequence of the privatisation deals, and the mergers and
acquisitions in the Croatian banking sector during 2002, eight foreign banking groups now
control over 90% of the total banking assets.
The aggregate balance sheet of the commercial banks has been characterised by the
dominance of loans extended to enterprises and citizens. The share of these loans has
increased from 43% in 1993 to 61% in 2007. Loans to enterprises have been constantly
decreasing, from 38.8% in 1994 to 32.6% in 2000 and 27% in 2007, while the share of loans
to households increased from 6% to 54% in the same period.
The substantial increase in deposits and assets in 2001 was primarily caused by the
conversion of the former Western European currencies to the Euro. The share of money
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assets and deposits with the Croatian National Bank increased from 10.4% in 1999 to 15% in
2001.
During the 1990s, Croatia made significant progress in developing its financial sector.
The banks recovered from a state of near bankruptcy, money and capital markets were
established, and a market-oriented legal framework was introduced. However, numerous
banks experienced severe problems in 1998 and early 1999.
2.3.5.3 The bank system
Following the introduction of a market-oriented legal framework in the early 1990s,
significant progress was made in establishing a modern banking system until 1997: the
banking system recovered from the near bankruptcy state it had been in at the beginning of
the transition and expanded vigorously until the end of 1997. 157
During the 1990s, the banking system was confronted with several inherited problems
that had to be solved, among them the issue of households’ foreign currency savings, which
had been redeposited with the National Bank of Yugoslavia. When the latter seized all
foreign exchange reserves after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Croatian government
assumed responsibility for these bank claims. Since its foreign exchange reserves were not
sufficient, the government issued German Mark-indexed bonds to the banks in late 1991 to
prop  up  their  assets  as  a  countervalue  of  the  foreign  exchange  deposits.  At  the  same  time,
households’ foreign exchange deposits were frozen by the government for a period of three
years in order to ease the liquidity pressure on banks, to be gradually unfrozen at a minimum
rate  of  20  semi-annual  instalments.  By  the  end  of  2004,  these  deposits  had  been  paid  back
almost completely.
Owing to the very liberal bank licensing regulations with low minimum equity capital
requirements and given the relatively liberal supervision framework, the number of banks
grew substantially during the 1990s and reached 60 by 1997. Several new universal banks
entered the market thanks to the relatively lax requirements, but they were too small to
achieve an efficient scale. At the time, the incentives to improve the efficiency of the banks
were limited, since deposits grew rapidly and banks could earn high returns by lending
surplus funds to the ailing state banks. The opportunities for unsound bank behaviour were
exacerbated by shortcomings in the prudential and legal framework and by a poorly designed
157 This chapter is based on  Thomas Reininger and Zoltan Walko, The Croatian Banking System, available at
http://www.oenb.at/en/img/fsr_09_special_04_tcm16-29258.pdf.
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deposit insurance scheme, which provided depositors with few incentives to monitor the
banks' financial health.
The incentives for sound bank behaviour were not fully established, and public
financial support was repeatedly granted to several state-owned banks in an attempt to restore
their long-term viability. In 1995-96, a bank rehabilitation programme was implemented (at
the cost of around 6% of the GDP), which helped solving the inherited problems (i.e. the
issue of households' foreign currency savings which had been redeposited with the National
Bank of Yugoslavia, the debt owed by the insolvent large state-owned enterprises, and the
counterproductive cross-ownership structures institutionalized by the early indirect bank
privatizations).
At the end of 1997, four state-owned banks (Slavonska banka, Rije?ka banka, Splitska
banka and Privredna banka), which accounted for 32% of the total bank assets, were
financially and operationally restructured under the 1994 Law on Bank Rehabilitation. While
these procedures successfully broke the linkages between the weak state banks and the loss-
making state enterprises, the privatization of the rehabilitated banks was initiated in 1998.
Several  banks were privatised in a way that left  the old management in control  and did not
break their ties with the enterprises which used to own them. During the ensuing credit boom,
banks'   risk  management  was  often  weak,  their  credit  processes  were  poorly  controlled  —
related party lending and single-client exposure were common practices — loan loss
provisioning was inadequate and the competition for deposits was often irresponsible. Bank
failures began to occur when the loans were not repaid in time as the economic growth
slowed down because of the tightened fiscal and monetary policies which were implemented
in 1998 in response to a sharp deterioration in the external balances.
The difficulties were exacerbated by adverse external factors (e. g. the Asian financial
crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998, and the Kosovo war) and peaked in a banking crisis
in 1998-99. The crisis affected 16 banks; 12 of these banks exited the market, 2 were merged
with other banks, and only 2 were rehabilitated. As a result of this consolidation process and
several bank mergers, the number of banks declined from 60 by end-1998 to 43 by end-2000.
One major outcome of the crisis was the government's decision to sell the remaining
state-owned banks to foreign strategic investors. In 1998, there were still no more than ten
foreign-owned banks  operating  in  Croatia,  with  a  share  of  6.7% in  the  total  banking  sector
assets. The situation tipped in late 1999 and early 2000, when the government stepped up its
privatization efforts, selling the country 's second, third and fourth-largest banks (as measured
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by their total assets) to foreign strategic investors, and placing the majority of the shares in
the largest bank with foreign investors through the London Stock Exchange.
This  step  and  the  sale  of  smaller  banks  to  foreign  investors,  as  well  as  the
establishment of new banks by foreigners led to an increase in the number of foreign-owned
banks to 24; by 2001, they accounted for 89.3% of the total bank assets. By September 2004,
their  number  was  reduced  to  17  as  a  result  of  several  mergers,  but  their  share  in  the  total
banking sector assets had increased to 91%. By the end of September 2004, 39 banks
operated in Croatia, with privately owned banks accounting for approximately 97% of the
total  banking sector assets,  and the share of the banks that  were majority-owned by foreign
investors amounting to 91% (one of the highest shares in the region). Italian and Austrian
banks are among the largest foreign investors in the Croatian banking industry.
The banking sector concentration decreased between 1995 and 1997; however, the
four largest banks (Zagrebacka Banka, Privredna Banka, Erste & Steiermarkische Bank, and
Raiffeisenbank Austria) managed to strengthen their position again after the banking crisis of
1998-99. These banks accounted for 64.3% of the total assets by the end of September 2004,
up from 53.1% at the end of 1997. As a result of this high concentration, the soundness of the
largest systemic banks has an enormous impact on the overall stability of the banking system.
However, the risks are mitigated by the foreign strategic ownership.
In December 1998, the new Banking Law entered into force aiming at increasing the
National  Bank’s  authority  over  the  numerous  small  banks  (60  banks  and  33  saving
associations) composing Croatia’s banking sector.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index of banking sector assets shows a decrease in
concentration until 1997, thus substantiating the concentration ratios measured on the basis of
the four largest banks' asset shares. The index figure increased between 1998 and 2000 as a
result of the bank mergers, before falling back to 1,237 in 2002, rising again to 1,363 in 2004
and falling again to 1,270 by September 2007.
Table 2.15 Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the banking sector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Q3/07
All banks 1,5967 1,267 1,016 1,018 1,190 1,368 1,316 1,237 1,270 1,363 1,358 1,297 1,270
Source: Croatian National Bank
The development of the interest rate margin (i.e. the difference between the interest rates on
loans to enterprises and households and those on their deposits) also serves as an indicator of
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the development of competition.  Before the banking crisis of 1998-99, this margin was at  a
double digit level (except in 1997). It declined until the end of 2001, following a decrease in
the interest rate level. Changes in the computation method from January 2002 led to a jump
in  the  credit  rate,  and  consequently,  also  in  the  interest  rate  margin.  The  2003  rise  in  the
interest rate margin probably reflects the tightening of the monetary policy during early 2003,
which prompted banks to raise credit rates while maintaining low deposit rates.
At present, the minimum amount of authorised capital required to establish a bank is
HRK 40  million.  The  shares  of  the  bank  must  be  registered  and  fully  paid  in  cash  prior  to
bank registration or before an increase in the authorised capital is registered. The shares must
be released in a dematerialised form. Whether direct or indirect, the acquisitions of a bank’s
shares  (by  the  same  person)  which  ensure  a  certain  capital  interest  or  voting  rights,  are
subject to prior approval by the CNB if the portion to be gained is 10% or more (a qualifying
holding), 20% or more, 33% or more, 50% or more, or 75% or more. The minimum capital
adequacy  rate  is  10%,  although  the  Croatian  National  Bank  may also  set  a  higher  rate  if  it
finds that the bank’s business contains risks. Bank operations must follow the principles of
liquidity and solvency. Certain provisions have been adopted with the new Banks Act that
will come into force on the day Croatia becomes a full member of the EU.
A foreign bank may provide banking and other financial  services in the Republic of
Croatia only through a branch licensed by the Croatian National Bank. A branch is not a legal
entity. In the Republic of Croatia, the branch may conduct business operations with third
persons within the authority given by the parent bank, with the latter being liable for all
commitments arising in Croatia from the transactions carried out by the branch. In order to
issue a licence, the CNB may make it a condition that the foreign bank deposit a certain
amount of money or provide another security to make sure that its liabilities in the Republic
of Croatia will be settled.
The Croatian financial sector is dominated by commercial banks, accounting for
77.6% of assets in mid-2006, which are to a large extent foreign-owned and generally very
liquid, well capitalised, and highly profitable. Banking supervision lies within the
responsibility of the Croatian National Bank and is in line with the EU best practice. One of
the key challenges is to manage robust credit growth, while simultaneously fully liberalising
the  capital  account.  Another  challenge  is  to  implement  a  comprehensive  overhaul  of  the
regulatory framework for banking supervision and payment services. Third, the credit risk
associated with the high level of Euroisation, as well as a generally weak legal framework for
the enforcement of creditor rights, remain potential vulnerabilities to the banking system.
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In the non-banking sector, the key challenge will be the development of the securities
market in order to sustain the growth of domestic institutional investors158 (pension and
investment funds, insurance companies).
2.3.5.4 Capital movements and regulation
Current payments, direct investment abroad and long-term credit transactions have been
liberalised in Croatia. The amendments to the Foreign Exchange Act in 2003 liberalised the
use of foreign currency, and the latest amendments (in 2006) enabled the full liberalisation of
portfolio investment. However, there is still a differentiation between investment into
domestic and foreign assets.
Croatia prohibits the granting of financial loans with a maturity of less than one year
to non-residents. Furthermore, resident physical persons investing in foreign securities are
obliged to execute their investments via domestic brokerage houses and deposit the purchased
securities in a domestic custodian bank.
The opening of accounts abroad by residents is generally prohibited. Cash
withdrawals and deposits from bank accounts held by non-resident legal persons are
restricted, though a recent CNB decision, still to enter in force, limits these restrictions to
deposits in the local currency. There are restrictions on cash transactions between residents
and non-residents, while cash payments on the basis of capital transfers are prohibited. Limits
also exist to personal transfers abroad of assets related to gifts and grants, of the export of
foreign cash by residents and of the export and import of domestic cash by both residents and
non-residents. The statistical reporting to the CNB of the credit transfers is a prerequisite for
the execution. Also, the Income Tax Act and related regulations provide that the payments of
receipts that are deemed income have generally to be made to taxpayers’ accounts (cash
payments being prohibited). The report identifies the following restrictions:
? The Insurance Act provides that until the EU membership, residents may insure
property and persons only with domestic institutions.
? There are restrictions on the activities of foreign or foreign-owned legal persons in
some sectors, namely in air carriers, and in seawater as well as in freshwater fisheries.
158 European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affair, 2006 Pre-accession
Economic Programmes of candidate countries, European Economy, no. 31  (2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2007/ocp31en.pdf.
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? The assets in a building saving's account of a Croatian citizen can be used only in
Croatia.
? Banks are obliged to ensure at  the end of each workday that  their  total  open foreign
exchange position, increased by their position in gold, does not exceed 20% of their
regulatory capital.
Special government rights (“golden shares” with veto rights) are foreseen in the privatisation
acts of the telecom (Hrvatske telekomunikacije-HT), electricity (Hrvatska elektroprivreda-
HEP),  and oil  (Industrija nafte – INA) companies.  Croatia has not provided a timetable for
the abolition of these special rights.
A 10% limit on individual or joint shareholding in HEP is included in the respective
Privatisation Act, as well as for the Central Depository Agency pursuant to the Securities'
Market Act. In both cases, the state is not restricted by this ceiling. There are a number of
restrictions on the foreign ownership of real estate:
? The acquisition of real estate by a national of a foreign country is subject to the
requirement of reciprocity and, except when acquisition is by inheritance, an
administrative authorisation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration after securing the opinion of the Minister for Justice. The Minister's
decision is subject to judicial review before the Administrative Court pursuant to the
Act on Administrative Lawsuits.
? The acquisition of agricultural land, forests and forestland in private ownership is
prohibited for foreign legal and natural persons, unless otherwise provided by
international agreements. The acquisition of proprietary rights over natural resources
(strict reserves, national parks, special reserves, nature parks, regional parks,
significant landscape, forest parks and park architecture monuments) and excluded
areas for security reasons is also prohibited.
? The Croatian legislation provides that certain categories of real estate, in particular,
state-owned forests, state-owned forest land and the public water domain, are
unalienable from state ownership and may therefore not be acquired either by
Croatian citizens or by aliens. Similarly, certain categories of real estate (the maritime
domain, seaports, and public roads) are excluded from legal transactions (public
goods), of which neither Croatian nationals nor aliens may acquire ownership nor
other proprietary rights. The state and local self-government units have pre-emption
rights on real estate in protected areas and on cultural goods.
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2.3.5.5 The Stock Exchange
The Zagreb Stock Exchange or ZSE (Zagreba?ka burza) was established in 1991 by 25 banks
and  2  insurance  companies.  In  1994,  the  system  of  electronic  trade  was  introduced.  In  the
first five years of electronic trade (1995-2000), market capitalisation increased by almost 10
times (982.6%). Despite the significant improvement in relative terms, in absolute values the
development of capital  markets was rather limited,  with a number of companies taken over
by foreign investors, which further reduced the number of the listed companies. However, the
authorities established rules for the obligatory listing of companies even though their shares
might not be traded.
The reform of the pension system in 2002 and the investment needs of the pension
funds promoted capital market development. A foreign exchange law, adopted in June 2003,
further liberalised the use of foreign currencies. 159
In March 2007, the ZSE was merged with the other Croatian stock exchange, the
Varaždin Stock Exchange160, to form a unique Croatian capital market, the largest one in the
region. As of November 23 2007, the ZSE included the stocks of 383 companies, with a
market capitalization of 369.6 billion Kuna (EUR 50.4 billion). The Zagreb Stock Exchange
publishes two indices: CROBEX (stocks) and CROBIS, (bonds).
159 “The Western Balkans in Transition.“ European Economy occasional papers, no. 5, (January, 2004),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_papers/2004/ocp5en.pdf.
160 The Varazdin Stock Exchange was founded in 1993. Trading was held through the order-driven trading
system. According to the January 2007 issue of Investitor, its market capitalization at the beginning of 2007
amounted to EUR 9.8 billion.
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Figure 2.22 The development of the CROBEX index, 2003-08
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2.3.5.6 The informal economy
The different estimation methods of the unofficial economy give different results. The
national accounting discrepancy method shows a growth of the unofficial economy from
1990 to 1993 to a maximum of 37% of the GDP and then a constant fall to 7% in 2000. In the
1990-95 period, the unofficial economy came on average to about 25%, and in 1996-2000 on
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average to about 10% of the GDP. The Eurostat method and the estimates of the tax evasion
coincide with these trends, while the two monetary methods and the electricity consumption
method show a rise in the unofficial economy in the 1995-99 period, ranging between annual
levels of 22% and 34%, followed by a fall in 2000. Because of uneven results obtained with
different methods and because of the uncertainty whether this is a real reduction in the
informal economy or just an improvement in the statistics, the analysis of the unofficial
economy shows that it decreased in the period 1990-2000.161
Table 2.16 Employment in the unofficial economy, 1991-96, %
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Calculation based on the
relation between the assumed
and registered population
activity rates
0.0 6.42 16.79 19.03 17.50 15.53
The Survey on Employment
results 25.8
Source: Bi?ani?, Ott. The Unofficial Economy In Croatia, Causes, Size and Consequences,
Occasional Paper No 3. November 1997. p.30
In the second half of the 1990s, the estimated size of the informal economy was 16-21% of
the official GDP. The sectors with informal economic activities of some significance were
trading, catering, construction, domestic appliance and car repair, commercial and residential
property rental, business services and household personal services, while the processing
industry and agriculture appeared to be less affected. Steps taken to constrain the informal
sector  included  the  development  of  an  effective  tax  system (in  particular,  the  VAT),  lower
taxes and improved labour relations within a stronger regulatory framework, and more
effective labour inspection.162
A recent survey163 estimated the share of the grey economy on the basis of the share
of illegal income, i.e. the share of income for which social security contribution and taxes are
avoided. The estimates range from 0-50%, while on average employers and employees
estimate  that  roughly  1/3  of  the  salary  is  paid  illegally.  The  most  affected  sectors  are  trade
(distributive trade), construction, and the tourism and hotel industry. According to the survey,
161 Katarina Ott, “Neslužbeno gospodarstvo u Republici Hrvatskoj 1990-2000,“ in Financijska teorija i praksa,
1-30. (Zagreb: Institut za javne financije, 2002), http://www.ijf.hr/FTP/2002/1/ott.pdf.
162 Report of the working party on the accession of Croatia to the world trade organization, (2000)
http://www.wto.org/.
163 Nenad Baki? and Vesna Pliško, Istraživanje o radu na crno Selectio grupe s Hrvatskom udrugom
poslodavaca (Zagreb, 2006), http://www.moj-posao.net/download/istrazivanja/RadNaCrno.pdf.
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the most pronounced type of the grey economy is overtime work, payment in cash of a part of
the salary, and housing and offices rental. According to the government’s estimates, the grey
economy in 2005 was 5.8% of the GDP per capita in PPP. 164
2.3.6 Infrastructure
2.3.6.1 Transport infrastructure
Some of the key European international land routes and railway links – including the historic
Europe to Asia route – pass through Croatia. Numerous passenger and cargo ports are located
along the coast, which is also home to nine international airports, four of which are located on
the coast – Pula, Zadar, Split and Dubrovnik. Three are on islands – Krk near Rijeka and the
islands of Lošinj and Bra? – and two are in the central plain (Zagreb and Osijek). There are
plans for new airports to be built on other islands.
The country also has six international seaports – Pula, Rijeka, Zadar, Split, Plo?e and
Dubrovnik – and dozens of small ports of local and regional importance. However, there are
some problems with the sea connections between the islands, as well as with fast transfers
between Central/East European and West European countries.
The Croatian Railways have very low cargo and passenger traffic and need
modernisation. There are 48 lines in operation per 1000 km2, which is comparable to the EU-
25 (50 km of railway lines per 1000 km 2).
When it comes to the share of tracks electrified, Croatia is below the EU-25 average,
with 36% of the lines electrified (compared to approximately 50% in the EU-25). Also, in the
period 1990-2003, the number of locomotives and railcars decreased by 30% (in the EU-25
by 21%) and the number of goods transport wagons decreased by 42%.
Table 2.17 The evolution of selected main networks in Croatia, 1990-2003, km
1990 2000 2001 2002 2003
Railways - 2 726 2 726 2 726 2 726
Motorways 291 411 429 455 554
Oil pipelines - 601 601 601 -
Source: Panorama of Transport, Eurostat, 2007, p.9
164 The Croatian and the EU statistics are not fully comparable. Croatia does not adjust the GDP figures for the
effects of the grey economy. However, the Strategic Development Framework states that the adjustments of the
GDP to include the grey economy would bring the Croatian GDP per capita expressed in PPP approximately to
52% of the EU average in 2005, compared to the 48% according to the Eurostat statistics.
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Motorway density (12 km/100,000 inhabitants for 2003) was at the level of the EU-25 (13 km
/100,000 inhabitants). Construction continued in the period 2004-07, and the length of the
motorways reached 900 kilometres in 2006.
2.3.6.2 Information and telecommunication technology
Compared to the other countries in Southeast Europe, the Croatian information and
telecommunications sector is very well developed.165 The South East Europe Core Regional
Network Development Plan includes the improvement of the telecommunication network:
planned is a project of covering the rail network and its interconnections with neighbouring
states by an optical telecommunication network.
The indicators show that the fixed line penetration rate (32%) is relatively low
compared to the EU average (45%), but it is higher than the average in the Southeast
European countries (26%). Mobile line penetration is 103%, which is higher than the EU
average.
Figure 2.24 Information and telecommunication technology indicators
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165 Cullen International. Report 4 – Country Comparative Report: Supply of services in monitoring of South
East Europe – telecommunications (2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/internationalrel/docs/eu_enlargement/cullen_report4_compara
tive_final_nov_2007.pdf.
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2.3.7 Energy
The energy infrastructure in Croatia consists of the electricity network, the gas network and
the oil pipeline network (JANAF). The electricity generation capacity consists of the power
plants owned by the Croatian Power Supply Company (the HEP group), a certain number of
industrial power plants, and a few privately owned power plants (wind power plants and
small  hydro  power  plants).  HEP’s  total  generation  capacity  in  Croatia  is  3,645  MW
(including Thermal power plant Plomin Ltd,  which is  jointly owned by HEP d.d.  and RWE
Power, and excluding Nuclear power plant Krško, jointly owned by HEP d.d. and ELES GEN
d.o.o.). The total installed capacity of industrial and other plants amounts to about 220 MW.
The transmission network consists of approx. 720 km lines, 100 substations, 200
transformers, and the power of transformation is 11 MVA (see Table 2.18) The distribution
network consists of 13,000 km lines and 2,500 substations (see Table 2.19).
Table 2.18 HEP Transmission network capacities in the Republic of Croatia
Voltage level 400kV 220kV 110kV Medium voltage
Length of lines (km) 1 159 1 233 4 781 58
Number of substations 5 6 101 -
Number of
transformers
5 (400/220 kV)
7 (400/110 kV)
16 158 *
Power of transformers
(MVA)
2 000 (400/220 kV)
2 100 (300/110 kV)
2 270 6 472 -
Source: Energy in Croatia, 2005, p. 156
Natural gas is produced from 20 on-shore gas fields and 2 off-shore fields, which covers
about 78.5 per cent of the total demand. The largest quantities come from Molve and
Kalinovac, where the central gas stations for gas processing and transport preparation, Molve
I, II and III, have been built. Their capacities are shown in Table 2.20.
Table 2.19 Distribution network capacities in Croatia
Voltage level 110 kV 35 (30) kV 20 kV 10 kV 0.4 kV Household
connections
Length of lines 85 4 594 3 890 29 836 61 645 28 363
Number of
substations
51(110/35(30)
kV)
30 (110/10 (20)
kV9
352
(35(30/10(20)
kV)
2 806 (20/0.4
kV)
21 568 (10/0.4
kV)
- -
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The underground gas storage Okoli  was designed with the nominal capacity of 550 million
m3. The maximum injection capacity is 3.8 million m3/day, while the maximum withdrawal
capacity is 5 million m3/day.
Table 2.20 Central gas stations' capacities
Central gas station Installed capacity (106m3/day)
Molve I 1
Molve II 3
Molve II 5
Total 9
Source: Energy in Croatia, 2005, p.138
The natural gas transportation system comprises 1,657 km, with diameters ranging
from DN 80 to DN 700. The system was designed for a work pressure of 50 bar and partly for
75 bar. During peak demand approximately 510,000 m3 per  hour  are  transported,  while  a
maximum quantity of 620,000 m3 per hour has been delivered to customers. The total
theoretical capacity of the transportation system is 2,000,000 m3 per hour. The system
includes 142 metering and reduction stations, with 210 metering points.
Figure 2.25 Gas network
Source: Plinacro web pages, http://www.plinacro.hr/transport.asp
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There are 36 natural gas distribution companies in the Republic of Croatia, and the total gas
pipeline length amounts to 15,980 kilometres. Additionally, there exist two distribution
companies for city gas and LPG/air mixture distribution, with the total network length
amounting to 239 kilometres. Thus, the total distribution network in Croatia is 16,219
kilometres long. The length of the distribution pipeline has more than doubled since 1995
(Table 2.21).
Table 2.21 Distribution pipeline in Croatia
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Length (km) 7 190 8 980 10 850 12 220 13 340 14 366 14 366 14 515 14 984 15 531 16 219
The oil pipeline network JANAF was constructed in 1979 as an international oil
transportation system from the tanker and terminal port of Omišalj to domestic and foreign
refineries in Central Europe. The designed pipeline capacity amounts to 34 million tons a
year,  while  the  installed  one  is  20  million  tons.  The  total  storage  capacity  at  the  Omišalj,
Sisak and Virje terminals equals 900 000 m3 for oil and 60 000 m3 for oil products.166
2.4 Tourism
Croatia boasts a long tradition in tourism, and its economy is highly travel and tourism
intensive. Croatia has five UNESCO World Heritage sites, eight national parks, and its main
attraction is the Adriatic coastline.
Travel and tourism directly contributes roughly to 9.7% of the total employment and 8.5% of
the total GDP. If the indirect effects are also considered, tourism and travel contribute to 19%
of Croatia’s GDP and 22% of the total employment.167 The  World  Travel  and  Tourism
Council estimates that in the period 2008-18, Croatia will continue to record above average
growth levels (7.9 % annually).
166 Ministry of Economy, Energy in Croatia (Zagreb, 2005), 113.
167 World Travel & Tourism Council, CROATIA 2007: The Travel and Tourism Economic Research,
http://www.wttc.travel/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/1croatia.pdf.
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Figure 2.26 Travel and tourism GDP and employment, 1988-2016
Source. The Travel and Tourism Economic Research, Croatia 2007.
The war in 1990 placed a great financial strain on the Croatian tourism industry, resulting in
the near collapse of the travel and tourism demand and a significant gap between Croatia and
its competing destinations (Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece)168 in terms of infrastructure and
product development.
The events of September 11, 2001, uncertainty in the Middle East, and a slow
economic recovery have led to increased price sensitivity among many of Europe’s key
source markets, such as Germany. As the majority of Croatia’s tourists come from Germany
(close to 18% of the total  arrivals)  this is  of significant importance for Croatia's  tourism. In
addition to Germany, which has maintained its position as the international market leader
since the late 1980s, the major sources are Croatia (i.e. the domestic market), Italy, Slovenia,
the Czech Republic, and Austria. The former domestic Yugoslav markets that used to be
168 THR International Tourism Consultancy, Barcelona, 2001.
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important sources of tourism – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro – shrunk
significantly in size as a result of the war.
The rapid re-emergence of tourism169 and the government’s policy (e.g. as outlined by
the Croatian Tourism Strategy 2010170), aiming  at targeting higher income groups, as well as
the progressive reduction of the government’s direct involvement in the industry provides
opportunities to invest in a dynamic and growing sector. The investments and development of a
comprehensive Croatian tourism offer should help extending the current tourist season, which is
characterised by a high seasonality of demand. The three months from June through August
account for 88% of the total overnight volume and 78% of the arrivals. The winter months
(October to March) account for 5% of the nights and 11% of the arrivals.
Due to the importance of tourism for the economy, an individual Ministry of Tourism
was established in 2008, aimed at mainstreaming policies for employment, trade, investment,
education and environmental protection.
2.5 Macroeconomic forecasts
The starting point of the economic policy document, the Strategic Development Framework
(SDF), is that government driven growth is not sustainable in the long run. Required is the
strengthening of the private sector, its competitiveness and its overall ability to become the
main  driver  of  future  economic  growth.  The  key  areas  that  can  challenge  growth  and
competitiveness relate to the completion of the transition process (mainly related to the
reform of the judiciary and the public service), the development infrastructure (education, and
an efficient labour market), and developmental links (macroeconomic environment, efficient
and integrated financial services, natural resources, and regional development).
The Pre-Accession Economic program schedules measures for the achievement of the
goals defined by the SDF. It can hence serve for the identification of the concrete challenges
that should be tackled within three years. These include privatization (primarily by the means
of capital markets), the elimination of administrative barriers for business development,
169 There was a 6 per cent increase in total tourist arrivals in 2002,  following a 19 per cent growth in 2001.
International business was stronger in terms of growth than the domestic market with several markets, including
the UK, recording a second year of double-digit growth. This means that arrivals ended in 2002 at 86 per cent of
Croatia’s 1989 peak.
170 Ministry of tourism, Croatian Tourism Strategy until 2010 (2003),
http://www.mint.hr/UserDocsImages/Strategija%20hrvatskog%20turizma%20-%20finalna%20verzija.pdf.
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labour market reform, the reform of the education system, and the reform of social  welfare
and related social benefits.
The key fiscal policy objectives in the period between 2007 and 2009 include the
reduction of the budget deficit below 3% of the GDP, stabilisation and the further reduction
of the public debt to less than 60% of the GDP, the decrease of foreign debt to values around
80% of the GDP, and support to a decisive implementation of the structural reforms.
Table 2.22 Macroeconomic forecast until 2013
1994-97 1998-2001 2002-05 2006-09 2010-13
Rate of growth of the GDP in % 6.4 2.1 4.4 5.1 7.3
Inflation rate (year end, in %) 2 5 2.6 2.5 2
Unemployment rate (ILO methodology, in %) - 14.9 13.9 12 9.5
Fiscal deficit /GDP, in % -1.1 -5.5 -6.7 -6.5 -6.5
General government expenditures/GDP in % 48 52 50 48 45
Current account balance /GDP -5 -5 -6.7 -6.5 -6.5
FDI/GDP, in % 1.7 6 5.1 7 6
Foreign debt/exports, in % 63.9 120.3 153.3 165.5 160
Export of goods and service /GDP, in % 41.8 44 50 54 58
Growth in EU-15, in % 2.3 2.9 1.5 2 2
Source: Strategic coherence framework 2007 – 2013, p. 36171
2.6 Welfare and financial services
2.6.1 Wages and incomes
Following the sharp decline in gross salaries in the period 1990-93, the average gross
monthly wages have constantly grown since. The average salary has increased 7 times in the
period 1993 2006, from EUR 127 to EUR 906 in 2006.
171 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU funds, Strategic Coherence Framework
2007-2013: Instrument for pre-accession assistance (Zagreb: Central Office for Development Strategy and
Coordination of EU funds, 2006), 36.
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Figure 2.27 Development of wages
Average gross monthly wage (EUR)
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However, the growth rates have varied considerably, between 14.45 in 1994 (yoy), 40.2% in
1995, and since 2000 they have been moderate, ranging from 1.5-3.4% (2.7% on average).
Figure 2.28 Average gross monthly wage, real growth, %, yoy
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The highest average monthly earnings are in the service sector, followed by the industry,
while the average gross earnings in the agriculture are 88% of the total average (in 2006,
Table 2.23). Net monthly earnings range between 65-85% of gross earnings.
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Table 2.23 Average gross monthly earnings by sector, HRK, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 4 131 4 551 4 896 5 366 5 236 5 985 6 248 6 634
Agriculture 3 558 3 005 2 909 4 383 4 477 4 795 5 039 5 640
Industry 3 681 3 869 4 100 4 864 5 130 5 400 5 645 6 064
Services 5 757 5 999 6 347 6 610 6 965
Source: DZS
Table 2.24 Average net monthly earnings by sector, HRK, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 2 681 2 999 3 326 3 720 3 940 2 173 4 376 4 603
Agriculture 2 409 2 726 3 065 3 720 3 287 3 504 3 698 4 088
Industry 2 421 2 614 2 855 3 409 3 635 3 801 3 995 4 245
Services 3 955 4 170 4 400 4 601 4 806
Source: DZS
In the industry, the highest wages are in mining and quarrying. Electricity and water supply
and construction follow, while earnings are lowest in manufacturing (see Table 2.25).
Table 2.25 Average gross monthly wages in the industry, HRK, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Mining and
quarrying
4 531 4 615 5 089 5 942 6 332 6 629 7 283 7 894
Manufacturing 3 681 3 869 4 100 4 794 5 043 5 288 5 575 6 003
Electricity, gas and
water supply
4 729 5 113 5 382 5 700 6 086 6 720 6 913 7 342
Construction 3 473 3 630 3 663 4 549 4 884 5 105 5 212 5 593
Source: DZS
Table 2.26 Average net monthly wages in the industry, HRK, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Mining and
quarrying
2 883 3 113 3 575 4 103 4 358 4 534 4 973 5 309
Manufacturing 2 421 2 614 2 855 3 346 3 561 3 711 3 934 4 189
Electricity, gas and
water supply
3 103 3 530 3 754 4 047 4 358 4 750 4 916 5 179
Construction 2 318 2 420 2 597 3 232 3 501 3 636 3 733 4 806
Source: DZS
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Since 1998, gross wages have increased between 1.4 (in public administration and defence)
to 2 times (trade). Net wages increased more: between 1.6 (public administration, defence,
health and social work) and 2.1 (trade and construction). The highest wages are in financial
intermediation and the lowest ones in hotels and restaurants.
Table 2.27 Average gross monthly wages in the services, HRK, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Trade 3 558 4 551 3 875 4 616 4 877 6 347 6 610 6 965
Hotels and
restaurants
3 453 3 610 3 859 4 406 4 739 5 204 5 406 5 701
Transport, storage
and communication
4 324 4 908 5 461 6 300 6 718 7 100 7 585 7 948
Financial
intermediation
6 413 6 998 7 634 8 853 8 858 9 153 9 801 10 376
Real estate 4 643 5 093 5 290 5 634 5 958 6 484 6 898 7 464
Public administration
and defence
5 053 6 185 6 409 6 073 6 422 6 487 6 635 7 008
Education 4 046 4 624 5 093 5 381 5 650 6 030 6 153 6 428
Health and social
work
4 989 5 789 6 358 6 407 6 613 6 954 7 404 7 765
Other services 4 662 4 994 5 153 5 583 5 926 6 530 6 673 7 125
Source: DZS
Table 2.28 Average net monthly wages in the services, HRK, 1998-2006
1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Trade 2 334 2 441 2 692 3 205 3 424 4 400 4 601 4 806
Hotels and
restaurants 2 306 2 432 2 706 3 126 3 377 3 617 3 785 3  962
Transport, storage
and communication 2 825 3 204 3 704 4 345 4 678 4 906 5 250 5 464
Financial
intermediation 3 900 4 468 4 892 5 697 5 843 5 993 6 417 6 725
Real estate 2 908 3 016 3 541 3 812 4 069 4 355 4 640 4 975
Public administration
and defence 3 188 4 048 4 214 4 182 4 472 4 611 4 749 4 964
Education 2 646 3 256 3  491 3 771 4 005 4 224 4 342 4 510
Health and social
work 3 144 3 874 4 220 4 364 4 005 4 781 5 109 5 136
Other services 2 960 3 187 3 495 3 861 4 144 4 493 4 634 4 906
Source: DZS
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2.6.2 Social security benefits
The social security benefits in Croatia include sickness (including work-related accidents and
illnesses) and maternity benefits, disability benefits, old-age benefits, survivors' pensions,
unemployment benefits and family benefits. 172
Sickness and maternity leave benefits are part of the social insurance system. Both
have been reformed several times since 1996.173 Farmers, pensioners, unemployed persons,
persons entitled to occupational rehabilitation, and children up to the age of 18 (the age of 26
if they are students), disabled former military servicemen without resources, the dependents
of insured persons, and voluntarily insured persons are eligible for medical benefits.
Employed persons are entitled to receive financial compensation and medical benefits.
Employers contribute to 15% of the income, plus 0.5% of the income for work injury and
work related illness, while employees do not contribute. The government contributes on
behalf of certain categories of persons and finances new-born child assistance, additional
maternity leave, obligatory maternity leave for unemployed mothers, sick leave for war
veterans, and adoption leave.
Cash  sickness  benefits  can  be  provided  for  up  to  6  months;  thereafter,  the  invalidity
commission of the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute decides whether the insured is
permanently disabled, cured, or in need of further treatment. In the latter case, an additional
six-month period of temporary disability is paid.
The sickness benefit varies between 70% and 100% of the average monthly earnings
in the previous 6-month period. 100% of the average monthly earnings is paid for an
incapacity that  is  the result  of a work injury or an occupational disease,  participation in the
Homeland War, pregnancy, childbirth, the donation of transplantation tissues or organs, or if
nursing a sick child up to the age of 3. The employer pays for the first 42 days, except if the
sick leave results from having participated in the Homeland War, pregnancy, or maternity
leave,  in  which  case  the  cost  is  met  by  the  Croatian  Institute  for  Health  Insurance  at  the
expense of the state budget.
A maternity benefit equal to the employee’s salary is payable until the child is aged
6 months (beginning 28 to 45 days before the expected date of childbirth). An additional
172 Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Europe 2002 – Croatia,
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2002-2003/europe/croatia.html.
173 1996 (maternity), with 2004 amendment; 1997 (health care); 2001 (health insurance), implemented in 2002,
with amendments; 2002 (contributions), with 2002 and 2004 amendments; 2003 (health care); 2004 (patients
rights); and 2005 (compulsory insurance contribution).
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benefit (ranging from approx. EUR 214 to EUR 300) is payable until the child is one year old
(age 3 for twins). Unemployed mothers receive 1,600 HRK (approx. EUR 214) a month
during the first six months of the maternity period. The newborn child assistance is a lump
sum of approximately EUR 200.
Medical benefits (for employed persons and dependents) are provided by the public
and private health institutions that are contracted with the Croatian Institute for Health
Insurance. The benefits include primary and specialist treatment, hospitalization, orthopaedic
and other aids, dental care, approved pharmaceuticals, laboratory services, maternity care,
preventive care services, emergency aid, rehabilitation services, appliances, and
transportation.
Cost sharing by patients varies according to the nature of the service provided.
Services are free for children younger than 18, persons with a low income, disabled persons
needing constant assistance, disabled Homeland War veterans, persons registered at the
Croatian Institute for Health Insurance as unemployed, and voluntary blood donors who have
made 35 donations (men) or 25 donations (women).
A two-pillar old age pension system (social insurance and the mandatory individual
account system) was implemented in two stages in January 1999 and January 2002. Persons
older than 50 when the new system was implemented are insured under the first-pillar social
insurance only and receive a regular pension. Those between the ages 40 and 50, who were
already insured under the first-pillar social insurance, could opt to join the two-pillar
mandatory system until June 30, 2002.
The social insurance is funded by the 20% contribution of gross earnings for those
insured only under the first pillar. The contributions of persons insured under the first pillar
and  the  mandatory  individual  account  system  are  also  20%  of  gross  earnings,  15%  to  the
social insurance and 5% to the individual account. The government covers all or part of the
first-pillar costs for military officers, policemen, judiciary officials, parliamentary deputies,
members of the government, and disabled war veterans.
The minimum qualifying conditions for old age pension are the age of 65, with 15
years of insurance coverage for men, or the age of 60, with 15 years of insurance coverage,
for women.174 The qualifying conditions for early pensions until 31 December 2007 were the
age  of  59,  with  35  years  of  insurance  coverage  (men),  or  the  age  of  54,  with  30  years  of
174 These minimum qualifying conditions apply since 1 January 2008. Until then, the requirement was the age of
64  and 16 years of insurance coverage for men, and the age of 59 with 16 years of insurance coverage for
women.
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insurance coverage (women). The early retirement age will increase by six months each year
until it reaches the age of 60 (men), or the age of 55 (women) in 2008. The same conditions
apply for social insurance pension and social insurance.
Insured persons may be eligible to receive different combinations of social insurance
and individual account benefits. For the coverage periods under the social insurance system
before 2002, the insured receives a regular pension benefit; for the coverage periods under
the social insurance system from 2002, the insured receives a basic pension benefit.
For the periods of insurance coverage under the social insurance system before 2002,
the  minimum  pension  is  calculated  as  0.825%  of  the  adjusted  average  gross  salary  of  all
employees in 1998 for each year of the insurance coverage, up to a maximum of 30 years.
For  insurance  coverage  periods  exceeding  30  years,  the  calculation  is  based  on  half  of  the
amount for each year of the insurance coverage exceeding 30. The maximum pension
depends on the length of the insurance coverage period and previous earnings, up to a ceiling.
Early pension is reduced by 0.3% for each month the pension is paid before the
normal retirement age. This reduction is permanent and continues after the recipient reaches
the normal retirement age. The benefits are adjusted every six months according to an index
based on the changes in the cost of living and the national average gross earnings.
Basic old-age pension is based on the average gross salary of all employed persons in
the  preceding  year,  the  number  of  the  years  of  insurance  coverage  in  the  new  system,  and
previous earnings, up to a ceiling. The benefits are adjusted every six months according to an
index based on the changes in the cost of living and the national average gross earnings. The
pension is based on the accumulated assets in the individual account and the average life
expectancy at retirement.
Disability benefits are payable for a permanent reduction in, or loss of, the ability to
work resulting from an occupational or non-occupational injury or disease. Higher awards are
made for a disability that is the result of a work injury or an occupational disease. There are
several types of disability benefits: general disability pension, occupational (partial)
disability pension, occupational rehabilitation and salary compensation and compensation
allowance for a physical injury.
The disability pension depends on the level of wages earned in relation to the
average wage of all employed persons, the length of the insurance coverage period (except
for a work injury or an occupational disease), and the assessed degree of disability (the total
loss of, or permanent reduction in, the capacity to work). In most cases, benefits are paid
under the first pillar.
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For  a  disability  caused  by  a  work  injury  or  an  occupational  disease,  the  minimum
number of years used for pension calculation purposes is 40. The amount of the pension is
calculated according to the years of the insurance coverage and the value of the pension per
qualifying year. The full amount is paid for a general disability; the occupational disability
pension is 80% of the general disability pension and 33.3% if the pensioner is still employed.
The general disability pension is not payable while the beneficiary is employed.
The minimum pension is calculated as 0.825% of the adjusted average gross salary of
all  employees  in  1998  for  every  year  of  the  insurance  coverage,  up  to  a  maximum  of
30 years. For coverage periods exceeding 30 years, the calculation is based on half of the
amount for each year of insurance coverage exceeding 30. HRK 46.92 is paid per year for the
first 30 years of insurance coverage and 23.46 Kunas for each year of the insurance coverage
exceeding 30 (July 2005). The maximum pension depends on the length of the insurance
coverage period and previous earnings, up to a ceiling.
Occupational rehabilitation and salary compensation is the same as the
occupational disability pension unless the disability was caused by a work injury or an
occupational disease. In such a case, it is the same amount as the general disability pension,
based on 40 years of insurance coverage.
Compensation allowance for a physical injury depends on the assessed degree of
physical injury resulting from a work injury or an occupational disease. There is no minimum
qualifying period. The allowance is payable during employment or self-employment and
thereafter, for the duration of one’s lifetime.
Survivor pension is payable to the eligible surviving spouse (aged 50 or older,
disabled, or caring for eligible children; a woman who is widowed at the age of 45 becomes
eligible when reaching the age of 50) or dependent children (up to the age of 15, age 18 if
unemployed,  age  26  if  they  are  students,  no  limit  if  they  are  disabled) of a pensioner, an
occupational rehabilitation beneficiary, or a person that had completed 5 years of insurance
coverage or a 10-year qualifying period, or met the qualifying period conditions for a
disability pension. There is no minimum qualifying period if the death resulted from a work
injury or an occupational disease.
The amount is based on the old-age or disability pension paid or payable to the
deceased and the number of survivors. The minimum number of years of insurance coverage
for pension calculation purposes is 21. If the insured's death was the result of a work injury or
an occupational disease, the minimum number of years of insurance coverage for pension
calculation purposes is 40. In most cases, benefits are paid under the first pillar.
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Unemployment benefits are part of the social insurance system. The employer pays
1.7%, and the government provides periodic subsidies and the total or partial cost of benefits
for  certain  categories  of  persons.  Eligible  are  persons  between  the  ages  15  and  65,  with
9  months  of  employment  in  the  last  24  months.  The  insured  must  register  with  the
Employment Institute in the first 30 days of the unemployment. There is no qualifying period
for unemployed mothers caring for children younger than the age of one. Persons whose
employment ceased as a result of misconduct or by agreement with the employer are not
entitled to unemployment benefits.
Unemployed workers with 35 years (men) or 30 years (women) of employment are
covered until  they are reemployed.  Benefits  may be paid to women during their  pregnancy
and until the child is one year old if there is no entitlement to benefits under any other
program. The benefit may be paid during temporary incapacity for work for up to 3 months.
Unemployed persons of retirement age are also entitled to unemployment benefits until the
minimum insurance coverage period for the old-age pension is satisfied, up to a maximum of
5 years. The beneficiaries of the unemployment benefit who became unemployed because of
the restructuring of their place of employment or because of unforeseen personal
circumstances are eligible for a lump sum payment.
Unemployment assistance is payable to unemployed persons who participate in
vocational training. The reimbursement of travelling and removal costs is  payable if the
costs are incurred as a result of finding new employment and having to relocate from one’s
regular place of residence.
The government bears the costs of family allowances. Family allowances are part of
the social  assistance system and are subject  to an income ceiling.   They are paid to parents
(including foster parents, tutors, stepparents, and grandparents) of children younger than 15
(regardless  of  whether  they  are  at  school)  and  children  older  than  15  if  they  are  full-time
students, incapacitated, or disabled. The income ceiling is 40% of the state budget base.175
175 Social Security, Social Security Online http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2002-
2003/europe/croatia.html.
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2.6.3 Household consumption
The  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  produces  the  monthly  consumer  price  index,  with
expenditure weights (updated every five years) derived from the 2001 Household Budget
Survey. In between rebating, the weighs are price-updated annually to the December of the
previous year. A harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) is also calculated in line with
the Eurostat methodology, but it is not released.
The final consumption of households has been growing since 2000 at the average rate
of 4.75.
Figure 2.29 Final consumption of households, real growth, %
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The highest share (32.5% on average during 2002-05) is spent on food and beverages,
housing (13.5%) and transportation (11.3%). Education represents 0.7% of personal
consumption, while alcoholic drinks and tobacco constitute 4% (Table 2.29).
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Table 2.29 Personal consumption, average per household, 2002-05
2002 2003 2004 2005
Personal consumption, total, Kuna 64736 65593 68525 69668
Food and beverages, % of total 32.15 32.6 31.5 33.21
Alcoholic drinks and tobacco, % of total 3.98 4.19 4.06 4.00
Clothing and footwear, % of total 8.86 8.33 8.06 7.72
Housing and energy176, % of total 13.71 13.78 13.02 13.56
Furniture, equipment and maintenance, % of total 5.52 5.37 5.35 5.09
Health, % of total 2.23 2.11 2.4 2.29
Transportation, % of total 11.07 11.45 11.85 10.86
Communication, % of total 4.81 4.97 5.35 5.32
Recreation and culture, % of total 6.42 6.18 6.45 6.22
Education, % of total 0.68 0.67 0.74 0.76
Hotels and restaurants, % of total 3.16 2.76 3.41 3.39
Other goods and services, % of total 7.41 7.59 7.72 7.58
Source: DZS
2.6.4 Stock of consumer durables
The stock of consumer durables has increased considerably since the beginning of the
transition period. The number of fixed telephone subscribers has almost doubled between
1993 and 2001 and has been stagnating since.
Figure 2.30 Fixed telephone subscribers, per 1000 persons
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176 Housing expenditures do not include imputed rent
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Since 2000, the mobile penetration rate has increased significantly.
Figure 2.31Mobile telephone subscribers, per 1000 persons
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The use of personal computers and the internet has started spreading since 2000 and has been
growing rather fast since. In 2004, the number of internet users (294) was higher than the
number of TV subscribers (251) per 1000 persons.
Figure 2.32 Number of personal computers and internet users per 1000 persons
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The number of radio subscribers was roughly 6% higher than the number of TV subscribers
in the period 1990-2006. The growth has been continuous, but rather limited.
Figure 2.33 Number of radio and TV subscribers per 1000 persons
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As regards motorcars in use, the number was falling in the period 1990-93. Since 1993, the
number grew at 7% on average (yoy) and doubled by 2003. The number of motorcars in use
is higher than the number of radio subscribers per 1000 persons.
Figure 2.34 Number of motorcars in use per 1000 persons
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2.6.5 The evolution of investments
The growth of gross fixed capital formation has been uneven during the period 1995-2004
(Table 2.30), ranging between 0.8% in 2000 and 43.5% in 1996.
Figure 2.35 Investment ratio
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The pattern of gross capital formation in Croatia since 1990 was the same as in Slovakia,
Slovenia, the fYR of Macedonia and Romania.
Table 2.30 Gross fixed capital formation, million Kuna, % change
Gross Fixed Capital
Formation
Change
  1995 15 398.00 26.1%
  1996 22 089.00 43.5%
  1997 29 936.00 35.5%
  1998 32 066.00 7.1%
  1999 33 025.00 3.0%
  2000 33 280.90 0.8%
  2001 36 984.10 11.1%
  2002 44 114.20 19.3%
  2003 53 167.50 20.5%
  2004 57 141.10 7.5%
Source: Econstat
184
Figure 2.36 Gross fixed capital Formation: Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, and Slovakia,
million USD
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2.6.6 The development of savings
Savings have been increasing since 1993. Following the banking crisis, deposits dropped in
1998-2000 and in 2002. The Euro conversion process in late 2001 brought a substantial
inflow of deposits, as the Euro-legacy currency held 'in mattresses' flowed into bank deposits.
The foreign exchange deposits grew by 2.8 billion Euros, but after this extraordinary inflow,
some of the deposits were redrawn in 2002, which was one of the periods when the savings
decreased. During the whole period of 1993-2007, savings increased 15 times.
Figure 2.37 Development of savings, million Kuna, end of period
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Net bonds vary significantly over time. In 2003, the first government Kuna Bonds were
issued (HRK 1 billion, equivalent to EUR 133 million), carrying a 6.125% interest rate with a
5-year maturity. This was in line with the government’s commitment to shifting from foreign
to domestic borrowing and helping the development of the local capital market. The main
clients were institutional investors, such as pension funds.
Figure 2.38 Bonds, net, end of period, million Kuna
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2.6.7 Credit to Households
In Croatia, as in other transition countries, bank lending accelerated sharply following the
restructuring of the banking system. A striking feature of the acceleration in bank lending has
been the very rapid growth in lending to households, albeit from a low base. Like most of the
transition countries, Croatia emerged from the early transition with a minimal stock of
household loans, roughly 5% of the GDP in 1995. Since then, household lending has grown
rapidly, rather faster than lending to enterprises.
The first phase of Croatia’s lending boom was in 1995-98. A high deposit growth due
to the repatriation of deposits held abroad after the ending of the hostilities and the strong
foreign borrowing after Croatia received an investment grade credit rating in January 1997
enabled funding. In this period, credits to households grew at 35%, 40% and 93% (yoy,
respectively). The second credit boom started following the large-scale entrance of foreign
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banks. A significant share of credit is housing loans. Household lending was a bit more than
34% of the GDP at the end of 2005.177
Figure 2.39 Credit to households, million Kuna, end of period, 1993-2007
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Credits to households represent roughly half of the total credits approved. The share of
housing loans is increasing, but other loans (e.g. consumer loans) are still higher. Housing
credits  are  the  fastest  growing  category,  and  the  interest  rates  on  this  type  of  credit  are  the
lowest.
Table 2.31 Credits to households, share in total, 2004-07
2004 2005 2006 2007
Companies 40.5 39.3 40.4 38.9
Household 49.3 49.4 49.2 50.5
-housing 16.3 17.5 19.1 20.5
  -other 33.0 31.9 30.1 30.0
Source: Croatian National Bank
2.6.8 Currency substitution
The Croatian economy is highly Euroized compared to other transition countries178.
177 C.f. Evan Kraft and Ljubinko Jankov, “Lending Booms, Foreign Bank entry and Competition: The Croatian
Case.” (paper presented at the Banking and the Financial sector in transition and emerging market economies,
Dubrovnik, June 26-28, 2003).
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Figure 2.40 The degree of dollarization in transition economies
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Some 80 percent of deposits in the banking system are denominated in foreign currencies or
are indexed, of which approximately 80 percent is in Euros.
Figure 2.41 Currency subsidisation
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The level of currency substitution is not only high, but also persistent. The persistence of
currency substitution is a well-known phenomenon, which is usually referred to as hysteresis
178 Boris Vuj???, “Monetary policy and management of capital flows in a situation of high euroisation - the case
of Croatia,” BIS papers no 17: 79-98 (2003).
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or the irreversibility of currency substitution. The reasons for relying on foreign currency
include a long history of macroeconomic instability dating back to ex-Yugoslavia: high
inflation, frequent devaluations, and partial foreign exchange deposit expropriations. In fact,
even a significant, at times very large interest premium on the domestic currency
denominated instruments could not reverse the high level of currency substitution.
Not only are banking sector liabilities predominantly in Euros, but the Croatian
National Bank (CNB) estimates that, even after the Euro changeover, foreign currency cash
in circulation is larger than the domestic cash. The CNB estimates that there is over EUR 2
billion of foreign currency cash compared to the EUR 1.5 billion in the domestic currency.
2.6.9 Real estate sector
The real estate market in Croatia started to develop in the second half of the 1990s, following
the privatisation of the housing and commercial property stock. The privatisation of housing
led to an increase in the already high proportion of both privately-owned and owner-occupied
housing. According to the 2001 census, 96% of the 1.4 million permanently occupied
dwellings in Croatia were owned by private individuals, and 83% were owner-occupied
dwellings. For comparison, in Western Europe the share of housing owned by private
individuals ranges from about 60% in Austria and Sweden to 90-95% in Belgium, Greece,
Spain and Portugal, while the share of owner-occupied housing ranges from 38% in Germany
to 80% in Ireland. Croatia is in this respect similar to some other CEE countries, where
privatisation has also resulted in a high level of owner-occupied housing.179
The real estate market in Croatia is relatively small – the construction and real estate
industries account for around 13% of the GDP, compared with 20-25% of the GDP in many
industrial countries. Only the prices of the newly built and sold dwellings are published
regularly by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics. The price index published by the rental
agencies and the media since 2006 are based on the supply-side requirements. The index does
not  consider  the  period  needed  for  rent  or  sale,  and  as  result,  the  prices  might  be
overestimated and not very reliable. In addition, commercial and residential property rental is
a sector with a significant informal economic activity.
179 Dubravko Mihaljek, “Free  movement of capital, the real estate market and tourism: a blessing or a course for
Croatia on its way to the European union,“ in Croatian Accession to the Europrean Union, ed. Katarina Ott
(Zagreb: Institute for Public Finances, 2005) , 185-228.
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As  a  result,  there  is  little  reliable  information  about  prices.  According  to  the  trade
union  cost  of  living  estimates,  the  rental  price  of  a  60  square  meter  apartment  in  2004  and
2005 was 240 EUR/month, which increased to 250 EUR/month in 2006. The prices in Zagreb
are estimated to be EUR 100 higher. The real average price of a square meter of a newly built
and sold dwelling has been increasing since 1994180
Figure 2.42 Housing price index estimates
Source: Tica. Stambeno tržište u Hrvatskoj (Housing market in Croatia), available from
http://web.efzg.hr/dok/MGR/tica/Stambeno%20tr%C5%BEi%C5%A1te%20u%20Hrvatskoj.pdf
2.6.10 The Stock Exchange and the money market
The Zagreb Stock Exchange or ZSE (Croatian: Zagreba?ka burza) is a stock exchange
which operates in Zagreb, Croatia. It was established in 1991. In March 2007, the ZSE was
merged with the other Croatian stock exchange, VSE, to form a unique Croatian capital
market, the largest one in the region. As of November 23 2007, the ZSE includes the stocks
of 383 companies, with a market capitalization of 369.6 billion Kuna (USD 74.6 billion, EUR
50.4 billion).
180 Josip Tica, “The Macroeconomic Aspect of Croatian Market,“ Ekonomski pregled no. 55 (7-8), (2004), 641-
659. http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=24733.
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Table 2.32 The Zagreb Stock Exchange, capitalization and CROBEX
1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006**
Stock market
CROBEX index
1000* 1035 1173 1185 1565 1998 2872
Zagreb stock
Exchange,
capitalisation, %
GPD
16 22 25 41 50 62
* 1000 on 1 July 1997
**in Q2 2006
Source: IMF, Staff Report for the 2006 Article I Consultation, January 19 2007.
The  ZSE  has  three  active  quotations:  Quotation  I,  Quotation  TN,  and  Quotation  JDD.  In
2003,  there  were  three  equities  listed  in  the  Quotation  I  category.  The  issuers  of  any  first
quotation equities in Croatia are required by law to publish financial statements and data on
dividends on a quarterly basis. The most important requirements for the Quotation I stocks of
the ZSE are the free transferability of the equities, the listing of the whole class of securities,
a prospectus,  the financial  statements of the issuer to be audited for three years prior to the
listing, minimum three years of operation, at least 25 percent of securities to be in public
hands (owned by non-dominant shareholders), and the expected market capitalization of the
issuer's stock to be at least 10 million Euros.
The official equity index of the ZSE is CROBEX, a capitalization weighted index,
which started at 1000 points on September 1, 1997. In 2003, eleven equities were included in
the index, two from the Quotation I category.
The Zagreb Money and Short Term Securities Market was founded in 1990
pursuant to the Money Market Act, as an organized and regulated market for public trading
by money market participants. The Money Market’s core business activity is the organized
matching of demand and supply of money market instruments: money (both Kuna and
foreign exchange funds), short-term securities, long-term securities in the last year prior to
maturity and other money market instruments. The Money Market participants are banks and
other financial institutions (building societies, insurance companies, investment and pension
fund management companies, funds and others), the Croatian National Bank and the Ministry
of Finance. In February 2004, the Money Market launched an electronic trading system
known as SETT, which enables simultaneous trading by all participants in various money
market instruments electronically, in real time. The SETT system also provides prompt
information  to  all  participants  on  current  market  developments,  supply,  demand  and
transactions. The short-term securities transactions conducted by the means of the SETT
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system are automatically registered in the Clearing and Settlement system of the Central
Depository Agency.
Figure 2.43 Money market interest rates
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2.6.11 Corporate sector banking
The loans to enterprises have been increasing at a slower pace than the ones to households. In
December 2007, the ratio of loans to enterprises/households in Kuna was 0.65, while it was
3.2. in foreign currencies. In 2004, the loans to enterprises were significantly bigger than the
ones to households: more than 3000 times in the domestic and 2.4 times in foreign currencies.
192
Figure 2.44 Loans to enterprises, end of period, million Kuna
Source: Croatian National Bank
According to the EBRD estimates, factoring in Croatia is underdeveloped. In 2005, factoring
in Croatia represented 0.5 % of the GDP, while factoring in the Czech Republic was 2.7% of
the GDP and in Slovakia 2.1%.  According to the country strategy, the EBRD will help the
development of financing for leasing companies and other non-bank financial institutions,
such as factoring companies.181
Based on a factoring study financed by the Austrian government in 2001, the
regulatory issues that inhibit the growth of this industry were identified, and the necessary
amendments to the legislation in order to overcome them were drafted. The findings were
presented to the Croatian Ministry of Finance and the National Bank of Croatia, and the
National Bank issued a regulatory decree reducing the starting capital requirements for
factoring from USD 10.5 million to USD 2 million, putting factoring entities in Croatia on a
more even footing with factoring companies internationally. A second decree enabled other
financial institutions in Croatia such as leasing companies to establish factoring.
The first factoring company was established at the end of 2003, and some banks have
also established their factoring companies.
181 EBRD, Croatia: Country strategy http://www.ebrd.com/about/strategy/country/croatia/index.htm
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Table 2.33 Factoring in Croatia, million EUR
Domestic International Total % GDP
Croatia 165 10 175 0.5
Austria 3 730 543 4 273 1.7
Czech Republic 2 370 535 2 882 2.7
Hungary 1 750 70 1 820 1.9
Slovakia 585 245 830 2.1
Slovenia 200 30 230 0.8
Source: World Bank
In 2004, factoring reached EUR 28 million, in 2005, HRK 1 billion, and estimates for 2006
are roughly HRK 1.5 billion.
2.6.12 Forecasts
The global developments make access to foreign capital more complicated. The recent
inflation growth has caused a decrease in real interest rates and real appreciation. The
Croatian Nation Bank tries to keep the nominal exchange rate stable and the exchange rate
ceiling  (7.35)  should  limit  the  depreciation  expectations.  The  CNB  will  also  maintain  the
limits on bank activities and limit  the nominal growth of investment to 12%. The identified
risks relate to a possible liquidity crisis related to foreign debt refinancing and the financing
of imports. 182
The changes in the monetary policy are not likely, as long as the credit growth
supports a high current account deficit, increasing prices of securities, real estates, as well as
goods and services.  It  is  also expected that  the government will  introduce policies aimed at
limiting inflation, such as limiting the central government deficit, price control, and limiting
the wage growth. Such measures are necessary in the pre-accession phase. Decreasing the
central government budget deficit in the pre-accession period would help bearing these costs
in the first years of the membership. It is expected that in the first years following the
accession, the impact of the EU membership on the consolidated general government balance
will be negative, resulting from a loss of tariff income and liquidity relating to the collection
of the value added tax for export to the EU.
The most significant financial effects of joining the EU relate to the contributions to
the EU budget, participation in the EU structural policies, infrastructure related costs, the
implementation of the common external tariff, the harmonisation of the fiscal system,
182 Zeljko Rohatinski (Governer of the CNB), Status of banking sector and monetary policy, February 2008.
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budgetary effects related to the agricultural support, and the decrease of state aid. The
expected indirect effects relate to higher growth rates, structural reform and the improvement
of the country’s credit rating, which could contribute to decreasing interest rates. In the
medium to long term, the EU membership should bring financial benefits for Croatia. 183
183 Economic Institute Zagreb, Pristupanje Europskoj uniji - o?ekivani ekonomski u?inci, (Zagreb: Economic
Institute Zagreb, 2007)  http://www.eizg.hr/Item.aspx?Id=336&lang=1.
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3.1  The governmental organization and institutional structure of EU relations
3.1.1 Governmental bodies responsible for EU relations
The  main  central  government  bodies  responsible  for  EU  relations  are  (i)  the  Ministry  of
Foreign Affairs and European Integration and (ii) the Central Office for Development
Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds. There is a separate structure for accession
negotiations, which is highly centralised and dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and European Integration. Line ministries have a rather indirect role.
Regarding the internalisation of European affairs, there are two central agencies that
deal  with  specific  issues  -  the  Central  Agency  for  Financing  and  Contracting  of  the
Programmes and the Projects of the European Union,  and the Agency for Mobility and EU
Programmes. A National Fund located within the Ministry of Finance administers the pre-
accession funds allocated under the responsibility of a National Authorising Officer.
3.1.1.1 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European integration
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration was established in an ad-hoc
decision in 2005, by the merger of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for
European Integration.
The main tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration related to
European integration are:
? the implementation of agreements with the EU,
? the coordination of the activities of governmental, regional and local bodies related to
the EU,
? the coordination of the process of the alignment of the Croatian legal system with that
of the EU,
? the  coordination  of  the  translation  of  the  EU acquis into  Croatian,  and  that  of  the
relevant Croatian legislation into one of the official EU languages; the publication of
the official translations of the EU documents
? the organisation and implementation of education and training projects in the field of
European integration,
? providing  analytical support to the integration process
? the implementation of the communication strategy aimed at informing the Croatian
public  about  the  European  integration  process  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia.  This  task
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also includes preparing the decision makers for the role that they have in the
integration process184.
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration are the Office of the Chief
Negotiator and the Secretariat of the Negotiating Team. These two organisational units are
parts of the separate structure for the accession negotiations.
3.1.1.2 The Central Office for the Development Strategy and Coordination of the EU
Funds
The Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds is responsible
for the overall coordination and management of the EU pre-accession funds available to
Croatia. The Office also coordinates the development of the Strategic Coherence Framework
as a basic strategic document for the use of the Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance
(IPA). It is headed by a State Secretary, who is directly responsible to the Prime Minister.
3.1.1.3 The structure for accession negotiations
A separate structure for the accession negotiations was established in 2005 by a governmental
decision185. It consists of:
? the State Delegation of the Republic of Croatia for Negotiations on the Accession of
the Republic of Croatia to the European Union;
? the   Coordinating  Committee  on  the  Accession  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  to  the
European Union,
? the  Negotiating  Team for  the  Accession  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  to  the  European
Union
? the Working Groups for the preparation of the negotiations on the individual chapters
? the Office of the Chief Negotiator and
? the Secretariat of the Negotiating Team.
184 “Act amending the Act on the organization and scope of work of the central government’s bodies,” Official
Gazette, no. 22 (2005), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0388.htm.
185 “Decision on establishing structure for negotiations of the Republic Croatia on the EU accession,” Official
Gazette, no. 49 (2005), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0950.htm.
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The  State  Delegation  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  for  Negotiations  on  the  Accession  of  the
Republic of Croatia to the European Union conducts direct political talks and negotiations
with the EU. It is responsible for the success of the negotiations for all chapters. The State
Delegation is responsible to the government. It acts pursuant to the negotiating guidelines that
are  adopted  by  the  government,  as  well  as  pursuant  to  the  conclusions  of  the  Coordinating
Committee for the Accession of Croatia to the European Union.
The State Delegation is obliged to provide reports on the course of negotiations to the
government following each meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Conference between
the Republic of Croatia and the EU Member States held at ministerial level. In addition, the
State delegation is obliged to provide special reports at the government's request.
The State delegation consists of six members:
? the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, who is the head of the State
Delegation,
? the deputy of the head of the State Delegation and the Chief Negotiator,
? two deputies of  the Chief Negotiator,
? the chief of the Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, and
? a secretary of the negotiating team.
The Head of the State delegation represents Croatia at bilateral intergovernmental
conferences and supervises and guides all negotiation chapters. The deputy of the head and
the  Chief  Negotiator  is  an  ambassador  in  the  Mission  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  to  the
European Union, appointed by the government. 186
The Coordinating Committee on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the
European Union is a temporary working body of the government. It discusses all the issues
relevant to the accession negotiations, including the draft proposals of the negotiating
positions prepared by the negotiating team before their submission to the National Committee
and to the government for adoption. It consists of the head of the delegation, the vice-
presidents of the government and all the ministers. The chief negotiator is also a member.
The negotiator of the respective field of discussion is a non-voting member of the
Coordinating Committee.
186 However, it is the president who, on the recommendation of the government and with the co-signature of the
prime minister,  appoints the ambassadors. (“Constitution of the Republic of Croatia,“ Officional Gazette, no. 41
(2001), Article 98),  http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2001/0705.htm.
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The Negotiating Team for the Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the
European Union is responsible for the negotiations with EU institutions and the Member
States of the European Union on all negotiating chapters (at an expert and technical level). It
considers and adopts the draft negotiating positions and submits them to the Coordinating
Committee on Accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union. The negotiating
team  also  reports  to  the  State  Delegation  and  the  government  on  the  course  of  the
negotiations.
The members of the negotiating team are responsible for the coordination of the
particular clusters of the negotiating chapters and provide expert support to the Chief
Negotiator, participate in negotiations on the basis of the instructions from the Chief
Negotiator, coordinate the work of working groups for the preparation of negotiations on
individual negotiating chapters, cooperate with EU coordinators in the state administration
bodies, and are responsible for the drafting of the negotiating positions and related reports.
The 15 members of the negotiating team include:
? the Chief Negotiator,
? his two deputies,
? the members of the negotiation team, responsible for the coordination of the particular
clusters of the negotiating chapters,
?  the chief of the Mission of the Republic Croatia to the European Communities and
?  a secretary to the negotiating team.
Eleven members of the negotiating team come from state institutions, two from the academic
community and two from economic interest groups. They are appointed by the government
upon  the  proposal  of  the  head  of  the  State  Delegation,  with  the  consent  of  the  Chief
Negotiator.
The Working Groups for the preparation of the negotiations on the individual
chapters of the acquis communautaire participate in the analytical review and assessment of
the harmonisation of the legislation of the Republic of Croatia with the acquis
communautaire (screening) and in drawing up the draft proposals of the negotiating
positions, in dialogue with state administration bodies or other bodies designated as
competent authorities for the individual chapters of the acquis communautaire, and  the  EU
Coordinator of the relevant body. The working groups have heads who administer their work
in agreement with the members of the negotiating team in charge of coordinating the specific
negotiation chapter.
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The Office of the Chief Negotiator provides expert, technical and administrative
assistance to the Chief Negotiator. According to the regulation on the structure of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Office of the Chief Negotiator is
formally part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. In view of the
special nature of its work and in line with the activities of the Chief Negotiator, the Office
operates  within  the  government  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  (in  its  premises)  and  within  the
Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the European Communities.
The Secretariat of the Negotiating Team provides expert technical and
administrative support to the State Delegation, the negotiation team and the Working Groups.
It also provides analytical reviews and analyses of the legislation, and it prepares the
meetings of the State Delegation and the negotiating team. The Secretariat is part of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.
3.1.1.4 Other Bodies
By integration toward the EU, European affairs are gradually integrated in domestic issues.
At the current stage, participation in some of the EU projects is open for Croatia. The
management of these projects is gradually decentralised, and specific agencies are being
established.  The Commission has decided to confer the management of the PHARE and
CARDS programmes to the Croatian institutions under the authority of the National
Authorising Officer on 7 February 2006, while maintaining the ex-ante control requirement
for tendering and contracting. This decision also allowed for the further decentralisation of
the elements of CARDS 2003 and 2004. The following implementation structures exist in
Croatia for the implementation of pre-accession assistance:
? -  A  National  Fund  (NF),  located  within  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  to  administer  the
funds allocated under the responsibility of a National Authorising Officer.
? -  The Central Finance and Contracting Unit as the Implementing Agency for
PHARE.
? - The Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the National Fund,
which provides a legal basis for the introduction of a decentralised implementation
system for EU pre-accession assistance187.
187 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 2006
Report on PHARE, pre-accession and transition instruments Country sections and additional information COM
(2007) 679 final. (Brussels, 2007).
205
In 2007, two central agencies that deal with specific issues – the Central Agency for
Financing and Contracting of the Programmes and Projects of the European Union, and the
Agency for Mobility and EU Programmes - were created by separate laws.188 They are
established as public institutions (i.e. they are not formally part of the government), but they
are under ministerial control in terms of the appointment of the management and supervision.
The management board and director of the Central Agency for Financing and Contracting of
the Programmes and Projects of the European Union are appointed by the Minister of
Finance, and the same ministry supervises the work of the Agency. In the case of the Agency
for Mobility and EU Programmes, the government appoints the management upon the
proposal of the Minister of Science,  Education and Sport,  and its  work is  monitored by the
Ministry for Education and the Ministry responsible for youth.
3.1.2 Parliamentary structures
The Standing Orders of the Croatian Parliament define the internal structure of the
parliament. The standing working bodies of the parliament are committees and commissions.
There are 22 Standing Committees and one Standing Commission.189 The Provisions of the
Standing Orders enable the establishment of new bodies, as the need arises.
The Croatian parliament participates in the preparations of the Republic of Croatia for
the  EU  membership  mainly  through  the  European  Integration  Committee,  the  National
Committee, as well as through the Croatia-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee. 190 Other
committees (the Inter-parliamentary Cooperation Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee)
also deal with EU-related issues as the need arises.
The European Integration Committee was  established  in  2001  as  a  standing
committee. It monitors alignment with the EU acquis, assistance programmes and
programmes of cooperation with the European Union, as well  as the implementation of the
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0679:FIN:EN:PDF
188 Croatian Parliament, “Regulation on establishment of the Central Agency for Financing and Contracting of
the Programmes and Projects of the European Union,” Official Gazette, no. 90 (2007),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2007/2734.htm,  and Croatian Parliament, “Law on the Agency for Mobility
and EU programmes, Official Gazette,” no. 107 (2007), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2007/3131.htm.
189 Croatian Parliament important Legislation, “Standing orders of the Croatian Parliament,“ Croatian
Parliament, Article 56, http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2434.
190 “ Odluka o imenovanju Izaslanstva Hrvatskoga sabora u Parlamentarni odbor za stabilizaciju i pridruživanje,
Official Gazette, no. 147 (2004), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2004/2579.htm.
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international treaties related to the Council of Europe.191 The Committee also cooperates and
exchanges experience with European institutions and bodies. The Committee has 13
members, among which one acts as chair, and one as vice-chair.
The National Committee was established in January 2005, following the adoption of
a Declaration on the basic principles of the accession negotiations by the parliament. The
National Committee is a parliamentary working body, established pursuant to Article 43 of
the Standing Orders of the Croatian parliament for monitoring the accession negotiations of
the Republic of Croatia to the European Union.192 The National Committee:
? supervises and evaluates the progress of the negotiations,
? gives  opinions  and  guidelines  on  behalf  of  the  Croatian  parliament  on  the  prepared
negotiating positions,
? considers information on the process of negotiations,
? considers and gives its views on the forthcoming questions on the agenda,
? analyses and assesses the performance of the individual members of the negotiating
team,
? holds regular consultations and exchanges information with the President of the
Republic of Croatia, the Prime Minister and the Chair of the Croatian Parliament,
? holds regular consultations with the Head of the Delegation and the Chief Negotiator
on the progress of the negotiations, on issues that arise during the negotiations and
possible ways of closing the individual chapters,
? gives opinions, as required, on the harmonisation of the Croatian legislation with the
EU regulations,
? reports on the work of the Committee to the Croatian parliament at least twice a year.
The National Committee consists of 15 members, of whom 6 are members from the parties in
office, and 6 are members from the opposition parties. The Chairpersons of the Foreign
Policy Committee, the Antiparliamentary Co-operation Committee and the European
Integration Committee are members of the National Committee, irrespective of their party
affiliation. There are four non-voting members of the Committee: one representative of the
191 Croatian Parliament, Standing orders of the Croatian Parliament, Article 97,
http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2434.
192  Croatian Parliament, “Decision on the establishment of a national committee,“ Official Gazette, no. 12
(2005),
http://www.mvpei.hr/zakoni/PDF/Odluka%20o%20osnivanju%20Nacionalnog%20odbora%20NN%2012-
05%20ENG.pdf.
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Office of the President of the Republic, one representative of the academic community, one
representative of employers' associations, and one representative of the trade unions.
The Foreign Affairs Committee deals with foreign policy issues and international
relations. Its tasks and activities include cooperation with the committees of the parliaments
of third countries, and it is the main working body in the procedure of the ratification of
international treaties.
The Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, together with the Foreign
Affairs Committee, supports the implementation of the foreign policy in the framework of
inter-parliamentary cooperation with third countries and international organizations.
The Parliamentary Delegation to the Croatia-EU Joint Parliamentary
Committee was established in October 2004. The Croatian parliament nominated 15
members and 12 substitutes of the Parliamentary Delegation for the Croatia-EU Joint
Parliamentary Committee delegation for co-operation with the European Parliament. The
Croatia-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee conducts political dialogue. In particular, the aim
of the Joint Parliamentary Committee is to promote:
? -Croatia's full integration into the community of democratic nations and gradual
rapprochement with the European Union;
? - an increasing convergence of the positions of the two sides on international issues,
also through the exchange of information as appropriate,  and, in particular,  on those
issues that are likely to have substantial effects on Croatia and the EU; and
? - regional co-operation and the development of good neighbourly relations; common
views on security and stability in Europe, including co-operation in the areas covered
by the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.193
Other committees deal with EU-related issues as the need arises. For example, the European
Integration Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Committee for Agriculture
and  Forestry  held  a  common session  on  the  negotiations  for  Protocol  7  of  the  Stabilisation
and Association Agreement, covering trade in agricultural products.
193 Croatian Parliament, Croatian Parliament delegation, http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?sec=380.
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3.1.3 The development of the institutional setting
The structure of the ten governments since 1990 have been quite heterogeneous in terms of
their size, the number of vice-presidents, and ministers without portfolio, as well as the
structures of ministries and central offices.
Table 3.1 Milestones in the development of the structures dealing with EU affairs
Period Structure Note
1990-92 Office for Alignment with European Integration Part of the government
1992-98 Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister for European Integration
Office for European Integration
1998-2000
Coordination for European Integration Consisted of the Council of
Ministers and the Advisory
Committee
2000-05 Ministry for European Integration
Since 2000 European Integration Committee
2004 Head of the state delegation and the secretary of the
negotiating team is appointed
Since 2005 National Committee is established
2005 Structure for accession negotiations is established
Since 2005 Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration
2006 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of
EU funds
Central government office,
which took over the
responsibility for the
coordination and
management of the EU pre-
accession funds from the
MFAEI
The first structures for European integration were established in the 1990s (See Table 1.1).
Different governmental bodies have been in charge of European affairs since.
The first structure for European integration, the Office for Alignment with European
Integration  was  established  in  1990,  as  part  of  the  government194. It functioned until 1992,
when it was absorbed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1998, the first minister
responsible for European Integration was appointed, who was also a vice-president of the
government. 195 The Office for European Integration and Coordination for European
194“Regulation on Office for alignment with the European integration,” Official Gazette, no. 55 (1990),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1990/1072.htm.
195 “Decision on appointment of the Minister in the government of Croatia,” Official Gazette, no. 32 (1998),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1998/0377.htm.
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Integration was also established in 1998.196 The  Office  for  European  Integration  was
monitoring the process of European Integration, and it prepared expert assignments for the
Minister of European Integration in the area of work of the Coordination for European
Integration.
The Coordination for European Integration consisted of the Council of Ministers and
the Advisory Committee. The prime minister was the president of the Council of Ministers,
while five ministers (the Minister for European Integration, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Justice) were
members. The Advisory Committee consisted of all the ministers. The president of the
Advisory Committee was the Minister for European Integration,  and the members were the
line ministers.197 Following the elections in 2000, the structure of the government changed.
After a short period, when the minister without portfolio was responsible for the EU relations,
in  February  2000,  the  Ministry  for  European  Integration  was  established.  It  consisted  of  a
Cabinet, a Secretariat, and a Directorate for legal alignment, a Directorate for coordinating
programmes of assistance and cooperation with the EU and a Directorate for Economic
Alignment.
The Secretariat of the Chief Negotiator for European Union was established in the
Ministry in July 2001. In 2002, the Directorate for the strategy of integration was
established.198 In January 2005, the government delegated the negotiation on the accession to
the EU to the State Delegation and nominated a head of delegation, deputies, a Chief
Negotiator and a secretary of the negotiating team.199
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration was created by merging
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for European Integration in March 2005.200
196 “Regulation on Office for European Integration,” Official Gazette, no. 51 (1998),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1998/0645.htm.
197 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Science and Technology, the
Minister for Development and Reconstruction, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Economy, the Minister
for Agriculture and Forestry, the Minister for Maritime Affairs, Transport and Communications, the Minister of
Justice, the Minister for Administration, the Minister for Spatial Planning, Construction and Housing and the
Minister of Labour and Social Care.
198 “Uredba o izmjenama i dopunama Uredbe o unutarnjem ustrojstvu Ministarstva za europske integracije,“
Official Gazette, no. 69 (2002), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2002/1163.htm.
199 Croatian Parliament, “Statement by the Croatian Parliament and the government of the Republic of Croatia
on joint actions in the process of negotations on membership of the European Union,“ Official Gazette, no. 12
(2005), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0189.htm and “Odluka o imenovanju voditeljice i zamjenika
voditeljice Državnog izaslanstva za pregovore o pristupanju Republike Hrvatske Europskoj uniji, te glavnog
pregovara?a,“ Official Gazette, no. 11 (2005), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0182.htm.
200“Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o ustrojstvu i djelokrugu središnjih tijela državne uprave,“ Official
Gazette, no. 22 (2005), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0388.htm.
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The structure for the accession negotiations was formally adopted a month later, in April
2005, by a governmental decision. In addition to the state delegation and the secretary of the
negotiating team, who had already been appointed, a coordinating committee, a negotiation
team, working groups and the office of the Chief Negotiator were established.
The problem of the overload of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration,
indicated through the declining number of laws harmonised201, was partially addressed by the
reorganisation of the Ministry and transferring some of its task to the Central Office for
Development Strategy. The Central Office for Development Strategy took over the
responsibility for the coordination and management of the EU pre-accession funds in August
2006.
3.1.4 The political importance of managing EU relations
Integration towards the EU has been one of the strategic priorities of the government.
However, the political importance of the state officials dealing with European issues is
limited.
Apart from the very first minister for European Integration, Ljerka Mintas Hodak,
who was also vice-president of the government, later ministers have not had a high political
profile. In the period 2000-01, the minister was Ivan Jakov???, who resigned when his party,
the Istrian Democratic Alliance (the IDS), left the government. After his resignation in June
2001, the new minister, Neven Mimica, was appointed in September. His task was considered
largely a technical one.202
During the term of the office of the last government, in 2004-07, the organisation of
EU-relations was highly centralised. The structure was formally dominated by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and European Integration. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kolinda
Grabar Kitarovi?, had limited influence. She joined the presidency of the Croatian
Democratic  Union  (the  HDZ)  only  after  she  was  appointed  minister.  Her  role  in  the  last
election  campaign  and  her  position  within  the  HDZ indicated  that  she  was  on  the  way  out.
201 c.f. Tomislav Marši?, “Assessing the negotiation experience: quick accession or good representation?,” in
Croatian accession to the European Union, the challenges of participation, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung,  2006), 29-56.
202 “Croatia's ultimate expert,“ European Voice 7, no. 4 (2001),
http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id=12388.
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Consequently, the high centralisation of the procedural and political power on a limited
number of persons strengthened the position of the prime minister.203
A new Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Gordan Jandrokovi?,
has been appointed in January 2008. It is too early to estimate his performance and influence.
It can be stated, however, that he has a stronger position in the party in office (the HDZ) than
his predecessor, Grabar Kitarovi?.
3.2 Political relations
3.2.1 Positions on EU relations
3.2.1.1 The governments’ positions
Croatia  had  contractual  relations  with  the  EU  before  1991  through  the  EU-Yugoslavia  co-
operation agreement, which was abolished when the former Yugoslav federation
disintegrated. The official position of the Croatian governments since 1991 has always been
pro-European. Nevertheless, because of the war imposed on Croatia from 1991 till 1995, and
its consequences, which produced un-democratic trends, in the period 1995-99 Croatia
suffered relative isolation from the EU countries and the international communities.
The EU briefly started negotiating a co-operation agreement with Croatia in 1995.
However, the negotiations were suspended due to the military operation Storm in the
occupied territories. In the period 1996-99, President Tudjman strongly opposed the EU’s
policy towards the region, the so-called regional approach. The regional approach was
considered to be an association of the Western Balkans, and Tudjman claimed that Croatia
belonged to Europe, as opposed to Western Balkans. Despite the fact that Croatia’s progress
in democratisation, respect of human rights, including minority rights and the rule of law was
non-existent or limited,204 the  official  position  was  still  proclaimed  European  and  the
improvement of the relations with the European Union was identified as a strategic priority.
In 1999, the government made its first concrete steps in defining priorities for the future
203 Op. cit. Tomislav Marši?, “Assessing the negotiation experience: quick accession or good representation?,”
in Croatian accession to the European Union, the challenges of participation, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,  2006), 29-56.
204 C.f. European Commission, Operational conclusions : Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern
Europe: Compliance with the conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, COM (1998)
237 final (Brussels, 1998)
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/
sap/com_1998_0237_en.pdf.
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integration activities by adopting an Action Plan for European Integration, which contained a
Government Policy Statement, and political, economic and legal reports.
The parliamentary elections in January 2000 and the election of Stjepan Mesic as
President of the Republic in February 2000 marked a turning point in the relations between
the EU and Croatia, which was reflected in a rapid development of the country’s relations
with the European Union. In November 2000, the government adopted guidelines for
conducting negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Since 2001, all
governmental bodies, when submitting legislative proposals, have to accompany it with an
explanatory note concerning alignment with the EU.205
In December 2002, the parliament asked the government to apply for EU
membership; the government submitted the application in February 2003. The EU application
was the last major international undertaking of the Ra?an government, which submitted a
7,000-page report in reply to the questionnaire by the European Commission. The cross-party
consensus on the political  goals of the EU membership was maintained after the change of
the government following the November 2003 parliamentary elections.
Membership in the European Union and NATO, relations with neighbours,
developing economic diplomacy, and changing Croatia's international image were the five
priorities of the foreign policy of the government in the period 2003-07. The achievements in
this period include the opening of accession negotiations and finalising the screening process.
Integration into the EU has remained a priority of the new Sanader’s government for the
period 2008-11.
3.2.1.2 Parliament and opposition reactions
All major and relevant parties represented in the parliament have supported Croatia’s
integration in the EU. During the time of Croatia’s relative isolation from the EU countries, it
was  the  opposition  who  started  establishing  contacts  with  the  EU.  In  February  1999,  the
leaders of six parliamentary opposition parties (which later formed the government in the
period 2000-03) went to Brussels, lobbied for the PHARE programme to be opened and
promoted cooperation between Croatia and the EU.206
205 Government of the Republic of Croatia, 19 July 2001, Decision on measures in the process of approximation
of the legislation of the Republic of Croatia with the acquis communautaire.
206 e.g . Dean Sinov???, “Ho?e li oporbena šestorica u Bruxellesu odbaciti regionalni pristup Europske unije,“
Vjesnik daily (1999),  http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/1999/02/05/ntem.htm#BOOKMARK%200.
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In 2002, the parliament adopted a resolution on Croatia's accession to the European
Union. The Resolution was supported by the vast  majority of the parliamentary clubs.207 In
the Resolution on the Accession, the Croatian Parliament affirmed that the membership of
Croatia in the European Union was a strategic national objective, which would be fully and
permanently supported by the parliament. The general consensus of all parliamentary
political parties regarding membership in the European Union was confirmed in the Joint
Statement of all Political Parties at the beginning of the negotiations between Croatia and the
EU in December 2004. The European position of the whole political elite was again
confirmed in January 2005 through the parliamentary Declaration on the fundamental
principles of the negotiations208 and the Joint statement with the government on the
negotiation process.
The Declaration on the fundamental principles of the negotiations stipulates the role
of the parliament in the alignment process, the importance of the cooperation with the
government, and it also identifies the need for constitutional change. The Joint statement of
the parliament and the government stipulated the importance of an ongoing dialogue and
concerted actions in the process of negotiating Croatia’s full membership in the European
Union.209
3.2.1.3 Public opinion polls and the reaction of the public
The Ministry for European Integration commissions semi-annual public opinion polls on the
European Union in the Republic of Croatia since 2000. The aim of the polls is to monitor the
public’s attitude towards the European integration and sources of information they have about
it. Croatia is also included in the Eurobarometer surveys from 2004.
The latest results of the Standard Eurobarometer (Spring 2007) show that the majority
of European respondents (52 per cent) perceive the European Union positively, with only 15
207 Signatories to the resolutions are  the Social Democratic Party (SDP) Group , the Croatian Peasant Party
(HSS) Group, the Croatian People's Party (HNS), the Primorsko-goranska Party (PGS) and the Slavonsko-
baranjska Croatian Party (SBHS),  the Libra Group, the Liberal Party Group,  the National Minorities' Group,
the Istrian Democratic Forum (IDS) Group,  the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Group, the Croatian Social
Liberal Party (HSLS) Group, the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)-Croatian Christian Democratic Union (HKDU)
Group,  the Democratic Centre (DC) Group,  the Croatian Block Group.
208 Croatian Parliament, “Declaration on the Fundamental Principles of Negotiations on Full Membership of the
Republic of Croatia in the European Union,“ Official Gazette, no. 12 (2005),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0190.htm
209 Croatian Parliament, “Statement by the Croatian Parliament and the government of the Republic of Croatia
on joint actions in the process of negotations on membership of the European Union,“ Official Gazette, no. 12
(2005), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/0189.htm
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per cent perceiving it negatively. In Croatia, both groups represent 30 per cent, while a
further 38 per cent are undecided. In 2006, the EU was positively perceived by 46 per cent
and negatively by 17 per cent of the EU citizens. At that time, 33 per cent of the Croatian
citizens had a positive attitude towards the EU, while 29 per cent had a negative one. Only 29
per  cent  of  the  Croatian  citizens  think  that  the  EU membership  would  be  good  for  Croatia,
and  those  thinking  it  would  be  bad  represent  one  percentage  point  less.  43  percent  of  the
Croatian citizens expect benefits from the EU membership, but still five per cent more do not.
Nevertheless, the majority of the Croatian citizens (49% vs. 43 %) would feel safer and think
that Croatia would be economically (53% vs. 39%) and politically (45% vs. 35%) more stable
if Croatia were a Member State.
Only a minority of the respondents in Croatia (35%) trust the European Union. While
distrust in the EU is relatively stable, averaging 54% during 1995-2005, the unwillingness to
join the EU was below 20% until the end of 2003. Since 2004, public opinion polls showed a
change in the general attitudes of the Croatian citizens to the European Union. In 2004,
unlike in previous rounds, more citizens (27.55%) showed a negative attitude towards the
EU, while 43.4% of the citizens expressed a positive opinion about the Union.
Analyses show210 that the motives of Euroscepticism seem to be heterogeneous, such
as exclusive nationalism and its socio-cultural, political and economic premises, while the
impact of utilitarian motives appear to be marginal.
210 e.g. Aleksandar Štulhofer, “Euroscepticism in Croatia: on the far side of rationality?,“ in Croatian Accession
to the European Union, the Challenges of Participation, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute of Public finances,
2006), 141-160. Dragan Bagi? and Ante Šalinovi?, “Analysis of benefits and harms as a factor in citizen support
to Croatian accession to the European Union,“ in Croatian accession to the European Union, the Challenges of
Participation, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb:  Institute of Public finances, 2006), 161-188.
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Figure 3.1 The dynamic of the attitudes concerning accession to the European Union,
Croatia 2000-05
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Source: Gfk- Croatia- omnibus, 2006, cited after Štulhofer, 2006, p. 146.
Public  opinion  polls  in  Croatia  are  consistent  with  the  main  characteristics  seen  in  other
Central  and  Eastern  European  countries:  the  further  a  country  is  from entering  the  EU,  the
smaller is the support for doing so.
3.2.2 Major events marking the EU-Croatia relations
Croatia declared its independence on 25 June 1991. The decision was suspended for three
months, and it was confirmed on 8 October 1991 by the parliament’s decision on the
abrogation of the state-legal ties with the former SFRY. The EU recognised Croatia as a
sovereign state in January 1992. In May 1992, the country was admitted to the United
Nations.
Due to the war in the early 1990s and its political, economic and institutional
consequences in the following years, Croatia lagged behind other Central and Eastern
European  Countries  in  its  relationship  with  the  EU211.  In  May  1992,  the  Commission
presented a proposal to the Council  for a Regulation to include Croatia in PHARE.  At the
211 Katarina Ott, “Croatian accession to the European Union: the challenges of participation,“ in Croatian
accession to the European Union: the Challenges of participation, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute of Public
finances, 20069, 5.
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time, the European Parliament rejected the proposal on the grounds of insufficient guarantees
for the respect for human rights. The Council was of the same opinion. In 1995, the
Commission  proposed  to  extend  the  PHARE  programme  to  include  Croatia,  but  the
negotiations of the cooperation agreement with Croatia and the application of the PHARE
programme were suspended after the Croatian military actions in its occupied territory in
1995.
The General Affairs Council defined a regional approach, a policy that should foster
the development of regional cooperation in the former Yugoslavia in 1996. The primary
objectives of the EU Regional Approach  were to reinforce the successful implementation of
the Dayton/Paris and Erdut peace agreements, as well as to create an area of political stability
and economic prosperity. The cornerstones of the approach were the promotion and
maintenance of democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human and minority rights, as
well as the returning to economic growth. In 1999, the European Commission proposed the
creation of the Stabilisation and Association Process, a more far-reaching strategy giving the
countries  in  the  region  the  prospect  of  increasing  rapprochement  with  the  EU,  with  the
perspective of full integration into the European structures. 212
 In May 2000, the Commission adopted a Feasibility Report proposing the opening of
negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).  The Stabilisation and
Association  Agreement  was  signed  in  October  2001,  and  an  Interim  Agreement  entered  in
force in March 2002. In 2003, the accession perspective of the Western Balkans countries,
including Croatia, was confirmed. In April 2004, the European Commission issued a positive
opinion on Croatia's application for EU membership. In June 2004, the European Council
confirmed the status of candidate country for Croatia. In December 2004, the European
Council set 17 March 2005 as the starting date for the negotiations, conditional upon full
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The
negotiation framework for Croatia was adopted on 16 March, but the start of the negotiations
was  postponed.  On  3  October  2005,  ICTY  Chief  Prosecutor  found  that  Croatia  was  fully
cooperating.  Based on this opinion, the Council  concluded that  the last  remaining condition
for starting the negotiations was met. The accession negotiations were launched the same
212 European Commission, “Commission proposes a Stabilisation and Association process for countries of
South-Eastern Europe,“ Press Releases, no. IP/99/350 (1999),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/99/350&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&
guiLanguage=en.
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day, and the screening stage of the accession negotiations began in October 2005. Screening
was concluded within a year.
Table 3.2 Major events marking the EU-Croatia relations
1992 The EU recognises Croatia as a sovereign state
1995 PHARE application and negotiations on a cooperation agreement suspended
1996, 14 February The EU adopts a policy towards the Western Balkans; regional approach
1999, May The European Commission proposes the Stabilisation and Association Process
2000, 15 February The EU-Croatia Joint Consulting Task Force is set up
2000, 24 November The beginning of the negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Zagreb
Summit)
2001, 19 October The Stabilisation and Association Agreement is signed
2002, 1 March The Interim Agreement enters into force
2003, 21 February Croatia applies for EU membership
2003, June Confirmed accession perspective (Thessaloniki summit)
2004, 20 April The EC issues a positive opinion on Croatia’s application for membership
2004, 18 June The European Council confirms Croatia as a candidate country
2004, 20 December The European Council sets 17 March 2005 as the starting date for the negotiations (conditional)
2005, 1 February The SAA enters into force
2005, 16 March The EU accession negotiations are postponed, framework for negotiations is adopted
2005, 26 April The first meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council; the meeting of the extended EU
Troika on Croatia’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
2005, 3 October Accession negotiations are launched
2005, 20 October The beginning of the screening process
2006, 12 June 12 The opening and closing of the Science & Research chapter of the Acquis communautaire
2006, 18 October Screening completed
2006, 11 December The opening and closing of the Education & Culture chapter of the Acquis
2006, November The EC publishes Enlargement Strategy 2007-2008
2007, 1 January Croatia is included in the IPA
2007 Croatia opens 11 negotiations chapters
2007, 16 November The EC publishes the Croatia Progress Report and Enlargement Strategy
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3.2.2.1 High-level political contacts with the EU
The high-level political contacts with the EU can be divided into three large groups: political
contacts in the period until 2000, the period between 2000-04, and the formalised political
dialogue following the entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
Following the 2000 elections, on 15 February 2000, the EU-Croatia consultative task
force was set up, and it adopted joint recommendations concerning the conditionality subjects
(the rule of law, the return of refugees, cooperation with the ICTY, the democratisation of the
media). In March 2000, Chris Patten, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, visited Zagreb,
while President Mesi?, Minister for Foreign Affairs Tonino Picula, and Minister for European
Integration Ivan Jakov??? visited Brussels in July 2000. That was the first official visit of
President Mesi? to the EU and NATO. In addition to Romano Prodi, the meeting included a
meeting with high representative for CFSP Javier Solana, Commissioner for External
Relations Chris Patten, and NATO general secretary George Robertson.213 The initiative of
French President Jacques Chirac to organise an EU-Western Balkans summit was discussed.
As a result of this initiative, the Zagreb Summit was organised in November 2000,
jointly  by  the  government  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia  and  the  French  government,  in  its
capacity as the EU presidency. The negotiations with the European Union on the Stabilisation
and  Association  Agreement  were  also  launched,  which  was  a  bold  step  towards  one  of  the
main goals of the Republic of Croatia – achieving membership in the European Union.
President Mesi? has remained active in the enhancement of the EU-relations. His latest
activities (in December 2007) include a 3-day visit to Brussels  including meetings with
NATO general secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Hans-Gert Poettering, High representative
for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana  and Commissioner Olli Rehn.
3.2.2.2 Formal political dialogue
The entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement on 1 February 2005
marked a new stage of enhanced relations and cooperation between the EU and Croatia. A set
of joint bodies was established at the ministerial level (the Stabilisation and Association
Council), at the high officials’ level (the Stabilisation and Association Committee), and at the
technical level (Subcommittees).
213 Croatian Television News, “Predsjednik Mesi? doputovao u Bruxelles u posjet EU-u, NATO-u i Belgiji,“
http://vijesti.hrt.hr/arhiv/2000/07/17/HRT0013.html.
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The first Stabilisation and Association Council meeting took place in Luxembourg on
26 April 2005. The President of the Council, Jean Asselborn, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Immigration  of  Luxemburg,  led  the  EU delegation.  Javier
Solana, High Representative/Secretary General, Olli Rehn, Commissioner for Enlargement
and Ambassador Grant, UK permanent representative to the EU, also participated in the
meeting as members of the Troika. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration,
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovi? led the delegation of the Republic of Croatia.214 The second
meeting of the SA Council was held on 10 April 2006, and the third on 6 March 2007.215
The Stabilisation and Association Committee, established under the SAA to conduct
political dialogues at senior officials level, meets, as the SAA Council, on an annual basis.
The first Stabilisation and Association Committee took place in Brussels on 14 July 2005, the
second was held in Zagreb in 2006, and the last, third meeting was held on December 5, 2007
in Brussels. Those took stock of the recent developments regarding the political and
economic criteria, as well as Croatia's progress in aligning to the body of the Community law
(the reform of the public administration, fight against corruption, as well as issues related to
state aid and public procurement). The meeting was chaired by Christian Danielsson, acting
Director in the European Commission Directorate General for Enlargement. Marija
Pej?inovi?-Buri?, State Secretary for European Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia headed the Croatian delegation.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) meets every six months. The first meeting
took place in Zagreb on 3-4 March 2004.
3.2.2.3 High-level political contacts with the Member States
Bilateral relations with the EU Member States have been steadily progressing since 2000.
President Mesi? decided that France should be the first country he would visit after he was
elected Croatian President, as France was taking over the EU presidency. On his trip to
France, the President was accompanied by Goranko Fižuli?, Minister of Economy, Ivan
Jakov???, Minister for European Integration, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vesna Cvjetkovi?-
Kurelec. Defence Minister Alain Richard welcomed the President, followed by talks with
French President Jacques Chirac, who said that Croatia could play a very important role in
214 Council of the European Union, “EU-Croatia Stabilisation and Association Council.“ Press Releases, no.
8441/05 (2005), http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/04/26cro01/croa.pdf.
215 Presidency of the European Union 2006, “EU-Croatia Stabilisation and Association Council,“ Press
Releases, (2006),  http://ue2006.at/en/News/Press_Releases/April/1004CroatiaSAC.html?month=4&day=1.
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the region. During their talks, they covered all current issues: the problems of the region, the
problems in the Croatian neighbouring countries, and finally, all the efforts Croatia was
making in order to achieve democratic standards and its strategic objectives. Following the
meeting with President Chirac, President Mesi? talked with Raymond Forni in the French
parliament, and with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the government. 216
A joint Croatian-Italian statement regarding the special relations between the two
countries was signed in 2000 by Croatian Prime Minister Ra?an and Italian Prime Minister
Giuliano Amato. Bilateral relations, specifically economic ones, were identified in the
statements. It was also agreed to hold regular annual meetings at all levels. These meetings
include joint consultations at a political and technical level. Special relations also relate to
bilateral cooperation in the field of economy, trade, transport and tourism.
There have been no changes in the German foreign policy towards Croatia, no matter
what party is in power. German President Schroeder was the first to invite Prime Minister
Sanader to Germany after the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won the 2003 elections. A
number  of  visits  followed,  and  the  last  visit  of  President  Schroeder  to  Zagreb  was  in  April
2007.217
As listing all the high political contacts between Croatia and the EU Member States is
beyond the scope of this paper, we illustrate them with the country’s contacts with Greece
and the UK.
3.2.2.4 Political relations visits with Greece:
? The President of the Hellenic Republic visited Croatia in May 2001, whilst President
Mesic of Croatia paid an official visit to Athens from 18- 20 November 2003.
? On 9 June 2004, Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis met with the Croatian Minister
for European Integration, Kolinda Grabac-Kitarovic on the sidelines of the Wilton
Park Ministerial meeting. The two sides exchanged views on Croatia’s European
prospects.
216 “Posjet Predsjednika RH Franscuskoj, Pariz, 11.-12. svibnja,“ Bulletin of the Ministry for European
Integration, no. 11, (2000),  http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/download/2002/08/28/May_June2000.pdf
217 Government, “Zagreb-Berlin relations always excellent, say Sanader, Schroeder,“ News, (2007),
http://www.vlada.hr/hr/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/najave/2007/travanj/zagreb_berlin_relations_always_excell
ent_say_sanader_schroeder.
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? The Greek Prime Minister met with his Croatian counterpart in Thessaloniki on 21
October 2004, on the occasion of the Congress of Orthodox Churches and the
Congress of European Peoples Parties.
? At the United Nations General Assembly, Greek Foreign Minister Molyviatis met
with the Croatian Foreign Minister.
? The Deputy Foreign Minister of Croatia, Biscevic, visited Athens on 3 February 2005
and met with Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis. Valinakis attended the
swearing-in ceremony of President Mesic in Zagreb on 18th February 2005.218
3.2.2.5 Political relations with the UK
? 18 July 2006 – Prime Minister Ivo Sanader met Prime Minister Tony Blair in London.
? 12 January 2006 – Chief Negotiator for the Accession of Croatia to the EU, Vladimir
Drobnjak met the Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander.
? 7-8 December 2005 - President Mesic attended a dinner organised by the East West
Institute, at which Tony Blair was honoured with the “Statesman of the Decade”
award, and met Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott.
? 29-30 November 2005 - President Mesic gave a lecture at the Oxford Union and met
the Lord Mayor of London, the President of the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), and other business leaders.
? 27 October 2005 – Prime Minster Ivo Sanader visited the UK to attend the EU
informal summit at Hampton Court Palace and met the Prime Minister.
? Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott visited Zagreb on 26 October 2005 and met
President Mesic and Prime Minister Sanader.
? 20-21 October 2005 - Neven Ljubicic, Minister of Health, attended the informal
Health Ministerial Conference in Chandler's Cross, Hertfordshire and met the Health
Secretary, Patricia Hewitt.
? 9-12 September 2005 - Petar Cobankovic, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry,
attended the Agriculture and Environment Informal Ministerial summit of the EU
Agriculture and Environment Ministers in London and met the Environment
Secretary, Margaret Beckett.
218 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Greece in the World, Bilateral Relations between Greece and Croatia, Ministry of
Foreign  Affairs. http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-
Eastern+Europe/Balkans/Bilateral+Relations/Croatia/.
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? 8-9 September 2005 - Vesna Skare Ozbolt, Minister of Justice, and Ivica Kirin,
Minister of Interior, attended the Justice and Home Affairs Informal Ministerial
summit of the EU Justice and Interior Ministers in Newcastle and met the Home
Secretary, Charles Clarke.
? 1-2 September 2005 - Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic, Minister for European Integration,
visited the UK for the Gymnich Informal Ministerial summit of the EU Foreign
Ministers in Newport and met the Foreign Secretary.
? 10-14 July 2005 - A Parliamentary Delegation from Croatia visited the UK and met
Douglas Alexander MP, Minister for Europe.
? 22-24 June 2005 - Filip Dragovic, Assistant Minister for European Integration and
Peacekeeping Operations.
? 20-23 June 2004 – Vladimir Seks, Speaker of the Croatian Parliament, visited the UK
on  the  invitation  of  the  Rt  Hon  Michael  Martin  MP  and  met  the  Political  Director,
House of Lords committee members and Scottish parliament members.
? 7 June 2004 – Miomir Zuzul, Foreign Minister (HDZ), visited the UK and met with
Denis MacShane MP, Minister for Europe.
? 10-12 May 2004 – Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic, Minister for European Integration,
visited  the  UK and  met  Denis  MacShane  MP,  Minister  for  Europe  and  Sir  Stephen
Wall. She also spoke at a Chatham House event on “Croatia and the EU in light of the
European Commission's Opinion”.
? Minister for Europe MacShane visited Zagreb on 19-20 April 2004 and met President
Mesic, Prime Minister Sanader, Foreign Minister Miomir Zuzul, and Minister for
European Integration Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic.
? 11 February 2004 – Miomir Zuzul, Foreign Minister (HDZ), visited the UK and met
the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and Denis MacShane MP, Minister for
Europe.219
3.2.2.6 Diplomatic relations with EU
The EU Member States were the first ones with which Croatia established diplomatic
relations. Diplomatic relations with Austria and Germany were established on 15 January
219 Country profiles, “Country profile: Croatia,“ Foreign and commonwealth office,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=10070293943
65&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019233785159.
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1992, the day Croatia was recognised as a sovereign state. By the end of March 1992, Croatia
established relations with Italy, Hungary, Denmark, Portugal, Liechtenstein, Slovenia, the
Netherlands, Latvia, Finland, Estonia, Spain, Belgium, and Lithuania. Within a year,
diplomatic relations were established with Poland, France, Luxemburg, the United Kingdom,
Iceland, Malta, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. Within 2 years diplomatic relations were
established with all present Member States, Cyprus being the last one on 4 February 1993. 220
All but three (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) EU Member States have established an
embassy in Zagreb. Some of them also have general consulates (e.g. Italy has consulates in
Rijeka and Split), and honorary consulates (e.g. Austria in Dubrovnik, Pula, Rijeka and
Dubrovnik). Croatia has diplomatic missions in 23 EU Member States (except in Malta,
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia).
Diplomatic relations between Croatia and the EC were established in March 2000,
when the  EC Delegation replaced the former Office of the EC. Per Vinther, former Special
Envoy of the EC, was appointed Head of the EC Delegation to the Republic of Croatia. 221
In 2001, the general representation of Croatia in the institutions of the European
Communities and its Member States was established222, and in 2002, a Permanent Mission of
the Republic of Croatia was set up to the European Communities. The importance of the
diplomatic relations with the EC was also demonstrated in 2001, when Per Vinther was
decorated for fostering political dialogue between Croatia and the EC223. President Mesi? also
decorated Jacques Wunenburger, the next chief of the Delegation of the European
Commission to Croatia, for his contribution to the institutionalisation of the relations between
Croatia and the European Commission. 224 President Stjepan Mesic also decorated Schroeder
for his contribution to the promotion of bilateral relations and the support to Croatia in its
Euro-Atlantic integration.225
220 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Croatia.
221 “Opening of the European Commission's Delegation in Zagreb, 9 March,“ Bulletin of the Ministry for
European Integration, no. 19, (2000),  http://www.mvpei.hr/ei/download/2002/08/28/March_April_2000.pdf.
222 “Odluka o osnivanju Op?eg predstavništva Republike Hrvatske pri institucijama i zemljama Europske
zajednice,“ Official Gazette, no. 22 (1991), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/1991/0664.htm.
223  “Decision on decoration of Per Vinther, Ambassador, Chiev of the Mission of the European Commission to
the Republic Croatia,” Official Gazette, no. 83 (2001), http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2001/1419.htm.
224  “Decision on decoration of  Jacques Wunenburger, Chief of Delegation of the European Union to the
Republic Croatia,” Official Gazette, no. 84 (2005)  http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/1615.htm.
225 Government, “Zagreb-Berlin relations always excellent, say Sanader, Schroeder,“ News, (2007),
http://www.vlada.hr/hr/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/najave/2007/travanj/zagreb_berlin_relations_always_excell
ent_say_sanader_schroeder.
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3.2.2.7 Parliamentary contacts
As with the governmental relations, parliamentary contacts have also intensified since 2000.
Doris Pack, Head of the European Parliament Committee for Southeast Europe visited
Zagreb on 17 March 2000.
The Stability Pact Parliamentary Summit held in September 2000 gathered
delegations of 39 countries and six international organisations, i.e. parliamentary assemblies.
Zlatko Tom???, President of the Croatian National Parliament, hosted the meeting. Prime
Minister Ivica Ra?an, Bodo Hombach, Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact, Adrian
Severin,  President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, and Lord Russel Johnston,
President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, addressed the gathering.
The main topics of the Zagreb Summit were expanding co-operation among countries, in
particular among the Parliaments of the Pact participating countries, as well as how to
increase  the  level  of  respect  for  human  rights  in  the  context  of  the  Euro-Atlantic
integration.226 Visits gradually intensified, and following the entry into force of the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, political dialogue was created in the framework of
the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee.
Since Croatia became an EU candidate country in June 2004, Croatian
parliamentarians have also been actively participating in inter-parliamentary activities in the
framework of the European Parliament, the national parliaments of the EU Member States,
and candidate countries. The most significant activities include the Conference of the
Presidents  of  the  Parliaments  of  the  EU Member  States,  the  Conference  of  the  Community
and European Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the European Union, and the
meetings  of  the  chairpersons  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committees  of  the  EU Member  States.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee, established under the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement, has had meetings every six months since March 2004.
3.2.2.8 NGO contacts
The  strengthening  of  civil  society  and  the  reinforcement  of  the  rule  of  law  are  crucial  for
building a functioning democracy. The EU has been providing support to NGOs that promote
226 “Stability Pact Parliamentary Summit, Zagreb,11-13 September,“ Bulletin of the Ministry for European
Integration, no. 12, (2000),  http://www.mvpei.hr/view1/download/2002/08/28/September_October_2000.pdf
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democratisation since 1999, when the European Commission provided financial support to
two Croatian NGOs (Glas and GONG) for election-related activities in the framework of the
Programme for democratisation.227
One of the very first awareness-raising activities on the role of NGOs in the process of
European integration was the international seminar “NGOs and public administration:
perspectives  of  partnership  in  the  Process  of  European  Integration“,  held  in  Zagreb  in  June
2001. The seminar brought together more than 120 participants, including Croatian NGOs,
representatives  of  the  EU  institutions,  European  NGO  networks  and  NGOs  from  the
candidate countries.228  Later that same year (in October 2001) the founding of the National
Foundation for Civil Society Development was initiated. In 2003, the Croatian parliament
enacted the Law on the National Foundation for Civil Society Development. The Foundation
invested significant effort in the establishment of relations with international partners.229
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) created the Western Balkans
Contact Group in 2004, which participated in the preparation of an exploratory opinion
requested  by  the  European  Commission  on  the  situation  of  the  civil  society  in  the  Western
Balkans.230
The National Foundation and ECAS organised the international conference “The EU
and Croatia: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue” in Zagreb 231 (on 30 September 2005).
The conference raised the issue of the establishment of the EU-Croatia Civil Society
Consultative Committee, just like in other candidate countries. On the basis of the conference
conclusions  and  the  foundation’s  initiative,  at  the  78th  session  of  the  Economic  and  Social
Committee held on 1 December 2005, the Council adopted a conclusion supporting the
initiative to establish a joint consultative committee between the Republic of Croatia and the
227 The budget of the democratisation programme for NGOs in the field of democratisation, human and civil
rights in 1999-2000 was 450,000 EUR , and the two Croatian projects received a support of EUR 45,000 each.
Croatian television news, http://vijesti.hrt.hr/arhiv/99/12/08/KRV.html.
228 Igor Vida?ak (ed.), NGOs and Public Administration: Perspectives of Partnership in the Process of European
Integration, Zagreb, 2001.
229 The partners of the National Foundation are the government of the Republic of Croatia,the  Delegation of the
European Commission in the Republic of Croatia, the USAID -US Agency for International Development, the
UNDP – United Nations Development Program, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the National Foundation
for Civil Society Development, Annual Report for 2004
230 European Economic and Social Committee, “EESC supports the development of social and civil dialogue in
the Western Balkans,“ Press Release, no. 31 (2006),
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/activities/press/cp/docs/2006/cp_eesc_031_2006_en.doc
231  “Civil society and EU. International Conference - EU and Croatia: Strengthening Civil Society Dialogue
held in Zagreb,“ National Foundation for Civil Society development,
http://zaklada.civilnodrustvo.hr/index.php?d=165&p=eng_civilno_drustvo_i_eu&s=80
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European  Social  and  Economic  Committee.  The  government  of  the  Republic  of  Croatia
forwarded to the Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Croatia and to
the European Economic and Social Committee a request to establish a Joint Consultative
Committee between the Republic of Croatia and the European Social and Economic
Committee as soon as possible.
In October 2006, an agreement was reached between the EESC and Croatian civil
society organizations to establish a joint body named EU-Croatia Civil Society Follow-up
Committee.  This  Committee  has  the  same  goals  as  the  similar  joint  advisory  boards  and
committees established with the other EU candidate countries (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania,
Turkey).  The  Follow-up  Committee,  with  members  from  the  EESC  and  the  Croatian  civil
society, provides an opportunity to the civil sector to participate more actively in the
Stabilization and Association Process, and it should contribute to Croatia’s progress in the
process of the EU accession.232
It is expected that the second Western Balkans Civil Society Forum, planned for 2008,
will review the development of the situation in the region and the co-operation between the
ESSC and the Western Balkans civil society organisations.
3.2.3 Negotiations, EU-level agreement
3.2.3.1 Contractual relations
Croatia started negotiating a cooperation agreement in 1995, but negotiations were
suspended.
Contractual relations began with the signature of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement  (SAA)  in  2001.  The  negotiations  with  the  European  Union  on  the  Stabilisation
and Association Agreement were opened on 24 November 2000 at the Zagreb Summit. The
agreement was signed less than a year later, on 29 October 2001, and it entered into force on
1 February 2005. From January 2002, until the entry into force of the SAA, an Interim
Agreement on trade and trade-related matters was applied.
Similarly to the Europe Agreements with previous candidate countries, the SAA
provides  the  contractual  framework  for  the  relations  between  the  EU  and  Croatia  until  the
accession. It covers political dialogue, regional co-operation, the four freedoms, the creation
232 OneWorld Southeast Europe, “EESC and Croatian CSOs Establish Joint Body,“ SEE Portal.
http://see.oneworld.net/article/view/140913/1//
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of a free trade area by 2007 for industrial products and most agricultural products, the
approximation of the legislation of Croatia to the EU acquis, including precise rules in fields
such as competition, intellectual property rights and public procurement, and wide-ranging
co-operation in all the areas of EU policies, including in the area of justice, freedom and
security. The full implementation of the SAA should help Croatia in its preparations for the
EU membership.  Conversely,  progress as regards the EU integration will  also be dependent
on Croatia’s fulfilment of its commitments under the SAA.
3.2.3.2 Negotiations with the EU
The  European  Council  of  June  2004  granted  Croatia  the  status  of  candidate  country.  The
negotiations with the EU cover 35 chapters of the acquis, 4 more than in the fifth
enlargement. The most difficult chapters were divided into separate chapters for easier
negotiation, and some easier chapters were united, moving some policies between chapters,
as well as renaming a few of them in the process.
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Table 3.3 Correspondence between the chapters of the 5th and the 6th Enlargement
5th Enlargement 6th Enlargement
1. Free movement of goods
1. Free movement of goods
7. Intellectual property law
2. Freedom of movement for workers
2. Free movement of persons
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3. Freedom to provide services
9. Financial services
4. Free movement of capital 4. Free movement of capital
5. Company law 6. Company law
8. Competition policy
6. Competition policy
5. Public procurement
11. Agriculture and rural development
7. Agriculture
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
8. Fisheries 13. Fisheries
14. Transport policy
9. Transport policy
21. Trans-European networks (one half of it)
10. Taxation 16. Taxation
11. Economic and Monetary Union 17. Economic and monetary policy
12. Statistics 18. Statistics
19. Social policy and employment
13. Social policy and employment
(including anti-discrimination and equal opportunities for women
and men)
15. Energy
14. Energy
21. Trans-European networks (one half of it)
15. Industrial policy
16. Small and medium-sized enterprises
20. Enterprise and industrial policy
17. Science and research 25. Science and research
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18. Education and training 26. Education and culture
19. Telecommunication and information technologies
20. Culture and audio-visual policy
10. Information society and media
21. Regional policy and coordination of structural
instruments
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
22. Environment 27. Environment
23. Consumer and health protection 28. Consumer and health protection
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights
24. Cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs
24. Justice, freedom and security
25. Customs union 29. Customs union
26. External relations 30. External relations
27. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 31. Foreign, security and defence policy
28. Financial control 32. Financial control
29. Financial and budgetary provisions 33. Financial and budgetary provisions
30. Institutions 34. Institutions
31. Others 35. Other issues
Source: Acquis Communautaire, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis#Chapters_of_the_Acquis
The  accession  negotiations  with  Croatia  were  opened  in  October  2005,  with  the  screening
stage. Following the conclusion of the screening process in October 2006, all 33 screening
reports were submitted by the Commission to the Council. So far (as of January 2008),
negotiations have been opened on sixteen chapters233 and provisionally closed on two
(science and research, education and culture). On eleven chapters, opening benchmarks were
agreed on by the Council and communicated to Croatia.234 In the Progress Report 2007, the
Commission considered only the opening benchmark on justice, freedom and security to have
233 These are: science and research, education and culture, economic and monetary policy, industrial policy,
customs, intellectual property rights, services, company law, statistics, financial services, financial control,
information society and media, consumer and health protection, external relations, trans-European networks and
financial and budgetary provisions.
234  I.e. public procurement; competition policy; justice, freedom and security; social policy/employment;
capital; goods; agriculture; environment; food safety; regional policy, judiciary and fundamental rights
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been  met.  The  application  of  the  Ecological  and  Fisheries  Protection  Zone  to  EU  Member
States, which started on 1 January 2008, slowed down the negotiations.
In January 2008, Austrian Socialist MEP Hannes Swoboda, who is in charge of the
Croatian dossier in the European Parliament, called on the country to speed up its reforms in
order to complete negotiations by 2009, or face delay in the EU membership. He also warned
that if the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone was not solved, Slovenia, which currently
holds the EU presidency, would not open the fisheries chapter of Croatia's negotiations
package. In February 2008, Commissioner Olli Rehn indicated that 2008 can be a decisive
year for Croatia's accession negotiations, if the country makes substantial progress in the
judicial and administrative reforms, fighting corruption and restructuring the shipbuilding
sector. He also indicated that Croatia needs to settle the Ecological and Fisheries Protection
Zone issue and that the application of the Zone presents an obstacle for  Croatia's accession
negotiations.
The repeated warnings from the EU that the application of the Zone would have
negative consequences for Croatia's ambitions to join the EU have led to a change in
Croatia’s position towards the Zone. Initially, the official position of the new Croatian
government and President Mesic was that additional effort should be put on finding a suitable
solution for all sides, but without questioning the Croatian legal right to regulate this issue in
the  first  place.  As  the  negotiations  did  not  proceed  after  the  Zone  entered  into  force,  the
dilemma of either the EU or the Zone emerged. As the Prime Minister and the government
believe that that priority should be given to the completion of the EU accession talks by mid-
2009, the Croatian parliament gave up the full implementation of the Ecological and Fisheries
Protection Zone in March 2008.235 The decision will remain in force until an agreement is
reached in the European spirit.
Immediately after this decision, the Commission’s President Barosso announced that
Croatia  should  be  able  to  conclude  EU membership  talks  by  the  end  of  the  mandate  of  the
Commission (November 2009), provided a number of conditions are met by Croatia. He also
announced  that the 2008 Enlargement package (which is to be published in the autumn of
2008) will contain an indicative timetable for the technical conclusion of the negotiations in
2009.236
235 Croatian Parliament, 13 March 2008.
236 Speaking points of Commission President José Manuel Barroso, following his meeting with Croatian Prime
Minister Ivo Sanader, available from
http://www.vlada.hr/en/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2008/ozujak/predsjednik_vlade_s_predsjednikom_europsk
e_komisije_barrosom, accessed on 1 April 2008
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Table 3.4 The progress of the negotiations
Acquis chapter Negotiation status Alignment
progress
Comments/benchmarks
1. Free Movement of Goods Finished screenings very hard to adopt 3 opening benchmarks defined
2. Freedom of Movement for Workers Finished screening very hard to adopt EU’s common position is being
prepared
3. Right of Establishment & Freedom to
provide Services
open chapter very hard to adopt 6 closing benchmarks defined
4. Free Movement of Capital Finished screening Considerable
efforts needed
2 opening benchmarks defined
5. Public Procurement Finished screenings very hard to adopt 2 opening benchmarks defined
6. Company Law open chapter Considerable
efforts needed
4 closing benchmarks defined
7. Intellectual Property Law open chapter 2 closing benchmarks defined
8. Competition Policy finished screening very hard to adopt 4 opening benchmarks defined
9. Financial Services open chapter very hard to adopt 5 closing benchmarks defined
10. Information Society & Media open chapter Considerable
effort needed
3 closing benchmarks defined
11. Agriculture & Rural Development finished screening very hard to adopt 1 opening benchmark defined
12. Food safety, Veterinary &
Phytosanitary Policy
finished screening very hard to adopt 4 opening benchmarks defined
13. Fisheries finished screening Considerable
effort needed
14. Transport Policy finished screening Considerable
effort needed
the EU is preparing its common
position
15. Energy finished screening Considerable
effort needed
the EU is preparing its common
position
16. Taxation finished screening very hard to adopt Croatia is preparing its
negotiating position
17. Economic & Monetary Policy open chapter 1 closing benchmark defined
18. Statistics open chapter 2 closing benchmarks defined
19. Social Policy & Employment finished screening very hard to adopt 1 opening benchmark defined
20. Enterprise & Industrial Policy open chapter 1 closing benchmark defined
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21. Trans-European Networks Open chapter 1 closing benchmark defined
22. Regional Policy & Coordination of
Structural Instruments
finished screening very hard to adopt 1 opening benchmark defined
23. Judiciary & Fundamental Rights finished screening very hard to adopt 3 opening benchmarks defined
24. Justice, Freedom & Security finished screening very hard to adopt 1 opening  benchmark defined
25. Science & Research Provisionally closed
chapter
26. Education & Culture Provisionally closed
chapter
27. Environment finished screening situation totally
incompatible with
the EU acquis
1 opening benchmark defined
28. Consumer & Health Protection open chapter C 4 closing benchmarks defined
29. Customs Union open chapter C 3 closing benchmarks defined
30. External Relations Open chapter No major
difficulties
expected
1 closing benchmark defined
31. Foreign, Security & Defence Policy Open chapter No major
difficulties
expected
32. Financial Control open chapter Considerable
efforts needed
5 closing benchmarks defined
33. Financial & Budgetary Provisions finished screening No major
difficulties
expected
1 closing benchmark defined
34. Institutions - Non-acquis
chapter, nothing
to adopt
35. Other Issues - Non-acquis
chapter, nothing
to adopt
3.2.4 The positions of the EU Member States
The application of the EU conditionality differs among the EU member states. At the time of
Croatia's application to the European Union, three EU countries were yet to ratify the
Stabilization and Association Agreement: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy. In
233
2002, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands had halted the ratification process because of
the Croatian government's handling of the Bobetko case.237. Italy was rather slow because of
issues relating to the bilateral property and minority rights (See more on this issue in Section
2.4.3). On the other hand, Austria strongly supported the opening of negotiations with Croatia
in 2005.
As regards the neighbouring EU Member States, there are several issues to be fully
resolved with Slovenia and Italy. Slovenia and Italy are both strongly opposing the
application of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone in the Adriatic, and there are also
several problematic bilateral issues with these two countries.
3.2.4.1 The Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone
Slovenia and Italy are disputing Croatia's decision to extend its territorial jurisdiction in the
Adriatic Sea.  In 2002, Croatia intended to proclaim its  right to an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) in the Adriatic. Although Slovenia has only forty-seven kilometres of coastline, access
to  international  waters  has  symbolic  significance  for  the  country,  and  thus,  the  decision  by
Croatia was met with a diplomatic offensive from Ljubljana, which raised the matter with EU
officials and with member-state embassies and even briefly recalled its ambassador in Zagreb
'for  consultations’,  only  to  send  him back  as  a  gesture  of  goodwill.  Instead  of  an  exclusive
economic zone, the Croatian parliament proclaimed a somewhat ambiguous “Ecological and
Fisheries Protection Zone”. This policy has been in place since late 2004, but it excludes the
EU countries (namely, Slovenia and Italy).
The Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone was formally activated on 1 January
2008, which has raised the matter to the EU level. Slovenia, holding the EU presidency,
required that Croatia immediately abolish the Zone. Despite the fact that the Ecological and
Fisheries  Protection  Zone  should  apply  to  Croatia  and  the  EU  Member  States  equally,  the
Council called on Croatia not to apply any aspect of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection
237 In 2002, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia  indicted general Bobetko, as the
supreme commanding officer, for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war during
Operation Medak pocket in 1993.  Bobetko refused to accept the indictment and surrender to the court, claiming
that such an indictment questions the legitimacy of the whole military operation. The crisis stretched out, as
popular opinion agreed with Bobetko, and the government was slow to reach a decision regarding his
extradiction. At that time, Bobetko was already gravely ill, and he died in 2003 before any final decision was
reached regarding his extradition.
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Zone  to  the  EU Member  States. 238 Dimitrije Rupel, Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs
indicated that the application of the Zone could block the accession negotiations with Croatia
in 5-6 chapters.239 The European Parliament and the Council called on Croatia to suspend the
application of the Zone, since it represented an obstacle for  Croatia's accession negotiations.
The repeated warnings from the EU that the application of the Zone would have
negative consequences for Croatia's ambitions to join the EU have led to a change of
Croatia's position towards the Zone. Initially, the official position of the new Croatian
government and President Mesic was that additional effort should be put into finding a
suitable solution for all sides, but without questioning the Croatian legal right to regulate this
issue in the first place. As the Prime Minister and the government consider that priority
should be given to the completion of EU accession talks by mid-2009, the Croatian
parliament gave up the full implementation of an Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone in
March 2008.240
3.2.4.2 Other open issues with Slovenia
In addition to the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, which is currently (in January
2008) very high on the agenda, there are several additional issues that have yet to be fully
resolved: border disagreement; property rights, and Croatian depositors' savings in
Ljubljanska banka from the SFRY times.
Until 2001, the open issues with Slovenia (including borders, the savings in
Ljubljanska banka, and NPP Krško) were considered as technical, negotiated by expert
groups.  As  regards  NPP  Krško,  the  governments  of  Slovenia  and  Croatia  appointed  two
expert groups to prepare a bilateral agreement on its status in 1998. Most of the issues were
solved by an agreement ratified by both parliaments in 2002. The most challenging issue
concerns the financial status of both parties, resulting from the period 1983-97, during which
Slovenia did not provide electricity to Croatia from NPP Krško.241
The  border  disputes  include   the  maritime  border  in  Piran  Bay,  a  small  number  of
pockets of land on the right-hand side of the river Dragonja in the Istria, the area  around the
238 PRESS RELEASE, 2839th Council meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, GENERAL AFFAIRS,
Brussels, 10 December 2007,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/97555.pdf
239 Lada Stipi? Niseteo, Voice of America, 11 December 2007
240 Croatian Parliament, 13 March 2008.
241 Slovenian Presidency of the EU 2008. http://www.gov.si/ursjv/en/akt_dog/8_11.php
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peak of the Žumberak/Gorjanci mountain, which  is assigned partly to Slovenia (the Trdinov
vrh area) and partly to Croatia (the Sveta Gera area).  Despite the fact  that  the Croatian and
Slovenian governments have reached a number of agreements, such as an understanding to
avoid future incidents in the contested Bay of Piran, which was reached at a joint session on
the Croatian island of Brijuni in early June 2005, a series of disputes could yet threaten
Slovenia's support for Croatia's accession.242 Croatian depositors' savings in Ljubljanska
banka from the SFRY times is related to the loss of the savings deposited in the Zagreb
branch of the former Ljubljanska bank.
3.2.4.3 Open issues with Italy
Croatia and Italy were debating bilateral property and ethnic minority rights issues stemming
from border changes after World War II. At the moment, the key issue in bilateral relations,
like with Slovenia, is the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone.
As regards bilateral property and minority rights, there were a number of Italian
citizens who had been citizens of Yugoslavia before they were exiled shortly after World War
II - known as the esuli (exiles) or optanti (volunteers). A later contract between SFR
Yugoslavia and Italy prevented the restitution of their property, since a deal was made that
made this seized property treated as war reparations. Still, there were people who were exiled
during a period that was not covered by the aforementioned agreement, who demanded that
their  property  be  returned,  and  those  who were  exiled  and  wanted  to  buy  real-estate  in  the
same areas.
Neither of these groups was allowed to pursue these actions legally in Croatia, and so
they were dissatisfied with the situation.  The free acquisition of real estate by foreigners is a
sensitive issue in Croatia. Numerous Italian politicians have expressed their discontent
concerning the current inability of Italians to purchase land in Croatia, considering it
discriminatory treatment, and stating that this issue should be resolved as soon as possible.
Croatia has denied discrimination, indicating that the Croatian legislation provides for
the same treatment of all EU citizens concerning this issue. In mid-2006, Croatia and Italy
reached an agreement, and now Italian citizens may purchase land in Croatia, and Croatian
citizens may purchase land in Italy.
242 Radio Free Europe, Slovenia/Croatia: A New Dispute In Bilateral Relations?, 20 July 2005.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/f6443c62-4eb8-480a-8303-7ac8cad50696.html
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3.3 Economic relations
3.3.1 Trade regime
Croatia has been taking advantage of the autonomous trade preferences which the EU has
been granting to it since 1993, on the basis of the earlier Trade and Economic Cooperation
Agreement with the former Yugoslavia. These preferences belonged to the most favoured
group and carried an exceptionally strong economic impact, enabling Croatian goods to be
price-competitive on the EU market. However, without permanent institutional links, they
could not warrant the long-term preferential treatment of Croatia by the European Union.243
Since November 2000, Croatia has benefited from the same regime granted
unilaterally by the European Union to the countries of the Stabilisation and Association
Process. In October 2001, the European Union and Croatia signed a Stabilization and
Association Agreement (SAA). Related to the SAA, an Interim Agreement concerning trade
and transport became effective on January 1, 2002. This agreement includes the Autonomous
Trade Preferences that the EU previously extended to Croatia, providing all Croatian
industrial and most agricultural products with free access to the EU market. On January 1,
2002,  Croatia  also  started  to  gradually  extend  tariff  preferences  to  the  EU,  providing  free
access  to  70%  of  the  value  of  the  EU  industrial  and  agricultural  products  exported  to  the
Croatian market. Croatia’s formal application for EU membership has been accepted, and
Croatia is now working diligently on the accession negotiations (which started on October 4,
2005) and on adjusting its entire legislative and administrative system to the EU
requirements.244
3.3.2 Foreign trade with the EU
3.3.2.1 The development of trade since 1990: Volume, dynamics, balance
The EU is Croatia’s most important trade partner – 66% of the total foreign trade of the
Republic of Croatia is with EU Member States245. During the transition period (1993-2001),
243 Višnja Samardžija, Mladen Stani??? and Gorazd Niki?, ed., Croatia and the EU: Costs and benefits of
Integration  (Zagreb: IMO, 2000), 210.
244 Trade Regulations and Standards, “CCG - Trade Regulations, Customs and Standards,”
http://www.buyusa.gov/croatia/en/traderegulations.html#_section20
245 Based on data for 2006.
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246  the share of the imports from Croatia in the total  EU-15 imports fell  from 0.4 to 0.2%.
The value of exports to the EU rose by 13.6%, while that of the imports almost doubled,
which led to a rise in the bilateral trade deficit.247 The share of imports from Croatia in the
total EU-25 imports reached 0.4% in 2006.
Table 3.5 The developments of the Croatian exports and imports
Total
exports,
million
USD
Total
imports,
million
USD
Total
trade,
million
USD
Exports to
the EU,
million
USD*
Imports
form the
EU,
million
USD*
Total
trade with
the EU;
million
USD*
Share of
imports
EU/total,
%*
Share of
exports/total,
%
Share of
trade,
%
1992 4.6 4.5 9.1 2 1.8 3.8 40 43.5 41.8
1993 3.9 4.7 8.6 2.2 2.6 4.8 55.3 56.4 55.8
1994 4.3 5.2 9.5 2.5 3.1 5.6 59.6 58.1 58.9
1995 4.6 7.5 12.1 2.7 4.7 7.4 62.7 58.7 61.2
1996 4.5 7.8 12.3 2.6 4.6 7.2 59 57.8 58.5
1997 4.2 9.1 13.3 2.1 5.4 7.5 59.3 50 56.4
1998 4.5 8.4 12.9 2.2 4.9 7.1 58.3 48.9 55
1999 4.3 7.8 12.1 2.1 4.4 6.5 56.4 48.8 53.7
2000 4.6 7.8 12.4 2.2 4.4 6.6 56.4 47.8 53.2
2001 4.6 8.4 13 2.5 4.7 7.2 56 54.3 55.4
2002 4.9 10.7 15.6 3.2 7.6 10.8 71 65.3 69.2
2003 6.1 14.2 20.3 4.2 10.2 14.4 71.8 68.9 70.9
2004 8 16.6 24.6 5.2 11.5 16.7 69.3 65 67.9
2005 8.7 18.5 27.2 5.4 12.2 17.6 65.9 62.1 64.7
2006 10.3 21.5 31.8 6.6 14 20.6 65.1 64.1 64.8
*methodological note: the EU denotes EU-15 for 1992- 2001 and EU-25 from 2002
Source: Central Statistics Bureau
The rise of the EU's share after 2002 (from 55% to 69% in total trade, 56% to 71% in imports
and 54 to 69% in exports) is the result of the change of the statistical set. The data from 2002
relate  to  the  EU-25,  while  the  earlier  relate  to  the  EU-15.  As  a  share  of  the  trade  with  the
CEFTA members was roughly 14% in 2001, the enlargement reflected this change (See more
detail in Section 3.1.3.)
246 As Croatia gained independence in 1992, here we present data from this year onwards. For more about the
trade relations of Croatia in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, see Stjepan Zduni?, “Central Europe and
Croatian foreign Trade Policy,” Croatian Economic Survey, no. 2 (December 15, 1994),
http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=toc&id_broj=651
247 However, some analyses show that trade links were not stopped but diverted, which is beyond the scope of
this study.
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Figure 3.2 The development of exports, imports and the trade balance
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Table 3.6 The development of the trade balance, million USD
Share
of
trade
Trade
deficit,
total
Trade
deficit, EU
1992 41.8 0.1 0.2
1993 55.8 -0.8 -0.4
1994 58.9 -0.9 -0.6
1995 61.2 -2.9 -2
1996 58.5 -3.3 -2
1997 56.4 -4.9 -3.3
1998 55 -3.9 -2.7
1999 53.7 -3.5 -2.3
2000 53.2 -3.2 -2.2
2001 55.4 -3.8 -2.2
2002 69.2 -5.8 -4.4
2003 70.9 -8.1 -6
2004 67.9 -8.6 -6.3
2005 64.7 -9.8 -6.8
2006 64.8 -11.2 -7.4
Source: Central Statistic Bureau
During the transition period (1993-99), the share of Croatian products on the EU market was
decreasing, while that of Central and Eastern European Countries (at the time applicants, now
new Member States) mainly increased their shares on the EU market.
This may have reflected a slower pace in the restructuring of the Croatian economy as
a whole, compared with other transition economies. The slow and inefficient restructuring
have impeded the adaptation of the Croatian products to the demand in industrial countries,
which has resulted in increasing the trade deficit. The relative trade deficit (41.5% in 2000)
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was greater than in any of the candidate countries, and it was comparable with that in BiH
and Albania.
In spite of the decrease and stagnation of the total exports to the EU and the decrease
of the market share until 2001, the EU has remained the most important market for Croatian
products. Until the fifth enlargement, roughly 50% of the total Croatian exports were to the
EU, while the countries of South Eastern Europe absorbed 16.5 % of the Croatian exports and
CEFTA states took 13%248.
Following the fifth enlargement, trade with the EU means trade with 25 countries
instead of 15. For Croatia, the impact of the enlargement from EU-15 to EU-25 was an
increase  in  the  proportion  of  its  trade  with  the  EU  from  under  60  to  over  70%  of  its  total
trade. The enlargement also caused a 10% increase of intra-EU trade and a 9% decrease of
the extra-EU trade.249
3.3.2.2 Products and partners
The structure of the Croatian exports during the transition period remained unchanged.
Sensitive sectors (agriculture, textile, footwear, iron and steel, wood) accounted for roughly
50% of the total  exports to the EU. The main import  products included vehicles (combined
nomenclature, or CN code 87), boilers, machinery, reactors (84), electrical and electronic
equipment (85), ships, boats and other floating structures (89), plastics and articles thereof
(39), mineral fuels (27), paper and paperboard (48), articles of iron or steel (73), organic
chemicals (29), pharmaceutical products (30).
The enlargement did not change the basic trade structure with the EU (the nature of
the goods traded). The most important export products to the EU-15, identified at the level of
the 98 products according to the two-digit combined nomenclature that denotes the statistical
classification of the EU, were ships, clothing, electrical appliances and wood and wooden
products. Exports were highly dependent on ten products categories, which accounted for
around 70% of the total Croatian exports to the EU-15. The import structure was more
248 Ana-Maria Boromisa, “The First Round of Eastern Enlargement of the EU – Possible Implications for
Croatian Trade” (paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of the European Trade Study Group, Brussels,
Belgium, 2001), http://www.imo.hr/europa/publics/euroreport/boromisa-paper.doc
249 C.f. Ana-Maria Boromisa, “What does enlargement of the EU mean for Croatia,“ in Croatian accession to
the European Union, the challenges of negotations, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institue for Public Finances :
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005), 31-60,
http://www.fes.hr/E-books/pdf/Croatian%20accession%20to%20EU_3td/02_0.pdf
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diversified, and the 10 most important import products accounted for around 60% of the total
imports. 250
Following the enlargement, the export structure to the EU-25 has not changed
significantly. The top ten export products according to the combined nomenclature have
remained the same, but their ranking has changed slightly. Export specialization has
decreased: instead of 71%, the top 10 products account for 67% of the total Croatian exports
to the enlarged EU. The import structure has changed less since the enlargement: the top 10
products now account for 58% of the total imports, as compared to the previous 61% of total
imports. The level of intra-industry trade between Croatia and EU has increased since the
enlargement, which implies a higher level at which the membership criteria are being met.
The  main  EU trading  partners  are  Italy  (20% of  the  total  trade),  Germany (15%),  Slovenia
(8%), Austria (7%), followed by France (4.5%) and Hungary (2.5).251
3.3.3 FDI from the EU
3.3.3.1 Foreign direct investments since 1990
The overall inflow of FDI in Croatia since mid-1990 until the end of 2006 reached EUR 14.2
billion or EUR 3,206 per capita. Croatia received EUR 2.8 billion during 2006. Some of the
largest FDI transactions took place in the last quarter of 2006 (e.g. initial public offering
regarding 15% of the stocks of the oil ad gas company INA,  the recapitalisation of foreign
owned banks).
250 These products are: vehicles (CN 87), boilers, machinery, reactors (84), electrical and electronic equipment
(85), ships, boats and other floating structures (89), plastics and articles thereof  (39), mineral fuels (27), paper
and paperboard (48), articles of iron or steel (73), organic chemicals (29), pharmaceutical products (30)
251 Data for 2003. The shares and ranking of Italy, Germany, Slovenia and Austria have been relatively stable.
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Figure 3.3 Foreign direct investments in Croatia from the EU Member States, 1993-
2000, million EUR
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Table 3.7 FDI from the EU, million EUR, 1993-2007 (the first three quarters of 2007)
FDI, million EUR
Austria 4,621.1
Netherlands 2,800.3
Germany 2,302.1
France 1,300.1
Hungary 1,008.0
Luxemburg 975.0
Italy 925.5
Slovenia 591.2
Belgium 406.8
UK 268.4
EBRD 257.4
Sweden 237.7
Denmark 84.3
Liechtenstein 68.4
Malta 67.0
Cyprus 55.8
Spain 43.9
Ireland 42.9
Slovakia 16.5
Czech Republic 15.0
Poland 11.2
Data source: Croatian National Bank
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3.3.3.2 The main sectors and employment effects
Inflows have been concentrated in a few sectors. Just five industries have received more than
65% of the overall amount of FDI inflows: financial intermediation (31.1%),
telecommunications (13.5%), chemical industry (14.0%), manufacture of coke and refined
petroleum products (4.7%) and gas and wholesale trade (4.1%). The uneven flow of FDI and
the dominance of brownfield investments underline the need for improvements in the
business and investment climate, or generally the need for structural reforms, which will
increase the competitiveness of the overall economy and its attractiveness for investors, in
particular foreign investors.252 The investments related to the restructuring of the industry,
such as those in the telecommunication sector, were also connected with the loss of
employment.
3.3.4 Labour migration to the EU since 1990
Despite the war and the transition, during the whole period since 1991, the number of
emigrants was smaller than that of immigrants.
Figure 3.4 Immigrants and emigrants in the working age population in the period of
1991–2005
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252 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU funds, Strategic Coherence Framework
2007-2013: Instrument for pre-accession assistance (Zagreb: Central Office for Development Strategy and
Coordination of EU funds, 2006), 16.
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The main target country was Germany, which absorbed 50% of the migration to Europe
(excluding ex-Yugoslavia) in the period of 1992-95. Austria (13%), Italy (3%), and Sweden
followed253.
In the period 1996-2000, the total number of emigrants to Europe (excluding ex-
Yugoslavia) decreased compared to 1991-95. In the period 1991-95 5,500 persons moved to
Europe (excluding ex-Yugoslavia), and in the period 1996-2000, 50% fewer people did so
(2,883). The main target country remained the same: Germany, Austria, Italy and Sweden,
but their shares changed to 60%, 18%, 4.5% and 2.7%, respectively.254
During 2001-05, the level of emigration to Europe (excluding ex-Yugoslavia)
remained stable, as did the shares of the main destination countries.
3.3.5 Infrastructure
Infrastructure development is of considerable significance for functioning energy and
telecommunications markets, and a prerequisite for the implementation of the environmental
policy. The alignment of policy instruments is a requirement for the EU integration, so
infrastructure can be regarded as a means and a precondition for the integration into the
EU.255
In Croatia, the infrastructure was seriously affected by war in the early 1990s. Direct
war damage included the destruction of the infrastructure, which severely impeded road and
rail  traffic  flow,  inland  navigation  and  energy  supply.  Significant  indirect  damage  was  also
caused by under-investment, and decreased transport volume.
The estimated war damage in the infrastructure and telecommunications is presented
in Table 3.8.
253 There was some more significant movement to Slovenia in 1991 and 1992, but Slovenia was not an EU
member state then. However, we present here the movements to Austria and Sweden, who joined the EU in the
mentioned period. Emigration to Sweden was at the level of Italy (3%).
254 Slovenia remained a significant target country. The migration to Slovenia was at the level of Austria. Source:
authors’ calculations based on the data of the State Bureau for Statistics.
255 C.f. Ana-Maria Boromisa, “Regional Cooperation, Coordination of National Policies and Alignment with
the EU- the case of infrastructure,” in Completing Eastern Enlargement: Effects on the Accession of Croatia
(Zagreb, 2007), 53-65.
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Table 3.8 War damage in the infrastructure and telecommunications
Type Damage (USD)
Rail Transport 353,000,000
Road Transport 351,000,000
Sea Transport 38,000,000
Inland Waterways 90,000,000
Air Traffic 94,000,000
Telecommunications and TV 528,000,000
Energy Networks 680,000,000
Oil pipelines 24,100,000
Water Supply 196,980,000
Total 2,355,080,000
Source: Procjena ratnih šteta u Hrvatskoj256
The  disruption  in  the  main  corridors  has  led  to  the  diversion  of  traffic  towards  other,  less
common routes. The priorities have also changed for political reasons: in Croatia priority is
given to V. pan-European corridor (north-east/south-west) instead of X. corridor (the former
“trans-Yugoslav” north-west/south-east).
3.3.5.1 Transport ties with Croatia’s neighbours and the EU
Since the 1990s, the EU has gone through extensive planning, resulting in the trans-European
transport networks (TEN-T). The World Bank’s analysis “The Road to Stability and
Prosperity in South East Europe” from March 2000 increased awareness about the need to
develop  a  regional  medium-term  approach  to  the  transport  infrastructure  in  the  SEE.257 In
addition, the “Western Balkan Transport Infrastructure Inventory“ financed by the EIB and
presented in July 2000 provided a systematic inventory of the basic transport network
elements in the region. This inventory was later used as a database for the development of the
transport network planning projects. The Commission’s paper “Transport and Energy
infrastructure  in  South  East  Europe”  and  the  assessment  of  the  needs  for  transport
256 (War damage estimate) for rail, road, sea transport, inland waterways and air traffic: Josip Kova?evi?  et al.,
Ratne štete i reparacije (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1993), 100; for telecommunications and TV: Josip Boži?evi?,
Ratna razaranja i štete u prometu i vezama Hrvatske (Zagreb: HAZU, 1992); energy and oil networks: Ministry
of Economy; water supply: Pavkovi?, Hrvatske ratne štete (Zagreb, 1997), available from
http://www.slobodanpraljak.com/materijali/PUBLIKACIJE%20O%20RATU/PROCJENA_RATNIH_STETA_
U_HRVATSKOJ/PROCJENA_RATNIH_STETA_U_HRVATSKOJ.pdf
257 The World Bank, The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South East Europe,
http://www.seerecon.org/region/documents/wb/wbrs/index.html
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infrastructure (the Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment - TINA) followed in 2001258,
while the EIB developed a Medium-Term Strategy for the Western Balkans in June 2003259.
In 2004, a  Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of the South East
Europe Core Regional Transport Network (Core Network) was signed by Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), and the
European Commission. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) provides for reciprocal
consultations on transport policy and for the institutional reforms needed to make investments
sustainable, and it opens the door to implementing a major infrastructure programme.
There is no regional structure for developing international transport. Based on the
MoU, the South East Transport Observatory (SEETO) was established. The SEETO
coordinates the development of the multi-annual plans for the development of the South East
Europe  core  regional  transport  (See  Tables  3.8  and  3.9.).   The  first  five-year  Plan  for  the
Development of the Core Network was published in 2006260, and updates for 2007-11, 2008-
12 are also available at  the SEETO web pages.261. The Core Network includes 4,300 km of
railways across the five SEE countries, 6,000 km of roads, major ports and airports, and the
inland waterways (the Danube and the Sava). The total cost of developing the Core Network
has been estimated at over EUR 16 billion. 17 priority projects have been identified. Among
these, three are in Croatia: (i) the rail track overhaul of the Savski Marof- Zagreb section, for
which the terms of references are being prepared; (ii) the transport and trade integration at
Port of Plo?e and (iii) the construction of international passenger terminal at the Port of
Dubrovnik. For both sea port projects, pre-feasibility studies are completed.262. Other projects
258 European Commission, Transport and Energy Infrastructure In South East Europe (Brussels, 2001).
http://www.seerecon.org/infrastructure/documents/ec_transport_energy_infrastructure_see.pdf
259 EIB, Medium-Term Strategy for the Western Balkans,
http://www.eib.org/lending/balkan/docs/balkan_strategy_en.pdf
260 SEETO, South East Europe Core Regional Network Development Plan, Five Year Multi-annual Plan 2006 to
2010,
http://www.seerecon.org/infrastructure/sectors/transport/documents/Seeto%20final%20unutra%201.pdf
261 SEETO, South-East Europe Transport Observatory, http://www.seetoint.org/site/documents.php
262 Other projects included in the plan are: the electrification of the railway section Beli Manastir–Vrpolje, the
track overhaul of the railway section Križevci-Botovo DG, the railway track overhaul of the railway section
Zagreb–Oštarije, the construction of a second rail track on 36 kms of the Dugo Selo-Krizevci section, the
modification of the electrical traction system on the rail line Moravice-Rijeka-Sapjane (Skriljevo-Bakar), track
reconstruction on the Kosovo (Knin)-Split section, the reconstruction of the stations on the rail line Ostarije-
Knin–Split, the construction of  a second rail track on the Hrvatski Leskovac-Karlovac section, the railway rail
track overhaul of the Ostarije-Ogulin (6.2 km) and the Skriljevo-Rijeka (11.4 km) sections, the rail track
overhaul of the Skrad-Drivenik (37.15 km) section, the construction of a second track on the section Zagreb-
V.Gorica, the remote rail control traffic system Savski Marof-Zagreb-Tovarnik, the rail track overhaul on the
Vinkovci-Tovarnik section; the project of optical telecommunication rail network (the whole core HŽ network);
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included in the Plan for the Development of the Core Network in Croatia include the
modernisation of airports, roads, railways and sea ports.
Figure 3.5 The Southeast Europe core rail and ports network
-
Source: MoU, 2001, Annex 1, available from
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/infrastructure/doc/2004_06_11_memorandum_annexe_1_a.pdf
the construction of the final phase of the container terminal Brajdica at the port of Rijeka; the construction of the
passenger terminal - domestic transport, the development of the operative coast Kantafig, the expansion of the
operative coast Gruž for the port of Dubrovnik. For more, see SEETO, South-East Europe Transport
Observatory: List of Projects for Country, http://www.seetoint.org/HRV/ProjectList.html
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Figure 3.6 The Southeast Europe core road and airport network
Source:  http://ec.europa.eu/ten/infrastructure/doc/2004_06_11_memorandum_annexe_1_b.pdf
3.3.5.2 Telecommunication ties with Croatia’s neighbours and the EU
Compared with the other countries in the SEE, the Croatian telecommunications sector is
very well developed.263 The improvement of the telecommunication network is included in
the South East Europe Core Regional Network Development Plan, as a project of the optical
telecommunication rail network (the whole core Croatian Railways network). The project has
started, and upon its completion, the optical telecommunication network will cover the rail
network and its interconnections with the neighbouring states.
In addition, it should be noted that Croatia follows and participates in some of the EU
initiatives for an information society. There is a special central government office for e-
Croatia (The Central Office for e-Croatia) that participates in the implementation of the
263 Cullen International. Report 4 – Country Comparative Report: Supply of services in monitoring of South East
Europe – telecommunications (2007)
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/internationalrel/docs/eu_enlargement/cullen_report4_compara
tive_final_nov_2007.pdf
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eEurope Action Plan (the COBRA recommendations) and in the preparation of the i2010
initiative. The Croatian government adopted the Strategy for the Development of Broadband
Internet  access  until  2008,  and  the  Action  Plan  for  the  Implementation  of  the  Strategy  for
2007.264 The Strategy aims at a 12-percent coverage of broadband access by the end of 2008.
This is in line with the EU objectives for broadband developments. Croatia also participated
in the Stability Pacts' Initiative for Electronic South East Europe, which promoted sustainable
investments in the ICT infrastructure. It is expected that some of these activities will continue
under the Regional Cooperation Council and the signed Memorandum of Understanding on
the development of a unified market of broadband networks that is fully interconnected with
the European and global networks. By signing this MoU, Croatia joined the Initiative for
Broadband South Eastern Europe, the BSEE.265  This should help improve connections with
the SEE countries, since the internet infrastructure is better connected with Slovenia than
with other countries.
Figure 3.7 The internet infrastructure in Croatia
Source: https://www.fer.hr/_download/repository/isp.pdf
264 Strategy can be downloaded  from http://www.e-hrvatska.hr
265 Memorandum of understanding, http://www.stabilitypact.org/e-see/bSEE%20MoU.pdf
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3.3.5.3 Energy supply and EU relations
The Croatian electricity network (See Table 3.10) was part of the former Yugoslav network.
The war caused difficulties in supply: the lines in the occupied territories could not be
used266,  some of the power plants were damaged, and there was no supply from Serbia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The construction of an interconnection line with Hungary stabilised
the system, and the conditions for import/export and the transit of electricity were created.267
Against this background, it is not surprising that Croatia was slow to join the first
Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Electricity Market in South East Europe and
its Integration into the European Union Internal Electricity Market in 2002. The signing of
the MoU launched the Athens Process, a key element of the long-term strategy for energy in
South East Europe. The Strategy was developed by the European Commission, together with
the partner countries and with help from the international financial institutions (notably the
EIB, the EBRD and the World Bank) in 2001, and it was endorsed in the framework of the
Stability  Pact.  The  aims  of  the  Strategy  relate  to  the  energy  infrastructure  and  market.  The
development of the energy infrastructure and the interconnections of regional interest should
be, according to the Strategy, accompanied with the creation of a regional energy market.
By signing the first MoU, the countries of the region committed to implementing parallel
rules to the Community provisions, creating an internal electricity market.
Faced with the strong conditionality from the EU, Croatia committed to the first
Athens memorandum in February 2003. The continuality stipulated by the EU concerned
Croatia’s commitment to regional co-operation within the framework of the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement (SAA). The SAA explicitly secures the tightening of the cooperation
in the adoption and planning of the energy policy, including the modernisation of the
infrastructure, the security of the supply, and the reinforcement of efficiency.  The
accomplishment of this cooperation in the Athens process was seen as one of the elements to
meet the regional cooperation obligation, which Croatia has bound itself to in the SAA as a
precondition for further rapprochement with the EU and the acceptance of the EU demands,
thus making the fulfilment of the membership conditions possible. The European
266 380 kV line Obrovac- Meilne and 220 kV line Konjsko-Brinje. As a result, Southern Croatia was supplied
through Bosina and Herzegovina until September 1991, when the substation Ernestinovo was destroyed. Until
December 2005,  Dalmatia was supplied by diesel and gas power plants (175.8 MW installed at 11 locations).
“Strategija energetskog razvitka,“ Official Gazette, no. 38 (2002),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2002/0839.htm
267 400 kV interconnection line Tumbri (Croatia) – Heviz (Hungary)
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Commission  in  its  SAA  Implementation  Report  (2002)  identified  that  Croatia  had  a
potentially key role in the energy linkage of the region, particularly from the point of view of
the development of the regional energy links (the physical infrastructure and the market).
Figure 3.8 The electric network of the Republic of Croatia, 2005, including
interconnections
Source: Energy in Croatia 2005. Ministry of economy, labour and entrepreneurship. P. 158, available
also form http://www.hep.hr/ops/hees/shema.aspx
In October 2004, Croatia had a key role in the physical reconnection of Zones I and II
of the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission for Electricity (UCTE). These had been
operating as separate interconnected systems since 1991, when a large power substation at
Ernestinovo in Eastern Croatia was destructed in the war. The resynchronisation enabled the
physical connection of the grids of South East Europe, including Greece, with the system of
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Western Europe. It was the first step in the creation of an integrated energy market between
the SEE and EU, and it was recognised as such in the Commission’s 2005 Croatia Progress
Report. The Report identified that Croatia has played an active role in the Energy Community
Treaty process. The Croatian Minister of Economy presented the same view at the first
Ministerial Conference of the Energy Community in Skopje, on 17 November 2006.268
It is the official position that on the entering into force of the Treaty establishing the
Energy Community, Croatia becomes an integral part of the EU internal energy market on an
equal  footing.  The  fact  that  the  accession  to  the  Energy  Community  is  also  an  important
condition which the countries aspiring to become EU Member States need to fulfil  is  often
underlined by the opposition, but not so clearly by the government.
3.3.5.4 Environment protection in Croatia
Croatia adopted the first environmental regulations in the first half of the 1990s. Significant
progress has been achieved since then in institutional and legislative terms. Since 1997, new
laws are gradually being aligned with the EU acquis. In 2000, the Ministry for Environmental
Protection and Spatial Planning was established, replacing the State Administration for
Environment. In 2002, the National Environmental Strategy and the National Environmental
Action Plan were adopted. The Environmental Agency was established in 2002, and the
Energy Efficiency and Environmental Fund was set up in 2003.
The process of integration towards the EU further increased the importance of the
environment in domestic policies and also in its relations in the region and with the EU. The
screening report published in February 2007 recognises the environmental chapter as very
difficult, primarily due to the legislation that needs to be changed and the price tag attached
to the implementation. A benchmark for opening the negotiations in the environmental
chapter was defined: before the opening negotiations, Croatia has to improve the
administrative capacity at  the national,  regional and local levels and develop an action plan
identifying the time frame and (human and financial resources) to implement and enforce the
acquis.
268 Report of the Ministry of Economy, www.mingo.hr
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According to official estimates, Croatia will be able to meet the EU standards by
2015, provided that EUR 11 billion is invested in environmental protection.269 According to
the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP), the total costs of environmental
infrastructure projects is estimated at about EUR 6,000 billion for the 10-year program.
Environmental protection is crucial for the sustainable development of South East
Europe. As a part  of the common objective of the SEE countries to gradually integrate into
the European Union, they have committed themselves to compliance with the EU
environmental laws, standards and policies. The SEE countries share similar problems in the
area of environment. Also, there are potentially large cross-border externalities arising from
the fact that interventions in the environment can have effects well beyond the boundaries of
the  country  in  which  they  are  being  undertaken.  The  international  community  and  the  SEE
countries alike have increasingly recognized that the common problems and their trans-
boundary effects can be tackled by a coherent regional approach to the environment, allowing
for coordinated action in more than one country. A coherent approach can increase the
benefits and reduce the costs of the environmental programs.
To enhance the cooperation between the countries and the international community in
the field of the environment, a number of regional initiatives have been established. Croatia
participates in the Regional Environmental Reconstruction Program for South-East Europe
(REReP); the DABLAS Sava River Basin Initiative, and the Mediterranean Action Plan. The
269 Statement by N. Ružinski, negotiator for the Energy and Environment chapters, 6.4.2007, cited  according to
Croatian news agency HINA, available from
http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/default.asp?ru=542&gl=200704100000001&sid=&jezik=1.
However, research and the evaluation of the expenses related to environmental protection in Croatia estimate the
necessary amounts differently, but without a clear separation of the EU-related costs (e.g. the specific issues
related to the implementation of the directives) and the non-EU related environmental costs (e.g. for
infrastructure). The National Environmental Acton Plan estimates the total costs of the environmental
infrastructure for the 10-year program at EUR 6,000 billion. A number of sector-specific  strategic documents
and plans for air, waste and waters have been elaborated since 2002. These plans identify the necessary
investments and financial means for environmental protection. In comparison with the NEAP, these documents
cover a longer period of investment (approx. 20-25 years) for the individual segments. The draft Air Sector
Implementation Plan covers an 11-year period from 2006-2016. The estimated capital investment costs of EUR
1,799 billion include the cost of improving the ambient air quality monitoring; bringing non-compliant large
combustion plants into compliance with the directives; controlling VOC emissions from petrol storage and
distribution installations; controlling VOC emissions from solvent-using applications; and modifications to
refineries. The Waste Management Plan covers an eight-year period between 2007-2015. The estimated capital
investment costs of EUR 350-400 million cover the cost of upgrading/establishing landfills for the disposal of
municipal solid waste and non-hazardous industrial waste, the collection and recycling facilities for particular
waste streams, and for the collection, storage and disposal of hazardous waste, including incineration.
According to the Water Management Strategy (draft), the total capital expenditure in the water sector (2005-
2020) is estimated to be EUR 3,700 billion. For more, see Sanja Tišma and Kristina Ozimec, “Environmental
Protection in Croatia”, in FORUM-Scientiae et sapientiae (2007), 38-43.
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REReP and the Sava Rive Basin are initiatives under the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe. They bring together countries in Central, Eastern and South East Europe with the
International Financial Institutions (the EBRD, the EIB, and the World Bank), the European
Commission, interested EU Member States, and other bilateral donors.
The REReP aims to foster regional environmental cooperation in South East Europe
and to create conditions for sustainable environmental protection. It is focused on four
principal themes: (i) institution building; (ii) support to the environmental civil society; (iii)
support to environmental, regional cooperation mechanisms and cross-border projects; and
(iv) reducing environmental health threats and the loss of biodiversity. The REReP has
helped to develop and facilitate the implementation of a list of priority environmental
investment programs covering the SEE countries. These priority projects focus on air
pollution control and monitoring, efficient energy use and conservation, solid waste
management, and water and wastewater management systems in the so-called hot spot
locations. Key results of the REReP include:
? The development of a Balkan Environmental Enforcement and Compliance Network
(BERCEN), which is  designed in the long-term to become a parallel  network to the
EU’s network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law
(IMPEL)
?  A Regional Environmental Investment Strategy approved by all SEE countries
? Participation in the activities of the European Environmental Agency
? The signature of a series of bilateral Memoranda of Understanding on cross-border
environmental cooperation
? The establishment of a network of South East  Europe NGOs and raising  awareness
on regional environmental issues
? The creation of an online database (at http://www.rec.org/REC/Databases/REReP/)
containing the details of the REReP projects (38 in Croatia)
? Setting up an informal donor network enabling an overview of the bilateral projects
The Sava River Basin Initiative has led to the creation of an international framework
agreement for the Sava River and the establishment of the International Sava River Basin
Commission with a seat in Zagreb. The Commission is responsible for the implementation of
the agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. The
Commission should contribute to (i) the rehabilitation and development of the navigation of
the Sava basin and its main tributaries, the Drina and the Una (ii) ensuring the sustainable
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development, utilization, preservation and management of the Sava basin water and related
resources (iii) the preserving and protection of the environment, biodiversity and aquatic
conditions of the Sava basin  and (iv) the promotion of the social and economic welfare of the
Sava basin riparian states and communities and the well-being of all the Sava basin riparian
people.
The DABLAS Task Force brings together the Black Sea and Danube countries with
the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), the Black Sea
Commission, the IFIs (the EBRD, the EIB, and the World Bank), the European Commission,
the Stability Pact, interested EU Member States and other bilateral donors to facilitate
communication and coordination, which should result in a more focused approach to the
protection of water270. The DG Environment of the European Commission holds the
secretariat  of  the  Task  Force.  The  majority  of  the  proposed  projects  listed  in  the  DABLAS
project pipeline target waste water treatment plants. The key outputs of the DABLAS include
the drawing up of a short list of priority projects (out of which two are in Croatia) and the
preparation of the prioritization criteria.
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) strives to protect the environment and to
foster  sustainable  development  in  the  Mediterranean  basin.  It  has  been  signed  by  16
Mediterranean states and the EC, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP). Its legal framework comprises the Barcelona Convention, adopted in 1976
and revised in 1995, and six protocols covering specific aspects of environmental protection.
Within the framework of the MAP, several programmes have been developed, including the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Strategic Partnership on the Mediterranean, the
Partnership for the Adriatic, and the Adriatic-Ionian initiative.
3.3.6 EU Pre-accession Funds
3.3.6.1 Forms of EU assistance since 1990
In the difficult period of war and transition, between 1991-95 the Community provided
humanitarian assistance to Croatia. Since 1996, the assistance gradually developed into
reconstruction assistance and support for refugee return. The EU consolidated its assistance
in 2000 within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Since gaining
candidate status in 2004, the assistance to Croatia has been increasingly integration–related.
270 More information is available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enlarg/dablas_en.htm
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Between 1991 and 1995, the EC provided EUR 243.2 million for humanitarian and
relief assistance. In the period 1996-2000, the assistance was focused on reconstruction and
support for refugee return under the programme OBNOVA. Support was also given for
democratisation, the independent media and de-mining. OBNOVA was the first Community
programme to Croatia that provided technical assistance for the European integration process.
During the whole period from 1991-2000, the EU provided EUR 367.33 million to Croatia.271
Since 2000, in line with the Stabilisation and Association Process, consolidated
assistance to Croatia under CARDS has increasingly focused on institution and
administrative capacity building, and legislative alignment with the acquis communautaire.
Croatia used the CARDS National Programmes until becoming a candidate (in the period of
2000-04), and it remained eligible for the CARDS Regional Programme in 2005-2006. Since
becoming a candidate country in 2004, Croatia has benefited from all three pre-accession
financial instruments: PHARE for institution-building and economic and social cohesion,
ISPA (in the period 2005-06) for  environment  and  transport  infrastructures,  and  SAPARD
(2006) for agricultural and rural development.
Since 1 January 2007, Croatia has been eligible for the Instrument for Pre-Accession
Assistance (IPA), whose main objective is  to help the beneficiary country to implement the
reforms needed to meet the EU requirements and to progress in the Stabilisation and
Association Process. 272 The IPA replaces previous pre-accession instruments, notably:
? PHARE, the scope of which is support for the implementation of the acquis
communautaire in the form of institution building and related investments,
investments in economic and social cohesion and cross-border cooperation;
? ISPA,  which  is  the  precursor  of  the  Cohesion  Fund  and  deals  with  the  environment
and the transport infrastructure;
? SAPARD, the precursor of the Rural Development plans,  dealing with the Common
Agricultural Policy acquis and rural development;
? CARDS, which covers the Western Balkans.
271“Croatia the European contribution,“ European Union assistance, (2000),
http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents/assist_croatia.pdf
272 Dali? et al., Glossary of the European Union Funds, Zagreb: Central Office for Development strategy and
Coordination of EU funds.
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For Croatia, as a candidate country, five components apply: (i) Transition Assistance and
Institution Building, (ii) Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation, (iii) Regional
Development, (iv) Human Resources Development, and (v) Rural Development.
Croatia has also benefited from participation in the Community programmes.
Participation in the EU programmes was reinforced in 2004, when a Protocol to the SAA was
signed on the general principles for Croatia’s participation in the Community Programmes.
Based on the signed Memoranda of Understandings, Croatia has been participating in the
following programmes:
? The 6th Framework Programme for RTD (2002-06);
? Community Employment Incentive Measures  (2001-06);
? Intelligent Energy Europe (2003-06);
? Gender Equality (2001-06);
? Marco Polo (2003-06);
? Fiscalis 2007 (2003-07);
? Customs 2007 (2003-07);
? IDABC (2005-09).
Croatia  also  participates  in  the  LIFE  and  Youth  programmes  as  a  third  county273, benefits
from twinning programmes, and since the beginning of 2004, the TAIEX assistance
instrument is also available.
3.3.6.2 The volume of the EU Assistance
In the framework of the CARDS National Programmes, the total financial allocation for the
period 2001 to 2004 reached EUR 260 million for the following four main priorities:
democratic stabilisation, economic and social development, justice and home affairs, and
administrative capacity.
The  overall  amount  of  EUR  260  million  was  committed  to  Croatia  in  the  CARDS
programme between 2001 and 2004. The main priorities of the CARDS assistance to Croatia
in the period between 2001 and 2004 were:
? The return of refugees, sustainable development in the return areas, reconstruction
and civil society development (EUR 74.70 million/28.5% of the total);
273 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds  web page,
http://www.strategija.hr/Default.aspx?sec=116
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? Trade, investment climate, social cohesion, including TEMPUS (EUR 68.85
million/26.3% of the total);
? The reform of the judiciary and the police, migration and asylum, integrated border
management, the fight against organised crime (EUR 62.95 million/24% of the total);
? Public administration reform, regional and local development, public finance (EUR
41 million/15.6% of the total);
? Environmental approximation, institution strengthening, monitoring and planning,
investment preparation (EUR 12.50 million/4.8% of the total).
Table 3.9 EC assistance to Croatia in 1991-2000, allocations in millions of EUR
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 total
Reconstruction &
Technical
Assistance
7.02 8.59 15.00 15.00 16.84 62.45
ECHO
Humanitarian Aid
204.77 38.43 21.15 14.50 6.95 6.50 n.a . 292.3
Media 0.09 0.31 0.72 1.67 0.59 0.20 3.58
Democracy &
Human Rights
0.72 2.2 0.6 n.a . 0.90 4.42
Demining 1.00 0.50 0.308 1.808
Customs (DG XXI) 1.00 1.00
TEMPUS 1.5 1.50
Total 204.77 0.09 38.74 29.61 26.96 24.14 23.00 19.748 367.058
Source: European Union assistance, 2nd edition, November 2000
Table 3.10 CARDS allocations between 2001–04 in the Republic of Croatia, EUR
million
Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Democratic
Stabilisation 24.2 16 16 17.5 73.7
Economic &
Social
Development
15.6 18 16.9 17.75 68.25
Justice and Home
Affairs 14.1 10 10.9 26.85 61.85
Administrative
Capacity Building 2.1 12 11.65 15.1 40.85
Environment and
Natural Resources 2 3 6.55 3.8 15.35
Total allocation 58 59 62 81 260
The pre-accession financial instruments PHARE, PHARE CBC, ISPA and SAPARD
replaced the CARDS instrument for the period 2005-06. Pre-accession financing reached
EUR 112 million in 2005 (PHARE: EUR 87 million, ISPA: EUR 25 million) and EUR 140
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million in 2006 (PHARE: EUR 80 million, ISPA: EUR 35 million, SAPARD: EUR 25
million). This represented a substantial increase in the overall EC assistance compared to the
amounts foreseen under CARDS for 2005 (EUR 60 million) and 2006 (EUR 62 million).
PHARE essentially continued the institution building efforts begun under CARDS
with the additional element of the PHARE Economic and Social Cohesion allowing for
limited investments. Cross-border cooperation had previously been financed under the
regional CARDS budget, with PHARE CBC taking over and continuing to finance the
Croatian participation in the neighbourhood programmes. Both ISPA, with its focus on
transport and environmental infrastructure, and SAPARD, for rural development, introduced
new elements of pre-accession assistance to Croatia by financing actions and investments that
could previously not be addressed under CARDS.
Table 3.11 PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD allocations 2005-06 in the Republic of Croatia
in EUR million
Programme 2005 2006 Total
PHARE 71.5 61.1 132.6
PHARE CBC 6 6 12
ISPA 25 35 60
SAPARD ~ 25 25
Total allocation 102.5 127.1 229.6
Table 3.12 IPA Programme components for Croatia, 2007-10, EUR million
IPA programme
components 2007 2008 2009 2010
Assistance in transition
and institution building 47.6 45.4 45.6 39.5
Cross-border cooperation 9.7 14.7 15.9 16.2
Regional development 44.6 47.6 49.7 56.8
Human resource
development 11.1 12.7 14.2 15.7
Rural development 25.5 25.6 25.8 26.0
Total 138.5 146.0 151.2 154.2
Source: Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds, web,
http://www.strategija.hr/Default.aspx?sec=108, accessed 9 December 2007
The financial value of the IPA programme in the period of six years, from 2007 to 2013,
amounts to EUR 11.468 billion, as it was established by Council Regulation No. 1085/2006.
The European Commission adopted the allocation of funds for a period of three years,
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between 2008–2010 (including 2007). For Croatia in the above-mentioned period these funds
amount to EUR 589.9 million, starting with EUR 138.5 million in 2007, with a planned
constant increase in the annual amount, which in 2010 would amount to EUR 154.2
million.274
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
IPA
SAPARD
ISPA
PHARE
CARDS
OBNOVA
Source: Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds, Glossary of the
European Union Funds, p. 10
3.3.6.3 The Main Fields of EU Contribution
The main objective of the EU pre-accession programmes is to provide technical and financial
assistance, first, for participation in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the
implementation of the obligations assumed under the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (CARDS). At a later stage (following Croatia’s candidate status and the adoption
of the IPA), the pre-accession assistance is focused on implementing the reforms needed to
meet the EU membership criteria.
Both the SAP and the EU membership criteria can be divided into three broad
categories: political criteria, economic criteria and legal criteria (i.e. alignment with the
274 Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds, Instrument for pre-accession
assistance – IPA, http://www.strategija.hr/Default.aspx?sec=108
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acquis). The EU assistance towards Croatia was first focused on the political criteria
(including respect for human rights, refugee return, etc.). Under the political criteria, the
CARDS assistance was focused on strengthening the judiciary capacities and structures
through projects focusing on training systems development, court system operations and
functioning. The public administration and the civil service reform have been also addressed.
Concerning human rights, the protection of the minorities and civil society dialogue, the
CARDS assistance facilitated the return of refugees and displaced persons with particular
emphasis on sustainable regional development in the return areas, the reconstruction of the
houses, public and social infrastructure, demining275, as well as civil society development.
The PHARE projects have provided assistance for the modernisation of the justice system,
the public administration reform, the protection of the minorities, in particular, that of the
Roma, and civil society development.
In the economic criteria sector, the CARDS assistance supported capacity building
related to the cadastre and property registration reform, the reform of the regulatory
framework for business investments, competition policy, public procurement and intellectual
property rights. The assistance also supported the reform of the public finance system,
focusing on internal audit and financial control, external budget oversight, public debt
management capacity, customs systems and procedures, and public finance statistics. PHARE
provides  further  assistance  to  the  improvement  of  the  investment  climate  with  a  project  for
the modernisation of the land administration and the reform of public finances by improving
the budget process for effective financial management.
Assistance under the sector ability to assume the obligation of membership has
absorbed the largest part of the available budget allocation for Croatia since 2004, reflecting
the candidate status.  In that period, the CARDS assistance contributed to the improvement of
trade, with actions supporting the introduction of the EU industrial standards, the
development of accreditation systems, food safety, veterinary and phyto-sanitary standards,
consumer protection and statistics. Social cohesion was supported through assistance to
vocational training, the labour market and higher education reform efforts. Assistance to
cooperation in justice and home affairs supported the improvements of integrated border
management, focusing on customs and border policing, inter-agency cooperation and asylum
policy and migration, as well as policing and the fight against organised crime, including
trafficking  in  firearms,  ammunitions  and  explosives.  The  CARDS assistance  in  the  field  of
275 Besides the CARDS assistance, support in the field of demining has been provided also through the
horizontal budget line 'Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines'.
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environment has resulted in further legislative alignment in the waste and water management
area, environmental impact assessment and monitoring, advocacy, awareness raising and the
promotion of renewable energy sources, as well as investment preparations.
The Projects under PHARE continue to address the areas of trade, customs and
taxation, agriculture and fisheries, transport, social cohesion, statistics, environment and
natural resources, policing and the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as
border management. The ISPA programme contributed to environmental and transport
related infrastructure investments.
The SAPARD programme started in 2006. The programme, as well as the SAPARD
agency, constitute the basis for the development of the IPARD programme and agency.
Under the sector supporting programmes, PHARE has provided assistance to national,
regional and local development capacity building, the participation of Croatia in community
programmes including TEMPUS, and it also includes a project preparation and institution
building reserve, a continuation of the administrative capacity building facilities introduced
under CARDS.
3.3.6.4 Impact on economic development
The screening process has also raised the awareness of the importance of the EU assistance
projects  at  the  political  level.  Many  reforms  that  have  already  been  undertaken  to  comply
with the EU acquis are a direct result of the CARDS assistance.276
The implementation of CARDS and the pre-accession instruments assistance projects
in Croatia has shown that (i) the weak administrative absorption capacity in Croatia’s public
administration bodies is reducing the effectiveness of the EC assistance and (ii) that greater
political support is needed, as the public administration has to meet project conditionalities,
such as policy decisions, the establishment and strengthening of institutions, and the
allocation of resources. The proper staffing of the units charged with implementing projects,
and support from the top management and political level in ministries is necessary for
successful project results.277  This might have an impact on strengthening expert positions in
the public administration (as opposed to political appointments) and the implementation of
reforms that without the EU conditionality would not be priorities. Such reforms might create
276 European Commission, Commission decision C (2007)2566 of 20/06/2007 on a Multi-annual Indicative
Planning Document 2007 - 2009 for Croatia, (Brussels, 2007).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_croatia_2007_2009_en.pdf
277 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_croatia_2007_2009_en.pdf
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conditions for economic development through institution building (e.g. help fighting high-
level corruption or increasing the efficiency of the public administration), and the
development of the infrastructure.
In June 2005, the National ISPA Coordinator submitted applications for EC assistance
under the ISPA instrument, together with final drafts of the National ISPA Strategies for
environment  and  transport.  The  overall  cost  of  the  proposed  investment  amounts  to
approximately EUR 125 million, of which approximately EUR 63 million is proposed for
ISPA financing. The remaining EUR 62 million is to be financed from national resources
(including in part loans from international financial institutions). In addition, the EU
assistance might be regarded as a catalyst in defining priorities and identifying the measures
necessary for achieving the reform goals. In July 2004, the Croatian government adopted a
paper called “Pre-Accession Assistance Needs (PAAN)”. This might be regarded as an
improvement in managing reforms, in terms of defining priorities and their sequencing,
which were identified as a significant impediment for successful reform implementation. 278
3.4 Legal adaptation
3.4.1 The evaluation of the national legal system
3.4.1.1 Transformation since 1990
There has been intensive legislative activity in Croatia since its independence, while the
efforts to align the Croatian legal system with the EU one started in 1999. The intention of
the Croatian government to participate in the integration process, specifically through legal
harmonisation, was confirmed by the Conclusion of the Government of the Republic of
Croatia  of  28  January  1999  on  the  obligation  of  the  ministries  and  state  executive
organisations to respect the laws of the EU when drafting bills and other regulations. Thus, a
basis  was  created  for  all  new  Croatian  laws  to  be  adjusted  with  the  law  of  the  EU.  At  the
time, contractual relations between Croatia and the EU were not established, and Croatia had
no legal obligation to harmonise with the EU legal system. This provided an opportunity to
select only priority areas for approximation, while the necessity to ensure full compliance
with the single market regulations was recognised.
278 For the summaries of this topic, see, for instance, Katarina Ott, “Croatian accession to the European Union:
the challenges of participation,” in Croatian Accession to the European Union: The Challenges of Participation,
ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006), 1-27.
http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU4/ott.pdf
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The first evaluation of the compatibility of the Croatian law with the law of the EU
was presented in the Action Plan for European Integration in 1999279. The preliminary
evaluation of the compatibility of the Croatian law with the law of the EU differentiated
several levels of compatibility: (i) completely or partly compatible, (ii) totally incompatible
or (iii) that the regulation of the particular legal area does not exist. If the evaluation showed
partial compatibility, comments indicated which parts of the Croatian legal instrument were
adjusted and which ones were not. Some explanations of the reasons why certain areas have
or  have  not  been  adjusted  (especially  whether  it  was  consciously  decided  to  postpone  the
approximation, taking into consideration the conditions and requirements of the Croatian
economy) were also given, as well as information whether there was a draft of the new
Croatian legislation, what phase it was in, and to what extent the proposal had been adjusted
to the EU legislation. A note on implementation was also provided.
The evaluation of the compatibility of the Croatian law with the EU in 1999 showed
that   the  approximation  process  in  Croatia  had  already  begun  in  some  areas,   where  the
appropriate market legislation (such as company law, competition, accounting, auditing,
VAT, banking, telecommunications and customs law) was adopted, and appropriate
institutions were established and  operational (e.g.  the Agency for the Protection of Market
Competition, the Securities Commission, the State Agency for Standardisation, the
Intellectual Property Agency, and independent auditing agencies). On the other hand, a
number of areas were recognised in which there was no appropriate legislative framework
or/and the necessary institutions (such as consumer protection and advertising, data
protection, or state aids).
The voluntary alignment continued until 2002, when the Interim Agreement entered
into force and created the obligation for legal alignment in the priority areas related to the
internal market. In 2001, when the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed, the
domestic harmonisation procedures were amended in order to speed up the process.
Since December 2001, the state administrative bodies have to submit a statement of
compatibility and an accompanying table of the concordance of the legislative provisions of
the Republic of Croatia with the relevant EU provisions together with the draft  texts of the
new Croatian laws.280 A  European  Integrations  Committee  tasked  to  follow  up  the
279 Government of Republic of Croatia, Action Plan for European Integration (Zagreb: Office for European
Integration, 1999), 63.
280 This obligation was initially introduced by a government’s decree and reinforced in 2002, when the
parliament adopted a conclusion requiring the government of Croatia to ensure that only draft acts accompanied
by a statement of compatibility and a table of concordance are forwarded to the parliament.
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harmonisation  process  was  also  established  in  the  parliament  in  2001,  and  the  parliament’s
Standing Orders were amended to enable a summary procedure for draft legislation to be
harmonised with the EU acquis.281 A distinction was made between draft legislation that
should be harmonised with the acquis and other “ordinary” draft legislation. Unlike in the
case of other draft legislation, voting on enabling the use of the summary procedure for
legislative proposals to be harmonised with the EU is not required. The summary procedure
means that the first and second readings are combined: in the same reading, amendments
have to be both discussed and decided on. Proposals can be enacted under the summary
procedure if so sought by the sponsor, unless the competent working body (which is either
the Committee on the Constitution, Standing Orders and Political System or the Legislation
Committee) proposes discussion and debate in the first  reading due to its  failure to comply
with the Constitution or the legal system.
According to the government’s Standing Orders282, all laws that the government
proposes have to be adjusted with the EU acquis. Hence, the government can seek the urgent
procedure for every single law that it proposes. Since in this procedure the ability to analyse
the proposed amendments and/or their adjustment with EU regulations is limited, these
provisions enable, in practice, the very reverse of what is desired to be achieved. At the same
time, limiting the debate makes the understanding of the integration process and the demands
that it makes more difficult at all levels – from the decision makers to the general public that
follows  their  work.  The  summary   procedure,  in  addition,  enables  a  perception  that  in  the
framework of the “European laws” some laws are passed that are not necessary for the
integration process but for the attainment of “ordinary” political objectives.283 This leads to
the marginalisation of the parliament’s role and the need for speed clashes with the goal of
fostering democracy.284
281 Croatian Parliament, “Standing Orders,” Official Gazette no. 117 (2001). English version available at:
Croatian Parliament Important Legislation. “Standing orders of the Croatian Parliament.“ Croatian Parliament.
http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2434
282 Government Standing Orders, Official Gazete 07 /2000
283 Ana-Maria Boromisa, “The readiness of the public administration for European Union accession,“ in
Croatian accession to the European Union, institutional challenges, ed. Katarina Ott (Zagreb: Institute for
Public Finances : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004), 180.
http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU2/Boromisa.pdf
284 C.f. Tomislav Marši?, “Assessing the negotiation experience: quick accession or good representation?,” in
Croatian Accession to the European Union: the Challenges of Participation, ed. by Katarina Ott  (Zagreb:
Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006), 29-56, http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU4/marsic.pdf
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The Interim Agreement that entered into force in 2002 and created the formal
obligation  for  legal  alignment  in  the  priority  areas  related  to  the  internal  market.  However,
the harmonisation process implemented through co-operation between state administrative
bodies in the phase of the preparation of the legislative proposals, and the Croatian
parliament in the phase of the adoption of the laws, does not differentiate between the priority
and other areas of the acquis. This approach was explained by the need for preparations for
membership, which is not limited by the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement.
3.4.1.2 Pre-accession help and actions
As mentioned before the EC assistance has been oriented towards alignment with the
membership criteria since 2000. The total allocations for the development of the ability to
assume the obligations of the membership in the period 2001-06 was EUR 184.47 million
(EUR 107 million under CARDS and EUR 77.47 million under the PHARE programme).285
The objective of the pre-accession assistance provided to Croatia under the IPA since 2007 is
to assist in meeting the accession criteria, i.e. the political and economic criteria, as well as
the adoption, implementation and enforcement of the acquis communautaire. The screening
process has identified the remaining legal gaps and the final stage of the alignment process
should focus on these issues. The plans for the period 2007-09 are based on an indicative
financial envelope of EUR 438.4 million. 286
In January 2008, the endorsement of the contracts under the PHARE 2006 programme
has  been  suspended.  The  measure  is  expected  to  be  temporary  (for  three  months),  until  the
benchmarks imposed by the EU are not met. Improvements are expected in the management
and the quality of the project tender dossiers resulting from insufficient administration
capacities at the Ministry of Finance.287 As the main challenges for the period 2007-09
identified by the Commission include the public administration reform, it is somewhat odd
that the assistance has been suspended because of the weakness of the administrative
capacities of the Ministry of Finance.
285 European Commission, Commission decision C (2007)2566 of 20/06/2007 on a Multi-annual Indicative
Planning Document 2007 - 2009 for Croatia (Brussels, 2007).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/mipd_croatia_2007_2009_en.pdf
286 Multi-annual indicative planning document for Croatia, op. cit.
287 Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Croatia. “Media Briefing on the Suspension of
Endorsement of the PHARE 2006 project contracts by the European Commission: Statement of Mr Oskar
Benedikt, Counsellor at the EC delegation.“ News, http://www.delhrv.cec.eu.int/en/content/news/id/996
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3.4.2 Comparative analysis according to the EU negotiation chapters
The gaps between the Croatian legislation and the acquis communautaire presented in this
chapter are identified on the basis of the screening reports, the progress report from
November 2007, and the progress of the negotiations.
3.4.2.1 Single Market
The acquis related to the single market signifies policies and measures relating to the free
movement of goods, services, workers and capital. As opposed to the fifth enlargement, when
4 (of the 31) negotiation chapters dealt with the single market288 before opening negotiations
with Croatia, the acquis was divided into 35 chapters. The free movement of goods is dealt
with in two negotiations chapters, Chapter 1: Free movement of goods and Chapter 7:
Intellectual property law. The free movement of persons is also dealt with in two chapters:
Chapter  2:  Freedom  of  movement  for  workers  and  Chapter  3:  Right  of  establishment  and
freedom to provide services. These chapters, together with Chapter 9, relate to freedom to
provide services, while Chapter 4 deals with the free movement of capital.
Table 3.13 Negotiation chapters dealing with the single market
1. Free movement of goods
1. Free movement of goods
7. Intellectual property law
2. Freedom of movement for workers
2. Free movement of persons
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
3. Freedom to provide services
9. Financial services
4. Free movement of capital 4. Free movement of capital
Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods is regarded as one of the hardest negotiation chapters.
It  is  regulated  with  a  regiment  of  technical  standards,  rules,  directives  and  regulations.  The
screening report indicates that the Croatian legislation is partially in line with the acquis in
Chapter 1, but implementing the structures needs to be completed and further upgraded,
especially as regards the horizontal measures.
Croatia has produced plans for alignment in many areas. However, these plans do not
cover the general principles deriving from Articles 28-30 of the EC Treaty and the related
288 I.e. Chapter 1 – free movement of goods, Chapter 2- Free movement of persons, Chapter 3 Freedom to
provide services and Chapter 4 –Free movement of capital.
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case law. Several sectors are not adequately covered by the alignment plans, and the target
dates for the legislation are not coordinated with the steps necessary to build the necessary
implementing structures. Sector legislation is developed without the prior completion of the
basic framework which is needed in particular for the proper operation of the conformity
assessment procedures and in order to complete the segregation of tasks between the
regulatory, standardisation, accreditation, metrology, conformity assessment and market
surveillance functions.289
Before opening negotiations on this chapter, Croatia has to meet three benchmarks.
The first one is to restrict all infrastructure procedures (accreditation, standardisation,
conformity assessment procedure, legal metrology, market surveillance). The second
benchmark determines establishing a universal strategy for the implementation of the EU
acquis communautaire in this chapter (including deadlines of implementations, legislative
measures, and improving administrative competence for all sectors). The third benchmark
requires an Action Plan for eliminating measures having equivalent effects.
The acquis on intellectual property law specifies harmonised rules for the protection
of copyright and neighbouring rights, for industrial rights, and it contains provisions on
enforcement. Croatia believes that it can accept the acquis regarding intellectual property
rights and that it will have no difficulties in implementing the acquis by the accession. The
EU shares this view: it believes that Croatia has a high level of legislative alignment with the
community acquis in the area of intellectual property rights, and while it possesses a certain
enforcement capacity, this needs further improvement.290 Negotiations  on  this  chapter  are
under way, and two closing benchmarks are identified.
The acquis under the chapter free movement for workers provides the right to EU
citizens  to  move  freely,  to  stay  and  to  work,  with  some  exceptions  in  the  public  sector,  in
another Member State without being discriminated against on grounds of nationality.  Croatia
has reached a satisfactory level of alignment in the field of the freedom of movement for
workers. However, there is a need for adjustment with the EU rules on the access to the
labour market, mainly as regards non-discrimination against EU migrant workers.
Considerable and sustained efforts are required also in particular in terms of developing the
administrative capacity for the co-ordination of the social security systems. The efforts need
289 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods (Brussels, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_report_01_hr_internet_en.pdf
290 European Commission. Screening report Croatia: Chapter 7 – Intellectual property law (Brussels, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_07_hr_internet_en.pdf
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to continue in view of the future participation in the EURES network, as well as in view of
the introduction of the European Health Insurance Card after the accession.
The right of establishment and freedom to provide services provides economic
subjects free supply of services throughout the EU, regardless in which Member State the
headquarter is  located .  On the other hand, Member States must ensure that  the right of the
establishment of the EU national and legal persons and the freedom to provide services is not
blocked by the national legislation. Croatia has identified itself most of the problematic
issues. In the area of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (especially
minimum training requirements), Croatia is very close to meeting the requirements of the
acquis. However, the Croatian legislation diverges from the acquis on two essential points.
The Act on the recognition of foreign educational qualifications does not distinguish between
the recognition of academic and professional qualifications. The second difference is in the
nationality requirements, which restrict access to certain professions to Croatian citizens.
Also, there is a need to change the Croatian legislation, which requires a proof of work
experience before granting a licence to a foreigner for exercising a profession.
According to the screening report, Croatia291 is  well  aware  of  most  of  the
incompatibilities with the acquis in the area of the right of establishment. It has presented a
precise timetable for alignment. As regards postal services, the acquis also aims to open the
sector of postal services to competition in a gradual and controlled way. Croatia has achieved
a  good  level  of  alignment,  but  it  needs  to  strengthen  the  position  of  the  Council  for  Postal
Services as the National Regulatory Authority. Certain provisions linked to the quality of
service should be amended. A problematic issue in this area of postal services is supervision
structure. The negotiations on this chapter are open, and six closing benchmarks have been
set.
Chapter  9  – Financial services also regulates freedom to provide services. This
chapter includes rules for the authorisation, operation and supervision of financial institutions
and regulated markets. Financial institutions covered by the acquis can operate across the EU
in accordance with the ‘European passport’ and the ‘home country control’ principle either
by establishing branches or by providing services on a cross-border basis. Overall, Croatia’s
legislation is satisfactorily aligned to the financial services acquis. Alignment has progressed
further in the areas of banking and financial conglomerates, and of insurance and
occupational pensions. The necessary supervisory authorities are established. However, their
291 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 3 – Freedom to provide services (Brussels, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_report_03_hr_internet_en.pdf
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competences need to be further strengthened. Croatia believes that it can accept the acquis
regarding financial services, and that it does not expect any difficulties in implementing the
acquis by the accession.292 The  negotiations  on  this  chapter  are  open,  and  5  closing
benchmarks have been defined.
Chapter 4 – The free movement of capital requires the abolishment of the
restrictions for the movement of capital both within the EU and between Member States and
third countries. The acquis also includes rules concerning cross-border payments and the
execution of transfer orders concerning securities.
Croatia  has  reached  a  reasonable  level  of  alignment  with  the acquis, but it needs to
make further progress in the area of the acquisition of real estate by foreigners, outward
portfolio investment by residents, short-term credit and cash transactions, and restrictions on
institutional investors.293 On  the  one  hand,  Croatia  complies  with  its  obligations  under  the
Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreement  (SAA),  but  on  the  other,  there  is  the  exception  of
the acquisition of real estate by EU citizens. Croatia has achieved a good level of alignment
with the acquis in the area of payment systems, but full alignment has yet not been achieved
in the area of money laundering. For the opening of this chapter, two benchmarks should be
met.  The  first  benchmark  relates  to  the  adoption  of  an  Action  Plan  for  fight  against  money
laundering and the second to the implementation of the existing procedures in the area of the
acquisition of real estates by EU citizens.
It  can be concluded that  Croatia has made progress in the alignment with the single
market. Still, many elements of the acquis are not yet in place. Croatia’s estimate of its
implementing capacity is more optimistic than the estimate of the European Commission.
However, even Croatia considers that difficulties might represent
??complying, upon accession, with the data exclusivity provisions requiring a period
of ten years (currently in Croatia 6 years is required)
- upgrading in time for the accession the marketing authorisations of the existing
products not authorised on the basis of the requirements foreseen by the Community
acquis.294
292 European Commission, Screening Report Croatia : Chapter 9 – Financial services (Brussels, 2006).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_09_hr_internet_en.pdf
293 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 4 – Free movement of capital  (Brussels, 2007).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_04_hr_internet_en.pdf
294 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 1 – Free movement of goods  (Brussels, 2007).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_report_01_hr_internet_en.pdf
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3.4.2.2 Investments
The implementation  of  the  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreement  (SAA)  should  create  a
new investment climate, which is considered to be crucial to economic restructuring and
modernisation.295
In addition to the general goals of the SAA, defined by Preamble, several provisions
of the SAA regulate investment-related issues. 296 These provisions relate to:
? The acquisition of real estate in Croatia by the nationals of the EU Member States,
? Investment promotion and protection
? Investment in the tourism sector
? Attracting investments and fostering the interoperability of networks and services
necessary for an information society
? The implementation of infrastructure projects of common interest.
According  to  the  SAA,  Croatia  has  to  authorise,  by  making  full  and  expedient  use  of  its
existing procedures, the acquisition of real estate in Croatia by the nationals of the Member
States of the European Union. The exceptions are agricultural land as defined by the
Agricultural Land Act (Official Gazzette no.54/94, consolidated text, 48/95, 19/98 and
105/99) and the areas protected under the Environmental Protection Act (Official Gazette no.
30/94). Within four years from the entry into force of the SAA, Croatia shall progressively
adjust its legislation concerning the acquisition of real estate in Croatia by the nationals of the
Member States of the European Union to ensure the same treatment as compared to Croatian
nationals. At the end of the fourth year, after the entering into force of the SAA, the
Stabilisation and Association Council shall examine the modalities for extending these rights
to agricultural land and the areas protected under the Environmental Protection Act.
A  four-year  transition  period  is  foreseen  for  the  liberalisation  of  capital  movements
relating to portfolio investment and financial loans and credits with a maturity shorter than a
year. Any restrictive measures shall not apply to transfers related to investment and in
particular to the repatriation of amounts invested or reinvested in any kind of revenues
stemming therefrom.
295 “Zakon o potvr?ivanju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju izme?u Republike Hrvatske i Europskih
zajednica i njihovih država ?lanica,“ Official Gazette, no. 14 (December 27, 2001)
296 E.g. Article 50, Article 60, Article 85,  Article 88, Article   99, Article 107.
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Article 85 of the SAA regulates investment promotion and protection. It provides for
the improvement of the legal framework in Croatia aimed at fostering investments and their
protection and promotes the conclusion of bilateral agreements for the promotion and
protection of investment.
On sector-specific issues, the SAA regulates investment in tourism and the
information society. It explicitly states that cooperation in tourism includes in particular
encouraging the development of an infrastructure conducive to investment in the tourism
sector. The strengthening of cooperation with the objective of further developing the
information society in Croatia has as the goal of attracting investments. Furthermore, EU
assistance is defined as having two basic forms: institution-building and investment. The
assistance shall contribute to the democratic, economic and institutional reforms of Croatia,
while considering the full implementation of the infrastructure projects of common interest
identified in Protocol 6. These are Pan-European Corridors V, VII, X and the Adriatic/Ionean
Pan-European Transport Area connecting to Corridor VIII.  The  development of a
multimodal regional transport network on the Croatian territory, which serves the needs of
Croatia and the South Eastern European region, covering the main road and rail routes, inland
waterways, inland ports, ports, airports and other relevant modes of the network, is also
identified as of particular interest to the Community and Croatia. This network shall connect
to the regional, Trans- or Pan-European networks of the neighbouring countries and be
interoperable with the Trans-European Transport Network of the Community. The respective
projects and priorities are assessed in accordance with the methods used in the Transport
Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA), taking into account the TINA results in the
neighbouring countries.
The SAA stipulates the necessity for substantial investments in the infrastructure and
also defines that transition periods would be needed in some investment-related areas. As
investment issues are of importance for Croatia and the EU Member States, the
implementation of some of these issues has already been discussed with the neighbouring
states (e.g. Italy). The investment-related issues are of significant importance for the
alignment with the EU policies, notably in the fields of energy and transport.
3.4.2.3 Environment
The aim of the EU environment policy is sustainable development and environmental
protection. The acquis communautaire in this chapter consists of over 200 main regulations,
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including horizontal legislation, quality of water and air, waste management, nature
protection, industrial pollution control and risk management, forest protection, chemicals,
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and noise protection. Compliance with the acquis
communautaire requires investments and strong and well-equipped administration at the
governmental and the regional level. According to Croatia's assessment, difficulties with the
implementation of some parts of the acquis may  be  expected  due  to  the  high  costs  of  the
needed investments297. Croatia has taken concrete steps in all fields within the chapter to
prepare for the transposition of the remaining parts of the acquis by the end of 2008.
As regards horizontal legislation, the Commission considers that the Croatian
legislation in this area is partially in line with the acquis, while the administrative capacity in
the area of climate change and horizontal legislation is limited. In the areas of air quality,
waste management, industrial pollution and risk management, progress in the transposition of
the acquis has  been  achieved,  but  it  is  expected  that  the  implementation  will  require  large-
scale investments. The further strengthening of the administrative capacity will be also
necessary298. Next, Croatia will have to make significant efforts to align its legislation with
the acquis in the area of water quality, and it should accelerate completing the alignment with
the noise-related acquis. Croatia is well advanced in the area of nature protection and
chemicals, while positive steps have been made in terms of alignment with the acquis on
GMO299.
In general, the institutions responsible for implementation and enforcement are in
place at the national, county and local level, though they need to be strengthened. To that end,
Croatia should ensure an adequate number of staff, the provision of training and the purchase
of equipment, and that the timetable for the reinforcement of the administrative capacity is
coherent with the plan for legislative alignment. As the costs of the adjustment of the existing
installations to the requirements of the acquis will be high, Croatia should ensure that
adequate financial resources will be at its disposal and that there is coherence between the
financial resources made available and the timetable for the legislative alignment300.
297 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 27 – Environment  (Brussels, 2007), 2.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_27_hr_internet_en.pdf
298 European Commission, Croatia 2007 Progress Report SEC (2007) 1431  (Brussels, 2007).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf
299 Id. at 24.
300 Id. at 20.
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Despite significant progress on the environmental chapter, Croatia has not opened
negotiations. An opening benchmark has been defined, requiring the development of a
comprehensive plan for putting in place the necessary administrative capacity at national,
regional and local levels, as well as financial resources to implement and enforce the acquis.
It is expected that the necessary reforms will be financed from the state budget, but also from
the private sector and from the local level. The coordination of the different bodies
responsible for environment-related issues has deficiencies and it requires improvement.
Croatia needs to take steps to integrate the environmental protection requirements into the
definition and implementation of all other policies and to promote sustainable development.
Given the scope and nature of the acquis in this chapter,  considerable efforts are needed to
fully meet the EU requirements. 301
3.4.2.4 Consumer protection
Consumer protection is part of the acquis under the chapter Consumer and Health Protection.
This chapter consists of horizontal policy instruments, including financial support, regulatory
and governing measures as well as vertical policies. The implementation and enforcement of
consumer protection policies require adequate administration capacities and infrastructure at
the national, regional and local levels. It is also necessary to raise public awareness, consult
with the public and involve consumers actively in effective policy implementation, thus
informing and educating the consumer and ensuring a role for consumer associations302.
Overall, Croatia has already reached a good level of alignment with the acquis.
However, it needs to finalise its transposition process on quite a number of EU measures in
both parts of the chapter. It also needs to strengthen its administrative capacity for acquis
enforcement. The 2007 Progress Report recognised that Croatia is undertaking efforts to
develop a consumer protection system in line with the EU Consumer Protection strategies
and values. Further alignment needs are identified by the analysis made in 2006, mostly as
horizontal aspects. In addition, Croatia needs to continue to prepare for the participation in
the RAPEX system. Consumer movements are not sufficiently supported and alternative
channels for settling consumer disputes are not sufficiently developed.
301 Id. at. 60
302 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection  (Brussels,
2007), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_28_hr_internet_en.pdf
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Negotiations  in  this  chapter  are  open,  and  four  benchmarks  for  closing  the
negotiations are set. Two of them relate to legal adjustment, and two to implementation
capacity. The necessary legal adjustment has been already made and recognised by the 2007
Progress  report.  Amendments  to  the  General  Product  Safety  Act  were  adopted  by  the
parliament in October 2007 (i.e. one benchmark has been met). Good progress has also been
made in the area of non-safety related issues by the adoption of a new Consumer Protection
Act  in  July  2007.  The  new  law  aims  at  ensuring  further  alignment  in  many  areas  of  the
acquis, such as unfair terms in consumer contracts, price indication, doorstep credits, distance
sales, distance marketing of financial services, consumer credits, misleading/comparative
advertising, unfair commercial practices, timeshare and package travel, which relate to the
second benchmark.303.
Support for meeting the remaining benchmarks relate to the strengthening of the
administrative capacity, for implementation in this area is provided under the CARDS 2004
programme “Further Capacity Building in the Area of Consumer Protection“. The
implementation of the EUR 1.1 million  project started in July 2007, and it should be
finalised in 24 months, contributing to an improved level of consumer protection in
Croatia.304
3.4.2.5 Labour legislation
Labour legislation is an important part of the acquis relating to the single market (i.e. the free
movement  of  persons)  and  is  also  dealt  with  in  a  special  chapter,  that  of  social  policy  and
employment. The acquis in this chapter includes minimum standards in areas such as labour
law, gender equality in labour market and social security, as well as health and safety at
work. Specific binding rules have also been developed with respect to non-discrimination on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.
Croatia believes that it can accept the acquis regarding  social  policy  and  employment  and
does not expect any difficulties in implementing the acquis by accession305.
303 European Commission, Croatia 2007 Progress Report SEC (2007) 1431  (Brussels, 2007), 60 – 61.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf
304 Poslovni dnevnik, “Projekt za ja?anja zaštite potroša?a u Hrvatskoj,“  http://www.poslovni.hr/62624.aspx
305 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 19: Social policy and employement (Brussels,
2006), 2.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_19_hr_internet_en.pdf
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As regards labour law, the main EU principles are in place, but the administrative
capacity  of  the  relevant  ministry  (the  Ministry  of  Economy,  Labour  and  Entrepreneurship)
needs to be substantially strengthened. The Commission estimates that good progress has
been achieved in the area of the employment policy, as the government has adopted the
Employment Action Plan 2005-08 and the Annual Plan for Employment Promotion for 2007,
aimed at tackling problems related to the low employment rate and the relatively high
unemployment rate. The plan contains measures aimed at increasing the flexibility of the
labour market and adult education and training.
For opening negotiations in the social policy and employment chapter, an Action Plan
has to be adopted, defining a timeframe for the adoption of the directive, as well as the
human resources, institutions and funds necessary for the implementation.
3.4.2.6 State aids
The competition acquis deals with state aid control policies and the rules aimed at preventing
governments from granting state aid which distorts competition in the internal market.
Croatia started alignment with the EU acquis following its entry into the WTO. At the time,
Croatia did not have a subsidy programme per se, but rather an industry rehabilitation and
reorganization programme. The government assisted the areas that were heavily devastated
during the war by financing the payroll of seven enterprises located there and involved in the
production of steel, steel refining and textiles, at an accumulated cost of approximately USD
3.2 million by mid-1996.  The Croatian Railways were also subsidized in the post-war period
at the level of some USD 400 million by the end of 1996.  The government also subsidized
the sea transport of tourists by paying the difference between the revenues and the
expenditure on popular tourist lines and connections (about USD 31 million in 1995 and USD
35 million in 1996).
In the process of accession to the WTO, Croatia was not able to provide sufficiently
detailed information on its subsidization policies, in particular with regard to policy
objectives, levels of subsidization, effects, and the duration of such policies.306 Against this
background, it is not surprising that Croatia has not reached a satisfactory level of alignment
with the acquis,  nor  does  it  have  the  administrative  capacity  to  do  so  at  this  stage. Croatia
needs to further align its  legislation,  strengthen its  administrative capacity and have a more
306 “WTO accession document, Croatia”, http://www.wto.org
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effective enforcement record. Special attention is needed in particular as regards state aid to
steel and shipbuilding, as well as in the area of fiscal aid.
The Competition Agency supervises the state aid in Croatia and the latest
improvements of the  State Aid Act (in 2005) enabled the Competition Agency to issue
binding decisions in the state aid sector. Despite this improvement, the current system is
insufficient, particularly as regards the power of the government to overturn decisions. In the
pre-accession period, Croatia needs to reduce and restructure state aid. The size of state aid in
Croatia,  measured  by  its  share  in  the  GDP,  is  four  times  larger  than  that  in  the  EU.  The
largest portion (56% on average) of state aid in Croatia in the period 2001-04 was allocated to
selected economic sectors, while sector specific aid accounted for only 25 % of the total aid
in the EU-15. Transport, shipbuilding, ironworks and the rescue and restructuring of
businesses account for almost 80 percent of sectoral aid.
Aid to transport can be divided in two groups: aid to railways and aid to other
transport sectors. Aid to railways in the period 2001-04 accounted for 80% of the total aid to
the transport sector. Therefore, Croatia has to reform its state aid by drawing a strict line
between supporting the services of general interest or investment in the infrastructure (which
is not considered as state aid) and transfers for covering current losses.307 According to the
screening report, Croatia should define the scope of Services of General Economic Interest
(SGEI) in its legislation.
The aid to shipbuilding in Croatia amounts to a high 20% of the total aid (compared
with 2% in EU) and should go through a comprehensive reform oriented towards research
and development, the innovation or the closure of shipyards, and related aid aimed at job
creation, exports of development, as well as regional aid. Croatia needs to adopt a regional
aid map before granting any regional aid measures, and generally downsize the rescue aid to
shipbuilding.  Namely,  the rescue and restructuring aid in the EU should be granted on the
“one  time,  last  time”  principle.  This  also  holds  for  the  steel  sector,  where  the  two existing
companies (the Sisak Pipe Rolling Mill and the Split Iron Mill) are experiencing serious
difficulties and are constantly obtaining operating aid.  The aid granted should be based on
individual business plans and a national restructuring programme in line with the
requirements set out in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
The Commission has recognised some progress in the area of fiscal aid, but there is a
need for further legislative alignment and the strengthening of the administrative capacity.
307 Kesner Šrkeb and Ivana Jovi?, Towards Less and Better State Aid in Croatia, Newsletter no 29 (Zagreb:
Institute of Public Finance, June 2007)
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For opening negotiations on competition, four benchmarks have to be meet regarding the
shipbuilding industry, the steel sector, the alignment of the legislation in the area of fiscal aid
(namely the Free Trade Act, the draft of which has not been aligned with the acquis), and for
state aid in general.
3.4.2.7 Liberalisation
The term ‘liberalisation’ refers to Article 3 of the EC Treaty, which states that the activities
of the Community shall include a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is
not  distorted.  For  this  purpose,  there  is  a  specific  surveillance  system in  the  case  of  public
undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights.
With respect to the liberalisation of specific sectors, reference is made to the relevant sector
specific negotiating chapters.308
Croatia holds that the rules applied to companies performing services of general
economic interest under the State Aid Act and the Act on market competition are in line with
Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty. However, the EU does not share this view, and according to
the screening report, the system currently in place does not fully reflect the EU rules. Croatia
should define the scope of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI) in its legislation
and  needs  to  ensure  that  anti-trust  rules  and  EU state  aid  rules  are  applied  in  full  to  public
undertakings and undertakings with special or exclusive rights, in accordance with Article 86
of the EC Treaty and with the definition of ‘undertaking’ in the acquis. Croatia also needs to
ensure that the EU rules on the transparency of the financial relations between the public
authorities and public undertakings apply.
As there are no national monopolies of a commercial character in Croatia, this aspect
of the liberalisation is in line with the EU rules, and Croatia should keep the Commission
informed of any new developments in this area. 309.
308 European Commission, Screening report Croatia: Chapter 8 – Competition policy (Brussels, 2007).
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_report_08_hr_internet_en.pdf
309 Id. at. 7-12
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3.4.3 Official positions on the future of legal adaptation
Croatia considers that  in most of the chapters it  can accept the acquis before the accession.
According to the official views, as presented in the screening reports310, there are six chapters
in which Croatia is likely to need transition periods:
? the free movement of goods (chapter 1),
? the free movement of capital (chapter 4),
? transport policy (chapter 14),
? energy (chapter 15),
? taxation policy (chapter 16),  and
? environment (chapter 27)
Croatia indicates that it can accept the acquis regarding the free movement of goods, and it
does not expect any difficulties in implementing the acquis by the accession, except for the
following:
? complying, upon accession, with data exclusivity provisions requiring a period of ten
years (currently in Croatia 6 years is required); and
? upgrading in time for the accession the marketing authorisations of the existing
products not authorised on the basis of the requirements foreseen by the Community
acquis.
Regarding the free  movement  of  capital, Croatia can accept the acquis, but real estate
acquisition is an issue of special concern. The acquisition of real estate is among the areas
where Croatia would need adequate transition periods. Croatia will define its timetable for
alignment with the acquis in its negotiating position on this chapter. Croatia has indicated
that it can accept the acquis regarding transport, but that it does expect some limited
difficulties in implementing the acquis by the accession. In energy, due to the considerable
investments deemed necessary by Croatia for complying with the acquis on oil  stocks,  the
energy performance of buildings, energy end-use efficiency and energy services, Croatia
expects some difficulties in implementing the acquis in these areas by the date it foresees for
its accession. Croatia has accepted the acquis regarding taxation and  stated  not  to  expect
difficulties in implementing the acquis by the time of accession. However, Croatia has
310 Screening Reports, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/croatia/screening_reports_en.htm
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indicated that it would request transitional periods in certain areas. Concerning the
environment, difficulties with the implementation of some parts of the acquis may be
expected due to the high costs of the needed investments. Also, the administrative structures
in charge of the implementation and enforcement are generally in place, but they will need to
be strengthened in line with the existing plans or those under preparation.
However, the alignment plans are prepared on an annual basis. Sector specific
alignment plans sometimes include the sequencing of the reforms, but this is not necessarily
harmonised with the alignment in other areas.311 As  a  result,  some  of  the  laws  have  to  be
amended quite often. The opposition proposed in 2007 the adoption of a multi-annual
alignment plan. However, the government considered that such a plan could make
negotiations even more complicated and further limit the possibilities for negotiating
transition periods.
3.4.4 Programs or ‘road maps’ of developing the national legal system
The government adopted the Strategic Development Framework 2006-2013 in August 2006.
This document defines the strategic priorities for economic development and identifies the
need for changing the role of the state. Alignment with the acquis communautaire is one of
the goals of the judicial reform, which is identified as a strategic priority.312 According to the
Strategic Development Framework, finalising alignment with the acquis communautaire
should be used not only for the normative convergence of the Croatian legislation in line with
the legislation of the EU, but also for a deep transformation of the overall judicial system and
its opening towards the application of the useful legal solutions of other states.
The programme of the government for the period 2008-11 also identifies the need for
a judicial reform, including alignment with the acquis. Concrete measures and annual
alignment plans are defined on a yearly basis by the National Programme for the Integration
into the EU, which is in line with the Accession Partnership. Also, there is a number of
sectored  road  maps  and  action  plans  identifying  the  need  for  the  adoption  or  review of  the
existing  legislation.  These  include  the  already  mentioned  legislation  gap  analyses,  as  in  the
311 E.g. the Law on the gas market was adopted in 2001 (Official Gazette 68 (1991)).  It was planned, at the
time, that the Law on concessions will be modernised and changed. As this law was not adopted, the Law on the
gas market had to be changed in 2005 (Official Gazette no. 87 (2005), and in 2007 (Official Gazette no. 40
(2007) new changes were introduced to reduce the gap with the EU legislation.
312 Government of the Republic of Croatia, Strategic Development Framework 2006-2013 (Zagreb: Central
Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU funds, 2006), 71.
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field of consumer protection or environmental protection.313 However,  there  is  no
comprehensive multi-annual plan identifying the needs for internal harmonisation.
3.4.5 Feasibility analysis
According to the screening reports, Croatia considers that it can accept the acquis before the
accession in most of the chapters.  Furthermore,  having in mind the vague timetable for the
accession, this view does not provide information about the timetable of the alignment.
Table 3.14 The alignment process, and the number of laws aligned with the acquis
Planned Adopted % of plan
2007 55 66 120
2006 59 34 58
2005 44 28 64
2004 45 32 77
The alignment  is  different  from what  was  planned.  The  parliament  was  supposed  to
align  55  laws  with  the acquis in 2007.314  According to the information service of the
Croatian parliament, in 2007, 66 European laws were adopted.315 This high statistical
efficiency, however, does not correspond with the achievements. Namely, the 12 laws that
have been identified by the plan (which could be considered as a priority list) have not been
adopted. Some of them have been planned since 2004 and have not been adopted yet316.
The  mistakes  in  planning  were  even  more  evident  in  2006,  when  it  was  planned  to
align 59 laws with the EU,317 but only 23 laws were aligned. The government claimed that it
was not a delay, nor a planning mistake, but a result of the screening process, which indicated
different priorities. 318 Next, the adoption of laws is not sufficient for legal alignment. It was
313 The 'Legislation Gap Analysis' project conducted in 2001 was the first in the process of the harmonisation of
the regulations in the competence of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and
Construction, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning  and Construction, “The 'Legislation
Gap Analysis' project,“ http://www.mzopu.hr/default.aspx?id=4293
314 Croatian Parliament, “Alignment plan for 2007,“ Official Gazette, no. 22  (2007),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2007/0819.htm
315 The information service of the Croatian parliament considers laws as being European provided they are
adopted by the summary procedure and accompanied by the statement on alignment and table of concordance,
http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?sec=1209
316 E.g. Law on free legal help, Act on regional development and Act on concessions.
317 Croatian Parliament, “Alignment plan for 2006,“ Official Gazette, no. 13 (2006),
http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2006/0322.htm
318 Minister Grabar Kitarovi?, cited according to Croatian News Agency.
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planned that in 2007, together with 53 laws, almost 230 by-laws and 180 implementing
measures should be adopted for efficient implementation.
In addition, legal alignment is just a first step in the integration. According to the
government’s conclusion from 2001,319 the Ministry for European Integration should prepare
a feasibility analysis for the implementation of each legal act being aligned with the EU.
However,  such analyses,  if  they exist,  are not publicly available.  The government considers
that the EU integration as a strategic goal and the accession by 2011 is feasible, but there is
no feasibility study on this issue, while the cost-benefit and financial analysis commissioned
by the government from the Economic Institute, estimates the economic benefits of the
accession based on the assumption that Croatia will become an EU Member State in 2009. As
regards the implementation of the acquis, the studies conducted so far indicate the number of
issues that can limit the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA), and the secondary EU legislation in Croatia, which questions the feasibility of the full
implementation of the SAA and also poses some legal questions arising from the eventual
membership. 320
3.5 EU conditionality
3.5.1 EU conditionality towards Croatia
The EU conditionality towards Croatia was developed in 1995, in the framework of
the regional approach321.  Croatia was among the “excluded” countries at the time, i.e. it was
a  country  without  an  Association  Agreement.  As  a  result,  the  economic  and  political
conditions were developed with a view of concluding a Cooperation Agreement,  and not as
EU membership criteria. Still, the EU conditionality was omnipresent, multi-dimensional and
multi-purpose, geared toward reconciliation, reconstruction, and reform. It was regional, sub-
regional, bilateral and project specific, relating to a number of economic, political, social and
319 Government’s Conclusion related to progress in negotiating Stabilisation and Association Agreement,
15.2.2001.
320 E.g. Siniša Rodin, “Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju. Interpretacija i primjena” (presentation available
from http://eu.pravo.hr/fileadmin/Europsko/dokumenti/Powerpoint/SSP_01_2004_Rodin.ppt#256,1)
321 Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of October 1995, February and May 1996, the guiding principles
of the Civilian Consolidation Plan agreed in Paris in November 1996 and the Conclusions of the London Peace
Implementation Conference of December 1996. In this context the Commission presented a strategy paper
entitled "The application of conditionality to the development of relations between the EU and the countries
concerned by the regional approach", which was welcomed by the General Affairs Council on 24 February
1997.
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security-related criteria. 322 The conditionality was also gradual: at the first stage, conditions
were focused on the democratisation and stabilisation of the region. The different levels of
the relations with the EU (i.e.  trade preferences, the extension of financial assistance and
economic cooperation, and the establishment of contractual relations) were subject to
different degrees of conditionality.
The renewal of autonomous trade preferences was linked to the respect for the
fundamental principles of democracy323 and human rights324 ,and to the readiness of Croatia
to allow the development of economic relations with the countries of the region. Assistance
for the support of democracy through PHARE was subject to evidence of the country's
credible commitment to democratic reforms and progress in compliance with the generally
recognised standards of human and minority rights325. General assistance through this
programme required compliance with the obligations under the peace agreements, including
those relating to cooperation with the International Tribunal in bringing war criminals to
justice. Compliance included an undertaking to make the Federation/Croatia compatible with
the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), under the guidance of the OHR. It
also  required  respect  for  human  and  minority  rights  and  the  offer  of  real  opportunities  to
displaced persons and refugees to return to their place of origin. Moreover, Croatia had to
undertake a credible commitment to engage in economic reforms,326 significant steps towards
cooperation with its neighbours and the establishment of open relations, including the free
movement of people and goods.
322 C.f. Othon Anastasakis and Dimitar Bechev, “EU Conditionality in South-East Europe: Bringing
Commitment to the Process.“ European Balkan Observer 1, no. 2 (2003), 2-4,
http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/EBO%202.pdf
323 Democratic principles: 1) Representative government, accountable executive; 2) Government and public
authorities to act in a manner consistent with the constitution and the law; 3) Separation of powers (government,
administration, judiciary) ; 4) Free and fair elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot.
324 Human rights, rule of law:1) Freedom of expression, including independent media; 2) Right of assembly
and demonstration; 3) Right of association; 4) Right to privacy, family, home and correspondence 5) Right to
property; 6) Effective means of redress against administrative decisions; 7) Access to courts and right to fair
trial; 8) Equality before the law and equal protection by the law; 9) Freedom from inhuman or degrading
treatment and arbitrary arrest.
325 Respect for and protection of minorities: Right to establish and maintain their own educational, cultural and
religious institutions, organisations or associations; Adequate opportunities for these minorities to use their own
language before courts and public authorities; Adequate protection of refugees and displaced persons returning
to areas where they represent an ethnic minority.
326   Market economy reform : Macroeconomic institutions and policies necessary to ensure a stable economic
environment ;  Comprehensive liberalisation of prices, trade and current payments ;  Setting up of a transparent
and stable legal and regulatory framework;  De-monopolisation and privatisation of state owned or socially
owned enterprises ; Establishment of a competitive and prudently managed banking sector."
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However, this conditionality did not function well. The conditions imposed under the
regional approach were considered unjust and as an attempt of the international community to
impose the regional framework on Croatia327.  The 1998 Conditionality Report stated that the
justification of the autonomous trade preferences may be questioned unless Croatia makes
progress in relation to the relevant criteria328. There was also considerable discrepancy
between the official statements and the practice on the ground. Until 2000, there was limited
progress in relation to a few of the relevant conditions, but it was not sufficient for additional
progress in Croatia’s relations with the Community. 329
The Stabilisation and Association Process, together with the visible and realistic
prospect of membership given to the new government in 2000, enabled the functioning of
conditionality. The EU conditionality at that time strengthened and anchored the incentive of
national authorities to pursue reforms. It also had an impact on the political process,
indicating that the party’s entry into the government whose political positions are not
compatible with Copenhagen would have negative implications for Croatia’s progress
towards the EU.330
The signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement,  its  entry into force and
the opening of negotiations were significant steps forward. However, the relatively slow pace
of the negotiations, the benchmarks and the delays in the verification process are fuelling
cynicism about the EU intentions. The conditions are not seen as steps in a structured process
but rather as an instrument for deferring membership. In this respect, the influence of the EU
conditionality is decreasing, which can be illustrated by the Glavaš case. Despite the fact that
the EU explicitly pointed to the Glavaš case, saying that “the EC expects Croatia to fully
327 European Commission, Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with the
conditions set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, (Brussels, 1997), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/9710_report_a_en.pdf
328 European Commission, Operational conclusions : Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern
Europe: Compliance with the conditions in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, COM (1998)
237 final (Brussels, 1998),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/
sap/com_1998_0237_en.pdf
329 European Commission, Regional Approach to the countries of South-Eastern Europe: Compliance with the
conditions set out in the Council Conclusions of 29 April 1997; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia COM(1998) 618 final (Brussels, 1998),
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/
sap/comm_pdf_com_1998_0618_f_acte_en.pdf
330 Italy, in its capacity of the EU presidency, expressed concerns regarding the possibility that the Croatian
Party of Right (HSP) enter into the government following the 2004 elections. Slobodna Dalmacija, Daily,
16.12.2003., interview with  Alessandro Grafini, “Veleposlanik Italije i predstavnik EU-a u Hrvatskoj”,
http://www.hsp1861.hr/vijesti4/031216ss.htm
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respect due procedure, independence of the judiciary and rule of law, in this, as well as all
other cases”, the parliament enabled Glavaš’ release. 331
The issue of the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone was seen as a major
obstacle for Croatia’s integration into the EU at the beginning of 2008 (January-March).
Immediately  after  the  suspension  of  the  Zone,  the  President  of  the  European  Commission,
Jose Manuel Barroso, signalled that Croatia should be able to conclude the EU membership
talks by the end of the mandate of the Commission (in November 2009). He also confirmed
that  the  2008  Enlargement  Package  (which  is  to  be  published  in  the  autumn of  2008),  will
contain an indicative timetable for the technical conclusion of the negotiations in 2009,
provided a number of conditions are met by Croatia. The first condition that needs to be
fulfilled relates to Croatia’s meeting all opening benchmarks by June 2008 (i.e. in eleven
negotiation chapters 23 benchmarks are to be met). Secondly, Croatia must comply with all
legal obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), and it must
continue to comply with the general conditionalities of the Stabilisation and Association
Process. Furthermore, Croatia urgently needs to improve its management of the EU financial
assistance under the PHARE and IPA programmes, while the forth criterion for presenting a
roadmap has already been met. That is, Croatia suspended all aspects of the Ecological and
Fisheries Protection Zone, with respect to EU vessels332.
3.5.2 The internalization of social, political and economic rules
The  main  EU  principles,  such  as  liberty,  democracy  and  respect  for  human  rights,
fundamental  freedoms and  the  rule  of  law,  as  well  as  fundamental  social  rights  and  values
(pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and
men) are accepted as objectives for Croatia. The fulfilment of the Copenhagen political,
economic and legal-institutional criteria would mean that Croatia has reached the goals of a
modern, capable and open society. In that sense, the social, political and economic rules
exerted by the EU are internalized in Croatia. Still, when it comes to more specific issues,
overreaching reforms which can be painful (e.g. the reform of the social security system,
331 Branimir Glavaš was indicted for war crimes. As he was elected MP, he got new immunity. The parliament
allowed continuing the investigation, but it decided that he has to be released, which questions the separation of
power between the judiciary and the parliament.
332 Speaking points of Commission President José Manuel Barroso during the press point, following his meeting
with Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, available from
http://www.vlada.hr/en/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2008/ozujak/predsjednik_vlade_s_predsjednikom_europsk
e_komisije_barrosom, accessed on 1 April 2008
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labour law) the readiness for implementation becomes a challenge. This is not necessarily
related to the readiness to accept the EU rules, but with the readiness to accept and implement
the remaining transition-related reforms or to adapt to the globalisation process. Studies333
indicate the need for the readiness of citizens to support  the changes and the willingness of
politicians to undertake the risk, plus a public administration capable of first reforming itself.
As comparable resistance also exists in the EU Member States (e.g. concerning services
directive or the liberalisation of the energy markets), it can be concluded that the core social,
political and economic rules are mostly internalised.
The EU’s tailor-made conditions are supposed to be formulated in order to judge each
country on its own merits. They are generally considered as social, political or economic
rules  that  are  common to  the  EU Member  States,  but  some of  these  tailor-made  conditions
might be inadequate, or not well communicated, and thus, not internalised. The Croatian
Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone and the Gotovina case represent such conditions.
The Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, according to the publicly available
arguments, seems to be an inadequate condition:  the regime of the Zone has been in force for
over three years, but it has not been applied to the EU Member States, as agreed at the
Brussels trilateral meeting in June 2004. However, all Croatia’s calls to conclude a fisheries
partnership agreement with the EC have remained unanswered.
In 2005 and 2006, respectively, Slovenia and Italy proclaimed their ecological zones
in the Adriatic  without  prior consultations among the neighbours, and in autumn 2006, the
opening of the negotiations of Chapter 13 (Fisheries) - under which the issues related to Zone
implementation could have been discussed - remained blocked in the Council by one Member
State  (Slovenia).   At  the  end  of  2006,  the acquis concerning sustainable fisheries
management in the Mediterranean developed further and a new regulation was adopted by the
Council, explicitly referring to the "Member States fishing zone”. As the Zone shall become
part of the Community waters after Croatia’s accession, the efforts to promote and protect
this Zone even before the accession to the EU seem to be in the best interest of the Union as a
whole. The suspension of the negotiations can be thus regarded as a lack of the EU’s genuine
interest to integrate Croatia and as an attempt of the protection of the economic interest of a
couple of Member States.
333For instance,  Katarina Ott, “Croatian accession to the European Union: the challenges of participation,” in
Croatian Accession to the European Union: The Challenges of Participation, ed. Katarina Ott  (Zagreb:
Institute of Public Finance: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2006), 1-4, http://www.ijf.hr/eng/EU4/ott.pdf
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On the other side, the issue of cooperation with the ICTY in the Gotovina case
represents a lack of internalisation, since the war crime suspect was considered to be a
national hero. In addition, the condition imposed on Croatia to “locate, arrest and extradite”
was perceived as inadequate, especially after he was arrested in Spain. Such cases undermine
the EU’s credibility and consequently, they can diminish the influence of the enlargement
conditionality, which is considered to be one of the EU’s most powerful policy tools.
3.5.3 Croatia’s accession date
It is expected that Croatia is likely to become the next (i.e. the 28th) EU Member State. It is
not likely that it will become a member before 2011, but it is extremely difficult to estimate
when the accession is likely to occur. In 2002, the Croatian government’s target date for
meeting the membership criteria was 2006334. In 2005, the Croatian parliament adopted the
Resolution on the Principles governing the negotiations, which stipulates the intention to be
ready for membership in 2007.335 In 2006, the government commissioned a cost-benefit
analysis of the membership, based on the assumption that Croatia will enter the EU in 2009.
According to the government’s programme, Croatia should enter the EU in this term of the
office, i.e. by 2011 at the very latest.
The projections of the EU are less optimistic, and in late 2005, the EU officials
projected that Croatia’s accession would likely happen between 2010 and 2012. In October
2006, Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that Croatia is likely to be ready for EU membership by
2010, provided it reforms its judiciary and economy with rigour and resolution. In March
2008, the President of the Commission stated that Croatia will be able to meet the conditions
which are required by the Commission in order to set out a conditional roadmap in the
autumn of 2008, with a view to conclude the technical negotiations in 2009, preferably by the
end of the mandate of the Commission.
The above-mentioned estimates are based on Croatia’s merits and alignment with the
EU membership criteria. It is assumed that the EU will solve its internal issues and enable
further enlargement. The signing of the Reform Treaty is also regarded as a step towards
Croatia’s membership. The Croatian government considers it feasible that the Treaty will be
ratified in the national parliaments by the beginning of 2009, which would allow its entering
334 E.g. Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2002, na str III, for more about this see Ana-Maria Boromisa, “Uklju?ivanje
Hrvatske u EU: retorika ili realnost,“ in Odnos države i tržišta na putu integracije Hrvatske u sjvetske
gospodarske tokove, ed. Ahec- Šonje, Babi?, Bibi? (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2003).
335 Parliament, 2005
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into force before the European Parliament elections in 2009. This timetable is in line with the
government’s expectations to finalise negotiations in 2008, and that the accession treaty can
be concluded in time for the European Parliament to give its consent before the next EU
parliamentary elections in June 2009. Considering that the ratification process in the member
countries cannot start until the European Parliament gives its consent, Croatia could lose 6 to
9 months.
In sum, the fast inclusion scenario is that Croatia finalises negotiations in 2008 or in
early 2009, and that the European Parliament ratifies the accession treaty in the first half of
2009. A fast ratification in 27 Member States should enable full membership in 2011.
However, the latest developments suggest that it is not very likely that Croatia could meet
such deadlines, especially having in mind the scope of the reforms needed (in the judicial and
administrative reforms, fighting corruption and restructuring the shipbuilding sector), as well
as recent temporary suspension of the EU’s financial support to Croatia. Next, the Reform
Treaty, once ratified, will provide a framework for the participation of the representatives of
the new Member States in the EU institutions. As the power of each individual Member State
will change with each enlargement, the institutional setting should be fine-tuned before each
enlargement.336 Thus, difficulties in drafting the accession treaty might arise and cause some
delays in Croatia’s accession and enable the catching-up of other candidates and potential
candidates. This would mean slowing down Croatia’s accession process and speeding up that
of the other candidates and potential candidates.
3.5.4 Conditionality and development
The EU conditionality, strengthened by benchmarks as a new instrument in the accession
process, in its substance should assist a country to identify and meet the specific targets, and
as such serves as an important measuring stick. In principle, conditionality can be considered
as a useful instrument for the promotion of social,  political  and economic development.  On
the one hand, the conditionality can add to the credibility of the accession process and
facilitate the ratification of the accession treaty in the EU Member States. On the other hand,
there  is  a  danger  of  misusing  the  conditions  as  a  means  to  prolong,  bloc  or  filibuster  the
accession process.
336 For more, see Ana-Maria Boromisa, “Western Balkans' European Perspective and EU's absorption capacity,“
in Economic integration, competition and cooperation, ed. Vinko Kandžija and Andrej Kumar (Rijeka:
Ekonomski fakultet Rijeka , 2007).
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The general  conditions,  such as those requiring a reform of the judiciary,  the reform
of the  public administration,  the protection of the minorities,  the fight against corruption,
cooperation with ICTY, refugee return, and the development of good neighbourly relations,
are  likely  to  play  a  positive  role  in  the  next  period.  The  efficient  implementation  of  the
required norms, and thus, the EU conditionality will play a positive role in promoting social,
political  and  economic  development  in  the  next  10  years.  The  EU’s  role  is  likely  to  be
stronger if  Croatia is  close to entering the EU. Delays as well  as specific cases,  such as the
Croatian Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, or the suspension of financial assistance
might undermine the credibility of the EU, and thus, the readiness to meet the conditions.
Acceptance  of  the  EU conditions  as  internal  norms  can  be  considered  as  one  of  the
major achievements of the transition process and a decisive step forward in promoting
development. The changing perception of the EU’s role, from a supreme authority and a
solution to the inherited problems to a partner can serve as an indication of the catching-up.
At  the  point  when  the  benefits  of  the  reforms  become  visible,  regardless  of  the  EU
membership, the conditionality becomes obsolete.
3.6 Divergence or convergence to EU norms after the accession
The negotiation process has become more rigorous and technically complex, in particular due
to the formalised opening and closing benchmarks. Benchmarks represent a novelty in the
process and provide for the implementation and not merely the adoption of the acquis. In this
respect, it is likely that the transitional periods following Croatia’s EU entry will be even
more limited in scope and duration than in the previous round of enlargement. Next,
conditionality is seen as an evolutionary process, i.e. at each stage, including the one after the
conclusion of the agreements, the situation can be monitored, and, in accordance with the
relevant articles of the agreement, its application could be suspended in case of serious non-
compliance.
Safeguard  clauses  and  verification  instruments  are  likely  to  be  applied  in  Croatia’s
accession treaty. Such clauses can build on the experience of the last round of enlargement.
The delays applied for Bulgaria and Romania can be strengthened with suspension clauses,
and thus, conditionality can be regarded as an evolving process,337 which is gradually being
337 C.f. Ian Barnes and Claire Randerson, “EU enlargement and the effectiveness of conditionality: keeping to
the deal,“ in Managerial Law 48, no. 4 (2006), 351-365,
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Artic
les/0100480401.html
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extended to the post-accession phase. Also, benchmarking should ensure that the
transformative effect of the accession process has been achieved.338 Further,  the  EU
introduces new tools for all Member States, not only for a new one. These include progress
monitoring and defining country-specific recommendations, as in the new “Lisbon package"
presented by the Commission in December 2007. Conditionality and the new EU instruments
should ensure that membership does not differ from pre-membership as regards the
compliance to the rules.
 Problems  might  arise  with  soft-law  or  the  compromise  culture  of  the  EU.  The
examples  of  such  behaviour  include  Poland  regarding  the  EU  energy  policy  (and  relations
with Russia), or Slovenia regarding the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone, thus
making accession negotiations slower. On the other hand, such behaviour can be regarded as
steps towards taking an active role in shaping community-level policy, comparable with role
of Poland and Lithuania in shaping the EU’s relations with Ukraine.. It can be argued that the
success of integration might be evaluated not merely as adherence to the EU norms and
reducing the differences between the old and new countries, but also as active participation in
policy making, which to a certain (albeit limited) extent might diverge from a compromise
culture. Thus, successful integration would mean convergence with the EU norms at the level
comparable with Member States, old and new ones.
338 C.f.  Heather Grabbe, “The Process of EU Accession: What will it bring to Southeast Europe?,“ (2003),
http://www.wiiw.ac.at/balkan/files/GDN_EU_Grabbe_EUaccessionprocess.pdf
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